


CICV
RAS
67-002

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B.188 AP-142

HEADQUARTERS
ARMED FORCES OF R.V.N.
OFFICE OF JOINT GENERAL STAFF - J-2

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF - J-2



CICV SPECIAL REPORT SR 67-002

VC/NVA GUNRUNNERS

ENGLISH EDITION

**COMBINED
INTELLIGENCE CENTER
VIETNAM**

PROPERTY OF THE
DIA
DOCUMENT LIBRARY

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED BY
AUTHORITY OF DOD DIR. 5200.1 R
BY KAKLETS ON 21 APR 88

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED, NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS EXCEPT REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, AUSTRALIA, NEW
ZEALAND AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA BY THE AUTHORITY OF
COMUSMACV DATED 3 DECEMBER 1968

CONTENTS OF THIS PUBLICATION WILL NOT BE
REPRODUCED WITHOUT ATTRIBUTION TO ORIGINATOR

GROUP 4

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 15 YEARS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIL 112997

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE
APO San Francisco 96243

MACJ236-1

9 August 1966

SUBJECT: The VC/NVA Gunrunners

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded for your information is a special report on the sea infiltration of VC/NVA weapons and ammunition into SVN.
2. This special report is based on an analysis of interrogation reports, captured documents, and US and ARVN files. The information used to compile this study is current as of 5 July 1966.
3. Comments are encouraged on all aspects of this document and should be submitted to J2, ATTN: MACJ236-1.

J. A. McChristian
J. A. McCHRISTIAN
Brigadier General, US Army
ACofS, J2

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

J2-1

PLUS

- 4-Political Section, American Embassy, APO US Forces 96243
- 4-Commanding General, I FFORCEV, ATTN: ACofS, G2, APO US Forces 96240
- 2-Commanding Officer, Air Force Advisory Group, (OIN), APO US Forces 96307
- 1-Commanding General, 1st Marine Div, ATTN: G2, APO US Forces 96325
- 2-DIA, ATTN: DIAAP-1C3, Washington, D.C., 20310
- 3-J21, MACV, APO US Forces 96243
- 1-ACofS, G2, 101st Airborne Div, Ft Campbell, Ky, 42223
- 1-CMIC: ATTN: Requirements Branch (via existing CMIC/CICV couriers)
- 25-Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group (ABN), 1st Special Forces, APO US Forces 96243

CONFIDENTIAL

**DEGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES**

CONFIDENTIAL

VC/NVA GUNRUNNERS

I. INTRODUCTION.

A. At about 200300 June 1966, the US Coast Guard Cutter Point League intercepted a Communist gunrunner off the coast of Vinh Binh Province, in the Ba Dong area (vic XR 733675).¹ Subsequent capture of this ship by US-GVN (Vietnamese Government) forces yielded 98 tons of Communist arms and ammunition destined for the Viet Cong. This event, coupled with the statements of a May 1966 returnee and the sinking of another large gunrunning vessel off the Ca Mau Peninsula on 10 May 1966, has generated a heightened emphasis on the incidence of enemy sea infiltration.

B. This study discusses the history of gunrunning incidents, routes used, units involved, landing and off-loading procedures, and types and amounts of weapons involved in Communist infiltration from the sea.

II. DISCUSSION.

A. History.

1. The supply of weapons and ammunition to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam has been built up sporadically since 1960. A VC junk was detected and captured off Ly Son Island, Quang Ngai Province, on 31 January 1960, and a cache of over 200 tons of ammunition--mostly of Communist manufacture--was found during an operation in An Xuyen Province in August 1962.²

2. In 1963, when the Viet Cong armed forces in South Vietnam began to develop rapidly, the infiltration by sea was stepped up. Returnee NGUYEN VAN TUOI stated that two shiploads of a "quantity of weapons--all heavy guns...and tens of tons of ammunition" from North Vietnam arrived in Vinh Binh Province around December 1963.³

3. A ship with a capacity of over 100 tons was discovered in Vung Ro Bay on 16 February 1965.⁴ On 31 December 1965, a similar trawler was discovered off the Ca Mau Peninsula; upon discovery, the ship changed course and was tracked to a point north of Hainan Island.⁵ (See Annex A.) A third ship, bearing a striking resemblance to the ship sighted 31 December, was discovered and sunk at the mouth of the Rach Gia River in An Xuyen Province on 10 May 1966.⁶ (See Annex B.) Most recently, a fourth ship was forced aground in Ba Dong, Vinh Binh Province, on 20 June 1966.⁷ Photographs of the two types of ships which have been discovered are found in Annex C.

4. A captive and a returnee who had participated in sea infiltration activities disclosed that since 1963 the VC have made over 40 shipments of weapons and ammunition.⁸ Returnee NGUYEN VAN XUAN stated that the supply of weapons to South Vietnam "was interrupted from April to October by the intensive activities of the U.S. 7th Fleet. Therefore, only six or seven trips were conducted in 1965."⁹

CONFIDENTIAL

5. According to the same sources, the VC had seven or eight ships in 1964 which made runs to South Vietnam. The tonnage capacities of these ships varied from 100 to 250 tons.¹⁰

6. Twenty-three probable sea infiltration attempts since 1 May 1965 are listed in Annex D. In addition, there have been some 89 suspected sea infiltration attempts during the same period. All cases of obvious coastal movement between two points in South Vietnam are not listed. Since actual out-of-country infiltration by sea cannot be firmly established, some of the 23 listed cases may also be intra-country redistribution.

B. Routes and Landing Points.

1. After leaving Haiphong, the route followed by large ships is generally east through the Hainan Straits and then south through international waters of the South China Sea. Upon arrival near Con Son Island, the ships change course and make a straight run for the landing points along the Eastern Delta Region coasts. Documents captured aboard the ship at Ba Dong, Vinh Binh Province, on 20 June 1966 confirm that the above route is still used by the communists. On the average, each trip takes 5 to 10 days.¹¹ (See Annex E)

2. Smaller junks use routes closer to shore and have been reported landing all along the South Vietnamese coast. Junks are probably used more in the northern part of South Vietnam to supply I and II CTZ. Routes followed by these craft are from southern North Vietnam to northern South Vietnam, about three miles offshore.

3. See Annex E for a list of sea infiltration landing points.

C. Landing Procedures.¹²

1. The optimum time for the voyage is during the first or last part of the lunar month. During this period (New Moon Phase and First Quarter Phase), there is either no moon or else the quarter-moon sets before midnight. A second consideration is the ocean tides. The large steel-hulled ships from NVN must make their approach to the SVN shore under the cover of darkness and during periods of lunar high tides.

2. The voyage is planned so that the ship arrives about 60 miles offshore at about 2200-2400 hours. This is just outside the effective range of friendly surveillance. The ship then makes a 4-hour, straight-line run for the beach, arriving on the high tide during the early morning hours.

3. Signals from the beach indicate the landing point and the "all clear" sign to the ships' pilots. Once inside the RVN, the ship can easily be concealed in a number of locations along the Eastern Delta.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The 100-foot triple canopy of the Nam Can Forest allows the effective concealment of large (120-foot) steel-hulled gunrunners.

D. Off-Loading.

1. The ship may remain in the area for two or three nights while off-loading operations are carried out.
2. A temporary dock is usually constructed for the operation. Off-loading is accomplished under the cover of darkness by a special platoon-sized stevadore unit.
3. The supplies are stored temporarily near the off-loading point awaiting later distribution to other areas in the Delta.

E. Units Involved.

1. I CTZ. It has not been possible to identify any units in I CTZ as being specifically responsible for receiving shipments of sea-infiltrated supplies.
2. II CTZ.
 - a. In II CTZ it has been possible to identify two units which may be used for receiving supplies from sea infiltration. In Binh Dinh Province, the 50th VC Main Force Battalion (located vic CR 000500) is apparently transporting supplies from the coast (vic CR 110450) to points inland (vic BR 860620). This assumption is based on an analysis of reported movements of this unit to and from the vicinity of a known supply point (CR 110450)¹⁴ on the coast of Binh Dinh Province.
 - b. Similar analysis indicates that transportation elements of the Sao Vang Division move with supplies from the coast (vic BS 920040) to points inland.¹⁵
3. III CTZ. Information on VC supply procedures and units involved in sea infiltration in the III CTZ is limited. It is known that the 860th VC Local Force Battalion operates along the coast of Phuoc Tuy Province. Also, there has been at least one recent report of sea infiltration in this area (vic YS 670580).¹⁶ There has been a report of a VC Main Force Battalion which planned to meet two submarines in or near the Rung Sat Special Zone on or about 18 May 1966. These submarines are reported to be gunrunning vessels from North Vietnam.¹⁷
4. IV CTZ.
 - a. Information on VC supply procedures in IV CTZ is much more voluminous than information available in other CTZs.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Considering the overall amount of reports and their contents, the major enemy sea infiltration effort would appear to be directed towards and executed within the IV CTZ.

b. Document analysis reveals a five-fold mission of all supply units in the Delta:¹⁸

- (1) Transportation of supplies to base areas.
- (2) Receipt and storage of materiel
- (3) Security.
- (4) Procurement of boats and recruitment.
- (5) Movement of supplies from base areas to combat units in the Delta and War Zone "C."

c. Analysis of field reports and interrogation reports from IV CTZ suggests the presence of a transportation group located along the eastern coast of IV CTZ, responsible for the logistics of this area.¹⁹ Current order of battle holds a battalion, the A101, with a strength of 250 personnel, in Kien Hoa Province. The Headquarters is located vic XR 804907. It is believed that the composition of this unit reflects a higher echelon than that of a battalion. Five teams are accepted in order of battle holdings as subordinate elements. Analysis of available evidence indicates that the A101 Battalion may actually be the A101 Group, organized as shown in Annex G.

d. The suspected Group consists of four battalions and a Group Headquarters: Headquarters and the 518th Security Battalion are probably in Kien Hoa, two unidentified battalions are probably in Vinh Binh and Ba Xuyen, and the 330th Battalion is probably located in An Xuyen. The mission of the A101 Group is to receive, store, and safeguard materiel infiltrated from North Vietnam by sea.²⁰

e. Organization of each battalion within its province is probably very flexible and decentralized, with each battalion's strength and organization varying with its mission and workload of the province.

f. The 330th Battalion of the A101 Group in An Xuyen is the only unit about which much is known. In June of this year, returnee NGUYEN VAN XUAN²¹ gave information on the strength, mission, and organization of the 330th Battalion. The 330th is a Security Guard Battalion and has the mission of maintaining security in the areas used by North Vietnamese gunrunning ships.²² The unit also receives the arms, temporarily stores them, and then issues them.

g. The 330th Battalion has four companies with a total strength of 400 men. Each company of the 330th is assigned an area of

CONFIDENTIAL

responsibility, centered about a river mouth which could be used for sea infiltration in the Ca Mau Peninsula. The size of the 330th in An Xuyen, along with the statements of the returnees from this unit, strongly suggest a major effort directed toward sea infiltration in this area.

F. Types and Amounts of Weapons.

1. How much ammunition can be brought by sea in a single shipment was demonstrated by the amount of materiel salvaged from the VC ship sunk at Vung Ro Bay in February of 1965.²³ A list of this materiel is found in Annex H.

2. A list of the weapons and ammunition captured from the ship which ran aground in Vinh Binh Province on 20 June 1966 is found in Annex I.

3. The most significant feature about the materiel recovered from the latest two gunrunning incidents is the fact that it was all unused and recently manufactured. The weapons and ammunition were produced in Communist China and North Korea.²⁴

4. See Annex J for detailed technical intelligence data on the captured ordnance.

III. CONCLUSIONS.

A. Background. From 1960 to late 1963, the sea infiltration efforts were sporadic and comparatively minor. From January 1964 to January 1965, steel-hulled ships from NVN infiltrated at a maximum rate of two (2) per month during periods of lunar high tides in the Delta region. At the same time (1964-1965) there were other, less-concentrated sea infiltration operations at other points along the SVN coast.

1. From February 1965 to November 1965, because of the inception of Market Time patrols, there was little activity of steel-hulled ships penetrating. Other sea infiltration incidents continued during this period, though these were probably limited to a few large junks at most. In November 1965, two (2) steel-hulled ships infiltrated from the north.

2. In the Delta, gunrunning has continued at a maximum rate of two (2) ships per month from November 1965 until June 1966. Other sea infiltration continues, but the major effort is directed toward the IV CTZ, where there is good natural concealment available.

3. The optimum time of arrival for these ships is during the beginning of each lunar month, when there is no moonlight. A high tide during the hours of darkness is needed for a successful landing.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. The enemy organization responsible for receiving weapons and ammunition from the ships in the Delta is the A101 Transportation Group, which has four transportation battalions operating in Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, Ba Xuyen and An Xuyen Provinces.

B. Analysis.

1. The detection of two significant gunrunning attempts in the past two months suggests two possibilities:

a. Communist logistical planners have returned to a significant sea infiltration effort because of air interdiction of the North Vietnamese land supply lines since 1 May 1966; or

b. Sea infiltration was only partially checked by the initiation of Market Time activities from May 1965 to October 1965, when it began on a large scale again. If this is the case, then it can be concluded that a more effective surveillance program resulting from the discovery of the 10 May ship led to the subsequent capture of the 20 June ship.

2. While it is possible that some combination of the above two theories exists as a third possibility, the fact that sea infiltration attempts have been reported throughout the period suggests that the comment in paragraph b above is a more valid conclusion.

6
CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

FOOTNOTES


1. COMNAVFORV INTSUM 68-66, 20 June 1966.
2. J2-JGS-RVNAF Doc #01-465/TIN/2/TTQB, "Supply of Weapons and Ammunition by Sea," 28 June 1966.
3. NGUYEN VAN TUOI, USMACV DEC Log No. 11-0149-65, 18 February 1966.
4. "Study on Waterborne Infiltration into South Vietnam, NAG Ser No. 0393, 23 September 1965.
5. Insert for MACV Daily INTSUM, submitted by COMNAVFORV, 4 June 1966.
6. Insert for MAVC Daily INTSUM, submitted by COMNAVFORV, 4 June 1966.
7. COMNAVFORV INTSUM 69-66, 21 June 1966.
8. Returnee NGUYEN VAN XUAN, DEC Log No. 06-0033-66, 24 June 1966.
9. Returnee NGUYEN VAN XUAN, DEC Log No. 06-0033-66, 24 June 1966.
10. J2-JGS-RVNAF Doc #01-465/TIN/2/TTQB, 28 June 1966.
11. From analysis of captured document shown in Annex A.
12. Landing and off-loading procedures are discussed in great detail in the interrogation reports and statements of VCC DUONG MINH TAM (USMACV Log No. 6-27-65) and Returnee NGUYEN VAN XUAN (USMACV Log No. 06-0033-66).
13. Landing and off-loading procedures are discussed in great detail in the interrogation reports and statements of VCC DUONG MINH TAM (USMACV Log No. 6-27-65) and Returnee NGUYEN VAN XUAN (USMACV Log No. 06-0033-66).
14. COMNAVFORV INTSUM 54-66, 24 May 1966.
15. From an analysis of unit movements of elements of Sao Vang Division in II CTZ. The Sao Vang Division is also known as the 610th NVA Division.
16. SMIAT 3006/66, 26 May 1966.
17. DET C-3, 5th SFG, Bien Hoa, 28 May 1966.
18. MACV INTSUM 151-66, 30 May 1966.
19. USMACV Doc Log No. 6-27-65, 16 June 1965.
20. DUONG MINH TAM, VCC; USMACV Log No. 6-27-65, 16 June 1965.
21. USMACV Log No. 06-0033-66, 24 June 1966.
22. USMACV Log No. 06-0033-66, 24 June 1966.
23. USMACV TRANSLATION BRANCH Log No. 7-482-65, 20 August 1965; J2-JGS #0773.
24. COMNAVFORV INTSUM 72-66, 24 June 1966.

7 **CONFIDENTIAL**

ANNEX A. Track of Trawler sighted 31 December 1965, off Ca Mau Peninsula.



ANNEX B: Track of Coast Guard Cutter Point Gray and Unidentified Trawler, 10 May 1966.




PLOT OF POINT GREY AND UNIDENTIFIED TRAWLER 10 MAY 1966

SOURCE: COMUSMACV (NAVFORV) IR 6 075 1216 66, 31 May 1966, Subj: "Sea Infiltration."

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C: Photographs of the two types of ships which have been discovered engaged in gunrunning activities in South Vietnam.




Photograph 1: This vessel was discovered attempting to penetrate RVN territorial waters. It subsequently was tracked on a northerly course until it entered Communist Chinese territorial waters. The Nationalist Chinese flag that it displayed was false, as was its stack. It also had slots in its bow and stern which could receive Chinese characters or Arabic numerals, and would allow it to change its identity at will. The trawler is similar to the one sunk at Vung Ro Bay in February, 1965. It is identical to, and may in fact be, the ship which was sunk off the Ca Mau Peninsula on 10 May 1966.

SOURCE: Naval Patrol Identification Guide, published by COMNAVFORV, 1966. Official U.S. Naval Photograph.

C-1
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C (CONTINUED)



Photograph 2: This 100-foot steel-hulled trawler was forced aground by the Coast Guard Cutter POINT LEAGUE on 20 June 1966. An estimated 98 tons of weapons and ammunition were taken.

SOURCE: Official U.S. Naval Photograph, XFV-109-6-66, COMNAVFORV, 20 June 1966.

C-2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX D: List of Sea Infiltration Attempts (1 May 1965 - 30 Jun 1966)

The instances of "confirmed" infiltrations noted in this annex fall into the following categories:

- 1 instance of a POL shipment from Thailand intercepted without proper papers.
- 3 instances of medical supplies intercepted near foreign borders in SVN waters without proper papers.
- 4 instances of personnel infiltration (2 involving confirmed VC cadre; 2 observed infiltrations--escaped).
- 1 instance of a large quantity of rice intercepted while at sea, without proper papers.
- 4 instances of ammunition intercepted near foreign borders.
- 3 weapons shipments intercepted at sea with signals seen from the beach.
- 1 base discovered containing evidence of infiltration of supplies in an area of suspected infiltration activities.
- 6 instances of vessels being challenged by US or ARVN coastal patrols where either the suspected infiltrators were blown out of the water and cargo and intent could not be established, or the VC eluded the patrol. In each case the VC were either: in a restricted area; near the border; observed signalling the shore (or answering); or follow-up examination of the area in question proved conclusively that infiltration had indeed occurred.

Of the 23 cases, only two were of any great significance. The 10 May intercept of the vessel off the coast of An Xuyen and the 20 June 66 intercept of the gunrunner off the coast of Vinh Binh. All cases of obvious coastal movement between two points in SVN were not listed here; it is true that some of the listed reports may also have been intra-country redistribution.

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX D (Cont'd)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
13 May 65	YD 480800	Confirmed	NAG INTSUM 109, 14 May 65
7 Sep 65	YD 270830	Confirmed	NAG INTSUM 205, 9 Sep 65
25 Dec 65	YD 500660	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 7, 10 Jan 66
18 Jan 66	YD 291758	Confirmed	NAG INTSUM 18 Jan 66
4 May 65	ZD 170070	Suspected	VNN Coastal Forces
26 May 65	ZD 193070	Suspected	VNN INTSUM 153, 26 May 65
30 May 65	YD 738380	Confirmed	Regional Force Troops
31 May 65	YD 987212	Confirmed	Coastal Group 13
19 Jul 65	YD 510124	Suspected	VNN Coastal Forces, 19 Jul 65
25 Oct 65	AT 950945	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 246, 27 Oct 65
4 May 65	BS 978899	Suspected	II CTZ INTSUM, 14 May 65
6 May 65	CR 040790	Suspected	II CTZ INTSUM 128, 7 May 65
15 May 65	CR 100450	Suspected	II CTZ INTSUM 136, May 65
23 Jul 65	CR 105520	Confirmed	II CTZ (Airstrike)
28 Jul 65	CR 107575	Confirmed	II CTZ (Airstrike)
20 Aug 65	CR 106425	Suspected	SMIAT Report, 30 Aug 65
5 May 65	CQ 085782	Suspected	FVS-11, 811, 26 May 65
15 May 65	CQ 280240	Suspected	FVS-11, 889, 21 Jun 65
25 Oct 65	CQ 300230	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 245, 26 Oct 65
23 May 65	CP 260900	Confirmed	NAG INTSUM 117, May 65
9 Aug 65	CP 042398	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 181, 12 Aug 65
28 Sep 65	CP 190695	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 224, 1 Oct 65
18 Dec 65	CQ 215155	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 292, 21 Dec 65
26 Jun 65	BN 832620	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 145, 26 Jun 65
28 Oct 65	BN 570485	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 248, 29 Oct 65
15 Oct 65	YS 330560	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 265, 19 Nov 65
4 Nov 65	YS 355612	Suspected	3rd Coastal District, Nov 65
16 Sep 65	XS 740507	Suspected	NAG INTSUM, 18 Sep 65
2 May 65	XS 896115	Suspected	IR BD300, 6 May 65
17 May 65	XS 940240	Suspected	IR BD300, 27 May 65
15 Jun 65	XS 706046	Confirmed	NAG INTSUM 137, 17 Jun 65
19 Jun 65	XR 853907	Suspected	SMIAT 1395/65
16 Sep 65	XS 940230	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 215, 21 Sep 65
31 Aug 65	XR 718714	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 201, 4 Sep 65
25 May 65	XR 280410	Suspected	IR BD300
11 Jun 65	XR 280410	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 134, 14 Jun 65
11 Nov 65	XR 310680	Confirmed	CTF 115, 23 Nov 65
18 May 65	UR 325285	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 21 May 65
26 May 65	VQ 820320	Confirmed	NAG INTSUM 121, 28 May 65
30 Aug 65	VQ 923957	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 183, 4 Sep 65

D-2

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX D (Cont'd)

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
6 Nov 65	VR 836407	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 258, 10 Nov 65
28 Dec 65	WS 112025	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 298, 29 Dec 65
8 May 65	US 996384	Suspected	Phu Quoc INTSUM, 8 May 65
11 May 65	VS 000600	Confirmed	MACV Sitrep, 11 May 65
26 May 65	VS 585232	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 131, 28 May 65
26 May 65	VS 598210	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 131, 28 May 65
21 Jun 65	VS 843206	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 141, 22 Jun 65
25 Jun 65	VS 555255	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 144, 25 Jun 65
3 Aug 65	VS 598212	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 176, 6 Aug 65
10 Sep 65	VS 837208	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 209, 14 Sep 65
12 Sep 65	VS 858173	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 211, 16 Sep 65
25 Sep 65	US 730470	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 222, 29 Sep 65
25 Sep 65	US 772393	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 222, 29 Sep 65
22 Sep 65	VS 833215	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 228, 6 Oct 65
6 Oct 65	VS 561254	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 228, 6 Oct 65
29 Sep 65	US 873505	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 222, 29 Sep 65
6 Oct 65	US 938313	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 243, 23 Oct 65
12 Oct 65	VS 890160	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 236, 15 Oct 65
26 Oct 65	VS 858173	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 254, 5 Nov 65
27 Oct 65	US 927246	Suspected	MT INTSUM 149, 3 Nov 65
3 Nov 65	VS 890150	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 258, 10 Nov 65
18 Nov 65	US 849329	Confirmed	MT Sitrep, 23 Nov 65
13 Jan 66	BT 320215	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 8, 11 Jan 66
13 Jan 66	CP 170730	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 13, 17 Jan 66
7 Jan 66	CP 049459	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 13, 17 Jan 66
9 Jan 66	XS 950340	Confirmed	MACV Sitrep 8, 8 Jan 66
3 Jan 66	XR 503462	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 9, 12 Jan 66
8 Jan 66	VS 590235	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 7, 10 Jan 66
26 Jan 66	US 772393	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 22, 29 Jan 66
10 Feb 66	BS 910100	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 32, 10 Feb 66
15 Feb 66	YD 410636	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 36, 15 Feb 66
16 Feb 66	XR 753857	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 38, 17 Feb 66
16 Feb 66	XR 697777	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 38, 17 Feb 66
16 Feb 66	YD 400635	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 38, 17 Feb 66
17 Feb 66	YD 585495	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 39, 18 Feb 66
19 Feb 66	BT 290390	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 41, 21 Feb 66
21 Feb 66	BS 855405	Confirmed	NAG INTSUM 42, 22 Feb 66
22 Feb 66	CR 055740	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 43, 23 Feb 66
22 Feb 66	CR 067610	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 43, 23 Feb 66
20 Feb 66	YS 250650	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 44, 24 Feb 66
19 Feb 66	BT 200583	Suspected	NAG INTSUM 45, 25 Feb 66
10 Mar 66	YD 285765	Confirmed	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 1, 1 Apr 66
27 Mar 66	CQ 175570	Suspected	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 2, 2 Apr 66
4 Apr 66	VS 880170	Suspected	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 4, 5 Apr 66
6 Apr 66	VQ 850710	Confirmed	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 7, 8 Apr 66

ANNEX D (Cont'd)

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
9 Apr 66	CP 205685	Confirmed	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 8, 9 Apr 66
11 Apr 66	CP 170690	Suspected	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 12, 14 Apr 66
12 Apr 66	US 998400	Suspected	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 12, 14 Apr 66
12 Apr 66	US 962256	Suspected	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 12, 14 Apr 66
12 Apr 66	YD 260800	Confirmed	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 12, 14 Apr 66
12 Apr 66	YD 260820	Confirmed	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 13, 15 Apr 66
14 Apr 66	US 996394	Suspected	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 14, 16 Apr 66
12 Apr 66	BS 830330	Suspected	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 15, 18 Apr 66
16 Apr 66	US 690520	Suspected	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 16, 19 Apr 66
16 Apr 66	US 728483	Suspected	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 16, 19 Apr 66
16 Apr 66	US 834456	Suspected	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 16, 19 Apr 66
10 Apr 66	BS 830420	Suspected	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 20, 22 Apr 66
27 Apr 66	XR 760935	Suspected	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 23, 27 Apr 66
10 Apr 66	XR 868930	Suspected	DOD IR 5 075 0005 66, 26 Apr 66
18 Apr 66	XR 723899	Suspected	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 31, 6 May 66
10 May 66	WQ 320650	Confirmed	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 34, 10 May 66
11 May 66	WQ 258660	Confirmed	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 35, 11 May 66
14 May 66	VS 845209	Suspected	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 36, 14 May 66
1 May 66	WT 294019	Suspected	IV CORPS INTSUM 134, 13 May 66
10 Mar 66	VS 905378	Suspected	IV CORPS INTSUM 134, 13 May 66
12 Apr 66	VS 884835	Suspected	IV CORPS INTSUM 134, 13 May 66
16 May 66	YS 670580	Suspected	SMIAT 3006/66, 26 May 66
5 Jun 66	(Rach-Nang)	Suspected	J2 MACV INTSUM 157-66, 5 Jun 66
5 Jun 66	YS 200600	Suspected	DET C-3, 5th SFG, 5 Jun 66
29 May 66	BT 330330	Suspected	PERINTREP 18, 29 May 66
27 May 66	WR 050660	Suspected	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 47-66, 27 May 66
1 Jun 66	US 810330	Suspected	COMNAVFORV INTSUM 54-66, 6 Jun 66

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX E: Route Followed by the Ship Captured on 20 Jun 66.

The 42nd Rangers, 21st ARVN Infantry Division recovered the ship's celestial navigation worksheets for 15-19 June inclusive and 1/100,000 scale charts of the SVN coastline depicting an area from the 17th Parallel to the Cambodian border including the Phu Quoc Island. The worksheets and charts were found floating near the captured vessel. Extract of the navigation worksheets showed that the ship used the following points:

15 June	21 degrees-03 minutes North	112 degrees-43 minutes East
	18 34	113 27
	17 13	115 32
16 June	16 46	115 51
	17 02	115 37
	17 09	115 34
	16 24	115 42
	17 03	115 27
	16 10	115 31
	15 37	115 37
	13 59	114 14
17 June	13 52	113 59
	13 29	113 45
	12 55	113 20
	11 31	111 10
	11 02	111 40
	10 59	111 10
18 June	10 25	111 48
	09 27	111 12
	09 11	110 48
	08 35	109 34
19 June	08 35	108 13
	08 35	107 56
	08 28	107 32
	08 35	107 28

One final position taken from chart #4074 was 09 degrees-59 minutes North 107 degrees-29 minutes East. From this position a track of 260 was laid out which led to the area where the ship ran aground.

Also found near the beached vessel was a weather chart with designated areas for the Tonkin Gulf and South China Sea; and an overlay of navigational lights and buoys on Hainan Island and the straits between Hainan and the mainland.


SOURCE: Message sent from NILO, Bac Lieu to COMNAVFORV Force Intelligence Officer on 25 June 1966.

E-1

CONFIDENTIAL

K-7

ANNEX E (CONTINUED)



CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX F: Locations of Landing Sites Most Likely to be Used by the Communist Gunrunners.


1. Vung Chon May	ZD 190 080
2. Cu Lao Re	BT 980 020
3. Tam Quan	BS 920 130
4. Vung MU	CQ 140 960
5. Vung La	CQ 160 820
6. Vung Ro	CQ 290 220
7. Ben Goi Bay	CP 250 950
8. Hon Heo	CP 170 690
9. Vinh Hy	CN 040 960
10. Cua Song	YS 580 580
11. Soi Rap	XS 970 520
12. Cua Tieu	XS 920 346
13. Cua Song Mekong-Bassac	XR 750 850
14. Rach Khau Bang	XR 750 858
15. Song Bo De	WQ 266 644
16. Rach Goc	WQ 008 502
17. Song Dong Cung	BQ 880 914

SOURCE: "Study on Viet Cong Infiltration," USMACV DEC Log No. 11-0724-65, April 1966.

F-1

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX G: Organization of the A101 Transportation Group



CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX H: Materiel salvaged from Ship Sunk at Vung Ro Bay, February 1965:

840 TNT CHARGES
88 ANTI-TANK MINES
42 BANGALORE TORPEDOES
2 60MM MORTAR SHELLS
20 GRENADES
5 BOXES OF MACHINEGUN AMMUNITION
1 BOX OF DETONATING CORD
11 BOXES OF FUSES
722 75MM RR SHELLS
12,900 82MM MORTAR SHELLS
9 57MM RR SHELLS
9,000 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION
204,000 ROUNDS OF AUTOMATIC RIFLE AMMUNITION
81,000 ROUNDS OF RIFLE AMMUNITION
840 ROCKETS
1,680 STICK GRENADES

SOURCE: CICV Technical Intelligence Study 66-12, "Viet Cong Munitions,"
26 March 1966.

H-1
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX I: Final Report on the Weapons, Ammunition and Equipment Seized
from the Vessel grounded at XR 730 688 on 20 June 1966:

35 82MM MORTARS
20 75MM CANNONS
14 57MM RECOILLESS RIFLES
100 B40 (ANTI-TANK WEAPONS)
16 .50 CAL MACHINEGUNS
3 AA MACHINEGUNS
1 .30 CAL MACHINEGUN
18 AUTOMATIC RIFLES
177 SUB-MACHINEGUNS
1777 RIFLES
177 PISTOLS
50 BARRELS OF WEAPONS
2 K43
7 RIFLE GRENADE LAUNCHERS
10 TONS OF VARIOUS TYPES OF AMMUNITION:
 1000 ROUNDS 75MM CANNON
 200 ROUNDS 57MM RR
 250,000 ROUNDS SMALL ARMS
 100 GRENADES
 40 CANS SMG AMMUNITION
 28 CANS 7.62 AMMUNITION
1600 LITERS OF KEROSENE
500 BAYONETS

SOURCE: USMACV DAILY SITREP 174-66 FOR PERIOD 221601Z TO 231600Z JUNE 1966.

I-1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX J: Technical Intelligence Data on Materiel Recovered from
Communist Gunrunners on 10 May 1966 and 20 June 1966.

A. 10 MAY 1966.

1. The most significant item recovered was 120mm mortar ammunition, which was manufactured in 1965 in Chinese Communist Plant No. 376. This is the second time this type of ammunition has been recovered in South Vietnam, and its first appearance in the Delta Region. Also significant was the recovery of 12.7mm API ammunition, also manufactured in 1965, in Chinese Communist Plant No. 41. The appearance of ammunition of such recent manufacture indicates the relative efficiency of the Communist supply system.¹

B. 20 JUNE 1966.

1. See ANNEX I for a list of captured materiel from this vessel.
2. The CHICOM 75mm RR ammunition and 80mm Anti-Tank Grenades were produced in 1966. The CHICOM 12.7mm HMG's were manufactured in 1965, as was the major ammunition. The mounts of the 75mm RR were made in 1964.²
3. A star-in-circle trademark on the AK-47 assault rifles indicates they were manufactured in North Korean arsenal 65. This is the first reported instance of North Korean manufactured arms appearing in IV CTZ, through they have been found in central South Vietnam.³
4. The most important items in intelligence value were the CHICOM 75mm cartridges with fin-stabilized projectiles. This is the first recovery of this type of HEAT ammunition. It appears to be a CHICOM version of the projectile used by the Soviet 82mm B-10 Recoilless Gun. The presence of this type of ammunition in the VC/NVA inventory considerably increases the enemy's anti-tank capability.⁴
5. Both Soviet and CHICOM 12.7mm API-T cartridges were recovered in quantity. This is the first recovery of tracer-type ammunition for the primary VC/NVA anti-aircraft weapons in use in RVN. Tracer ammunition significantly increases the effectiveness of AA fire against aircraft.⁵

Footnotes to ANNEX J:

1. COMNAVFORV INTSUM 37-66, 16 June 1966.
2. Technical Intelligence Spot Report; Subj: "Captured VC Supply Vessel," 23 June 1966.

J-1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. COMNAVFORV INTSUM 72-66, 24 June 1966.
4. Technical Intelligence Spot Report; Subj: "Captured VC Supply Vessel,"
23 June 1966.
5. Ibid.

J-2

CONFIDENTIAL