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
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ARMED FORCES OF R.V.N.
OFFICE OF JOINT GENERAL STAFF - J-2



HEADQUARTERS

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF - J-2



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1966

NEWSLETTER ~~#~~ 10

PART I VCI ORGANIZATION & THREAT
PART II VCI BIBLIOGRAPHY

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20 DECEMBER 68

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
APO San Francisco 96222

MACJ231-5

20 December 1968

SUBJECT: CICV Newsletter: VC Political Infrastructure

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. Forwarded for your information is the tenth newsletter of the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, concerning VC political infrastructure (VCI).
2. The purpose of the newsletter is to provide the intelligence community with the latest trends, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of the VCI. The ultimate goal is more effective and timely identification and neutralization of the enemy's infrastructure.
3. This issue is in two parts. Part One defines Viet Cong political infrastructure and describes its threat. It further discusses how each functional element performs its VCI mission. Finally, it provides a typical scenario of how a VCI organization gains its initial foothold and builds an organization. Part Two is a basic, annotated VCI bibliography.
4. Subsequent newsletters will be published as new information, trends, and developments warrant. Comments and additional information pertaining to the newsletters should be submitted to HQ MACV J2, ATTN: MACJ231-5.

1 Incl.
as

John A. Roberts Col.
PHILLIP B. DAVIDSON, JR.
Major General, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff, J2

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NAME: CICV
SUBJECT: CICV Newsletter: VC Political Infrastructure

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THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE

I. PURPOSE. The purpose of this paper is to define VC infrastructure and to describe its threat.

II. DISCUSSION.

A. General. The VC infrastructure is a group of hard core political cadre, about 81,000 strong, who operate a complex of organizations supporting the insurgency. This organizational complex consists of three parts: military, Party government, and front. The complex is controlled by the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), the southern branch of the Lao Dong Party, and it exists at each of the enemy's echelons: COSVN, region, subregion, province, district, village, and hamlet. The VC infrastructure has two missions. The first is to provide money, food, recruits, intelligence, refuge, and guides to VC military units, without which they could not survive. Secondly, it sets the stage for the assumption of power by a Communist-controlled government seeking to win support of the population for the revolution and by developing an organization capable of governing.

B. Organization.

1. At any echelon, the insurgency looks like that depicted at Annex A; the center is the party government, on the left is the military, and on the right is the front. All cadre in the middle are VCI, however, most of the cadre on the left are not VCI; a few of the cadre on the right are VCI. The subordinate functional elements of the Party government are shown in Annex B. Each will be discussed in detail later in the paper.

2. Specifically, at any echelon, VCI includes:

- a. All members of the Party Executive Committee.
- b. Leaders and cadre of all subordinate functional elements in the Party government.
- c. Only a few military leaders who are involved in Party planning.
- d. Front leaders only; Liberation Committee leaders only.

3. All three parts of the insurgency, however, are controlled directly and closely by the PRP committee at every echelon. First to be discussed is the military.

a. The Echelon Party Executive Committee must approve all military operations before the units get permission to attack. For this purpose an intermediate committee exists at each echelon between the Party Executive Committee and the unit headquarters (see Annex C). At province

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and district levels this intermediate is called the Ban Can Su -- **Coordinations and Operations Committee**. Its mission is to advise the Party Executive Committee on the tactical feasibility and political desirability of the planned attack. This is a joint committee of military and civilian **Party** members. The military representatives are chosen from unit headquarters and the civilian representatives from the echelon Party Executive Committee.

b. Only top military leaders who sit on this intermediate committee or on the echelon Party Executive Committee itself are considered VCI. They are VCI because they are involved in planning military operations for political purposes.

c. At the village level this usually involves a maximum of two men, the village guerrilla platoon leader and the unit political officer. At province level it may include up to five men. Other than these few men at each echelon, all soldiers are simply soldiers and not VCI.

d. There is a tendency to confuse guerrillas and VCI because guerrillas do not wear uniforms. They are, however, soldiers who perform primarily military missions.

e. The Party controls the military further through the web of Party chapters and cells in each staff section and each unit (see Annex D). But these Party members are not VCI; they are soldiers **with a strictly military mission**.

4. The Front.

a. The front is the vehicle through which the Party cultivates popular support and involves the population in the insurgency. The front exists, for all functional purposes, at two levels only, the national level and the village and hamlet levels. It exists at the national level to conduct negotiations and to present the appearance of a broad-based popular movement. The front exists at the village and hamlet levels: to organize existing groups of people (by professions, ethnic groups, and religions) into Party-controlled organizations; and to exploit these front organizations for the support of the insurgency, specifically as a recruiting base for military and VCI agencies and as a source of civilian labor.

b. The people who belong to these front organizations in village and hamlets are mostly non-Communists, non-VCI, dupes of the Party. They don't see the big picture. They see the NLF as pictured in Annex E, a national alliance of groups, associations, and parties (one element of which is the PRP), an alliance whose goals are to end corruption, replace the RVN, reunify the country, and expel foreign invaders -- an alliance which supports progressive programs in the countryside. That is the way the front presents itself to the world and to the people of South Vietnam. This format is useful because it disguises the Communist control of the Liberation movement and it provides flexibility of doctrine outside the Party line to include a great number of progressives who would not support an open Communist line.

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c. In fact, the NLF follows a Party chain of command (see Annex F). The leader or the deputy of each association is a Party member. The echelon NLF Committee Chief and some of the committee members are simultaneously members of the Echelon Party Executive Committee where their first loyalty lies. By placing Party members in these key positions, the Party maintains firm control over these low-level front associations. Only these leaders of the front are VCI, thus clearly good targets for our neutralization effort. Members of associations are not VCI. The leaders are VCI because they realize how the front relates to the Party and because they work to develop this relationship.

C. Missions.

1. One of the main missions of the VCI is to organize the population of villages and hamlets into these front associations. This mission is assigned to the Civilian Proselyting Section. It is tasked to organize any previously unorganized group into an association and to continue to pump members into the associations once they are formed. It operates in the following manner (see Annex G):

a. Civilian Proselyting has a subsection for each exploitable group of people. It organizes an association for each group. After the association is organized, it nominally comes under the authority of the NLF. In fact, the association is controlled by the Party through the NLF committee and the proselyting subsections. The proselyting subsection is tasked, thereafter, to continue pumping new members into the associations. A strong effort is made to recruit natural leaders of the community into associations where they will be tools of the Party, willing or unwilling.

b. Except for the few military leaders discussed previously, the VCI personnel in any echelon are civilians. They are omnipresent. There are VCI operating at one time or another in every hamlet in the nation. These individuals range from overtly elected members of liberation governments operating in VC-controlled areas to members of functional cells operating covertly in every precinct of Saigon.

c. As with the military, the Party controls the VCI functional organizations or Party government through a matrix of Party chapters and cells that ultimately report to the Echelon Party Executive Committee (see Annex H). This Party government is the core of the VCI. All cadre in these functional organizations are VCI.

2. The top executive management at each echelon is the Current Affairs Committee (see Annex I). It is chosen by the Party Executive Committee and consists of the chiefs of the most important elements. These men are always high ranking members of the Party Executive Committee itself.

3. Functional elements of the Party government carry out VCI missions in various ways. Mission one, to support military units, is accomplished by the Finance and Economy Section, Military Proselyting Section, Security Section, Forward Supply Council, Front Associations, and Propaganda and Training Section.

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a. The Finance and Economy Section collects money and food. It supervises the allocation of food and war materiel. It operates small war materiel manufacturing centers and food production units. All over half of the food produced for both VC and NVA units operating in RVN is procured in-country. It is the VCI civilian Finance and Economy Sections which plan and manage this enormous effort. They decide when and where to collect as well as how and to collect. A captured enemy document shows the 1977 Ninh Binh Province budget to be 1 1/2 million dollars, 60% of which is allotted for military purposes. Figures from a recent CIA study further research indicate the total VC annual budget is in excess of 15 million dollars.

b. The Military Proselyting Section runs operations to subvert Allied and ARVN personnel. Before an offensive, the section increases this activity. This mission is considered so important now that military units, themselves, are assigning selected cadre to operate in coordination with the civilian VCI.

c. The Security Section runs intelligence and reconnaissance operations. It also administers a legal system that includes courts and detention camps. It is responsible for counterintelligence and countersubversion, including the VC anti-Chieu Hoi Program. Before an offensive, security cadre increase reconnaissance and intelligence collection activities.

d. The Forward Supply Council coordinates activities between **Finance and Economy and Rear Service** elements for the purpose of passing supplies to units (see Annex J). The Forward Supply Council is responsible for managing all civilian laborers drawn through VCI resources from front associations to VC as porters and litter bearers. The Forward Supply Council also manages entry and exit points where supplies are purchased on the open market and cached nearby for future distribution. Immediately before and during an offensive, this section's activities reach a peak. Like the Coordinations and Operations Committee, the Forward Supply Council is staffed jointly by civilian VCI and military personnel, civilians coming from the Finance - Economy and Security Sections, and military coming from Rear Service Staffs.

e. Front Associations provide the manpower base for recruitment into military, paramilitary, and VCI organizations. They are also a manpower pool for civilian laborers who are drafted to support military units just before an attack. Members of associations commonly make punji stakes and booby traps to directly support their local guerrillas. Before an offensive these associations are hit with intense propaganda and levied for civilian laborers.

f. The Propaganda/Training Section and the Civilian Proselyting Section play major roles in recruiting for VC military units. These sections recruit directly, during village meetings, or by personal contacts. Recruiting soldiers for VC military units is such an important function that it is closely supervised at all levels by the Echelon Party Executive Committee itself.

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The Executive Committee directs the recruiting effort and shifts the burden of responsibility from agency to agency within the Party government as events dictate. Civilian Proselyting Sections recruit by levying quotas on the Front Associations they control. Often District Party Executive Committees must meet quotas levied from province by drafting people. As drafting may involve the use of force, security cadre and sometimes guerrilla units themselves get involved. There are five known examples of special "mobilization committees" being formed to meet immediate requirements. These sections are jointly staffed by propaganda, forward supply, civilian proselyting, and commo liaison cadre in order to mobilize and pipeline recruits to units as fast as possible. These special committees are headed by a member of the Echelon Party Executive Committee. More than any other function, recruiting of VC soldiers is a joint responsibility, administered by the Echelon Party Executive Committee and shared by all organizations it controls.

4. Mission two, setting the stage for assumption of power by a Communist-controlled government, is carried out by the Civilian Proselyting Section, Propaganda and Training Section, Civil Health Section, Court and Detention System of the Security Section, Organization Section, and People's Liberation Committees.

a. Civilian Proselyting Sections organize the population into Front Associations, which are subsequently exploited for Party purposes.

b. Propaganda and Training Sections spread the Party gospel through direct propaganda (leaflets and speeches). In addition, they provide civilian schools and operate cultural improvement programs. Propaganda, Indoctrination, and Culture Sections form clubs, show movies, and sponsor live shows. All, of course, somehow emphasize the righteousness of the front and the wickedness of the GVN puppets. This section's activities, especially regarding schools and entertainment, are viewed as a normal part of the community services usually provided by a civil government. Before an offensive, this section steps up propaganda activities and issues aggressive themes.

c. Civil Health Sections attempt to meet the medical needs of the population by providing dispensaries and medcap service. In practice, they spend much of their time treating military casualties, but in VC-controlled areas the Civil Health Sections are part of the functioning government which governs, in part, by virtue of providing services such as this. Before an offensive, Civil Health Sections expand their facilities and stockpile medicine.

d. The Court and Detention System of the Security Section may be viewed in the same light. By resolving civil disputes, it meets one of the essential needs of the community, usually handled by a government. In practice this system is used more to suppress opposition and deviation than to resolve civil disputes.

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e. The Organization Section keeps detailed records of all VCI personnel, especially Party members in each echelon. They know who fills what slot at what time, and they make recommendations to the Current Affairs Committee regarding manpower needs and cadre qualifications. When a Liberation Committee is to be appointed or elected, it is this section which judges the credentials of the candidates by Party standards. This section is the only place where lists of all organizations and all VCI personnel are kept; therefore, it should be a primary target for agent penetration.

f. People's Liberation Committees are intended to serve as transitory organs of control, more sophisticated than the mass organizations under the NLF. They intend not only to influence people but also to perform civil administrative functions like a legitimate government. If Liberation Committees are established throughout South Vietnam, the VC/NVA can claim de facto control of the countryside in the event of a ceasefire. People's Liberation Committees are elected or appointed as security conditions permit, and they represent the last stage of development in the VC take-over plan. The following is a brief examination of this take-over plan to show how the VCI gains its initial foothold and builds its organizations:

(1) They start with a core of two or three VCI cadre, usually sent from above, who together collect intelligence, spread propaganda, and proselyte the people (see Annex K). At this stage, these three are called the Cadre Affairs Section.

(2) The three cadre form associations for social and community purposes which are not, at this stage, overtly connected with the insurgency (see Annex L). For example, the Farmers' Associations market crops cooperatively and improve farming techniques. Women's Associations uphold women's rights and double as social clubs. Concurrently, the VCI cadre are slipping in propaganda at association meetings, passing around copies of Party newspapers, and starting discussions for "political education." Sympathizers are singled out and cultivated carefully. Several of these sympathizers join the Party after the first year; and, together with the original three VCI cadre, they form the village Party chapter of five or six people (see Annex M).

(3) The association leaders continue to weave propaganda into these regular meetings. For example, they work on Women's Associations to get mothers to proselyte their sons. Soon a squad of youths is organized as a village self-defense force (see Annex N), commanded by one of the original three hard core cadre, who is now known as Chief of Military Affairs. At the same time, the five members of the Party chapter take responsibility for specific functions. One becomes responsible for finance - economy, one for security, one for military proselyting, and one for civilian proselyting (see Annex O).

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(4) As the associations become more and more indoctrinated with VC theology, they elect representatives, usually the chief or deputy chief of each association, to form an NLF Committee for the village (see Annex P). This act draws the various associations together under a common umbrella, a broad-based popular front with common goals, these being the traditional front goals of ending corruption, replacing the GVN, driving out foreigners, and reuniting the country. The chairman or deputy chairman of the NLF Committee will be a Party member, as will some of the association chiefs.

(5) As soon as there are nine members in the village Party chapter, a Village Party Executive Committee is elected (see Annex Q). At this point the VC infrastructure organization is complete. It is usually in a position to elect or appoint a Liberation Committee if it chooses to (see Annex R).

D. Liberation Committees.

1. Liberation Committees are interposed in the chain of command between the Echelon Party Executive Committee and its subordinate functional elements. Directives to form Liberation Committees emanate from COSVN and are passed down the echelons through Party channels. Liberation Committee representatives are chosen first at hamlet, and the structure is then built upwards to region. At all times, the Party strictly controls candidacies, allowing only suitable people to run for office. The Party further specifically requires that the chairman of the Liberation Committee, and the chiefs of Liberation Committee elements in charge of military affairs, security, and finance - economy will be Party members.

2. In some areas there are reports that where Liberation Committees have been established, the NLF Committees have dissolved, as indicated by the dotted lines around NLF on the chart (see Annex R). In these cases, the front associations become subordinate agencies of the Liberation Committees directly, and the lines of separation between the front, Party government, and military disappear. Thus, the NLF is made good in a functioning government.

3. Liberation Committees have been identified in 1,429 out of 2,500 villages in South Vietnam as of 20 November 1968.

a. The appearance of Liberation Committees is the final stage of VCI take-over, but it is not the critical one as far as indicating VC control. The VCI are now appointing Liberation Committees in some contested areas just so they can claim control. The critical point is the establishment of the village Party Executive Committee. When that is formed, the VCI organization itself is complete.

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b. This take-over pattern varies from area to area. In villages where there is a presence of GVN, the presence must be eliminated at the same time the VCI are building their own organization. However, the tactic of generating support through mass associations remains the same.

4. Thus, we can see that the key to the VCI operation is organization. They organize village and hamlet residents to meet basic needs of social groups and proselyte within these groups to gain support for their revolution. At the same time, they organize in such a way that rigid and complete Party control is assured, a universal-Communist method.

5. There are three kinds of people in every VCI organization: leaders, cadre, and rank and file. Leaders and cadre are counted as VCI; they are hard-core and pose real threats. The rank and file are not VCI; they are nonessential and are easily replaced. Thus, VCI cadre are defined specifically as trained and experienced VCI members who have some responsibility. They are not easily replaced, and represent a real threat to the GVN.

III. SUMMARY.

A. VCI Composition.

1. All members of all Echelon Party Executive Committees.
2. Leaders and cadre of all subordinate functional elements in the Party government at all echelons.
3. Only a few military leaders who are involved in Party planning (Coordination and Operations Committee, Forward Supply Council).
4. Front leaders only; Liberation Committee leaders only.

B. Threats Posed by the VCI.

1. Providing government services to the community.
2. Organizing the population under Party control.
3. Providing support to enemy military units without which they could not survive.

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PARTY GOVERNMENT

MILITARY

FRONT

VILLAGE PARTY
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

MILITARY
HEADQUARTERS

NLF
COMMITTEE

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ANNEX A

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MILITARY

PARTY GOVERNMENT

FRONT

VILLAGE PARTY
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

NLF
HEADQUARTERS

MILITARY
COMMITTEE

FORWARD
SUPPLY

SECURITY

CIVIL
HEALTH

MILITARY
PROSE

FINANCY


PROPAGANDA

ORGN

CIVILIAN
PROSE


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ANNEX B



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MILITARY



PARTY GOVERNMENT


COORDINATION
AND
OPERATIONS

PARTY
EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL

FRONT CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX E



PROGRAM:

- END CORRUPTION
- REPLACE GVN
- REUNIFY COUNTRY
- EXPEL FOREIGNERS
- PROGRESSIVE PROGRAMS

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PARTY GOVERNMENT

PARTY EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE



FRONT

NLF COMMITTEE



FARMERS ASSC.



WOMEN'S ASSC.



WORKERS ASSC.



YOUTH ASSC.



INTELLECTUALS ASSC.



OLD MONKS ASSC.



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ANNEX G

PARTY GOVERNMENT

PARTY EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE

FRONT

CIVILIAN
PROSELYTING

FARMERS PROSELYTING

WOMEN'S PROSELYTING

WORKERS PROSELYTING

YOUTH PROSELYTING

INTELLECTUAL PROSELYTING

MONKS PROSELYTING

NLF
COMMITTEE

FARMERS ASSOCIATION

WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION

WORKERS ASSOCIATION

YOUTH ASSOCIATION

INTELLECTUAL ASSOCIATION

MONKS ASSOCIATION

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PARTY GOVERNMENT

MILITARY

FRONT

ANNEX H

PARTY
EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE

FORWARD
SUPPLY
COUNCIL

FINANCE
ECONOMY

CIVIL
HEALTH

CIVILIAN
PROSE

SECURITY

ORG.

MILITARY
PROSE

PGND
& TNG

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ANNEX I

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79
80

ECHELON PARTY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

11 MEMBERS

SECRETARY, DEPUTY SECRETARY

CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

5 MEMBERS

SECRETARY, DEP. SEC.

CHIEF SECURITY


CHIEF PROPAGANDA

CHIEF FINANCE &
ECONOMY

CHIEF CIVILIAN
PROSELYTING


CHIEF MILITARY
PROSELYTING

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ANNEX K



3 HARD CORE ORGANIZERS

**MISSION: INTELLIGENCE
PROPAGANDA
PROSLEYTING**

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ANNEX L

**CADRE AFFAIRS
SECTION**

**FARMERS
ASSOCIATION**

**WOMENS
ASSOCIATION**

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ANNEX M

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VILLAGE PARTY
CHAPTER

FARMERS ASSOC

WOMENS ASSOC

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
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VILLAGE PARTY
CHAPTER

FARMERS ASSOC

WOMENS ASSOC




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
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ANNEX O



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
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MILITARY

PARTY GOVERNMENT

FRONT

VILLAGE PARTY
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE



FINANCE
ECONOMY

SECURITY

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PROS

MILITARY
PROS

NLF
COMMITTEE

FARMERS
ASSOC

WOMEN'S
ASSOC

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VILLAGE PARTY
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

NLF
COMMITTEE

FARMERS
ASSOC

WOMEN'S
ASSOC


PEOPLES LIBERATION
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN

CIVILIAN
PROS

MILITARY
PROS

FINANCE
ECONOMY

SECURITY



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A Pulitzer Prize winning reporter's assessment of the military and political situation. The author addresses such questions as: What weapons and tactics do the VC use? On what writings are the Viet Cong philosophies based and what are their propaganda techniques?

Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1962.

Traces Vietnam's long struggle for ethnic and national survival. Discusses how for 2000 years this small country has been thwarting Chinese southward expansion and has defeated half a dozen Chinese attempts to penetrate the rich rice bowls of Indochina. It also discusses the role of France, Japan, and the United States.

Chinh, Truong. Primer for Revolt: The Communist Takeover in Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1963.

Truong Chinh, former Secretary-General of the Vietnamese Communist Party and Vice-Premier of North Vietnam, chronicles the Viet-Minh's takeover tactics. Primer for Revolt consists of two books, The August Revolution and The Resistance Will Win, which serve as the ideological guides for the Viet-Cong and provide the conceptual framework and ideological basis for the revolution in South Vietnam.

Conley, Michael C. The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy. (Center for Research in Social Systems, DA Pam 550-106). Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967.

A major study of the VCI which draws analogies between the Vietnam insurgency and other communist insurgencies. It analyzes its history, development, strategies, and tactics. It also gives excellent background on organization and functions of the National Liberation Front (NLF), the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), and the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

Davidson, W. P. Some Observations On Viet Cong Operation in the Village (U). (Memorandum RM-5207-ISA/ARPA). Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, July 1967. (Confidential).

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It describes the insurgent organization, how it was built up, and how it has been used to support Viet Cong military activities.

Fall, Bernard B. Viet-Nam Witness, New York: Praeger, 1966.

This work contains a selection of articles from 1953 to 1966 which originally appeared in journals and magazines. These articles, along with the author's introduction, commentary, and epilogue assessing the war's future course, chronicle mistakes from which we must learn.

Fall, Bernard B. Last Reflections on a War. Garden City New York: Doubleday, 1967.

This series of articles reflects the authors last comments on the Vietnam war and serves as an update to Viet-Nam Witness.

Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. (Rev. ed.) New York: Praeger, 1964.

This work describes the tactics and strategy, both military and political of the Viet Minh and their offspring, the Viet Cong. Chapters 8 and 15 emphasize the importance of the "parallel hierarchies," the author's term for the VCI and mass associations.

Giap, General Vo Nguyen. People's War, People's Army: The Viet-Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries. New York: Praeger, 1963.

The victor of Dien Bien Phu presents his strategy for winning the third world war. Giap adds to Mao Tse-Tung's stages of protracted war the concept of the battle for the villages.

Hickey, Gerald C. Village in Vietnam. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.

This book is an ethnographic study of a delta village, its culture, social structure, and value system.

Leites, Nathan. The Viet Cong Style of Politics (U). (Memorandum RM-5487-ISA/ARPA). Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, July 1968. (Confidential).

A subjective study of Viet Cong motivation, morale and techniques of persuasion is presented in this work.

Pearce, Michael R. Evolution of a Vietnamese Village-Part I: The Present, After Eight Months of Pacification (U). (Memorandum RM-4552-ISA/ARPA). Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation,

July 1968. (Confidential).

This is a study of the evolution of a rural Vietnamese village as it passes from insurgent control through pacification to government control.

Pearce, Michael R. Evolution of a Vietnamese Village-Party III: The Past, August 1945 to April 1964 (U). (Memorandum RM-4692-ARPA). Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation. July 1968. (Confidential).

It describes in detail the background of the problems which are being faced in a village today.

Pearce, Michael R. Evolution of a Vietnamese Village-Part III: Duc Lap Since November 1956 and Some Comments on Village Pacification (U). (Memorandum RM-5086-ARPA). Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, February 1967. (Confidential)

This work discusses events which have contributed to deterioration of Government of Vietnam influence in a village. Based on the experiences of three widely separated villages, a generalized picture is drawn of a "contested village." Finally, suggestions are made for regaining the initiative in Duc Lap within the context of the present GVN/US pacification program.

Pike, Douglas. Viet Cong. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1966.

This study of the VCI focuses on its organization and communication practices. The author sees the growth of the NLF as rising out of its capacity to bring disciplined organization and manipulated social communication to a disorganized society.

Shaplen Robert. The Lost Revolution. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.

This book describes America's twenty years of lost opportunities in Vietnam.

Smith, Harvey W. Et al. Area Handbook for South Vietnam. (Center for Research in Social Systems, DA PAM 550-55). Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967.

This handbook provides information on all aspects of Vietnamese society—political, social, economic, cultural, religious, and ethnographic. It has a good general introduction with an extensive bibliography.

The Viet Cong Infrastructure: Modus Operandi of Selected Political Cadres (U). July 1968. (Confidential). (Requests for copies should be addressed to MACJ231-5)

This manual provides the best tactical guidance on how to eliminate VCI cadre. Section I presents a brief overview of the infrastructure. Section II describes some typical operating patterns of VC political cadre and includes suggestions for exploiting those patterns to locate key members of the party. Section III provides more specific modus operandi data for selected political cadres.

CICV VCI PUBLICATIONS

CICV Newsletter, VC Political Infrastructure (U). Newsletter #1. 17 January 1968. (Confidential).

This first Newsletter includes the history, organization, and mission of the VC infrastructure.

CICV Newsletter, VC Political Infrastructure (U). Newsletter #2. 30 March 1968. (Confidential).

This newsletter discusses new VC boundaries and place-name changes; changes in VC infrastructure organizations; VC strengths and vulnerabilities, and other significant activities. Also included is an article which discusses the political objectives of Phase One of the enemy's General Offensive.

CICV Newsletter, VC Political Infrastructure (U). Newsletter #3. 5 June 1968. (Confidential).

This issue contains three articles: (1) Infrastructure losses during Phase One of the General Offensive, with particular emphasis on the loss of quality cadre, (2) VC taxation, and (3) a discussion of the creation of a military region-level party committee in Tay Nguyen-Lower Laos Military Region.

CICV Newsletter, VC Political Infrastructure (U). Newsletter #4. 5 June 1968. (Confidential).

This newsletter includes an article concerning the formation of the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region and an article discussing the organization, functions, and vulnerabilities of the Commo-Liaison system.

CICV Newsletter, VC Political Infrastructure (U). Newsletter #5. 27 July 1968. (Confidential).

This issue contains two articles. The first article discusses the evolution and reorganization of Military Region 2. The second

article deals with the VC's recent efforts to form popular alliances and liberation committees.

CICV Newsletter, VC Political Infrastructure (U). Newsletter #6.
12 September 1968. (Confidential).

This newsletter discusses the history and organization of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN).

CICV Newsletter, VC Political Infrastructure (U). Newsletter #7.
14 Oct 1968. (Confidential).

This issue contains three articles. The first article discusses reorganizations into subregions of the VC Military Regions surrounding Saigon. The second discusses COSVN control in the Delta. The third article analyzes possible VC/NVA offensive indicators.

CICV Newsletter, VC Political Infrastructure (U). Newsletter #8.
25 November 1968. (Confidential).

This issue provides an in-depth study of People's Liberation Committees (PLCs) as they exist within the VC political infrastructure. The study concludes by relating the strategic importance of the formation and implementation of PLCs to expanded peace negotiations.

CICV Newsletter, VC Political Infrastructure (U). Newsletter #9.
7 Dec 68. (Confidential).

Analyzes the activities of the VCI in support of Phases One and Two of the General Offensive. Phases One and Two are the increased VC/NVA offensive activities during Tet 1968 and May 1968. The VCI play an essential role in the preparation of an offensive in both rural and urban areas.

Strategy Since 1954. CICV Study ST 67-039, 29 June 1967.

This study traces the evolution of the Communists' military and political strategies in South Vietnam and our responses to these strategies. The study delves into the roots of our involvement and describes the nature of "Wars of National Liberation". Attention is focused on the ideas of Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap and on practical applications of their ideas.