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1. (S) FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

a. Mission. The mission of the Arc Light program is to assist in the defeat of the enemy through maximum destruction, disruption and/or harassment of major command and control centers, supply storage facilities, logistical systems, enemy troops, and lines of communications in selected target areas.

b. Capabilities of the B-52. The B-52 Stratofortress aircraft possesses an all weather bombing capability against any target that produces a definitive radar return or is adjacent to a discernable radar offset aiming point which may be natural or in the form of a manually located radar beacon. Targets can also be bombed in all weather conditions by using MSQ-35/77 (Sky Spot) equipment for determining the required bomb release point.

(1) Normal mission. For targets that are developed over an extended period of time. B-52 forces can strike the target within 18 to 24 hours after the SAC unit at Andersen Air Base, Guam is notified of the mission.

(2) Reduced reaction time missions. A part of the Arc Light forces, six B-52's standing on alert, can strike a target within 10 hours after the mission request is received by SAC. This method of operations called Quick Run is shown in Annex C.

(3) Bomb load. The B-52 D/F bomber has the capability of carrying 60,000 pounds of ordnance. The B-52 is capable of carrying 500, 750, and 1000 pound high explosive (HE) bombs, and CBU munitions cannisters containing anti-personnel bomblets. The number of bombs carried varies from 48 to 105 HE bombs depending on the ordnance requested. Normally, 144 BLU/3B cannisters (CBU) which include 10,656 individual bomblets are loaded in the B-52 for an antipersonnel strike.

(4) Area of bomb strike coverage. To achieve minimum saturation a three ship element covers an area of one square kilometer with conventional iron bombs. One B-52 aircraft dropping BLU type bomblets covers an area two kilometers long and one half kilometer wide.

c. Arc Light Force. At present there are fifty B-52's assigned to 3rd Air Division, SAC, at Guam to support the Arc Light Program.

d. Monthly Sortie Rate. The programmed sortie rate is 650 per month. The sortie rate for CY 67 requested by COMUSMACV is 1050 per month (975 high explosive bomb and 75 CBU).

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e. Sorties. Forty sorties can be provided in one day or on one mission; however, 48 hours is required to regenerate the force. This total includes the six aircraft on alert for Quick Run. For normal operations twenty-two sorties per day can be provided.

f. Priority of targets. COMUSMACV has established an order of priority for Arc Light force targets; however, the priority order is flexible and is altered through considered judgement of such variables as the persistency of the target, friendly troops operating in the area, planned or proposed friendly ground operations, probable courses of enemy action, accuracy of the intelligence and the current field situation. In the present fluid situation, lack of designated front lines, and rapidly changing tactical situations, priority establishment and even the validity of a fully developed and approved target is ever changing. Therefore approved targets are presently scheduled only two or three days in the future and can be changed with as little as 17 hours prior notice. The missions objectives listed below vary in their priority of strike, dependent upon the current tactical situation or desirable future objective planning.

(1) Support ground forces engaged with the enemy by destroying marshalling force, prepared defenses or enemy attack units.

(2) Destruction of the enemy's command and control personnel and facilities.

(3) Destruction of the enemy's major supply and storage facilities.

(4) Destruction of the enemy's base areas and combat units.

(5) Interdiction of enemy lines of communication.

(6) Softening of enemy defenses in preparation for major ground operations.

(7) Harassment of the enemy to impair his capability to take offensive action.

(8) Destruction of the enemy morale by taking full advantage of the psychological effects of heavy aerial bombardment that he can neither anticipate nor defend against.

g. Target Development. Target development is the natural evolutionary result of constant monitoring, collation, and analysis of

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all intelligence information which becomes available and the noting of actual or possible build-ups of enemy activity in specific areas. This is true whether development is accomplished by field intelligence organizations, RVN intelligence organizations, or within the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, MACV. In Vietnam, the ACofS, J2 has established the Target Presentation Branch, Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam, (CICV) which acts as the central office for development of B-52 targets, and for preparing briefing aids for use in gaining approval of targets. Specific procedures used in the development, nomination, selection, and approval of targets are contained in MACV Directive Number 381-22, Annex I; and Annex J, Target Presentation Branch Operating Procedures. The basic criteria for the selection of a target for B-52 strikes are listed in Annex K.

h. Target Selection and Approval. Targets are selected by COMUSMACV or his designated representative after development and presentation by ACofS, J2 and J3. Upon approval of a target, a request for a strike is prepared by ACofS, J3 and forwarded to CINCPAC. At the same time the intelligence justification for the target is forwarded to CINCPAC by the ACofS, J2. CINCPAC grants strike approval on targets in South Vietnam and requests approval from higher headquarters on the remainder.

i. Bomb Damage Assessment. Adequate statistical data on bomb damage assessment is not available. Weather and scheduling permitting, aerial visual and photographic reconnaissance are conducted over the target area to obtain post-strike bomb damage assessment intelligence. Because of the dense jungle canopy existent over most of the strike areas, physical damage statistics cannot be determined. All information obtained on strike results including that gained from returnees, refugees, prisoners, agents, captured documents or any other source is reported to appropriate interested agencies as soon as possible after receipt. The CICV Special Report on effects of B-52 raids is shown in Annex L.

j. Munitions Availability. After the sortie allocation was increased from 400 to 450 in April 1966 the monthly allocation was underflown in April, May, June and July because of the munition shortage and guidance from higher command. Currently the sortie rate is 650 per month, 600 of the sorties are for conventional iron bomb sorties and 50 sorties for anti-personnel CBU munitions. MACV has stated a minimum sortie requirement of 1050 (975 high explosive and 75 CBU - equivalent of 600 HE and 200 CBU) each month.

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k. Intelligence Estimate of Enemy Ground Forces: The current MACV intelligence estimate is that by 1 April 1967 the enemy will reach his greatest strength and will have 180 VC/NVA battalions as compared to 152 on 30 June 1966. Subsequent attrition by continually increasing RVNAF and US/FWMAF forces will result in a gradual reduction to 159 VC/NVA battalions by the end of CY 1967. It is recognized that the enemy has the resources and the capability to train, infiltrate, recruit and support more battalions than are projected by this estimate.

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
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COMPARISON OF AIR BASES

AIR BASE	DISTANCE TO NHA TRANG, NM	RUNWAY LENGTH, FT	RUNWAY WIDTH, FT	WEIGHT BEARING CAPACITY RUNWAY
Requirements for - B-52 Opns.		11,000	200	TT 400 (400,000 lbs gross weight)
Ban U Tapao, Thailand	650	11,500	200	*
Clark AB, Phillipines	770	10,500	150	TT 300
Mactan AB, Phillipines	910	8,500	150	AUW 350
Ching-Chuan Kang AB, Taiwan	950	12,000	200	TT 470
Tainan AB, Taiwan	950	10,000	148	TT 207
Kadena AB, Okinawa	1370	12,100	300	TT 364
Andersen AB, Guam	2100	11,200	200	TT 400

* Not published but can support B-52 aircraft operations.
 TT - Runway can support B-52 aircraft operations.
 AUW 350 - Any type gear configuration up to gross weight of
 350,000 pounds.

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NOTE: DISTANCE CIRCLES MEASURED FROM SAIGON.

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QUICK REACTION FORCES (QUICK RUN)

On 1 July, SAC established a Quick Reaction force consisting of six B-52's. Aircraft are standard configured with 24 M-65 1000 lb HE bombs internal and 24 MK-82, 500 lb HE bombs external. From one to six strike aircraft may be employed on any one Quick Run mission. Reaction time will normally be ten hours from notification at Guam until time over target. This reduced reaction time is made possible by use of MSQ-77 (Sky Spot) ground radar equipment for determining the required release point thus eliminating much of the required strike planning time. The strike force is available 24 hours a day however when the Quick Run force is utilized the following strikes will normally be degraded by the number of sorties used, or an adjustment made to stay within the total monthly allocation. It takes 16 hours to regenerate the alert forces.

Field commanders submit their strike request to Hq, MACV for action and approval, Hq MACV relays the mission request to CINCPAC for final approval and to SAC for planning. COMUSMACV has restricted the use of the Quick Run force to targets in direct support of friendly forces in contact with a confirmed enemy. During the first month of operations three Quick Run strikes were executed.

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STATISTICAL DATA

MONTHLY/CUMULATIVE TOTAL

MONTH YEAR	MISSIONS	SORTIES	M-I-S-S-I-O-N D-I-S-T-R-I-B-U-T-I-O-N							ORDNANCE TONS	REMARKS
			I	II	III	IV	LAOS	NVN	SVN		
JUN 65	1/1	27/27			1/1				1/1	493/493	
JUL 65	5/6	147/174		1/1	4/5				5/6	2581/3074	
AUG 65	10/16	169/343	6/6		4/9				10/16	2601/5675	
SEP 65	19/35	326/669	5/11		10/19	4/4			19/35	6185/11860	
OCT 65	23/58	292/961	3/14	6/7	11/30	3/7			23/58	5552/17412	
NOV 65	38/96	311/1272		14/21	23/53	1/8			38/96	5918/23330	
DEC 65	39/135	306/1578	6/20	5/26	22/75	5/13	1/1		38/134	5527/28857.125/652	BLU 3s
JAN 66	26/161	350/1928	6/26	1/27	19/94				26/160	5286/34143	
FEB 66	37/198	334/2262	4/30	5/32	22/116	2/15	4/5		33/193	5186/39329	
MAR 66	33/236	403/2665	6/36	6/38	21/137		5/10		33/226	5877/45206	26,163 Inced BOMBS,10,471 BLU 3s
APR 66	62/298	423/3088	29/59	0/38	14/151	1/16	22/32	2/2	38/264	8344/53550	
MAY 66	45/343	410/3498	16/75	3/41	16/167	0/16	10/42	0/2	35/299	7997/61547	5,321 BLU 3s
JUN 66	54/397	385/3883	24/99	13/54	11/178	0/16	6/48	0/2	48/347	6579/68126	3,687 BLU 3s
JUL 66	68/465	426/4309	36/135	6/60	14/192	5/21	7/55	0/2	61/408	7489/75615	1,728 BLU 3s

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