

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

on

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE PRESIDENCY

OF VIETNAM

Submitted to

The President of the Republic

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by

Dr. John T. Dorsey
Michigan State University
Vietnam Advisory Team

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THE REORGANIZATION OF THE PRESIDENCY OF VIETNAM

I. INTRODUCTION--THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENCY

The Presidency of the government of Vietnam has taken on heightened importance as a result of two recent developments. Most recent and most important is the national revolution culminating in the deposition of the former Chief of State, the establishment of the Republic, and the election of Ngo Dinh Diem as Chief of State and President of the Republic. With the independence of Vietnam an established fact, the soundness of its governmental institutions, particularly those providing overall direction and coordination, becomes crucial for the future well-being of the nation. But at the same time, this very problem of overall direction and coordination has become more complex and difficult because of the assumption by the government of additional functions and responsibilities in very recent years--notably in the fields of foreign affairs, national defense, and economic development. In view of these closely related developments, the alacrity with which the government has looked to the reform and modernization of its institutions augurs well for the future. The present study, executed under conditions of urgency, is submitted in the hope that it will contribute to this reform and modernization, and thus in the long run to the freedom, independence, and well-being of the Vietnamese people.

Before discussing the Presidency of the Republic of Vietnam, a few general observations on the role of governmental chief executives may help clarify the ideas in terms of which the analysis was made. The executive function is at least a triple one. First, the executive must take the lead in the development of policy--in the determination of what is to be done. Because of the complexity of modern governmental functions, adequate means must be provided for the coordination of the activities of the many people and organizations contributing

to the development of policy. The end product must be, on the whole, integrated and harmonized, and must represent a series of the most reasonable choices from adequately examined alternatives. This role of executive leadership in policy development is as necessary in democratic government as in any other kind of government, for the wisdom of the decisions made by a representative legislature will be heavily influenced by proposals submitted to it by the chief executive. Secondly, the executive must see to the effective execution of what has been decided upon, and this also requires complex means of coordination and control. Included in the latter are the means and instrumentalities for insuring good management throughout the government, such as providing competent personnel and giving them adequate organizational and financial tools to do the job, making sure that they understand what they are to do, and checking to find how well they did it--or if not, why not. The third function links policy execution back to the first one of policy development by providing means for the reporting to the chief executive, the legislature, and the public the results of the policies which they have, in collaboration, adopted.

A common thread running through these three aspects of the executive function is communication. The chief executive needs both individual and organizational help in collecting information of many kinds from a multitude of sources, in transmitting it to appropriate points for analysis and comparison with other information, in synthesizing it with wish or will into decisions, and in communicating the decisions to and through a whole series of further points. Thus controlling the complicated flow of communication becomes one of the basic means of developing policy and controlling its execution in an organization.

Although at first sight this would seem to imply a need for more and more centralization, the very complexity of the jobs of coordinating policy development, execution, and reporting means that the executive must leave as much of the work as possible to others, and this includes the executive as an institution

as well as a person. The Presidency, in other words, should not compete with the departments or ministries or take over functions which they can perform in coordination with each other. Instead, the executive must interest itself primarily in those functions that cut across the whole of the administrative structure, the control of which assures coordination and integration of policy in its various phases. The role of the executive is to lead, advise, stimulate co-operation, and to control directly only where necessary.

Finally, let it be said that no way has yet been found for completely systematizing or rationalizing these complicated functions. Even the best administrative machinery can only set the stage, so to speak, for a drama which will still demand the utmost in performance from the players. Success still depends on providing competent personnel, personnel infused with a spirit of teamwork, flexible cooperation, breadth of view, and leadership.


II. PROBLEMS OF THE PRESIDENCY OF VIETNAM

The problems which have been identified in the survey of the Presidency are problems which are in some degree common to most centers of governmental decision and communication. The pressures for political decision and administrative management which are channeled in from all parts of the government are sufficient to put severe strains on any organizational structure, to say nothing of the weight to be borne by the individuals who man it. Thus it is not at all surprising that the neatness and symmetry of the organization chart shown on the following page does not accurately represent the structure of the Presidency viewed in terms of the actual interpersonal relationships and channels of communication. The problems which are discussed below (particularly those in section B) will serve to point out some of the differences between the formal and the actual organization, and they will also indicate some of the shortcomings of the structure as formally conceived. This list of problems is not

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exhaustive, but it contains the most important ones--those which press most for solution as early as possible.

A. General Problems

(1) Coordination. There is a clear need for better coordination of the work of the Presidency. Often various organs of the Presidency do not learn of matters which will require their action until just before that action is required. Each service is not continually aware of what the others are doing or planning to do, with the result that it is difficult to coordinate their own actions with those of the other services. This problem is due in part to the compartmentalization of the Presidency and the resulting insufficient communication between the various units of organization. But it is also due to the fact that the roles of several key people in the Presidency are not clearly defined; thus there can be uncertainty as to who is supposed to be doing what, when he should be doing it, and who should be informed about it. Specific assignments of work (such as studying a particular problem to prepare a recommendation, drafting a speech, or contacting a Department to discuss or handle a particular matter) are sometimes given to individuals other than those who are normally expected to receive such assignments. In other words, specific work assignments do not always follow standard or past practices, and in some areas there are no standard practices. Perfection in such matters could seldom be approached even under the best of circumstances, and emergency situations do arise when the handling of a question must be assigned to the nearest person at hand. But confusion could be avoided if everyone, from the

President on down, gave more attention to the need for systematic work assignments and to the need for keeping everyone concerned regularly informed about things that are being done and plans that are being made.

(2) Delegation. One of the first things to be noticed about the work of persons in important positions in the Presidency is that there is too much of it. The work load that is borne by such persons is crushing, and a significant token of the quality of such officials and of their devotion to the President and to the ideals which he seeks is the fact that no one complains about the amount of work. But in most cases a significant proportion of this problem is caused by insufficient delegation. Often matters of relatively small importance require the attention or signature of officials who badly need more time for dealing with matters of great significance. The tendency to minimize delegation is due partly to traditional administrative practice; partly it is due to the way decrees, arrêtés, etc. are written (requiring Presidential signature, for example). Sometimes the load of work on people at the top of the hierarchy is caused by the unwillingness of subordinate personnel to accept responsibility, and conversely, those at the top may lack complete confidence in the wisdom and competence of their subordinates. But none of these problems are insoluble, and it should be possible to reduce some of the pressure on key persons. Some of the recommendations in Part III of this report deal with this matter directly or indirectly.

(3) Distinction between auxiliary and direct services. One way to classify or analyze the kinds of work done by components of the Presidency is to distinguish, on the one hand, between persons

and units whose work consists chiefly of preparing, informing, following up on, or otherwise aiding the President in making the political and administrative decisions which he must make, and on the other hand, persons and units whose work consists chiefly of providing common services and generally facilitating the work of those in the former category. The distinction is not always a clear one, but in most cases it is possible to identify organizational units which are directly engaged in the formulation of governmental policy and those which are engaged primarily in providing auxiliary services. The work of the former may vary widely from day to day in subject matter and in degree of urgency, as well as in the way it has to be handled. The highly important work of the latter is more uniform, and its flow is more regular and more susceptible of being systematized.

In the present organization of the Presidency, the units engaged in auxiliary or facilitative functions are not grouped under the same head, and some of the persons whose primary responsibility is to aid the President in policy formulation are also charged with the direction and coordination of auxiliary services. This is particularly applicable to the Direction du Cabinet, but also applies to the Secrétariat Général. In at least one case, filing, each of these two components of the Presidency maintains its own auxiliary service. This manner of distributing the direction and control of auxiliary services is less economical than would be grouping them all under one head. Also, the problem of coordinating this work, so essential to the effective functioning of the Presidency as a whole, would be simplified.

(4) Distinction between work requiring immediate decisions and handling and that requiring or permitting lengthy study and analysis. The distinction indicated here is perhaps harder to make with respect to the work itself than the distinction discussed above. But it is easier to make organizationally, that is, with regard to the organizational units or persons doing it. However, one would note two things in seeking to identify, in the present organization of the Presidency, persons whose primary work is to collect information and documentation, study and analyze problems, and prepare recommendations on the basis of such study. First, the number of persons charged with such work is very small. Second, those few who are engaged in such work are also involved in the day to day flow of decision-making and management of matters which do not require or which cannot await more thorough study and analysis. Also, there are not available enough persons with specialized knowledge or experience in economics and finance, public administration, military affairs, social problems, etc. As a consequence, many decisions must be made in the absence of vital information and careful analysis. While it is true that most such study and analysis should be done in the various Departments of the government, it is also true that the Presidency, if it is to effectively direct and coordinate the various Departments, also needs more qualified persons in these fields than it has at present.

(5) Need for better trained subordinate personnel. If the quality and competence of the top level and managerial personnel of the Presidency is gratifyingly high, it is also true that the organizational depth of this layer of ability and competence does not extend very far. In other words, there is a strong need for better trained

and more able personnel below the level of the chefs de service and chefs de bureau. This need is particularly apparent in the units responsible for press relations, protocol, and cryptography. In these areas the shortage of trained subordinate personnel is perhaps the main obstacle to effective delegation. The heads of these units must spend so much time in close supervision or in handling details themselves that their effectiveness is hampered. While this problem extends throughout the government of Vietnam, it is particularly serious to find it in the Presidency, which has to assume leadership and overall direction and coordination of government policy.

(6) Lack of space and general facilities. A final general problem that harasses all components of the Presidency is the lack of office space and material facilities. Over the past year the number of personnel attached to the Presidency has grown from 134 to about 280--an increase of over 100 per cent. All of these employees have been crowded into Independence Palace, a structure that was not designed to house a large administrative and office force. It is not necessary to describe in detail the problems of overcrowding, inconvenient arrangement of offices, and lack of privacy for many. It is obvious, however, that lack of space alone contributes to the difficulty of working in the Presidency, both materially and in terms of the morale of Presidency personnel.

The same may be said about office furnishings, machinery, and other equipment. The present study made no attempt to assess the adequacy of such facilities, but observation and occasional remarks by Presidency personnel tend toward the

conclusion that more thorough investigation in this direction would reveal a problem of perhaps significant dimensions.

B. Specific Problems

The division of this discussion under the headings "general" and "specific" problems is not meant to imply any lesser importance for the problems about to be considered. On the contrary, some of the problems yet to be listed below are more serious than most of those already discussed. They are problems which are immediately identifiable, which concern specific units or services of the Presidency, and which lead to proposals for specific organizational and procedural changes.

(7) Organization of the President's work day. The time of the chief executive is one of a nation's scarcest and most valuable resources, and as such has to be carefully guarded and conserved for expenditure only where it will accomplish the most. The demands on his time will always exceed the supply. Both he and those responsible for assisting him must give careful attention to the problem of making the most effective use of it. This involves both the careful scheduling of his working hours and the careful screening and selection of the matters to which he gives his attention. The comments on delegation which have already been made are pertinent here, as well as those on careful assignment of individual work projects or pieces of business. Although a standard schedule for the President's work day exists, it is not always followed as carefully as it could be; the work allotted to a given period of the day turns out to take longer than the time allowed by the schedule, with the result that the remainder of the day's affairs may be thrown off

schedule, to be postponed until night, or wedged in wherever possible.

The same remarks apply in only a slightly lesser degree to the President's primary aides and assistants; their time likewise needs to be carefully guarded. These matters seem not to have been adequately studied by the Presidency personnel concerned --or if they have been, the conclusions reached have not been effectively applied. Without adequate recognition of the value of careful planning in this matter, the problems of coordination and of rapid and effective work accomplishment are more difficult to solve.

(8) The role of the Secrétaire d'Etat à la Présidence. A very important specific problem of the organization of the Presidency is the fact that the role of the Secrétaire d'Etat à la Présidence is not clearly defined. As a Secretary of State, it is clear only that he is the second ranking man in the Presidency. It is not clear whether he is to act as an assistant to the President, handling only those matters which the President assigns to him on a day-to-day basis, or is to serve as a sort of super Directeur de Cabinet in the traditional sense, generally managing the stream of political affairs that require the President's attention, or is to serve as the manager and coordinator of the Presidency, relieving the President of the necessity of directing the Presidency as an institution and thereby allowing him more freedom to deal with the matters of policy that require his attention and decision. The lack of clear understandings on this point is perhaps the most important reason for the problem of coordination of the work of the Presidency. Much of what the

Secrétaire d'Etat does at present tends to overlap the formal attributions of the Directeur du Cabinet. These two, as well as the Secrétaire Général, seem to have informally arrived at a division of functions which avoids conflict between them. However, the work and position of the Secrétaire d'Etat are variously understood in different parts of the Presidency, and this situation reduces the possibility of smooth coordination. His presence presents an opportunity to focus responsibility for coordination, but so long as no carefully thought out decision about his role is made, and so long as no written text defines his functions or lists his attributions, this opportunity becomes instead a source of confusion.

(9) The roles of the Directeur du Cabinet and Secrétaire Général.

Partly because of the above-mentioned uncertainty about the role of the Secrétaire d'Etat, the role of the Directeur du Cabinet is also in need of clarification. If there were no Secrétaire d'Etat à la Présidence, the work of the Directeur du Cabinet would consist mostly of the following tasks: (a) the preliminary examination of incoming mail to keep the President informed of important matters; (b) the examination and presentation to the President of documents requiring his signature; (c) the transmission orally or in writing of the President's instructions to the Departments concerning matters which have been presented to him; (d) the transmission of other orders of the President to the Services of the Presidency or to the Departments and following up on their execution so as to report on them to the President; (e) preparing the work for the President in Council, drafting the minutes, and circulating

them to the Departments; (f) handling reserved questions, especially the urgent or confidential ones; (g) redoing or modifying certain proposals presented by the Departments in accordance with the President's instructions; and (h) giving instructions to the Services which serve the Presidency in common concerning the execution of their responsibilities, and supervising their functioning.¹ However, since the appointment of a Secrétaire d'Etat à la Présidence in May 1955, the latter has been given some of these functions to perform--particularly (f) above, but also in some cases (c), (d), and (g). Also, the Secrétaire d'Etat often represents the President in various ceremonies when the President is unable to attend, he attends meetings of the Council, and he is sometimes sent on foreign missions. Thus it can be seen that the roles of these two persons have become mixed, and need to be defined so as to avoid confusion. Also, it will be noted that the work of the Directeur du Cabinet, in practice, consists largely of transmitting communications to and from the President, providing the services of a secretariat to the Council, and directing the activities of certain services in the Presidency. (See the organization chart on page 4, but see also the remarks below concerning the Chef du Cabinet Particulier and the Secrétaire Particulier.)

¹The formal attributions of the Directeur du Cabinet include several other matters, such as "political propaganda, political expenditures, and political intelligence." (Arrêté No. 22/Cab-Prés. of 17 June 1952, modified by arrêtés Nos. 126-PTT/DL and 154-PTT/KT of 3 Sept. and 4 Oct. 1954) As far as the present study was able to determine, however, these functions are at present largely handled elsewhere.

The work of the Secrétaire Général is officially distinguished from that of the Directeur du Cabinet by the qualification of matters he handles as "administrative," while the Directeur's business is "political." There is of course no criterion that is valid in all cases to make the distinction; it is made, when questions arise, by the personal evaluations of these two officers or their chief assistants. They must work in close collaboration to avoid conflicts and confusion, but disagreements about who should handle particular matters arise occasionally. The Secrétaire Général studies and prepares summary abstracts of matters that are to be submitted to the Council, reviews legislation and regulations coming from the Departments to be submitted to the President for signature, coordinates, under the direction of the President, the "administrative action" of the Government, and supervises the publication of the JORVN. In addition, he is responsible for the elaboration and study of plans for administrative reform.

The Secrétaire Général and the Directeur du Cabinet thus manage most of the day-to-day flow of business between the Presidency and the remainder of the Government, and although the Directeur du Cabinet technically takes precedence over the Secrétaire Général, the relationship between the two more nearly approaches that of collaborators of equal status. Should the Directeur du Cabinet disapprove of a proposal which the Secrétaire Général wishes to submit to the President, he cannot prevent its submission but can merely record his disapproval.

The work of the sections of the Presidency directed by these two persons is further complicated by the fact that the

preparatory work done in the Departments on proposals, drafts of regulations, and particularly on reports is often inadequate. The Direction du Cabinet and the Secrétariat Général have to spend much time telephoning the Departments for additional information and in reworking the materials that are submitted by the Departments.

(10) The roles of the Chef du Cabinet Particulier and the Secrétaire Particulier. The Cabinet Particulier and the Secrétariat Particulier are nominally a part of the Cabinet de la Présidence, under the direction of the Directeur. In practice, they work for the most part independently of his supervision, in direct contact with the President. Both the Chef du Cabinet Particulier and the Secrétaire Particulier have access to the President at any time. Many confidential matters are transmitted to or from the President by the Chef du Cabinet Particulier, and he handles most of the secret correspondence with Vietnamese representatives in Paris, Washington, and Tokyo. The Secrétaire Particulier handles the personal correspondence of the President and much of the official communication with important governmental agencies in Vietnam, such as the Regional Délégués, as well as some with Vietnamese representatives abroad. But also, since he is also Chef du Service du Chiffre, all coded communications, including those sent by the Department of Foreign Affairs, are coded and transmitted by the Secrétaire Particulier--except for those confidential or highly secret ones handled by the Chef du Cabinet Particulier. In these cases, the latter borrows the code from the Secrétaire Particulier, codes or decodes the message, and transmits it to the President

or to its overseas destination. Neither of these persons has had training in cryptography, nor do they have trained cryptographers at their disposition. Both units are understaffed; the Chef du Cabinet Particulier has only one assistant and the Secrétaire Particulier has only four--including the Service du Chiffre. Because of this shortage of personnel, the Service du Chiffre is not a separate unit in the Secrétariat Particulier. This shortage places a heavy burden on these personnel because they have to rotate their hours at work so as to maintain 24 hour service.

The Secrétaire Particulier is responsible for maintaining the President's calendar and daily schedule of audiences, attendance at ceremonies, etc., and in the latter function he works in collaboration with the Service du Protocole. However, others, such as the Chef du Cabinet Particulier and the Directeur du Cabinet, also participate in the scheduling of the President's audiences.

Thus the roles of the Chef du Cabinet Particulier and the Secrétaire Particulier are not adequately distinguished, and their nominal position in the Direction du Cabinet is equivocal. Lack of clarity in their roles is another factor contributing to the difficulty of coordination in the Presidency.

(11) The roles of the Chargés de Mission à la Présidence. An important group of persons in the Presidency are the five Chargés de Mission who are placed under the direct control of the President. Each has the responsibility for following, coordinating, and reporting directly to the President on specific matters of particular importance. One is charged with directing the

Presidential Press Service; another, who strictly speaking is not a Chargé de Mission but is a Chef de Service, is charged with the Service of Political and Social Studies. This latter Service studies and reports to the President on special questions which he assigns to it. A third special service is the Chargé de Mission who handles matters related to the Geneva Agreements and maintains liaison with the International Control Commission. There is a fourth Chargé de Mission in charge of Chinese Affairs, and a fifth whose particular assignment has not yet been fixed.² These persons serve as high level administrative assistants to the President; their responsibilities are not formally defined and the services they direct are not formally organized by decree or arrêté except in the case of the Service of Political and Social Studies. Because of the special nature of the matters which are assigned to them no serious problem in co-ordination arises, except in the case of the Service du Presse. Because he stands between the daily activities of the President and the representatives of the foreign and domestic press, the question of coordinating his work with certain other services of the Presidency is of particular importance. This co-ordination is not at present satisfactorily effected, and this is due in part to the fact that the functions and responsibilities of this Chargé de Mission have not been clearly defined. The line dividing his responsibilites from those of the Ministry

²A sixth official in the Presidency is attached directly to the President. He is an Advisor, responsible for relations with French Technical Assistance. A large part of his work at present consists of coordinating the grants of scholarships to France.

of Information needs to be ascertained, but this cannot be done until a decision is made about the extent to which the Press Service will serve as a public relations organ for the President. Policies need to be established concerning the setting of deadlines for advance preparation and distribution of speeches. The question of whether this Chargé de Mission, someone else, or no one is to be the official spokesman for the President should be examined and a decision made. Until these matters are settled, the potential effectiveness of the Presidential Press Service cannot be realized.

(12) The organs of economic and budgetary policy development and program control. The Presidency is not at present equipped to give leadership and direction to the Government in the development and control of economic and budgetary policy, and this is one of the widest gaps in the organization of the Executive. With problems of economic stability and development coming to the fore, and with a significant proportion of the national budget for the moment based on foreign aid, there is a need for a policy focus close to the President in these matters.

There are organs presently attached to the Presidency which would normally fulfill these important functions, but certain obstacles exist. The decision was recently made to detach the Direction du Budget from the Department of Finance and to attach it to the Presidency. The budget function in the Government of Vietnam has not been developed as a means of positive policy leadership and formulation. The crucial functions of fixing ceilings in advance for the government's

major programs and effective central budget review of each agency's expenditure estimates have not been viewed as the important tools of program control that they could become. Emphasis has instead been placed on central control of individual expenditures by the Departments, and the procedures of review and clearance are complex and slow. Until this emphasis is changed, the transfer of the budget agency to the Presidency will probably not have significant meaning in strengthening the President's influence on policy development and program control. But if an effective and modern budget system is to be developed, there is a need for trained budget officers, not only in the central budget agency but also in each Department. At present there are very few budget personnel trained in developing budgetary and accounting classifications based on programs or in estimating future expenditure needs in terms of program accomplishment. Finally, the military budget is at present outside of the control of the central budget agency. Until a consolidated government budget is adopted, the gains in developing a central budget office will of necessity be small.

Another organ of potential significance in filling this ^{blank, missing part, cavity} lacuna is the Direction Générale du Plan, formerly a part of the Ministry of Planning and Reconstruction, but attached to the Presidency since August when that Ministry was dismantled. This agency is at present small, but it contains very competent personnel. At present, however, its work is not integrated with the central budget review process nor related to program planning in the various Departments. The long range studies and proposals which it prepares will have little meaning unless they are

accepted by the Departments as guides for program planning and are integrated with annual budgetary allocations. But policy development on this level is also a political matter, regardless of whether the decisions to be made deal with economic, industrial, public works engineering, or agricultural questions. Therefore the planning agency needs to be closely related to a policy organ such as the Conseil Supérieur du Plan, which is a committee of the Council of Ministers. Finally, because of the close relationship of many government programs to foreign economic aid, the coordination of decisions concerning the allocation and use of such aid needs to be closely related to planning and budgetary functions. The absence of integration of planning decisions with the work of the Comité Nationale de l'Aide Extérieure would seriously inhibit the coordination of realistic economic and financial policy development.

(13) Presidential influence of personnel policy. The decision was recently made to transfer the government's central personnel agency, the Direction de la Fonction Publique, from the Department of the Interior to the Presidency. If the functions of this agency are appropriately developed, it can become the focal point of civil service reform and modernization. If it continues to perform only the functions it performs at present, little will have been gained by transferring it to the Presidency. The Direction de la Législation et du Contentieux spends most of its time in the preparation and interpretation of salary and pension regulations. This Direction could become an agency of policy leadership in recruitment, placement,

training, employee representation, executive development, research, and other fields of modern personnel administration. This would require a larger staff and a more flexible and imaginative view of personnel administration than now exists. The Direction de l'Administration du Personnel deals with individual cases in such matters as inter-Departmental transfers and leaves. Many of the functions which it performs might well be decentralized to the various Departments, while those that require central administration could be transferred to the Direction de la Legislation et du Contentieux. To effect these changes would require, first, the development of a more positive and dynamic conception of the personnel function; and second, active personnel divisions in the various Departments. Both of these innovations presuppose the establishment of in-service training courses for present personnel.

(14) Problems needing further study. Several problems were noted during the course of the present survey which could not be investigated thoroughly because of lack of time. Among them are the need for more effective methods of ensuring the security of the President and of Independence Palace, more efficient and modern methods of filing and records management, and more modern methods of internal telecommunications. These problems are merely listed here as worthy of further systematic attention, with no attempt to detail the needs in each area.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE ORGANIZATION AND METHODS OF THE PRESIDENCY

It is always simpler to identify problems than to find solutions.

The following proposals are not offered on the assumption that they are the only possible solutions to the problems which have been discussed. They do, however, seem to promise reasonably effective results in the long run. The Government of Vietnam has opted for a presidential system of government, in which the democratically controlled executive will possess the administrative means to develop and propose policies to a representative assembly, and to put into effect those policies approved by such an assembly. Had the choice been for a different form of government, some of the recommendations would have taken a different form. Also, the framework for some of these recommendations was provided by decisions taken by the Government independently of the present study. The recommendations of budgeting and planning, for example, might have been considerably different had the Government not decided to move the Direction du Budget to the Presidency. Taking these decisions as given, and aiming to overcome the problems listed in the preceding section, the changes and innovations proposed below should lay the foundations for constructing a Presidency capable of performing the functions outlined in the first section of this report.

- (1) The responsibility for coordinating the work of the Presidency should be focussed in the Secrétaire d'Etat à la Présidence. He is the only person in a position to relieve the President of the necessity of attending to matters of management of the Presidency, thereby giving him more freedom to deal with questions of general policy. The Secrétaire d'Etat should not be an Assistant President, but rather an Assistant to the President, who would be responsible, under the President's general direction, for co-ordinating the functions of the Presidency in policy development,

managing the day to day flow of business with the Departments, and handling such special assignments as the President would give to him. He should be given the kind of high level assistance he would need to accomplish these functions, particularly the coordination of the daily communications to and from the Departments. Much of this vital work could be delegated to a Secrétaire d'Etat Adjoint, who should be a person of at least the stature of a Directeur du Cabinet. In addition, he might be given a special assistant to help in the analysis and preparation of special assignments given by the President.

An important yet simple method of improving coordination would be the institution of weekly staff meetings of all Chefs de Service.

- (2) The Cabinet Particulier, the Secrétaire Particulier (including the Service du Chiffre) should be taken out of the Direction du Cabinet and attached directly to the President, subject to the requirement of coordinating with the Secrétaire d'Etat à la Présidence. This change would merely formalize the existing pattern of relationships, while emphasizing the need for coordination with the rest of the Presidency.
- (3) The Service du Chiffre should be placed under the control of the Chef du Cabinet Particulier, and the latter should be made responsible for handling all coded communications to and from the President. The present division of this responsibility between the Secrétaire Particulier and the Chef du Cabinet Particulier leaves the door open for uncoordinated action. Additional personnel should be assigned to the Cabinet Particulier so as to

permit it to discharge its responsibilities of liaison without undue strain and with more effectiveness.

- (4) The Secrétaire Particulier should be given sole responsibility for establishing, under the direction of the President, the President's daily schedule and his calendar of activities. The daily schedule should be realistic, and should be followed conscientiously except when emergencies impose departures from it. The Secrétaire Particulier should be the guardian of the President's time, and should be recognized as such by all concerned. In addition, the Secrétaire Particulier should be charged with handling the President's personal correspondence, as he does at present. The Secrétaire Particulier should be made responsible for advance coordination where necessary with other Services of the Presidency, particularly Press, Protocol, Interior, and Security. Of course, he would maintain constant liaison with the Secrétaire d'Etat à la Présidence.
- (5) The Etat-Major should be abolished, and military aides for land, sea, and air should be appointed, responsible directly to the President. These aides should be high-ranking military officers, and should be charged with maintaining liaison with the armed forces and with handling such specific assignments as the President might make, including the study of policy proposals related to the national defense.
- (6) All auxiliary and common services in the Presidency should be consolidated under a Directeur des Services Générales, who should have no other responsibilities than assuring coordinated and efficient services to all persons and units in the Presidency engaged in the formulation and control of governmental policy.

The units included would be the Services de Sécurité, d'Ordre, de Protocole, de Comptabilité et Personnel, de l'Intérieur, des Archives, and du JORVN. Give the Service d'Ordre authority to route incoming mail directly to the units concerned, without clearing it through the office of the Directeur des Services Générales. Establish a consolidated typing pool under the direction of the Chef de Service d'Ordre. Consolidate the files of the Presidency in the Service des Archives.

(7) The responsibilities of the Chargés de Mission should be defined in terms of the attributions of each, but organizational units should not be established for each. Their positions should be flexible, to be established or abolished according to need.
Those with whom the President wishes to maintain constant contact should be kept directly responsible to him; others should be placed under the coordinating responsibility of the Secrétaire d'Etat à la Présidence, or under a coordinator responsible to him.

(8) The responsibilities of the Chargé de Mission responsible for the Press Service should be defined to include maintaining liaison with representatives of the domestic and foreign press and with various governmental agencies, particularly the Department of Information; establishing and maintaining a system of accreditation for photographers and reporters; planning and convening Presidential press conferences; preparing and distributing press releases, including advance distribution of speeches of the President; keeping the President informed of news in the foreign and domestic press; maintaining a long-range calendar of dates and events which may require a Presidential statement or his presence, and keeping the President and the Secrétaire Particulier informed

of such dates and events; and establishing and maintaining a "press room" in the Palace. He should study and propose to the President policies concerning the coordination and setting of deadlines for the preparation and advance distribution of speeches. He should be responsible directly to the President, and should serve as the President's spokesman to the press. His role would not include public relations or propaganda; his primary responsibility would instead be to facilitate the communication of the President with the public through the press.

(9) A number of Chargés d'Etudes should be established in the Presidency, to be available to the President, the Secrétaire d'Etat, and any other persons responsible for program analysis and the study of policy proposals. They should be competent to do research and make analyses in given areas, such as economics, finance, public law, administrative organization, or social problems. Their number should not be large, and they should be placed under the control of a Coordonnateur d'Etudes responsible to the Secrétaire d'Etat. This could be the same coordinator responsible for the coordination of the Chargés de Mission, if such were established. The Coordonnateur d'Etudes would be responsible for allocating the Chargés d'Etudes as needed for long or short range projects, and assigning projects to them himself when they were not being used elsewhere. They would not constitute an organizational unit, but would in a sense provide a "pool of expertise" to be used as needed by various parts of the Presidency. If he deemed it desirable, the President could make one or more such persons responsible directly to him for the execution of specific projects. Their role would not be to

formulate policy, but to provide the assistance of specialized knowledge to those responsible for policy making.

(10) The Direction du Budget should be brought into the Presidency and placed under the direct control of the Secrétaire Général. The Secrétariat Général should be reorganized to permit the integration of the budget agency, and the whole should be designated the Direction du Budget et de la Législation Générale. The title of the Secrétaire Général would then become "Directeur du Budget et de la Législation Générale." He would retain his present responsibilities for the analysis of legislative proposals from the Departments, and would have the additional responsibilities of supervising the preparation of the budget, reviewing the Departmental expenditure estimates, and making recommendations to the President. He would exercise such controls over budget execution as might be established in a reformed budgetary system, such as approving monthly or quarterly allotments, and requiring the establishment of contingency reserves. He would work in close collaboration with the Directeur du Plan during budget preparation. His organization would consist of a Secrétariat, a Service de l'Analyse des Requêtes, and a Service de la Legislation Générale. He would need at least one Adjoint in addition to the one he has now, and the staff of his Services would have to be large enough to permit him to carry out his responsibilities.

The details of this proposal will not be outlined here, since they will depend largely upon the extent to which budgetary reform is carried out in accord with the discussion in Part II of this report. It is appropriate to mention here that a detailed

proposal for budgetary reform was made to the Ministry of Finance in the Summer of 1955, including a proposal for a new budget law. This proposal should be restudied in connection with the proposals that are made in the present report.

This proposal to bring the budget agency into the Presidency proper is made because of the close relation between budgetary program planning and the work of legislative analysis performed by the Secrétariat Général, the similarly close relation that should be established between budgeting and long-range planning, and the need, if they are both to be effective, to place them close to the President. But also, if the budget is to become an effective instrument of executive management in the Government, it must be placed under the control of a competent and energetic high level administrator who can transmit the President's wishes directly to the organization. An effective budget system cannot be established overnight, and determined and imaginative leadership will be required to plan, begin, and realize the reforms that will be necessary. The minimum steps which should be taken are the following:

- (a) Train budget personnel in program budget classification, both in the Direction du Budget and in the Departments.
- (b) Establish a budget system which would require effective central review of departmental expenditure estimates.
- (c) Develop, in the Department of Finance, sound methods of estimating revenues.
- (d) Consolidate the civil and the military budgets.

(11) The planning agency, now attached to the Presidency, should be moved into the Presidency on a plane with the Direction

du Budget et de la Législation Générale. This would complete the structure of the Presidency by properly integrating economic policy development and program control, and bringing both under the direction of the President. This agency should consist of two organs: The Service du Plan and the Comité Nationale de l'Aide Extérieur. It would, as has already been emphasized, collaborate closely with the budget agency. But here yet another organ would participate: The Conseil Supérieur du Plan, a cabinet committee. This Council should continue to exist, but a change in its name to "Conseil du Développement Economique" would give more information about its objectives and would perhaps aid public understanding of its role. It would be under the President's direction and its role would be to give him advice on questions of economic policy and planning. It may be desirable to alter the composition of the Council in the direction of making it a cabinet committee of the whole.

The diagrams on the following two pages outline a planning process in general terms which can be used as a guide in working out the actual planning procedures and relating them to the annual budgetary process. It should be understood that the foreign aid committee is included in the "Service du Plan" of the diagram.


(12) The Direction de la Fonction Publique should be developed into an organ of personnel policy leadership. A study should be undertaken to determine the practicability of transferring the control over individual personnel actions, how centralized in the Direction de l'Administration du Personnel, to the personnel units in the various Departments. If the central agency's control over individual cases could be decentralized,

PROPOSED CENTRAL PLANNING PROCESS

1) At President's request, each Department prepares a program which includes:

- (a) a summary of the current situation and major problems
- (b) a statement of objectives over 4 or 5 year period
- (c) proposals for realizing these objectives, together with supporting statistical data which show resources needed, probable sources for such additional resources as are needed, etc.

These departmental proposals are transmitted to Service du Plan



2) which prepares a general report:

The general report brings together all the program proposals and comments on

- (a) overlaps and conflicts
- (b) extent to which proposals exceed current resources
- (c) major problems and possibilities

3) Council of Economic Development considers general report; fixes

(Council of Economic Development is Cabinet Committee, presided over by President)

- (a) objectives
- (b) priorities
- (c) major program outlines


4) Decisions are communicated to

Service du Plan

and to Departmental planning staffs

5) Departments revise program objectives and prepare

- (a) Legislative proposals for first year, including
- (b) Budget estimates
- (c) Long-range project schedules, with cost estimates.



6) Long-range project schedules go back to Service du Plan, which incorporates them into revised General Plan which it has already begun. Coordinates with Budget Bureau (see opposite).



Legislative proposals and budget estimates go to Bureau of Budget, with copies to Service du Plan for information. Budget Bureau reviews, begins preparation of President's budget. Representatives of Service du Plan sit in on final stages of review.

7) Council of Economic Development receives General Plan and first year budget, reviews, makes recommendations to President who makes final decisions.




8) President submits Plan and Budget to National Assembly.




National Assembly considers, adopts necessary legislation, transmits to President.

9) President transmits to Service du Plan, Budget Bureau, and Ministries.



10) Ministries begin execution, subject to budget controls. When Ministries prepare projects obligating funds, affecting credit, employment, or purchasing power, copies go to Service du Plan. Service du Plan makes periodic reports to President, advising on problems of coordination and revision. President coordinates through Council of Economic Development, which meets once a week until practice shows less frequent meetings needed.

ORGANISATION PROPOSÉE



the function of policy development could be energized. Personnel research is much needed in Vietnam, and the Direction de la Fonction Publique could make a notable contribution in this direction. Training programs, employee representation systems, recruitment and examination methods--these and many more aspects of personnel management should be developed. They can be developed by a central personnel agency under dynamic leadership.

The structure of the Presidency, reorganized as outlined in these pages, is shown in the organization chart on the following page.

- (13) A survey could be made at an early date to examine the possibilities of remodeling and expanding the office space available to Presidency personnel. If it should prove impractical to remodel the Palace of Independence, the possibility of constructing a new office building on the Palace grounds should be explored.
- (14) Short intensive training courses should be organized for personnel in the Services du Presse, Protocole, and Chiffre. Such courses might be arranged in conjunction with appropriate U. S. or other foreign agencies in Saigon. A long-range recruitment plan for Presidency personnel might be prepared, which would lay the basis for bringing in only the better trained and most competent civil servants.
- (15) Surveys should be made of the Presidency's security, filing, and internal telecommunications systems to determine if improved methods could be instituted. Specialists in these matters are available in the Michigan State University Group, should the Government wish to call on them for such a purpose.