

August 4, 1958

TO: Chief Advisor
FROM: Coordinator
SUBJECT: Police Leader Itineraries and Participant Lead Time
RE: Your Memo of July 7

I have just received carbons of the two 29 July letters that Art sent to you and Hoyt. I was disturbed to note that in both of them he said, in regard to the police leaders, "We had nothing to do with planning the program". This is very much in error. I have spoken to Art since and brought him up to date with the facts.

Since there have been so many erroneous conceptions about this particular subject, I feel somewhat compelled to put its history into the record. Part of the story revolves around the issue of East Lansing planning for the various participants. As you will recall, in my July 7 memo I made a plea for more lead time in receiving Saigon's recommendations. Saigon had led us to believe that planning for leaders should be determined in Saigon; as a result we awaited the recommendations for the first group of police leaders to the point that these misconceptions arose. If you will recall, when the word came to East Lansing that Mr. Trach and Mr. Them were coming we immediately went to work, drew up an itinerary and proposed it to Saigon. Saigon ignored our proposal, did not even comment on it, and submitted its own. Thus, when we were informed of the impending arrival of the four police leaders and of the impending transmission of a proposed itinerary by Saigon, our natural reaction was to wait for that itinerary before attempting plans of our own. Art was informed that the police leaders were coming; Art and I even agreed that Shelby would be used to direct the program. However, it was my suggestion to Art that we not plan the program until the proposed itinerary did arrive from Saigon. As you now know, this took a matter of weeks. (In your July 17 memo, first paragraph, you state puzzlement about my interpretation of your earlier June 5 memo. I was at that point also referring to the Saigon lag--agreeing with your own concern.)

When the long awaited proposed itinerary did arrive, it unfortunately arrived just prior to the departure for Washington of Elsie (for unrelated reasons) leaving no time to work through Art until she returned to Lansing in three or four days. We left East Lansing on about June 15 and she was back in Lansing on about the 18th. The police people down at ICA learned that she was in Washington and they offered to assist in setting a program up. Given the lateness of the date, Elsie accepted that offer but on the condition that the program be based solely on Saigon's recommendations. When Elsie returned to Lansing, she went over the program with Turner as worked out with ICA and IACP. Certain changes were discussed and made at that time.

Memo to Chief Advisor -- August 4, 1958

A short while later I returned to campus on approximately the same issue and as you know, proceeded to the Coast. Before leaving, I received from Art some further recommendations and while on the Coast I made these *changes*. Art had also proposed that they also be sent to St. Louis. For what I felt was a legitimate reason, their fatigue, I argued against that stop. However, all this time Turner and Shelby were in constant communication with the Coast and changes were being made right along. It is important to note that most of the itinerary originally based on the Saigon proposal was changed with regard to Saigon's considerations. When the group arrived in Lansing, Shelby, Turner, Elsie and myself reviewed the remainder of the itinerary, considering both the Vietnamese criticisms and suggestions, and our own observations. Shelby has now gone to Washington with the group where he will remain until he is satisfied that the Washington people, ICA and IACP and the FBI, are providing what we really want.

To sum up, then, I feel that Art was simply away from campus when we so thoroughly reviewed and restructured the itinerary with Shelby and Turner. The confusion stems from the fact that too much time had slipped away before we had received the proposed itinerary. We were reluctant to move ahead with our own plans because of the experience with the Trach itinerary. In the future, and as is present practice regarding Mr. Thong and the second group of police leaders, we are moving ahead on the respective itineraries without having heard from Saigon. I hope you will inform Howard that MSU did not abdicate its responsibilities to the point that could be inferred from Art's letter. Further, Washington will not be involved in the planning for the second group. I hope that this is the last word written on this subject.

SKS/abr

cc: Art Brandstatter

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
VIETNAM ADVISORY GROUP

MAILING ADDRESS : MSU - USOM
 AMERICAN EMBASSY
 SAIGON - VIETNAM

CABLE ADDRESS : MICHGOVBUR

GENERAL OFFICE :
 137, DUONG PASTEUR

TELEPH. NUMBER : 22.022-21.528
 SAIGON : 383-384

August 4, 1958

TO: The Coordinator
 FROM: The Chief Advisor *WAS*
 SUBJECT: Contract and Police Program

I do not see much to disagree with in your July 31 memorandum on the police program. As far as I am concerned, you can rule out the possibility of our continuing to operate a police group at the present strength. It then becomes a matter of how far we reduce. Unless the situation takes an unforeseen turn, I believe that our estimate of an eight to ten man Police Division will be realistic. I will not be satisfied with only Ralph Turner out of the present Police Department. It may take some patient selling on the part of people on campus to point out the desirability of serving with the project in the police field. Have there been any developments which would indicate that the Police Administration Department is becoming more interested in this kind of international activity? For example, has anything come of the international police institute which Art Brandstatter called me about six months ago and then never followed up on it?

I agree with you that if Barrows objects strongly to a split program, we should move in the direction of your last alternative. Even if this occurs, however, it might be desirable to bring a few highly specialized people here, such as Ralph Turner. I would not push this very far but it might serve as a final compromise point to the desires of our own Department of Police Administration should we have to move out of the police field here.

As for contract negotiation in general, Barrows agreed this morning that we are on the right track, namely, trying to find another alternative to short term extension by going ahead with a six-month extension, if necessary, to get us over the hump. If I do not receive a cable from you in response to my S-42, I will be sending a proposed amendment to Secretary of State at the Presidency Thuan tomorrow. If your reaction to my suggestion and the one being sent by USOM to ICA still has to be negative, I will proceed with the amendment.

I believe that Thuan expects me to submit the amendment to him and sees little likelihood of some other solution occurring. A stumbling block which you probably have not thought of in this six-month extension of the

3-SL-44

corollary agreement is the fact that we would have to extend the budget as well "in order to protect the interests of the University," as Walter Menke put it. I do not fully agree with him but he is the best legal advisor we have. If we have to add piasters to the budget, we get enmeshed with the piaster shortage problems and cannot treat this as lightly as would otherwise be the case.

RHS:mrw

Am proceeding leaving piaster question
completely open to further negotiation
after 6 month extension is signed.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

VIETNAM ADVISORY GROUP

MAILING ADDRESS: MSU - USOM
 AMERICAN EMBASSY
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CABLE ADDRESS: MICHGOVBUR

GENERAL OFFICE:
 137, DUONG PASTEUR

TELEPH. NUMBER: 22.022-21.528
 SAIGON: 383-384

August 5, 1958

TO: Coordinator *HWH*

FROM: H.W. Hoyt, Chief, Police Administration Division

THRU: Dr. Smuckler, Chief Advisor *RHS*

SUBJ: Motor Vehicle Registration Program

As indicated in correspondence from the Chief Advisor, we are working out a schedule in which we are planning for the services of Mr. Chalfant starting with the winter quarter. In the meantime, Mr. Newman will continue to work closely with the Department of Public Works in which the motor vehicle registration and drivers' licensing responsibilities rests. Mr. Newman will be asked to contact Mr. Chalfant directly and forward to him all information as it comes into his hands; for example, the number of vehicles registered in Vietnam, the types of vehicles, the present licensing procedures, the forms used, etc. He will try to learn more of what the Government of Vietnam really wants from a new motor vehicle registration setup, e.g. taxes, controls, efficiency, statistics, better service to the public.

We plan to get in touch with the Minister of Public Works within the next week, advising him of our new schedule as we see it now for bringing over our consultant. We will also work out the working relations for Mr. Newman for the next few months. We will go as far as we can in preliminary work so that Mr. Chalfant's services can be used most efficiently when he arrives.

HWH/her

cc: Chief Advisor
 Mr. Newman

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE • EAST LANSING

HEALTH SERVICE

August 5, 1958

Mr. Stanley K. Sheinbaum
Coordinator, Vietnam Project
9-A Wells Hall
Campus

Re: Mr. Tran Ba Thanh

Dear Mr. Sheinbaum:

The above named Mr. Thanh was under the direct observation of the Michigan State University Health Service from July 9, 1958 until the morning of July 14, 1958. During this period of time he was not found to be addicted to the usage of any drugs or intoxicants.

Examination of Mr. Thanh's chest revealed healed, old, minimal, bilateral pulmonary tuberculosis. There was no evidence of any active tubercular infection and hence he was not a case of contagion.

Respectfully,

James S. Feurig, M.D.
James S. Feurig, M.D.
Medical Director

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
VIETNAM ADVISORY GROUP

MAILING ADDRESS : MSU-USOM
AMERICAN EMBASSY
SAIGON — VIETNAM
CABLE ADDRESS : MICHGOVBUR

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ADVISOR

GENERAL OFFICE :
137, DUONG PASTEUR
TELEPH. NUMBER : 22.022-21.528
SAIGON : 383 - 384

August 7, 1958

TO: Coordinator 

FROM: Chief Advisor 

SUBJECT: Police Staffing

I do not believe it is too early to begin considering the arrangements for the police project after June 30, 1959. It is true we have already given this a good deal of consideration and are generally agreed on a University policy. However, you will recall that my proposal for an 8 to 10 member police staff under the new contract arrangement was based on an important assumption that our Police Administration School would be sufficiently interested in the work out here to provide more than one staff member. Since you have given me some indication that only one police staff member is interested in coming to Vietnam as a regular MSUG person, I believe it is time to reexamine that assumption and thus to reexamine our projected police project.

Keep in mind that the position the University is presently taking may not be acceptable for any one of several different reasons to either the Government of Vietnam or USOM. The Secretary of Interior, with whom we will be discussing our police program in order to arrive at agreement on the police activity beyond our present contract, may request that we increase or decrease our emphasis in certain fields. I feel strongly that we must not increase above ten, and it is the position I will take. However, we may meet with some discontent and even a request to scale it down to a smaller number. There is also the question of whether USOM will want to get into the police field and take over our police activity. This is related to the outcome of the Civil Guard issue, which is far from settled. Therefore at the outset of this memorandum you should realize that one of the major problems we will face in negotiating our contract lies in the police program and the personnel totals implied by that program.

Another thing that you should take into consideration is the fact that our police project has been for the most part quite successful. It is highly regarded by USOM and by the Government of Vietnam, I believe. I might add that in my opinion a good deal of the satisfaction with our police work on the part of the Vietnamese Government is related to our advisory role to USOM in obtaining new police equipment. However, our general rapport with the police services is good, and, with a few exceptions, our staff is effective.

If it is true that only one MSU faculty member is willing to come to Vietnam, I am not sure that we should argue at all for the continuation of our police project. Jack Ryan, who is at present the only representative of our campus out of a large staff of police advisors, will be completing his second two-year tour before we are very far into our new contract. I believe we all assume that Jack should return to the United States at that time. If Ralph Turner comes out, he will be a source of strength and a valuable addition to the police staff. However, with the departure of Jack Ryan, we would again have only one person out here from the campus. Even if Ralph Turner is put in a place of leadership, he would be surrounded by non-MSU people, who, while they may be good and effective police specialists, would not return to MSU nor could they be expected to develop any particular loyalties to the University during a brief tour in Saigon. I might add parenthetically that Ralph Turner would be hard pressed to fulfill a leadership role and also do the important work on the crime laboratory and records management which we will want him to do.

I cannot honestly recommend that it is to the University's interest to continue a police project unless additional MSU staff become a part of it. As I understand the desires of the University, this would run contrary to our general feeling about University technical assistance abroad. We would be a type of recruiting and supervising agency rather than participating in the development of our own University faculty while providing service abroad.

I believe you should take this up very seriously with Dean Seelye and Dean Taggart and also with Art Brandstatter. I am not trying to put pressure on people to come out if they do not want to, nor am I trying to convince Art Brandstatter that it is in his interest to have more people out here. I am willing to accept whatever interest Dean Seelye, Art Brandstatter, and the police faculty consider to be theirs. However, I believe this requires serious consideration on campus and some guidance to me as I go into these negotiations out here.

It may be reasonable to propose that MSU bring out several specialists on its staff and make them available to a civil police unit established at USOM. In this way Ralph Turner might be brought out, and from time

to time other MSU police people might be used, if available. If this is a reasonable alternative to maintaining a staff of 8 to 10 police advisors, only one of whom would be from East Lansing, I would like to get the University's reaction..

I would appreciate hearing from you rather soon on this since I hope to have opened discussions with Secretary of Interior Lam Le Trinh and others by the end of next week.

RHS/dcm

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

VIETNAM ADVISORY GROUP

MAILING ADDRESS: MSU - USOM
AMERICAN EMBASSY
SAIGON - VIETNAM

CABLE ADDRESS: MICHGOVSBUR

GENERAL OFFICE:
137, DUONG PASTEUR
TELEPH. NUMBER: 22.022-21.528
SAIGON: 783-784

August 20, 1958

TO: Coordinator
FROM: Chief Advisor
SUBJECT: Contract Negotiations #1

No sooner do I get over one hurdle than another appears! We now have the letter from the Government, and its contents have been cabled to you. I hope that USOM's cable containing the contents of the letter was sent through their channels last night. If not, it will go out today.

The new hurdle relates to the police program. Yesterday afternoon we had a special meeting at USOM to discuss the current negotiations on the Civil Guard. It appears that the Civil Guard will be a combination of military and civilian to the point where USOM can supply equipment. This is tentative, but if I were to predict an outcome of the present situation, I would say that USOM may have to set up some kind of a division or organization to handle the Civil Guard. Barrows appears to accept our position and is not applying pressure for us to become involved in the Civil Guard. Furthermore, we do not know if the Government desires any civilian advisors at all, and therefore USOM does not know exactly how to staff this either.

As the USOM organization is established, the question of the total operation of the police program will come into focus. I believe that Barrows will be interested in seeing that USOM operates the whole thing, but he may be saying this only to try to move us toward taking the Civil Guard.

I hope to receive East Lansing's reactions to my police program memorandum of August 7. If by the time you receive this you have not sent me a reaction to that memorandum, would you please cable the general viewpoint of East Lansing. Since I am already being pushed by Mr. Thuan and Mr. Lam Le Trinh, Secretary of State for Interior, to give them my program plans for the future of MSUG, it is essential that I have a clearer picture of the situation on campus before I

submit a basic memorandum. Therefore I need the type of guidance requested in my August 7 memorandum.

Believe me, the situation in the police program negotiations is now up in the air.

RHS/dcm

Note: You will note that I am starting to number contract negotiation memoranda beginning with this one as #1. (For cable purposes, let's call them CNM.)

August 21, 1968

To: Dr. Ralph H. Smuckler, Chief Advisor
From: Stanley K. Sheinbaum, Coordinator
Subject: Police Program Directive

The University desires to retain its involvement in the police program in Saigon. MSU has a specialized competence beneficial, we believe, to the U. S. technical assistance program. Furthermore, MSU has a long-range interest in continuing its support because of its plans to develop its on-campus international police curriculum. However, to make its contribution in Vietnam an optimum one the University's role must be more narrowly defined than at present.

MSU must withdraw from those action-oriented aspects of the police program; e.g., the administration of U.S. aid equipment, the work of Art's friends, etc. MSU's efforts have to be concentrated in those educational and advisory activities that will represent an extension of the School of Police Administration's on-campus program. These will include training, research, reorganizational work, and such specialized fields as radio communications, traffic, etc. Only by doing this can East Lansing provide substantive guidance and thereby make the University's involvement meaningful.

Realistically, MSU can furnish only two or three of its campus police faculty; these can provide leadership to a staff in Saigon of no more than about eight. As the size of the police group in Saigon is larger the University's function becomes predominantly recruitment and administration and, again, less substantive.

Further, the present nature of the police program has subjected MSU to criticism. An educationally-oriented program in Saigon enriches the experience of MSU staff in a manner that enhances the on-campus program. Action-oriented and economic aid operations do not optimally draw on the University's competence nor accrue to it the academic enrichment and prestige it should obtain.

A meaningful and operationally-feasible division of effort along these lines can and must be made with USOM. The lines are clear. We urge this because of the University's strong desire to provide maximum support to the U.S. technical assistance program in Vietnam.

SKS:bmc
CC: President John A. Hannah
Philip J. May
Thomas H. Hamilton
Alfred L. Sealy
Glen L. Taggart
Arthur Brandstatter

August 21, 1958

TO: Coordinator
FROM: Chief Advisor
SUBJECT: Police Program

I have just received your memorandum of August 15 giving me a one paragraph resume of your discussions of my August 7 memorandum. I understand from your statement that we should proceed to develop plans for an 8-10 man police section within MSUG.

Although I have mentioned this earlier, I feel I should go into a bit more detail concerning the status of negotiations in the police field. I would appreciate your showing this to Art Brandstatter or anybody else if, in your judgment, it deserves broader circulation.

It now appears that USOM will create a Civil Police Division in order to handle any staffing which may be necessary in connection with the Civil Guard program. Since MSU has decided (I am sure correctly) not to become involved with that organization, USOM will probably have to pick up the ball. When USOM sets up a Civil Police Division it will probably be recruiting some civil police advisors, and these would be involved in the same types of police problems and be drawn from the same backgrounds as our people. Barrows may well feel that if he must go this far he should go considerably farther and absorb the entire police activity. You should be aware of the fact that this is not only a possible outcome but might even be considered a probable development.

Even if some type of split operation is developed, the question arises as to who in fact serves as the head of the police advisory work done by Americans in Saigon. Will it be the USOM Civil Police Division Chief, or the MSUG Police Administration Division head, assuming we would have such an individual heading up a section of our staff? Since we are talking in terms of millions of dollars of aid equipment, I feel quite sure that Barrows would want the top man within his own office. We then come to the question of whether

MSU wants to continue a program which it would not really control. With a split operation and the head of the total police advisory work at USOM, our portion of the operation would probably be subsidiary and questions of loyalty and leadership would be unclear.

The Government of Vietnam has not yet been asked about its desires pertaining to the future MSU police role. It may be that the Government will want MSU to continue with the Surete and municipal police advisory work while recognizing USOM's role in the Civil Guard. If the Government takes this position and USOM takes the contrary view, we may well be in for a period of delicate negotiations in which questions of importance to American policy here would be matched against the desires of the Government of Vietnam, with MSU in the middle. I think you can see the problem we might face during these negotiations. While we would want to do right in relation to the Government, we also have a certain loyalty to follow American policy and not work against it.

I am mentioning these things to you at this time because during the next few weeks I may be called upon to make various decisions and proposals. I want you to understand at the outset that the situation in our police program is highly fluid and could go in any of a number of different directions. The one direction which we will not move in is to increase our staff in order to handle the Civil Guard work. If some kind of functional break or organizational break desired by the U.S. Government and the VNG can be found, we will move in that direction. However, it may turn out that we will only staff in the police field by bringing out one or two or three individual specialists from our faculty to advise on highly specialized matters such as records and crime laboratory.

Let me comment on your selection of Ryan as the successor to Hoyt and Turner as the replacement for Jack. I think that Ryan could move into Howard's job without too much difficulty after Howard leaves. However, this assumes that Jack's volatile nature will not cause any eruptions and that his cynical attitude toward the Government will not be too disruptive. Jack has been doing a good job, and on the whole I agree with the "substantial agreement" that you seem to have arrived at on campus. As for Turner following Ryan, let me point out that Turner's services as a specialist are greatly needed here. In fact, just yesterday Howard Hoyt mentioned to me that they certainly could use him out here before next summer to continue the good work in records management. As important as the records management consulting will be, Turner's contribution in the crime laboratory should be even greater. In fact, I have been assuming that with Ralph on the scene he would spend very little time in MSUG offices while spending most of the day working with

the laboratory and records people of the Surete. How he could couple these consulting assignments with the management of the police staff if it totals 8 or 10 people is beyond me. Therefore I hesitate to say either yes or no at the present time to Turner's replacing Ryan. You might ask Art Brandstatter if he has a good records management and identification man on his staff who could come out and take over at least that part of the work which we are now considering for Ralph Turner. Such a person should be recruited after our present contract negotiations clear the air and would probably be a one-year appointment.

Please do not discuss my stated position and view concerning the future of the Civil Guard and our police project with Mac Salter. In many of these cases, I am thinking aloud and you may have information which has not yet been given to ICAW. Thus you should keep it to yourself, realizing that the discussions out here will tell the tale rather than anything you might initiate vis-a-vis ICAW. I suggest the same caution to Art, i.e., when he talks with Washington.

I am looking forward to your longer memorandum on the meeting since it may give me a better feel for the viewpoint on campus. I do appreciate, however, the very prompt reply to the basic question, and it gives me some basis for moving ahead.

RHS/dcm

p.s. I am adding this additional comment so that you do not misunderstand my view of Turner. I think he is an excellent man and could do the job without any question. My reservation about his being too busy in his specialty could be overcome if we had a good #2 assistant to him or if somebody else came out to do the records management job. In any case, I hope you are going slow with any commitments such as this related to a division chief job, since we are not sure there will be a division. I would hate to have a staff member disappointed once he arrived.

This memo is aimed at informing you about the current situation rather than asking for any particular action. I sometimes feel I am overinforming East Lansing on undecided matters and thereby creating difficulties at your end. I hope this is not true.

August 27, 1958

To: Ralph H. Smuckler, Chief Advisor
From: Stanley K. Sheinbaum, Coordinator
Subject: Police Staffing re Your Memo 21 August (CNM #4)

By now you have received the police program directive that states the campus position. This morning I received your August 21st memo outlining the possible alternative courses the police program may take after July 1959. Deans Seelye and Taggart are on vacation, but fortunately I was able to sit down immediately with Art Brandstatter to discuss it.

First, I want to allay your fears about "over-informing" us. It is best that we do our thinking here with the various alternatives in mind, and, in turn, think in terms of alternatives. Otherwise, reactions we transmit to you on a given subject could be meaningless because by the time they reached you one of the ^{OTHER} Saigon alternatives might be predominant. Furthermore, we are not in discussion with ICA/W on the subject, and we will avoid being so until a position has been established. As you put it, the Saigon picture is "fluid"; I do not want to muddy the fluids.

The hope, of course, is that Barrows does not attempt to "absorb the entire police activity". We understand why he may wish to do so, but you should try to resist this extreme. MSU has made an investment, from which it now can start accruing benefits; to lose that opportunity at this stage would be in error. Further, Art's campus operation is now able to supply larger numbers from its regular staff, a factor previously not available. We also must consider the prestige factor involved in the University's bowing out of the police picture while the Public Administration Division continued. At the very worst you should accept no less than an MSU role of bringing out "on or two or three" individual specialists from our own faculty. And the best, of course, is the position stated in the directive: around eight. (A leeway of one or ± two either side of that eight is at your own discretion.)

The session with Art also gave me an opportunity to relay to Art the results of my meeting with President Hannah. I have already relayed to you his concerns that the directive might be too limiting for your negotiations. He authorized me to tell you that your evaluation and judgement will carry the greatest weight factor in the final decision since we're not in full command of the necessary background and nuances.

As for your concerns about Ralph Turner's assuming leadership of the police group there is really not too much concern inasmuch as one of the men Art has

2 - Sheinbaum to Smuckler re Police CNN #4

August 27, 1958

has in mind would make a good number to man to Ralph's substantive role. We await your final reactions on both Ryan and Ralph. In the meantime I am asking for a brief statement from Art on the qualifications of the various MSU police staff who have expressed interest.

SKS:jg

cc: Deank Seelye
Dean Taggart
Art Brandstatter

August 27, 1958

To: Ralph Smuckler, Chief Advisor
From: Stanley K. Sheinbaum, Coordinator
Subject: Explanations of Revised CNM #3 and of CNM#4.

In my hurry to catch the afternoon mail I dictated the results of my meeting with President Hannah in a way that gave me cause for concern later in the evening. Thus my EL-52 and the revision of CNM #3. Implicit in the original CNM #3 (Aug 26) was the authority for latitude in only one direction, increase above the "about eight". The new CNM #3 (Aug 27) gives the authority ~~above~~ in both directions.

However, you must know that my meeting with President Hannah and the dictation of the revised CNM #3 both occurred prior to receipt of your August 21st memo. Thus you cannot now consider the authority for ~~altitude~~ as permitting as complete a phase-down, actually a phase-out as the alternative of having Barrows "absorb the entire police activity."

As for such an extreme possibility let me say that Art's reaction was not violent. He, of course, is opposed to a complete withdrawal as I indicate in my CNM# #4. Getting that approved on campus will involve something of a struggle as I'm certain you are aware. Glen will be back on Tuesday and with him I'm going to move ahead on the basis that it is a "probable" alternative. It may take a while however to provide you with a concrete answer; nevertheless, it has priority and I'll try to avoid delay. Let me point out again that Art's reaction "was not violent". I had expected a stronger expression of resistance to the possibility from him, and I was actually surprised by his moderateness. The position stated in CNM #4 (in the same enclosure) is really his; I hoped you would infer that.

SKS:jg