

REPORT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY AGENCIES  
IN THE  
PROVINCE OF QUANG NAM, CENTRAL LOWLANDS, VIETNAM

Michigan State University  
Vietnam Advisory Group

April, 1961

Lloyd D. Musolf  
Chief Advisor

Ralph F. Turner  
Chief Police Advisor

Paul M. Shields  
Police Advisor

The following report of law enforcement and security agencies in the Province of Quang Nam, Central Lowlands, Vietnam was prepared as part of a study of provincial, district and village administration in the Province of Quang Nam. The study was under the general guidance of members of the Public Administration Division of the Michigan State University Advisory Group. The information pertaining to law enforcement and security services was obtained and developed by Mr. Paul M. Shields, of the Police Administration Division of MSUG. The study in the field was conducted from March 28 to April 1, 1961.

REPORT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY AGENCIES  
in the  
PROVINCE OF QUANG NAM, CENTRAL LOWLANDS, VIETNAM

Cam An Village

General

One of the 30 villages which constitute the Dien Ban district, Quang Nam province, the Cam An village is a narrow spit of land hugging the South China Sea and located on the Hoi An River mouth which is strewn with numerous islets. It is about 12 square kilometers large and has a population of 6,491 (3,315 adults). In addition to the peninsula, it consists also of a group of three off-shore islands, only one of which is inhabited by some 250 people. It is the Cham island.

The Cam An village is administratively divided into four "Thon" (hamlets), namely: An Bang, Tan Thanh, Phuoc Trach and Tan Hiep (Cham island).

Apart from an inhabited islet which annually yields a crop of salangane nests valued at \$450,000 \$VN (which revenue goes to the national budget), the village's sole industry is sea and river fishing. There are very few rice fields and very little trading.

The majority of the people are fishermen and the local economy is to a large extent dependent upon the weather conditions. Except during the hot season -- April to August -- when Hoi An townsfolk customarily flock to its sandy beaches, the village seemingly lives in a kind of torpor most of the time.

The Police Chief

The Village Councilor in charge of Police is Mr. Nguyen Duong. Born in 1930, married and having one child, with a primary school education, Mr. Duong is a fisherman, like most villagers. From 1951 to 1953, after receiving basic military training in Hue, he served two years with the Vietnamese Army (Artillery Company of the 2nd G.A.V.N. or Vietnamese Autonomous Battle-Group) and obtained the Valiancy Cross with one citation. After his discharge, he returned to Cam An and resumed his original trade. He was appointed chief of a cluster of houses (Lien Gia Truong) until 1958 when he was nominated chief of the village Self-Defense Corps (Dan Ve). Early in 1960, he underwent at the district seat of Dien Ban a two-month military training course intended for the 600 men of the district self-defense corps and village police councilors. Supervised by the District Chief

and conducted by Army officers, the course consisted of mainly: close-order drill, combat, elementary tactics, tactical movements, weapons and camouflage. The curriculum has no law-enforcement studies. In July 1960, Police Chief Nguyen Nhan retired and Mr. Duong was appointed Cam An Police councilor and simultaneously held the function of SDC Chief, theoretically with 15 men under his command (actually there were only 3 SDC men; the rest had been integrated into the cantonal mobile unit.) Since January 1, 1961, the village SDC unit has no longer existed; some of the men have been discharged, some have enlisted in the Civil Guard, and the 12 remaining men have been assigned to the Tong Doan Dan Ve (Cantonal Self-Defense Unit). The police councilor's salary is 1,500 \$VN a month. Mr. Duong actually was paid for only 2 months. Payment has been suspended since August 1960 due to a shortage of public funds.

The village budget amounting to \$277,000 VN, is based mainly on yearly contributions of 40 \$VN per adult (60 \$VN for FY-1961). The 1960 revenue amounted to only \$161,000 VN. A great many citizens were not in a position to contribute because of a bad fish crop. Because his job is a full time occupation, Mr. Duong has been supported by his family since receiving his last pay.

#### Recruitment and selection

The police councilor was appointed by the Dien Ban District Chief, based upon recommendations submitted by the Cam An village representative after consultations with local popular groups. Loyalty to the National Government, good behaviour and mores, good physical condition and military experience seem to be the unwritten criteria for selection. There exists no real promotion in that position. The only advancement would be for the police councilor to take office as Village Representative, in case of resignation, retirement or dismissal of the man occupying that position.

#### Organization

Prior to January 1961, the Police councilor who was at the same time the Village Self Defense Corps Chief, had under his command, theoretically 16 (but actually 3) armed SDC men and 864 men of the "Nhan Dan Tu Ve Doan" or "Popular Self Defense Group", distributed into 24 platoons of 36 men or 72 squads of 12 men. He was equipped with one French Mat-submachine gun. Since January 1, 1961, he has been simply police councilor, and no longer is entitled to a firearm. The village SDC was merged in the SDC cantonal unit.

In carrying out his functions, the police councilor is assisted by four "Thon Doan Truong" (people's Self Defense Chief in a hamlet). Each of these men is in charge of six platoons or 18 squads of 12 self-defense men. Besides, each Thon has at its disposal one "Tieu Doi Dac Biet" (special Squad) of 12 men, all former draftees or servicemen who have received basic military training.

The "Nhan Dan Tu Ve Doan" (People's Self Defense Group)

Every able-bodied male adult between 18 and 56 years of age belongs to this organization. Men are grouped into squads of 12. Three squads make a platoon. Each hamlet has the required number of six platoons.

Functions:

No daytime operation. Each platoon is in turn on duty one night out of six. It mans the three watchposts existing in each hamlet. Four former servicemen from the "Special Squad" are to stay constantly at the disposal of the Hamlet Self Defense Chief. The remaining 16 men of the platoon (including the platoon leader) must go out, at least twice every night, patrolling within the hamlet boundaries.

Each man has the following standard armament:


1. One 5' 7" long (1<sup>m</sup>70) wooden stick.
2. One 5-meter rope.
3. One kerosene torch.
4. One tocsin (in most cases, a piece of hollow bamboo)
5. One bag containing 25 rocks or brick splinters (used as a hand-thrown projectile).

The on-and-off four-week training course directed by the police councilor and closely dependent on weather conditions (most men are at sea in case of fine weather) consists of: close order drill, ambush techniques, patrol and search, watch and guard, deployment and disposition in case of emergency.

The basic functions of the "People's Self Defense Group" are to ensure security and maintain peace and order in the various hamlets. Questioned as to their effectiveness in case of subversive Viet Cong activity, Mr. Nguyen Duong said that such units are known to have kept at bay armed Viet Cong agents elsewhere in Quang Nam province. They surrounded the Viet Cong and threw rocks at them, having no other weapons.

ORGANIZATION CHART

C A M   A N   V I L L A G E



Note: "Hamlet (administrative) Chiefs" are appointed by District Chief upon recommendations of village council whereas Hamlet Self-Defense Chiefs are nominated by the village council itself; they are not volunteers.

### Functions of the Police councilor

Mr. Nguyen Duong holds all police powers and judicial authority in the village. He has the right to make an arrest, to keep a minor offender in custody for 2 hours, to inflict fines not exceeding 30\$ (or one day's work in behalf of the community in case of insolvency) and to administer justice in minor disputes.

He has a regular six and one-half hours of attendance every day of the week (from 8 to 11:30 a.m. and from 2:30 to 5:30 p.m.) including Sunday. He patrols every night in the three hamlets located on the mainland (from 9 p.m. to 11 p.m. in one hamlet, from 11 p.m. to 1 a.m. in another one, then from 1 to 4:30 a.m. in the third one.)

In terms of office work, he has to serve all court warrants or subpoenas and government orders regarding draft or ex-servicemen called up for the yearly training period. (In such cases, he makes copies of the paper in question, sends the council's only messenger out to summon the party concerned to the communal house, then, to have him or her sign the notification.) He issues authorizations for villagers to travel outside the province (suspected subversives are barred from that privilege) and also rice trading licenses (when rice is rationed as it is currently.) He has to report monthly to the District Chief the number of villagers who have joined the Vietcong after the Geneva Agreement. (The figure was 55 and has remained unchanged since 1955.) He is responsible for the surveillance of the "can cuu" or "offenders under investigation." These people, 51 in all, are suspected of being sympathizers with the Vietcong, either because some relatives of theirs have joined the Vietcong or because they were denounced as suspects by other inhabitants during public meetings held years ago (around 1955.)

An agent of the Hoi An VBI is permanently assigned to Cam An village for the surveillance of these suspects. The cooperation between the local police councilor and that agent is confined to an exchange of the information to be used in their monthly reports regarding the situation of these suspects.

### Patrol and Inspection

The watch and patrol in each hamlet being assumed by the self-defense platoon on duty, the night beat walked by the police councilor should be called more properly an inspection tour. He usually starts out at 9 p.m. and goes to one of the three hamlets. There, he first gets in touch with the hamlet self-defense chief who then sends for the 12 men comprising the "special squad." Once all of them are rounded up, they start patrolling the hamlet area and checking the fixed watchposts. After he is finished with one hamlet, the "special squad" is dismissed and he goes to another hamlet and repeats the operation.

In case of emergency, the police councilor could ask the district chief's office for help. Depending on the case, one armed squad or platoon of self defense corps could be sent to the village.

Liaison is performed by bicycle and it takes two and one-half hours for the messenger to reach Dien Ban district seat. On his way to Dien Ban, he must pass Hoi An (Quang Nam province seat) which is only ~~4.5 km~~ <sup>4.5 km</sup> away. But he need not stop there, having no business to do with provincial level agencies. By the same token, he could not contact either the cantonal SDC unit responsible for the security in the group of villages to which belongs Cam An, since that unit is supposedly mobile and the police councilor does not know where it is stationed. There would be no problem if the cantonal unit happened to be bivouacking in the village.

#### Crime Rate

Although he denied, at first, having had any trouble: "No law violation, no fights, no complaint, no land disputes, no gambling, no prostitution," the police councilor finally conceded that since he took office, July 1, 1960, he has had to deal with two cases (?); one suicide and one theft.

The suicide case occurred about 2 months prior to this interview. One night, the police councilor was notified at exactly 11:30 p.m. that a woman had committed suicide in the fishermen's hamlet by drowning herself in the river. Around midnight, he arrived on the spot. The body of the victim had been already recovered and laid in her house. After ascertaining the victim was dead, he made (with the village representative's assistance; he admitted that he was not familiar with that matter, lacking training and experience) a certified statement of the case and then proceeded to interrogate witnesses. He finished his report at 2 a.m. and sent it, at once, to the district chief, with one duplicate copy to the Gendarmerie outpost in Dien Ban. The next morning, at 9 a.m., one gendarme came to Cam An to make inquiries. His findings appeared to confirm the preliminary report made by the police councilor. The victim, a newly wed young girl, had jumped into the water to drown herself. Alerted neighbors could not rescue her because of darkness. Rumors had it that she had been unhappy since her marriage and that she had suffered from her mother-in-law's mistreatment. With the gendarme's agreement, the village council issued a burial permit, and the gendarme left.

Nevertheless, the victim's family refused to bury her, complaining that justice had not been done. The body was kept there for two more days. The police counselor could do nothing but once again notify the Gendarmerie. The gendarmes came back this time with an ambulance and a man in white smock they thought to be a medical doctor. The latter said that since the victim's parents questioned the death of their offspring, he was bound to perform an autopsy

right in their home. The parents were disturbed by this information so they withdrew their complaints and buried the victim the same day. Some time afterward, the victim's husband and parents-in-law were reportedly summoned to the Hoi An tribunal by an examining judge and were allowed to go free after testimonies. That is the extent of the police councilor's knowledge of the case development.

The other case dealt with a theft of jewelry just before Tet. A villager found, one day, that one pair of earrings he kept in a locked suitcase had disappeared. He suspected a neighboring woman of having stolen them but did not file a complaint. He waited, until one day the suspected woman went to the bus station intending to go to Hoi An. He intercepted her there, searched her, and found the earrings. The struggle resulted in a fight which attracted a large crowd.. Both were arrested. The girl denied having stolen the earrings, affirmed she had bought them in Hoi An. The complainant could not prove his property ownership. The police councilor simply took their statements, made a report in triplicate addressed to the Quang Nam Court, the District Chief's office, and the Gendarmerie. The parties involved were at the same time placed at the disposal of the Court. The police councilor did not follow up the case and therefore did not know its final disposition.

#### Unity of Command

In any case of law violation or trouble, the police councilor must report to the village representative and the district chief. Cases unsolvable by him or serious crimes are to be referred to the district chief, the Hoi An judge, and the Gendarmerie at the same time.

Government instructions, court orders, conscription summons, etc. reach the village council through the channel of the district chief's office.

#### Budget

Since tax collection in Cam An village is rather negligible, it might be said that the village council which normally registers a monthly expense of 20,000\$VN is supported by the local people by means of an annual contribution of 40\$VN per voter or adult of legal voting age (this contribution has been increased to 60\$VN for 1961.) The police councilor, who draws 1,500\$VN a month, has not been paid since August, 1960, since many adults were not in a position to contribute. There is hope that the fish season will be better this year and the councilors will be paid again. But no back pay is anticipated.

### Physical plant

The police councilor shares a common room with other councilors. He has a shabby small desk placed on the right hand side of the village chief's desk and resting against the desk of the councilor in charge of information. A large wooden cabinet with a glass door is placed nearby and serves as a storage place for the council records and odds and ends. A wooden bench along the wall is for the use of visitors.

The police councilor has no weapon. Apart from the VBI agent's pistol, the only other firearm of the village is a .38 Smith & Wesson revolver (serial number 947.578) with 6 cartridges, assigned to the village representative by the district chief. The representative usually leaves it at home when going to work.

A one-armed elderly messenger works for the whole village council with a monthly salary of 900\$VN. He owns his own bicycle and acts as liaison agent with the district and provincial authorities when required. A round trip to Hoi An takes about an hour. But, in general, he has to go to Dien Ban, about 15 ks. away. When asked if he could, in case of emergency, stop in Hoi An and alert the responsible authorities, he could not answer. "Because," he said, "the village council has never asked itself such a question."

### Relationship with other police agencies

The police councilor of Cam An has only occasional contacts with the Gendarmes. On the contrary, he often sees the local VBI man to whom he passes information regarding the number of "tap ket" (villagers expatriated to North Vietnam) and "can cuu" (suspects under investigation.)

### Miscellaneous

There used to be a Civil Guard detachment occupying the three now unmanned concrete pillboxes located along the beach. No actual shore patrol. Coast guard patrol is assumed by the Vietnamese Navy.

DISTRICT OF DIEN BAN

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

200 square ks.	150,000 people
30 villages	400 men security force


Persons of the District Chief's office interviewed:

1. Mr. Le Nhat Trung  
Administrative Clerk  
in charge of Military affairs and Self Defense Corps
2. Mr. Tran Quang  
Administrative Clerk  
in charge of Political and Judicial Affairs
3. Mr. Nguyen Gia Du  
Assistant Inspector 2nd Class  
holding the assumed rank of Urban Inspector  
Chief of the Police Outpost at Dien Ban

There exists in Dien Ban District the following security forces:

1. The "Dan Ve Doan" or Self Defense Corps numbering 345 armed men in total distributed into 11 cantonal units.
2. One platoon of Civil Guard (40 men).
3. A national police outpost manned by 6 men.
4. A VBI district agency of 12 men.
5. One Gendarmerie outpost with 3 officers.

I DÂN VỆ ĐOÀN or SELF DEFENSE CORPS  
ORGANIZATION CHART



There are eleven SDC cantonal mobile units of 30 men each. Each unit is responsible for the security in a delimited area consisting of three to four villages. They are constantly on the go -- Outdoor encampment -- standard armament: 1 Bren automatic rifle, three French Mat 38 submachine guns and 26 Indochinese-type rifles.

Command: 1 Tong Doan Truong or cantonal Unit Chief who has received a three months training course, plus a number of short-termed refresher courses. All enlisted men have undergone a two-month basic training course set up under the supervision of the District Chief.

### Functions and duties

The functions of the SDC cantonal units may be defined as follows:

1. Fight against Communist subversive activities

In other words: protect villages against Viet Cong infiltration. Engage Viet Cong units whenever possible. Patrol area for detection of suspects.

2. Maintenance of peace and order

Although Self Defense Corps men have no police powers, they may take action and make arrests in case of public disturbances or "flagrant delicto" crimes. Offenders are turned over to the concerned police councilor. In general, they only act upon requests made by village councils.

3. Civic action

Whenever possible, they are expected to lend assistance to the people in building or repairing roads, bridges, houses, etc. Help in case of disasters, fire, flood, etc.

### Operation

Each unit moves from one village to another without forewarning the visited village council. They maintain constant liaison with the district chief's office for instructions and notification of exact position, and seldom leave their respective cantonal areas. All major movements and actions are to be decided by the District Chief himself.

### Function of the District Self Defense Corps Bureau

Its Chief, the Civil Guard Platoon leader, an Adjutant (Master Sergeant) has no actual commanding role regarding the cantonal units. With five SDC men doing office work under his command, he is mainly in charge of the administration of the district SDC organization, viz.: Recruitment, promotion, discharge, transfer, payroll and training.

### Budget

Provincial funds: 600\$VN plus 300\$VN from National Budget (American Aid)

### Miscellaneous

About fifteen Self Defense Corps men stay at the disposal of the District Chief at his headquarters. Six of them are his personal bodyguards, five work at the SDC bureau and four perform various service chores.

## II. CIVIL GUARD

At normal times, the 39-man Civil Guard platoon assigned to Dien Ban district is deployed as follows:

- 3 men (including the Platoon leader): District Chief's office
- 12 men: guarding the political prisoners' jail
- 24 men: guarding bridges and other sensitive buildings

For operational purposes, the Province Chief, or his Deputy in charge of Internal Security, can mobilize the whole platoon and send it anywhere else within the province for any length of time. Thus, at the time of this interview, the Civil Guard platoon of Dien Ban had been entirely relieved by the SDC and was protecting an agricultural development center outside the district, in Thanh Son village, part of the foothill area. It is worth noting that the main difference between Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps resides in such a tactical deployment of Civil Guard units outside of their assigned area. SDC cantonal units never go out of the district. Because of its better weapons and its firepower, the Civil Guard platoon could lend a valuable support to SDC units in district level operations.

## III. POLICE OUTPOST OF DIEN BAN

### The Outpost Chief

Mr. Nguyen Gia Du, who holds the actual rank of Assistant Inspector 2nd class, wears the insignia of an assumed Inspector rank. Thirty-eight years old, married, and having eight children, he entered the Hanoi Police Department in 1949. After the Geneva Agreement, he went South and has stayed in Hoi An since 1954. He was assigned to the Dien Ban outpost in 1955 as deputy chief for 2 years, then as outpost chief for the past 3 years. His present salary is 7,200\$VN per month. He believes that it comes from the provincial budget, although he is certain that, unlike the South Vietnam rural police, he enjoys the National police status; that is, same salary scale as the VBI and Municipal Police Departments.

### Training

He received two basic training courses, each lasting three months, the first one in 1949 in Hanoi and the second in 1957 at the Saigon National Police Academy.

### Organization

Mr. Du is, in fact, the Police Chief of the district seat of Dien Ban, a small town of 5,000 population. He has five men under his command: one secretary doing office work and constantly present at the outpost and four patrolmen doing field work with two half-day shifts; that is, two men at one time, one regulating traffic and watching the bus station and the other patrolling on bicycle along the two main streets of the town.

### Functions

- 1) Maintenance of peace and order
- 2) Traffic control
- 3) Judicial police (Investigation of any law violation or criminal offense occurring within the boundaries of the town. He could require assistance or reinforcement from the Gendarmerie. He also turns over to the Gendarmerie any case involving army men. He furnishes the VBI district agency with information relating to political or subversive activities.

### Chain of command

The Dien Ban Police Chief reports to both the Administrative District Chief and the Hoi An Provincial Police Chief. Theoretically, he is administratively dependent upon the district chief and technically dependent upon the provincial police chief. In fact, he always sends duplicate reports to both and, in case of serious crime or arrest made "flagrante delicto" (while the offense is being committed), a copy of the report must also be addressed to the prosecutor's office in Hoi An. Depending on the case and according to instructions from higher echelons, offenders could be sent either to the District Chief's office, the Provincial Police headquarters, or to the Hoi An Tribunal.

### Crime rate

During the past five years, there have been very few cases of misdemeanors such as petty larceny and gambling and no felony at all. The police deal mainly with violations of city ordinances and, depending on the case, inflict fines ranging from 1 to 60\$VN. The monthly average fine collection amounts to 250\$VN which goes to the district funds.

### Physical plant

- a. Headquarters: Housed in one barracks-type building about 7<sup>m</sup> x 4<sup>m</sup>, partitioned into two rooms; one office and one sleeping quarters. The office has two desks and one wooden cabinet.
- b. Equipment: Standard police equipment and four revolvers. One Triumph motorcycle without gasoline supply (the police chief usually obtains gas from Army friends.)

The VBI district agency with a 12-man personnel concerns itself with political and subversive activities only. A number of these men are assigned to specific areas as local observers and "contacts." It is, above all, an intelligence branch agency with the essential mission of collecting information on Viet Cong activities.

The small squad of Gendarmes based at Dien Ban is responsible for all judicial investigations within their jurisdiction; viz. within the limits of Dien Ban district but outside the boundaries of Dien Ban town (in other terms, the rural area of the district.) They deal mainly with all cases involving military people, traffic accidents, and serious crimes as ordered by the Hoi An tribunal.

Security problems in Dien Ban district seat

No notable subversive incident has been reported during the past twelve months in Dien Ban district, whereas stepped-up Viet Cong activities have been registered in the mountainous area and the outlying districts. The only manifestation of Viet Cong action in Dien Ban district was the infiltration (early this year) of a limited number of armed propaganda cadres who lured into the mountains draft-age youths from several foothill villages. The majority of these young people come from those families that have "tap ket" (persons who have gone to North Vietnam) among their members.

The interviewed officials confirmed partially a feat performed by the "Nhan Dan Tu Ve Doan" (People Self Defense Group). In a certain village, several armed Viet Cong were at one time surrounded by the Self Defense Group. The outcome of it was not made public: they got away after having wounded a number of Self Defense people.

INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR NGUYEN VAN CHAP

Commanding Officer, Civil Guard and  
Self Defense Corps in Quang Nam Province

Personal background information

Married and has 11 children, 43 years old, Major Chap served in the French Army from 1936 to 1949 and went to Yunnan, China, during the 1945 retreat. Transferred into the North Vietnamese Bao Chinh Doan in 1949 as a second lieutenant, he rose to the rank of major in 1953. He went South after the Geneva Agreement, was Civil Guard commanding officer in Quang Ngai province for five years, and was transferred to Quang Nam 14 months ago.

Organization

Major Chap has 3,000 men under his command, distributed into 28 regional companies of 120 men and, theoretically, each administrative district rates one company. In fact, many districts receive only one platoon, as the distribution varies according to security conditions. Nine companies or 1,000 men are being trained and stationed in Tourane as reserve forces. About 300 men of the two Headquarters and Service companies stay in Hoi An. Furthermore, jointly with the ARVN, the Civil Guard man seven outposts along the Laotian border (one Civil Guard platoon plus one ARVN platoon in each.) The garrison of the Paracels Islands is also staffed by the Civil Guard (one platoon.) Civil Guard units are equipped with small arms only; the automatic rifle is the heaviest weapon they have.

Function and duties

The Civil Guard has no police duties. Its role consists essentially of ensuring security, carrying out military style operations and patrols, and guarding outposts and sensitive points. All activities are aimed at fighting the Viet Cong. They are empowered to make arrests in cases of "flagrante delicto", like all citizens. but normally, they are not concerned with law enforcement except in the highlands where they play both administrative and judicial roles in their capacity of sole representatives of the Vietnamese government. There is not much to be done in terms of law enforcement, as tribal laws are more usually applied in such areas.

Chain of command

In accordance with Presidential Ordinance No.26, the Civil Guard is literally at the disposal of the province chief or his representative, the deputy in charge of internal security. In districts where Civil Guard units are assigned, they depend upon the district chief. Major Chap concerns himself more with administrative duties (recruitment, training, payroll, promotion, transfer, logistics) and coordination than with tactical use of his men. He can, when necessary, submit

recommendations for movement of units and transfers of personnel but he cannot make decisions.

#### The Self Defense Corps - Relationship with Civil Guard

The 3,200-man Self Defense Corps of Quang Nam province is administered by the deputy province chief in charge of internal security, through the provincial Self Defense Corps Bureau manned by some 20 Civil Guard officers and non-coms who take care of the administrative paper work; recruitment, discharge, payroll, logistics. At the district level, a similar bureau is headed by the Civil Guard platoon or company commander assigned to the district. In principle, the Civil Guard is in charge of the Self Defense Corps training. Actually, ARVN often co-operates, especially in provincial level training courses.

#### Security problems

The main problem encountered by the Civil Guard in their anti-communist fight can be said to be the general hostility of the Montagnard tribes. This very factor has enabled Viet Cong infiltrations and raids in the valley since the various tribes have managed to elude Government control. Major Chap, who claims long experience in handling Montagnard tribesmen, disagrees somewhat with the Vietnamese government's present policies of assimilation. He pointed out that "all the trouble stemmed from the fact that tribesmen are very suspicious of anybody who tries to change their customs. Most of them are completely illiterate and have a very blurred notion of nationalism or communism. They cannot differentiate between the Viet Cong and the free Vietnamese. They just want to be left alone. And one thing is certain, they do not consider themselves citizens of Vietnam. The least one could say about the Vietnamese Government policy is that our approach to the problem is rather awkward." Major Chap quoted the following example: "clinging to their old customs and beliefs (that certain places of dwelling might be propitious or ill-starred) and attached to their freedom, Montagnards habitually have largely scattered habitations in the jungle. With a view to ensure a close check on them, the Vietnamese authorities ordered them to move into hamlets or densely populated communities. That only made them move farther and deeper in the jungle. By the same token, compulsory schooling and other coercive measures scared them away. Interference with tribal laws on the other hand alienated tribal chiefs. The Montagnards became, every day, more hostile, and started to build up obstacles to keep away the Vietnamese. Booby traps were laid around their villages. Vietnamese troops who penetrated into their zone unavoidably sustained casualties, got excited and started shooting indiscriminately. All these factors enlarged the gap between tribesmen and Vietnamese. Viet Cong agents act more tactfully. They bring salt and tools, without demanding anything in compensation. They live among tribesmen, adopt their customs, even take a native wife, and, once they enjoy their confidence, they surreptitiously advise them to stay away from the South Vietnamese government."

Major Chap advised that he used to have under his command over 300 montagnards, some of them commissioned officers of the Civil Guard, in Quang Ngai province. He had found that it was nearly impossible to try to mend the montagnards' way of life. His montagnards would spend all their money to buy alcohol, toys, gongs, water buffaloes and offerings to the sorcerer. Within a few months after their discharge, they would return to their primitive way of life. Major Chap had laudative comments on the French policies regarding the montagnards. He had submitted his recommendations which could be summed up as follows: Less interference with the montagnards' internal affairs, no imposition of Vietnamese laws and mores, respect of tribal institutions, material assistance and education non-compulsory for the younger generations.

Major Chap also mentioned in passing the hardship experienced by civil guard outpost garrisons. They are supplied by parachute drop once a month and relieved every three months. It takes normally ten days' walk to get to these frontier outposts. The figure of "tap ket" (local Viet Cong who went to North Vietnam after the Geneva agreement) of Quang Nam province was estimated by Major Chap at 10,000 persons (Quang Nam total population: 992,088).

INTERVIEW WITH ARVN LIEUTENANT NGUYEN VAN TUYEN

HOI-AN POLICE CHIEF

Background Information

Lt. Tuyen is 48 years old, married and has three children. He has served for 25 years in the Army, was appointed Police Chief, City of Quang Ngai, in Quang Ngai province from January 1960 to February 1961 when he was transferred to Hoi-An as Police Chief. (Upon request made by Lt. Tuyen who admitted that he was not yet quite familiar with the organization of the Hoi-An Police Department, Messrs. PHAN LUONG BAT, Bureau Chief or Assistant in charge of the Support Staff and LE HUU HUYEN, Chief accountant in charge of equipment, attended the interview and answered most questions.

Organization

Hoi-An Police Department has an effective strength of 88 men, distributed as follows:


-- Office staff	16
-- District outposts	14
-- Special assignment	11
-- Field officers	47

There are two main shifts, from 6:00 to 12:00 AM and from 12:00 AM to 6:00 PM. After 6:00 PM, rotating shifts of two hours are held. The Department has around 20 men on duty at any time, day and night. They handle two traffic control fixed posts, five patrol areas (on foot and by bicycle) and two branch stations located downtown.

Subversive activities in the city of Hoi-An fall under the jurisdiction of the "Ban Chi Huy Hon Hop Thi Xa Hoi-An" (mixed command for the Hoi-An municipality). This command, headed by the Deputy Province Chief in charge of Internal Security, consists of three members, representatives of the Civil Guard, Police and VBI, and has a 21-man task force (seven men from each organization) concerned exclusively with security problems in the 16,500 population Hoi-An municipality.

The Police are furthermore assisted by 23 Self Defense Corps men placed under the command of the village police councilor who is at the same time a Civil Guard Sergeant.

Although Hoi-An does not enjoy the city status and legally is just a village, it is practically considered, due to its importance, as a "town district" (quan Chau-Thanh). Its regular village council headed by a village representative is directly supervised by the Police Chief who holds in fact the functions of a district chief. The five police patrol areas are actually the five "Thon" or hamlets which compose Hoi-An village.



### Functions

The principal functions of the Hoi-An Police Department are the following:

- Maintenance of peace and order.
- Traffic control.
- Criminal investigation.
- Administrative police duties.

Except for cases involving military personnel, all law violations, criminal offenses and traffic accidents occurring within the boundaries of Hoi-An village fall under the jurisdiction of the Police.

Besides, the Police Chief has extended powers with respect to economic affairs. He is responsible for the control of staple prices and the distribution of cereals and imported goods throughout Quang Nam province.

An attempt has been made in 1960 to turn over the administration of the Hoi-An municipality to the Province Chief's office. It has failed and, at present, 80% of the Police Chief's workload is concerned with city administration: population census, issuance of identity cards, tax collection, travel authorizations, control and issuance of business licenses, health and sanitation control, price control, etc... (except for registrar's work; birth, death and marriage certificates are issued by the village representative.)

### Chain of Command

The Police Chief's direct supervisor is the Chief of Province. He must keep him informed about everything, even about judicial matters reported to the Court or about technical police matters reported to Lt. Colonel Thuong, Police Regional Director. Copy of reports of criminal investigation ordered by the tribunal must be forwarded to the Province Chief as well as recommendations regarding transfer or promotion of personnel addressed to the Police Regional Direction in Hue. By and large, all going-out reports must go through the Province Chief's channel. The three police outposts installed in Hoa-Vang, Dien-Ban and Tam-Ky districts depend directly on the District Chiefs.

### Budget

Police personnel salaries are supported by the provincial budget. The Police Chief draws his pay in the capacity of an Army Lieutenant. (Status: On loan to the Department of Interior).

### Physical plant

The police headquarters are located in a five-room villa. There are no living quarters for the personnel.

The total armament includes:

- 30 Smith and Wesson revolvers and 3 French automatic pistols.
- 2 Shotguns.
- 10 rifles.
- 6 Submachine guns.
- 10 Tear gas grenades.

Transportation: 1 jeep, 2 light trucks, 1 motorcycle.

Communications: 4 telephones (2 at Headquarters and 2 interphones installed in the 2 city outposts).

#### Recruitment

The same recruitment standards are applied as at the national level. (From 18 to 30 years of age, primary school degree, good physical condition, entry examination.) The department has 20 men who have been trained at either the Saigon NPA or the Rach Dua Training Center, and two men trained in Commando tactics in Nha Trang.

The organization has the same salary scale as the VBI and the Municipal Police. Not taking into account the high cost of living allowances, their salaries are therefore slightly higher than the South Vietnamese rural police's (Canh Sat Huong Thon, or small town police).

#### Relationship with other law enforcement agencies

"Excellent cooperation with the Civil Guard and VBI in the anti-Communist fight, due to the existence of the Mixed Command Unit", the Chief said. Relationship with the Army is good, too.

Although the Police do not concern themselves with political cases, they always follow closely such cases just for their own information, even after they have informed the VBI as required. Very few contacts with the Gendarmerie brigade of Hoi-An except for cases involving army men, which are turned over to the gendarmes.

The village SDC men under command of the village police councilor are in fact at the disposal of the Police Chief. They constitute a good auxiliary force for watch and patrol duties at night.

#### Crime rate

It is estimated that the Hoi-An police department has to deal with an average of 2 serious crimes and 15 misdemeanors per year. City ordinance violations number 30 to 40 cases entailing an average of 2,000 \$VN in fine per month.

HOI-AN V.B.I.


HEADQUARTERS FOR THE V.B.I., QUANG NAM PROVINCE

(In the absence of Mr. NGUYEN-BUC, VBI Chief, his deputy, Mr. TRAN-DUOC whose official title is "Bureau Chief" was interviewed.)

Personal information regarding Mr. Tran-Duoc

41 years old, married, has five children; Mr. Tran-Duoc belongs to the Civil Service Administrative Clerk classification. He was assigned to the Hoi-An VBI since 1947 and has had no police training at all.

Organization



It can be said that over 90% of the VBI work load consists of securing intelligence about Viet Cong activities. A few criminal investigations or administrative inquiries are occasionally made as ordered by the Court or requested by the Administration. In terms of judicial police (criminal investigation), the Hoi-An court may order either the VBI or the Gendarmerie, sometimes both at the same time, to conduct a criminal investigation anywhere in Quang Nam province. (Example: Murder case in a remote village; preliminary inquiry made by village police councilor and report addressed to court. It is then up to the court to designate the investigative agency. In case the offense occurs in Hoi-An, the city police normally will be in charge of the investigation. But, for further information or in case of biased conclusions, the court could order a "counter-inquiry" to be conducted by either the Gendarmerie or the VBI.)

Thus the VBI devotes most efforts to the collection of information regarding political and subversive activities and to the "exploitation" of such information. For this work, it has a 40-man VBI commando unit readily available for raids and arrests within the province. In case of emergency and when the VBI Chief deems that he has enough manpower for making a raid, he is empowered to do so and report it afterwards. But normally he has to communicate his information and submit his recommendations to the Province Chief (under the present circumstances, the deputy in charge of internal security) for decision. The Hoi-An security mixed command will handle any subversive activities reported in Hoi-An.

#### Chain of Command

The VBI Chief receives orders from both the Province Chief and the Regional Director of VBI and Police. His direct supervisor is the Province Chief; the VBI Regional Director is a mere "technical superior officer."

#### Methods of performance

By and large, maintenance of intelligence networks with paid or voluntary informers and former Viet Cong agents.

#### Budget

All expenditures and payroll are supported by the National budget.

INTERVIEW WITH CAPTAIN BINH

DEPUTY CHIEF OF PROVINCE IN CHARGE OF INTERNAL SECURITY

CAPTAIN BINH is 36 years old, married and has six children. He was a District Chief in North Vietnam before entering the Army seven years ago. His last assignment was with Second Division Headquarters as G-2 Chief. He is at present the representative of the Second Military Region Command with the civil administration of Quang Nam. Although he was appointed Deputy Province Chief since November 1, 1960, unlike the Province Chief, Major VO HUU THU, he is not on loan to the Department of Interior and is still on the Army payroll. (Asked whether he draws more or less money than the other deputies, he said that depends on the family status and number of children.)

Organization


An organization dubbed "Uy Ban An Ninh Tinh" (Provincial Security Committee) composed of:

Major Thu, Province Chief. . . . .	Chairman
Captain Binh, Deputy Province Chief. .	Member
Major Chap, Civil Guard C. O. . . . .	Member
Mr. Nguyen Buc, VBI Chief. . . . .	Member

is responsible for solving all security problems.

Notes: (to accompany organization chart on next page)

1. The Political Section studies, evaluates, compiles and centralizes all information obtained by various intelligence services. At normal times, it should come under the control of the Political Affairs Deputy who has a kind of policy-making power. (He recommends lines of conduct regarding various political problems to the Province Chief.) Under the present circumstances, this section serves both Deputies and is placed under control of the Internal Security Deputy. Captain Binh said it is equivalent to Army G-2.
2. The "Security Section", despite its name, is actually the provincial G-3, minus the training duties. It makes plans for operations, raids, emergency measures, etc.
3. The "Military Affairs Section" handles all military questions such as conscription, reservists, training periods, etc.



4. The SDC Bureau, as explained by Major Chap, deals mainly with administrative work concerning the provincial SDC: Recruitment, discharge, payroll, training etc.

5. In case of emergency and if needed, an ARVN unit (up to one battalion) could be made available to the Province Chief by the Second Division stationed in Quang Nam. The deputy in charge of Internal Security is officially the liaison officer and has special authorization to contact directly the Divisional Command. He does not have to go through the channel of the Second Military Region Command as normally required.

6. The "Mixed Command of Hoi-An" which is also under the I.S. Deputy concerns itself only with security in the municipality of Hoi-An.

#### Functions of various organizations

1. Civil Guard. The Civil Guard is placed under the command of the Province Chief. Civil Guard units broken down to platoon strength are distributed throughout the province of Quang Nam at the disposal of District Chiefs for routine duties such as patrols, guarding of public utilities and sensitive points and for localized support to the Self Defense Corps. They have no police functions. They also man the seven frontier outposts (recently with the cooperation of the ARVN) and the Paracels Islands garrison. They can be mobilized by the Province Chief or his representative for mopping-up operations or any other specific missions.

Note: The right of "hot pursuit" is implicitly taken for granted. The Vietnamese authorities are well aware of the fact that the Viet Cong take advantage of Province borders and provincial jurisdiction to carry out at best their subversive activities. Besides, "there is no clear-cut demarcation lines in mountainous areas", emphasized the deputy.

2. V.B.I. The VBI depends on the Province Chief, in the same capacity as the Civil Guard or any other provincial agencies. It is essentially an intelligence organization specialized in political and subversive activities. As an auxiliary responsibility, it conducts also judicial investigations ordered by the Court or by the Province Chief.

3. Gendarmerie. The Brigade of Gendarmerie of the Quang-Nam province has five outposts (Tam Ky, Dien Ban, Hoi-An, Than Binh and Dai-Loc) each manned by two to three men. They handle all criminal cases involving military personnel and make judicial investigations upon request of the Hoi-An tribunal or the Province Chief.

4. Self Defense Corps. District Chiefs are responsible for the recruitment of the SDC men. Besides the nationally applied physical criteria, a good behavior and political attitude is required of applicants from 18 to 45 years of age.

Their main function consists of protecting villages from Viet Cong infiltrations and ensuring security thereof.

They are uniquely used for local and small-scale operations within a district. They have basically a territorial mission.

All of them have received basic military training.

5. The "Nhan Dan Tu Ve Doan" (People's groups for self defense.) They are conceived as a civic corps intended for maintenance of peace and order and, should the occasion arise, for fulfilling an auxiliary role in behalf of the Self Defense Corps. They help in cases of fire fighting, robbery, burglary, etc... "They are not designed as an offensive unit", stressed the Deputy.

#### Miscellaneous

Question: What measure has been taken to fight the Viet Cong attempts to enlist draft-aged youths?

Answer: There are two kinds of countermeasures; these are designed to prevent the repetition of such activities and the others intended as a punishment of the offending young people. He advised that the Viet Cong are not in a position to support these draftees. They rely on their families to get their food. So the first measure consists of a mass education or indoctrination program, pointing out the disastrous consequences entailed by such "errors". The second measure consists of moving the families of the parties concerned out of the area so as to render impossible any material support from them.

Question: The security situation has deteriorated during the past seven months in Quang Nam province. Why?

Answer: First, it is because the Viet Cong have stepped up their activities, because it is a part of their general program of action intended for subversion and for sabotaging the forthcoming presidential elections. Secondly, the internal security of Quang Nam province has been somewhat affected by the troubled Laos situation. Bases of supply established in Laos for Viet Cong military operations have abetted an increase of Viet Cong activities in the mountainous areas of Quang Nam, and raids have been launched against the government agencies in the valley. If we could secure control of the highland, we could readily solve the security problems that are posed for the valley.

Question: Is any attempt made to check Viet-Cong infiltrations through Ho Chi Minh trails?

Answer: Yes. The border outposts are installed for that purpose. Patrols fan out from these bases into the jungle in order to prevent infiltrations. We have daily radio-communications with these outposts. In case they would report anything suspicious, we would send out a scouting plane for reconnaissance.

Captain Binh advised that through captured documents and his analysis of the present situation in Quang Nam Province, he believes the Viet Cong have three stages of conquest. First stage is to take control of the mountainous regions and win the support of the Montagnards; the second stage is to take the valley, with the support of bases established in the mountain regions; the third stage is to join with the Viet Cong cells already located among the heavily populated areas along the seacoast, and win the support of the people through means of propaganda.