

VIETNAM 1969: POLITICS

by

Neil Staebler

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Some Currently Relevant Conclusions

- (1) The population of Vietnam is divided into four groups: (a) Vietcong, (b) anti-Vietcong, pro-Administration, (c) anti-Vietcong, anti-Administration, (d) uncommitted. The first two groups are roughly the same size. Each is searching for a way to combine with the others. The Vietcong formula is persuasion and terror, the anti-Vietcong groups are groping for a formula of decision by voting. The future of the country lies in one of these two alternatives.
- (2) The government is making notable progress in establishing and legitimizing the elective system, in coping with problems of land distribution, poverty, economic growth, education, the elimination of terrorism, the resettlement of refugees, the restoration of civil rights, the elimination of corruption.
- (3) The rate of American withdrawal is the immediate, decisive factor. The fact of withdrawal is stimulating moves toward reforms and autonomy, but time is needed for them to take effect.
- (4) In preparation for the time when the struggle will shift from the military to the political arena, democratic processes in the country need development. Along with the rate of withdrawal of American troops, this will be the determining factor in whether the nation is able to remain independent and whether democratic or totalitarian institutions prevail.

Objectives, Methods, and Limitations

This study deals with South Vietnamese political capabilities, focussing on political parties but looking, also, at the other available means of affecting political decisions. It is not a scholarly study. Rather it is a politician's wet-thumb appraisal drawn from talking with leaders and lower echelon workers in most of the principal political groups in the country. A politician, casing the situation for his party, always likes to talk with his opponents and look at the prospects through their eyes. In the present instance, this has not been possible and represents a weakness only partially offset by reading and drawing upon experts who study the Vietcong.

The object of the study can be put in political campaign terms: What needs to be done by the political forces on the democratic side, to get ready for an election in which everyone in the country--including Vietcong--would participate. This presupposes the withdrawal of American armed forces over a period of several years. It assumes that the election would take place under some international auspices, that it would have been preceded by some joint negotiations with the Vietcong to determine the terms and conditions of the election, but that there not be a coalition government.

The Present Political Situation

Vietnam is very different from other countries in which multi-party elections take place. Providing background for understanding these differences is a hazardous undertaking because so many of the underlying facts are open to controversy. This paper will attempt to identify the range of uncertainty, whether arising out of differing opinions, general lack of data, or the limits of the author's information.

The population of South Vietnam is commonly quoted as being 16,000,000 and could be 1,000,000 more or less. About one-third live in cities, three million in the metropolitan area of Saigon alone. The percentage fluctuates with the degree of security in the villages. Refugees from the Vietcong tend to cluster around army camps and urban areas; when security spreads they move back to their homes in the countryside. During some months of 1969 this has occurred at a rate of more than 100,000.

Security is subject to semantic difficulties and is always changing. For several months, perhaps since late 1968, the area and degree of security for pro-government people has been increasing. It is now safe to travel many highways in the daytime previously subject to Vietcong blockade. The number of villages in which self-defense forces are operating has greatly increased. The number of incidents provoked by the Vietcong has fallen drastically while the number of operations initiated by government forces has risen. But security is still a long way off. Every bridge and significant public building is guarded 24 hours a day. Many, perhaps most, villages are penetrated by the Vietcong at night. This has special political relevance: there are few villages in which people dare to declare publicly that they are members of one of the government political parties for fear of assassination.

Religious Divisions

Religion plays a highly important role in the life of the Country. A large proportion of the people are attached to one or another of the sects and many of the sects influence their members strongly in politics. Pro-government

Vietnamese talk in terms of the following rough breakdown:

Catholics	1,500,000	solidly anti-Vietcong
Hoa Hao	1,500,000	almost as solidly anti-Vietcong
Cao Dai	2,000,000	weakly and somewhat uncertainly anti-Vietcong
Montagnards	1,000,000 (+ or -)	anti-Vietcong with numerous exceptions
	<hr/>	
	6,000,000	preponderantly anti-Vietcong
Khmer	2,000,000	open to persuasion but leaning toward the government
Chinese	1,200,000	largely city dwellers, hence inclined pro-government, but with numerous exceptions
Buddhists and Ancestor Worshippers	7,000,000 (+ or -)	see discussion below
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	10,200,000	preponderantly open to persuasion and commitment

The situation of the Buddhists requires explanation, and what follows is admittedly only a sketch. In the first place, no one knows how many Buddhists there are. Millions of Vietnamese practice ancestor worship; some also adhere to Buddhism. On the other hand, most Khmers and many Chinese are Buddhists. Hoa Hao is a form of Buddhism.

Unlike the Catholics, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, the Buddhist faith does not give rise to a unified church organization. Instead, Buddhists have temples or pagodas, each a separate entity, operated by an association of laymen and bonzes. These are sometimes affiliated with other pagodas, sometimes not. Many are related in two groups or movements: The An Quang, a very militant body led by the politically active monk, Thich Tri Quang, and Quoc Tu, a smaller and

non-militant group. No one seems to have any good evidence for estimating the number of adherents of An Quang and the guesses range from one to three million.

In an effort to get some notion of how the Buddhists feel, I talked with two An Quang bonzes and two prominent laymen. The bonzes, each the head of a pagoda, held positions that might be compared to the status of a cardinal and bishop. One of the laymen, not himself a member of the An Quang but with similar views, is the head of a nominal political party (we could not find evidence of branches or organization) that fielded an unsuccessful Senatorial slate in 1967. All of the four are unhappy with the present government, were unhappy with its predecessors, and feel that they are second-class citizens. They complain that the government discriminates against them--and for the Catholics--in making it difficult for them to hold meetings, in refusing to release their members imprisoned for alleged subversion and rebellion (particularly those who participated in pitched battle with loyal government forces). They complain that they are discriminated against in taxes upon pagoda property. Though many Buddhists boycotted the elections, they feel that they are disproportionately represented in the government (15 Senators out of 60, and 57 members of the lower house out of 140), some charging that they were fraudulently counted out.

This long bill of complaint, however, was accompanied in each instance by a declaration which went in substance, "We don't like the government but we fear the Communists; they would destroy us."

There are many other groups and political cross currents among the

Buddhists. One new group is forming around a militant lawyer in Saigon. Another is planning the organization of a civic association that will provide Buddhists with a vehicle for later political action. Many Buddhists are in the government and many are members of the various political parties. Even the two Catholic parties are now recruiting Buddhist members and can point to a few provincial party officers who are Buddhists. One of the older line parties boasts, like an American party, that its members pay no attention to each other's religion.

Economics; Poverty; Land

Poverty and the exploitation of peasants by landlords and money lenders provided the soil out of which grew the resentment that the Vietcong converted, with adroit indoctrination, into revolution. These have since been supplemented by new factors: resentment at official corruption, and anti-Americanism, which will be discussed later.

It is difficult to pin down figures for land tenancy and rental rates but apparently under the French something like three-quarters of the peasants were renters. Rental rates ranged from 25% to 60% of the crop and often fluctuated at the whim of the landlord. Many peasants had to resort to money lenders to support their families between crops; interest rates of 50% were common, 100% or more not unknown. In addition, poor transportation and lack of equipment forced many peasants to sell their produce to itinerant middlemen. The buyers, mostly Chinese, earned the same reputation for rapacity that middlemen did in the United States in the days before cooperatives, farm-to-market roads, and government price stabilization gave farmers some alternatives.

Rice farming is very labor intensive. Holdings are small, generally 5 acres or less, and many families have only a fraction of that. In French colonial days, there were many large estates and rubber plantations, an

incendiary situation in a land-hungry country and sufficient, in itself, to trigger revolution.

It might be supposed that the various South Vietnamese governments, with American advice, could have solved the land problem in the past 15 years. Numerous moves indeed were made and French estates have largely been broken up. But locally-owned land holdings have not been much disturbed, except where the Vietcong have taken over. In fact, up to the quite recent past, when the Government reclaimed an area from the Vietcong, the absentee owner frequently asserted his claim for rent. Often the poor tenant found himself paying rent to the owner and protection money to the Vietcong. The situation was a strong deterrent to cooperation with the Government.

Now the matter is close to solution. A bill before the Assembly in mid-1969 would vest in every peasant ownership of the land he now tills, no matter how he came by it. It would compensate the owners with a little cash and the balance in ten-year bonds. This, in effect, legitimizes land distribution in Vietcong-controlled areas and removes the fear that peasants would be disturbed if the Government ousts the Vietcong. It would result in something of a windfall for owners whose land was seized by the Vietcong long ago. In spite of considerable criticism by members of the Assembly, apparently the bill will ultimately be passed. The total cost of reimbursement is estimated at less than \$200,000,000.

A related problem is the lack of adequate surveys and titles. The new measure contains streamlined administrative proceedings to cut red tape and issue titles quickly.

While land ownership rates highest in political appeal, it is not the only factor, or even the most important factor, in raising farm income. The keys to farm prosperity in Vietnam are increased productivity and better

marketing. To promote these developments, U. S. civilian advisors have been encouraging and facilitating experimentation and plantings of the new "miracle" rice, increased use of fertilizers and herbicides, and establishment of cooperatives and market roads. The new rice, making possible three or even four crops annually instead of two, is beginning to get wide usage. In addition, peasants are being encouraged to plant vegetables in the intervals between rice crops. While Vietnamese farmers, like American farmers, are conservative and tend to resist change, several hundred thousand of the country's 2,000,000 peasants have taken up one or more of the new crops or production methods. If this trend continues, farm income will be greatly increased.

Government; Taxes; Corruption

The Vietnamese Village is nearly self-sufficient. The peasant can grow the food he needs. His house is simple: basically, a hut with bamboo supports and rush siding and roofing; it is replaced as he moves upward in income with adobe walls and tin roofing, then with cement floor and walls. All he needs to buy are a few simple items of clothing and supplementary items of food if he wants something to vary his menu.

The word village has been used up to now in this paper. It is time to be a little more precise. Village means the same thing in Vietnam that township does in most of the U. S. People live in hamlets and these are grouped for administrative purposes and by custom in villages. There are roughly 2500 villages, comprised of roughly 12,000 hamlets.

Hamlets are rather close-knit social units. In Vietnam, as in all Oriental societies, the family is very important--much more important than in Western countries (though in the cities it is beginning to follow the same

course as in the West). Hamlets often comprise only a few extended family groups, and these may be loosely related.

In pre-colonial days, the hamlet-village units followed a very independent line. When a representative of the central government arrived he negotiated with the local elders the amount of tax or tribute the local body would pay and if he was too stiff in his demands, he often got nothing. The elders would solemnly warn him to leave quickly, because "a tiger might swallow you." Even today, villagers are not very acquiescent about taxes and not very impressed with the importance of central government.

Central government has been forced on the villages. The French came, taking land, imposing taxes and requiring forced labor on roads and irrigation ditches. Then came the Japanese, then revolutionary parties preaching national independence, then the Vietcong with a program of land for the landless. Everybody imposed levies for "national" support. Then came independence and a succession of governments sharing authority--and levies--with the Vietcong.

In many villages, where the people belong to one of the tightly knit religious groups--Cao Dai, Catholics, or Hoa Hao--the coming of the Vietcong brought a new source of conflict.

The villages thus became the battle ground of forces--Vietcong, the government, later the Americans--between which they are being forced, often reluctantly, to choose.

A further piece of necessary background is the widespread corruption among the employees of the government and its soldiers. Corruption is common in most Asian countries, where bribes and pay-offs are expected to supplement

low salaries at all levels of government. But in a country torn for many years by revolution and war, corruption becomes endemic. According to all informants, this is true of the Vietnamese government, and to a lesser extent of the Vietcong.

Corrupt practices affect the villager whenever he wants to go somewhere or take his goods to market. At every government checkpoint he is forced to pay a bribe, which is kept by the person who collects it. On the Vietcong side, he is also forced to pay, but generally only once and the money goes to the party.

One of our informants in the Delta described the movement of a boatload of produce through government and Vietcong areas. In the government areas he paid repeated levies which totaled up to 11% of the value of his cargo. When he passed into Vietcong-controlled area he made one payment of about 6%, was issued a receipt, and whenever he was stopped thereafter the display of the receipt was sufficient.

The behavior of the army reinforces the bad opinion many have of the Government. Usually the man who collects bribes at a check point is a soldier, who, in addition to exacting money, often insults the villager as well. Another complaint, heard several times, is that ARVN does not conduct a commissary operation in many areas, but instead gives the men an allowance--inadequate--to cover their food. As a result, stealing by soldiers is common. We were told that they no longer steal pigs or slaughter a water buffalo--losses which represent a large part of a family's livelihood--but smaller live stock and other provender are fair game. This condition may be on the road to correction: we were told that a daily rice distribution is now being made to all army personnel.

It would be a mistake to think that the villagers, in their distaste for the shortcomings of the Government, automatically love and respect the

Vietcong. There is ample evidence to the contrary in the large movements of refugees from Vietcong-controlled areas into areas where Government and U. S. security is more certain, notably the suburbs of cities or the environs of army camps. The notion, common in the U. S., that refugees are forced to leave home by U. S. military action is out of date. Our programs that laid waste to whole hamlets have largely disappeared. Meanwhile the Vietcong terror tactics are reported to have changed for the worse, up to the time of the lull in late 1968. The Vietcong appear to have made a great domestic blunder in the Tet, 1968, offensive when they staged senseless attacks on civilians in hundreds of areas, including the much-publicized atrocities in Hue. There is some speculation among Americans in Vietnam that the losses sustained by the Vietcong, their declining morale and internal discord, plus the increasing effectiveness of Government and U. S. policies, may account for the undeniable gains in establishing more widespread security and, with it, a changing, more favorable attitude toward the Government.

All this has happened before--several times. The programs to establish agrovilles and later strategic hamlets were touted as successes at the time, only to collapse before Vietcong attacks. The same thing could happen again. The evidence we saw--the figures showing a large and steady return of refugees to their hamlets--suggests that a lot of Vietnamese think otherwise.

The American Presence

Critics of American involvement, in pointing out the adverse effects of the presence of American troops in large numbers, can make many telling points. In the cities, on the highways, in the air we are very much in evidence with our noisy, smelly vehicles. Our many security check points inevitably inconvenience people. Our programs and the inevitable miscarriages of them hurt and sometimes kill people. Despite our increasing efforts to avoid

damaging incidents, they still occur. While we were there, we ran across an incident which was being deplored in many quarters. A flare had fallen out of a plane into a village and burned many houses. No one had been injured. Steps had been taken to rush building materials and equipment to the site to rebuild quickly. Well and good, but still trouble.

The size of Americans is a bit frightening and their Western behavior annoying. A soldier in baggy jungle outfit looks half again as large as the average Vietnamese. We are noisier than the Vietnamese, especially some of the civilians on construction jobs. The Vietnamese are a religious, rather straight-laced people; the behavior of a host of huge, loud westerners cannot fail to disturb them.

We were very impressed with the numerous American soldiers to whom we talked, sometimes at length. We found their attitudes very well related to the Vietnamese, indicating that some effort had been made to get them to look at matters from the Vietnamese standpoint. But we also saw the bar girls and the bars near every military installation and could understand the reaction of many Vietnamese.

There are other complaints. Our presence has contributed to inflation--we live on a higher standard and pay higher wages. American supplies have leaked out of warehouses in conspicuous volume and have swollen the black market. Above all, we are the guys who are always prodding, pushing to get something done, to get somebody to change his mind or his habits. And we are foreigners.

But it is a mistake to see only one side of the picture. In particular, it is a mistake to look at some of the practices of the early stages of the war and imagine that they are continuing unchanged. In prior years, a number of U. S. programs that aimed at purely military objectives

did inflict great suffering and casualties upon civilians, and often had the effect of alienating villagers and playing into the hands of the Vietcong. Since military programs have so great a bearing on village attitudes, we were interested to learn what we could about present programs. From the fragmentary evidence we picked up, we get the impression that they have been changed drastically.

If the interest of the military at one time was to secure military success at almost any cost to other objectives, that attitude has changed. The military, both U. S. and ARVN, in impressive numbers talk about winning in terms of the minds of the people. If they once thought that they could corner the enemy or drive him out, they have changed: they now are equipping village after village with weapons and trained manpower to drive out the enemy themselves, aided by regional reserves and military units to offset the Vietcong and North Vietnamese military units. Meanwhile they are motivating the villages to achieve gains they could not attain under the Vietcong, to develop self-government, and to train leadership to replace that lost in the wholesale assassinations and kidnappings carried out by the Vietcong over many years.

One of our informants had recently participated in an election in a Montagnard village, where the process was conducted in the fashion traditional to the village: candidates lined up in a row and each elector voted by standing behind the candidate of his choice.

The details will be spelled out in connection with the description of political developments later in the paper. The point to note here is that American policy and behavior has changed greatly--perhaps most significantly a year ago. What is taking place needs to be looked at without imputing to its present performance the mistakes of past years.

Politics

The closest approach to solid facts in securing an understanding of

the current political situation can be found in recent voting figures. Three sets of elections have been held since the revolution in 1963: (1) National elections for the Constitutional Assembly in 1966, (2) Presidential and National Assembly elections in 1967, (3) village and hamlet elections in "secure" areas in 1965, 1967, 1968, and 1969.

There is an upward trend in the number and percentage of eligible voters who vote. In the 1966 Constitutional Assembly elections, 52% of the estimated population of voting age cast ballots, in the 1967 Presidential election 57% (votes cast 4,275,406 and 4,868,266). Village and hamlet elections have been scheduled when areas were sufficiently secure. At the end of June, 1969, elections had been held in 1891 of the nation's 2130 villages (88.7%) and 8,776 of 10,775 hamlets. Elections for municipal and provincial councils are scheduled for 1970.

Holding an election does not prove that a village or hamlet is totally secure. Elections are conducted during the daylight hours in areas where the Government has daytime control; in many of these areas, the Vietcong prowls at will at night. We inquired whether villagers in such cases were caught in a crossruff between the Government and the Vietcong and how much suasion each used. The Government pressure to vote took the form of a mark on the person's identity card and was thereafter visible to both Government and Vietcong agents. Casting a vote and acquiring a mark therefore put one on the side of the Government where the Vietcong tried to prevent voting. Apparently the Vietcong did not adopt a uniform policy to permit or prevent voting and in many areas there was evidence that Vietcong members participated in the vote. In other areas, we were told, villages put off the Vietcong by saying that they were compelled to vote by Government soldiers.

The distribution of votes in the 1967 Presidential election indicated a wide range and some independence of opinion. The selection of candidates had been subject to some manipulation: identifiable and alleged Communists were excluded from the ballot and "Big" Minh, who is the most popular opposition candidate in sight, was then in exile. Nevertheless, many people showed a determination to express disapproval of the leading candidates, Thieu and Ky, and to support various kinds of peace and reform proposals. A tabulation of votes for the 11 Presidential slates by provinces is included as an appendix. The significance of the vote for some of the slates should be noted:

<u>Candidates</u>	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
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Thieu--Ky	1,649,561	34.8%
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Dzu--Chieu	817,120	17.2
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This was the leading peace ticket. Its symbol was the white dove, the main plank in its platform was a proposal to initiate talks with Hanoi and with the Vietcong.

Suu-Dan	513,374	10.8
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This was a middle-of-the-road peace ticket, calling for mutual de-escalation and "opening the door" to talks with Hanoi.

Huong-Truyen	474,100	10.0
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This ticket acknowledged a "crisis of confidence," underscored government reform.

Ky-Dinh	349,472	7.3
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This ticket urged a "new revolution" through the election, reform of the army and bureaucracy, land reform.

In talking with the leaders of two of the parties high on the list of

also-rans, we picked up strong complaints on the counting of votes. In both cases they were the kind of circumstantial evidence that could have indicated some manipulation of totals or merely sloppy early reporting (which American parties seize upon to make the same allegations). However, repeated prodding on the subject of election administration brought out something less than total confidence from many people.

Along with the current statistics, it will be helpful in understanding present politics to dig up some of the politics of the past, as many Vietnamese do.

Under the French, all political parties were forbidden. Nevertheless, three present parties can trace their origins to clandestine groups organized to fight for Vietnamese independence. People who regard the National Liberation Front as an indigenous South Vietnamese development will object both to the term I have been using--"Vietcong" (which is what its opponents call it)--and to the linkage with North Vietnamese and Communist connections. I am no authority and refer the reader to the opposing interpretations.

The other two parties, which trace back to revolutionary groups in early Ho Chi Minh days, both hasten to offer testimony. One is the Quoc Dan Dang, formerly a Vietnamese counterpart of the Kuomintang of China, the other is the Revolutionary Dai Viet. Quite a few of the present leaders of these parties whom I met were active in the French period and served time in prison for their illegal activities. Some were imprisoned for political reasons both under the French and under the Diem or later regimes. They relate their first antagonism to Ho Chi Minh to his trickery in 1946 when he caught them in a trap on behalf of the French, who executed several thousand. In 1955-6, after the Geneva Agreement, he conducted his own purge and many people were killed. Some of the lucky participants who escaped estimated the death toll at

50,000, some estimated several times that number. The purge followed closely upon the mass migration from North to South Vietnam of more than 800,000 persons.

These two parties, the Quoc Dan Dang and the Revolutionary Dai Viet, have always provided a nucleus of resistance to the Vietcong and its terrorism. They have been joined by other parties who hate the terrorists: the Catholic, the Hoa Hao (whose founder was murdered by the Vietcong), the Cao Dai who have suffered less extensively. Today, even many Buddhists can be added to the list because of the Vietcong's wanton slaughter of their co-religionists at Hue in the 1968 Tet offensive.

Up to the present time, the anti-Vietcong side has not been an organized opposition. It might be said that the terror tactics of the Vietcong promoted the opposition and held it together. Some segments of public opinion in the U. S. credit U. S. policies with creation of the opposition, but this does not hold up under observation. The opposition is there--deep, bitter, and widespread. It may be able to count upon more people than the Vietcong. The number is highly debatable--and fluctuating--on both sides. Without U. S. military aid it would doubtless have succumbed to the combined strength of North Vietnam and the Vietcong or to the superb propaganda and coercive organizational skill of the Vietcong.

The big question we will explore is: what will happen as the U. S. gradually withdraws, the Vietnamese extend responsibility to all phases of their national life, and politics takes over as the principal arena for settling differences?

What are the Tools of Persuasion

Given a society in which many people have grievances, many are poor and deprived, but in which many people--the decisive margin--just want to be

left alone, what does a politician do?

The Vietcong answered the question by developing a formula:

(1) propose that the grievances be eliminated, (2) agitate for a new social order that promises plenty for all, (3) organize thoroughly, (4) propagandize skillfully and increasingly, and (5) silence the opposition by scare or, if need be, real terror, tactics. It has worked up to a point. They have acquired the willing commitment or the reluctant acquiescence of perhaps a quarter of the people. By force and terror they were prepared to intimidate the rest of the population.

What does the other side do? It, too, comprises about a quarter of the population, grouped in segments loosely united by religious outlook but held together overall only by its fear and hate for the Vietcong. It has one advantage over the Vietcong: The basic sympathy of another large chunk of the population that hates the Vietcong more than it dislikes the Government. It, too, wants to win over the uncommitted and would readily live with the Vietcong if it could find a formula to do away with terror. It thinks it knows the direction to go, has made a start, and is preparing to push ahead.

Its formula:

1. National self-government. In selecting a constitutional assembly which wrote a very adequate constitution subsequently adopted by the people, in selecting a president and the members of two houses of the Assembly, and in making the whole apparatus operate with reasonable effectiveness and promise, it has given the anti-Vietcong segment of the population a sense of legitimacy.

Many people in America discuss the Saigon Government as a creature of U. S. policy. In the sense that American troops and resources support it, no one will argue; but they miss the point that the Government has moved a long way from chaos, a considerable distance toward autonomy, and is taking the

requisite steps toward total independence.

2. Responsible self-government. A sense of legitimacy is not enough. The people have been cruelly and capriciously governed by more-or-less legitimate governments for many years. Through their Hanoi radio programs the Vietcong are hammering away, calling the Government irresponsible and corrupt, accusing top officials of trying to accumulate fortunes in foreign bank accounts before fleeing the country. The Government has set up machinery to combat corruption: a high level inspectorate has been established, President Thieu has removed several province and army chiefs for malfeasance, and the Assembly has official committees with the sole duty of combatting corruption. However, some of the most responsible politicians to whom we talked feel that the Government is doing far too little to meet the problem. This is the weakest link in the Government program.

3. Security. This is the critical factor in the immediate future. Now that the ARVN and U. S. forces have brought large military operations to an impasse, the Government has found a way to increase security against local terrorism and guerilla tactics: The development of local self-defense. Each village is asked to send volunteers for a local self-defense unit. The members are armed, trained, and paid. By accepting arms and pay from the Government, they make an overt commitment against the Vietcong. Through a rather thorough training program they are turned into effective supporters of security and the cause of law and order, which means the Government. Local self-defense units are supported by regional forces, who are supposed to have some of the mobility of American troops. In any case, the task of security is being taken over by Vietnamese. The results appear to be most promising. Some of the authorities considered them spectacular and gave us figures showing a drop in terror attacks of 50% and 75% in recent months.

4. Village elections. As soon as a degree of security is established,

village and hamlet elections are held. Holding these local offices takes a lot of courage and commitment; these are the first people the Vietcong assassinate. Treasurers are especially hard to find and we learned that self-defense officers frequently have to be ordered to take the post. Elections have been held in 90% of the villages and hamlets, with more than 40,000 officials elected. A training program has started and several one-month courses have been completed; hopefully all 40,000 will attend. Village elections accomplish many important things. First, legitimacy; villagers formerly elected their officials until Diem abolished elections, so this is a return to a revered village custom. Second, leadership; the Vietcong had killed off most village leaders other than their own members, and the new ones are flouting them by assuming the offices. Third, community know-how; local elections are a community making up its own mind without waiting to be told by the Vietcong cell what is good for it.

5. Revolutionary Development. Security is the name of the game at the moment, but behind security is the motivation of development assistance. In the villages, one of the sources of strength of the Vietcong--over and above intimidation--is their superb exploitation of grievances and their claim that only a revolutionary party can bring a happy future. The Government has now outbid them. Every village with elected officials is being given 1,000,000 piastres, villages with appointed officials 400,000 for revolutionary development. Villages are encouraged to propose projects that will benefit the community. Up to individual project sums of 50,000 P. these can take the form of cooperatives. In some areas we heard about pig cooperatives in which the money, matched by some of the villagers' own, was used to build model pig pens or purchase brood sows. (We also heard that sometimes the coop lasted only long enough for each participant to get a pig). In other places the money was used to dig a well, construct a dike or an irrigation ditch, or build a school. In any case, the money is disposed of by village vote, providing

at the same time tangible evidence of benefits from the central government and exercise in village democracy. The total cost, assuming participation of 2,500 villages, would be 2.5 billion piastres or \$20,000,000. This is a small part of the national budget and thus an expenditure that can be repeated.

In the cities, social welfare programs take other forms. One of the popular ones is housing. Because of the constant year-round temperature, housing is simple and inexpensive. The Government has fostered public housing and housing cooperatives. Two top-notch members of the lower house of the Assembly told us that they were elected because of their work in developing public housing in Saigon; one had been a teacher, the other a doctor. The Vietnamese are deeply interested in education for their children and the Government has apparently been quite successful in providing schools in the cities. (In the provinces the problem has been complicated by the Vietcong penchant for assassinating teachers, but in one of the worst provinces we were informed that the teacher roster was filled for the new term about to begin).

6. Information. Saigon has 27 newspapers, two in English and the rest in Vietnamese. They are private ventures, unsubsidized by government. They are subject to censorship after publication and 18 have been suspended during the past year for varying periods; some are back in publication. There are some 20 radio stations and 2 TV stations, all, we gather, either government--owned or controlled. Few newspapers reach the provinces (one political party paper claims to be an exception) which are dependent for news upon radio. In the environs of Saigon and Danang, TV has superseded radio as the popular medium.

The Government and the Vietcong are competing for the ear of the villager on radio, the former through its Information Service, the latter through the clandestine "Liberation Radio", Radio Hanoi, and the party cadres.

We were told that Radio Hanoi provides very interesting programs of entertainment and pours out news and views to fit every occasion. Our informants were in disagreement as to whether the heavy-handed propaganda put off their listeners or whether people might not be taken in by it. In any case, they were impressed by it.

The Government Information Service is working hard, too. We inquired in a number of provinces and found that the range of employment was 200 to 350 per province. Most of the employees operate in teams, keeping up hamlet reading rooms, local public radio sets (up to 700 in some provinces), and providing loud-speaker service in hamlets for news and village announcements. We found one province ready to publish a monthly 4-page paper, with one page reprinted for local news. Two other provinces were cranking up to do so.

If the Government opens up new TV stations or installs CATV operations it can make considerable gains in the information field. Everyone we talked to in the political parties agreed that villagers had a great deal of skepticism about what they heard on radio, but when they could see the speaker on TV, credibility ran very high.

The Vietcong hold two big advantages in the information field which should not be overlooked: they have their cadre in the villages working hard to disseminate ideas and they carefully select the ideas they wish to implant. This is a significant factor at the present time. It will be even more important when the battle shifts to political issues.

7. Another area of persuasion needs to be mentioned: women. The Vietcong have been notably effective in enlisting women in their activities. Vietnamese women play a conspicuous role in business or farm affairs; they man a majority of the street stands and do a large share of the farm work. We probed to see whether they were being given an opportunity to participate in affairs on the Government side and were somewhat disappointed in what we

found. There are two women senators and several women members of the lower house. We found that the political parties draw heavily on women for demonstrations and when it comes time to vote. But there was no evidence that women in any numbers are being drawn into political organizations. One provincial organization chairman went over his roster of members name by name and found that about 3% were women. A few boasted of a member or a party officer here or there. Most opined that women would follow their husbands in politics, or excused the absence of women by saying that party membership involves risks which women shouldn't be asked to run.

Whatever the reason, the lack of involvement of women on the Government side is a serious handicap and needs to be remedied. Politics is largely a matter of person-to-person communication and women are first-class communicators.

8. Finally, there are the military and the government employees. There are a million men in the ARVN and a quarter of a million people in government service. They will be a potent influence. Veterans of the armed service will be numerous and potentially powerful. I merely note the existence of this significant influence, but I have no data on it.

Political Parties

If the Vietcong could come up with a formula they trust for an honest election, they would be very shrewd to agree to an election in the early future. With their superior organizational and propaganda skill, with the anti-Vietcong parties in an early state of development and divided on leadership and tactics, they might win by securing the highest plurality-- perhaps only 25% of the votes cast. Unless the U. S. pulls out so fast that everything collapses, time will work to strengthen democratic processes.

At the moment, political parties as mass organizations are so new and weak that their influence on the public is not great. Some of them trace their origins back to revolutionary days against the French, a great many

political leaders got their baptism of fire along with Ho Chih Minh--and from him. Some parties are outgrowths of religious associations. But from the standpoint of performing like political parties, all are newborn chicks.

Until recent years political parties were illegal, or at least repressed, in Vietnam. The elections in 1967 and following years, in which the President, members of the Assembly, and village and hamlet officials were selected, saw the emergence of some party activity, especially in religious groups. The old clandestine parties began to emerge from the underground in which they had formed, and played a limited public role in these elections. But not until the Assembly in June 1969 passed a new law defining the rights of party organizations did they begin to work in earnest. Several conditions were laid down, including the organization of minimum of 10 provincial chapters of 500 members each (5 if the party has a number of Assembly members), and requiring the party to show its membership list on order of the court. Written membership is required, a step of great consequence in a country where, if the Vietcong take over, party members would be the first victims of a purge.

We explored party organizational developments with care, first at the national headquarters level, then in the provinces where we probed to learn what was happening at local levels. Of the twelve principal parties or groups attempting to form parties, we talked to 9. The three we missed were the Committee to form a National Progressive Force, a new militant Buddhist group; the Social Democratic Party (not to be confused with the National Social Democratic Front of which it is a member), one of the two chief Hoa Hao parties; and the Citizens Front of All Religions, a grouping of personalities of some significance. The nine we contacted, arranged by fronts, pro- and anti-Administration, were:

National Social Democratic Front
(pro-Administration)

Revolutionary Dai Viet. One of the branches of the historic Dai Viet of French revolutionary days.

Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang. Now splintered in five discernible fragments, two of which remain in the Administration's front and three are outside. This is the oldest political party formed at the same time as the Kuomintang in China and with much the same outlook at that time.

Greater Union Force (also known as Greater Solidarity Force).

One of the two principal Catholic parties.

Social Humanist Party (Nhan Xa), largely Catholic and including many people who were close to Diem.

Lien Minh. This is itself a front of several groups formed at the call of President Thieu who visualized it as the nucleus of all groups supporting him. One of the components is a new party being organized by the principal labor federation, which will probably move outside the Lien Minh structure.

Opposition Parties Discussing Formation
of an anti-Administration Front

National Salvation Front which includes a number of groups, among them the Freedom Fighters Association. Formed at the time of Tet, 1968, to pull together patriotic groups into the Lien Minh, it switched to the opposition in 1969.

New Peoples Movement. This is constructed around Cao Dai religious groups.

Viet Nam Peoples Force. This is a group of Hoa Hao and old-line revolutionaries very angry with the Administration, very fearful of the Vietcong.

Progressive Nationalist Movement, founded by members of the Tan Dai Viet, an offshoot of the Dai Viet.

The first goal of every party is a sufficient number of provincial chapters to qualify as a legal institution. Several are way over, claiming more than 40. Many either have more than the requisite number or have made a start by establishing sufficient local organizers to put the chapters together. In only one instance did it appear that adequate organizing effort might be lacking. Almost all of the parties have a country-wide organization as their objective, but it appeared from the information some gave us that this might be more a wish than expectation. Organizing is proceeding most satisfactorily from Saigon, north and lagging in the Delta. Several of the parties were regional in their underground days under the French and are proceeding especially well in the areas of their old strength while struggling elsewhere. The religious-base parties got off to quick starts with their ready-made cadres, but admit the going is slow elsewhere, though several pointed to some local successes.

We met with provincial chapter and other local officials of most of the parties. We were very favorably impressed by their high caliber and obvious zeal. There were more teachers and professors than members of other professions, a few local government officials, a few business people, some doctors, a labor leader, a retiree, only one farmer. We dug somewhat deeply into their organizing methods and efforts. Whenever possible we got them to show us their recent membership applications or record books. Being familiar with the optimistic nature of politicians when they talk about the number of members in the organizations they head, we inquired in quite a few different ways about their membership in order to confirm or modify the figures they gave us.

The aim of most provincial organizers is, first, to qualify the party by getting 500 or more members, then to set up local organizations. More than half are setting up district (6 to 10 per province) committees, many of them for the purpose of establishing hamlet or village committees, almost universally referred to as cells. There was great variation in the amount of effort and success in establishing district and village units. A few could give us convincing figures on the number of cells in being--never very large--but in most cases they had not yet made much progress. But in all cases, when pressed, they admitted that village members could not operate fully overtly even when the cell reached 20-25 members, the size they were aiming at. In one case, the party organizes cells of 3 members in the villages, and in the traditional revolutionary manner, has all communication go from cell to the district level so that no cell knows the membership of another.

Every organizer spelled it out to us in the same way. There is no longer much danger in being a party member at the provincial or district level, but there is at the village level, where assassination by local Vietcong groups is a familiar device to discourage opposition. (We noticed that most provincial party officials, who characteristically reside in very modest houses, often adobe, had iron bars in their windows, not very usual in this class of house.) Most felt confident that this would change in the near future. Some said it wasn't much of a handicap now, because there were plenty interested people from whom to recruit.

Ultimately, of course, this will be a problem that has to be solved. The amount of political work that can be done without letting villagers know what you're doing is limited. Under present circumstances, when the appeal of the parties is limited almost wholly to opposition to the Vietcong, recruiting is feasible within limits. But later, when the parties argue specific issues and platforms, proponents will have to be able to speak openly and be

publicly identified. At present, the parties at the local level are still clandestine, where they exist at all. Getting them established in every hamlet as overt party committees is clearly the number one political problem for the future.

There are many others, involving platforms, communication, money, and women.

Only three politicians out of the seventy or more to whom we talked mentioned anything resembling an issue other than anti-communism. Survival and security loom so large everywhere that people have not started thinking about much else. When I asked what positive things, other than security, their party stood for, they hemmed and hawed. When I asked what arguments the Vietcong used to attract people, they were quite explicit in talking about corruption, government check points, land ownership and bad government officials. If and when the fighting ends, the politicians are going to have to learn a whole new kind of persuasion.

Communication will not pose a wholly new problem to the parties but it will call for a lot of changes in outlook and in party procedures. At the present time party communication is wholly within the party. National officials go out on speaking dates to local groups of members and prospects. One boasted that it was staging two provincial chapter dedication meetings each weekend. Several national leaders talked about their busy speaking schedules. We met a national party leader and several assemblymen out in the provinces mending fences. But no one ever talks to a public meeting where non-members or hecklers are present. No one has given any perceptible time and thought to the strategy of appealing to Vietcong adherents.

When it comes to printed matter, party people have had little experience. Most of their communication is intra-party mimeographing. Few efforts are made to reach the general public. One of the parties distributes a newspaper published by one of its members, a Senator. One of the provincial

chairmen surprised us by popping out a whole platform in English. It carried no party name or source and I gathered would be useful as a model when platform-writing time occurred. The government information service has begun the monthly issuance of a newspaper for village distribution in some areas, which will give some people a little experience in mass communication. But when the time comes to appeal in print to mass audiences it will be a new experience.

In the field of electronic communication, newscasters are getting a workout but few politicians have a similar opportunity. President Thieu speaks over radio fairly often and a few other government officials have a chance to do so, but the average office holder or candidate does not. Instead, campaigning in the past has, by regulation, consisted in joint appearances on a platform with all other candidates, each allotted 5 or 10 minutes. A real ding-dong campaign will be a new experience for candidates and constituents alike.

There is one area of politics in which the parties will start with an advantage; people are accustomed to frequent meetings. The executive committees (frequently designated as the presidium) of provincial chapters almost uniformly have weekly meetings; cells, where they exist, meet weekly. Provincial chapters, where the membership is concentrated in one locality, may meet weekly. National executive committees of some parties meet weekly, or where in some instances the committee is large, or scattered geographically (usually not so), an interim committee meets. At the present skeletal stage of party organization, most business gets transacted face to face. Most of the provincial chapter officers we met go to Saigon every few months, some much oftener, for conferences. Few parties have field organizers, and what passes as such are apparently assemblymen or other people recruited to go to a certain area to do some spot organizing. This kind of casual contact is fine at the present low level of party activity but it will never do when the parties get into competition with the pros in the Vietcong.

Money is another problem, and will become a bigger one. Present operating costs are not large, indeed, ought to be much larger to permit a more rapid rate of party development; but even present needs are being met with difficulty. The underlying problem lies in the absence of any tradition of popular contributions for political purposes. Almost all the money now received by the parties comes from large contributors or other special channels.

Every party, without exception, has a paper plan for raising money from memberships. Each one recited its monthly membership dues, ranging from 10 piastres (8 cents) upward, with 20 piastres the most common rate in the villages, but there was very little indication that parties were collecting them. Many have small entrance fees, 20 to 50 piastres, and these were being collected in most instances. Only one party, a fairly new one aimed especially at professional people (always referred to as "intellectuals" in Vietnam) was actually collecting dues in amounts which might be sufficient to support the party. It had a sliding scale: 500 piastres per month (\$4.00) for its members in Saigon, 200 in provincial capitals, 50 in the villages. Our one check on a provincial chapter of the party indicated they were collecting in most cases, but the pressure for membership is so great no one is turned away for failure to pay.

Financial inadequacy is hampering organizational work that ought to be put in high gear. One small example: most of the parties do not have headquarters space in Saigon and operate out of homes; in two instances where they do have offices, I visited them and found them woefully inadequate to support a genuine organizing effort. The source of some of the funds for parties supporting the Administration may well be public money that will not be available later. In any event, when the real political battle is joined between the Vietcong and the democratic parties, the latter will need a lot more money--from sources which the Vietcong cannot impugn--to cope with the

substantial amounts the Vietcong can raise inside and outside the country.

The problem of women was mentioned in the discussion on revolutionary development. It should be repeated here. The Vietcong have involved women in great numbers in their organizational work; none of the political parties has gone much beyond tokenism. This will be an area in which the parties will need to put great thought and effort.

An important trend that may have far reaching consequences is the effort now being made to effect some combinations and mergers, in the hope that there might eventually emerge two parties, one pro and one anti-Administration. President Thieu is using various kinds of political pressure and inducements to draw the pro group together. The pro parties have a steering committee which meets once a week, and I inadvertently walked into one of their meetings when I visited a party headquarters. In addition, the Social Democratic bloc in the Assembly is putting pressure on both Thieu and the parties to get together. I was invited to a meeting of the bloc, attended by some 25 or more members; in appearance and behavior it was a duplicate of a U. S. Congressional caucus.

Perhaps the final thing to be said about the parties concerns people. I don't know what I expected to find; after swallowing the newspaper version of the puppet government, I was prepared, at the very least, to encounter very reserved and probably devious people playing their cards close to the chest. There were, in fact, a few of these. But we encountered far more who opened up, criticized the Administration (a standard phrase was, "I am a supporter of Thieu, but . . ."), analyzed the situation very thoughtfully, looked forward to the time when Americans would be gone, pondered their country's future. The common denominator was opposition to Communism and a desire for independence and freedom. Some of them have been in prison under more than

one regime, all of them have had friends and colleagues assassinated. Many have had narrow escapes themselves. A few of them were in the high-income group undoubtedly benefiting from the war; most were conscientious professional people trying to find a satisfactory solution to their country's long travail. They are obviously capable and determined to run a government that represents the people.

In Conclusion

1. The four groups in Vietnam, (a) Vietcong, (b) pro-Administration, anti-Vietcong, (c) anti-Administration, anti-Vietcong, (d) uncommitted, are all minorities, searching for a way to combine. The Vietcong formula is persuasion and terror, the anti-Vietcong groups are groping for a formula of decision by voting. The future of the country lies in one of these two alternatives.

2. The Government has been making commendable progress in establishing and legitimizing the elective system, in coping with the problems of land distribution, poverty, economic growth, education, the elimination of terrorism (on its own side as well as the Vietcong's), the resettlement of refugees, the restoration of civil rights, the elimination of corruption, but it has a long way to go. Time is working for the Government and the more it has, the more progress it will make. Corruption may be the one exception; to cure or reduce this, new and more vigorous policies are needed.

3. The rate of American withdrawal is the immediate decisive factor. The fact of withdrawal is stimulating the moves toward reform and autonomy, but time is needed for them to take effect. No set time for the completion of withdrawal should be announced in advance; rather the possibility of acceleration will be a small helpful factor in Paris and a prod in Saigon.

4. In preparation for the time when the battle will shift from the military to the political arena, the democratic processes of the country need strengthening and development. Ultimately this will be the determining factor

in whether the nation is able to remain independent and whether democratic or totalitarian institutions prevail. The communist world has a sense of solidarity. It supplies assistance to the Vietcong and to North Vietnam in its efforts in South Vietnam. The free world has some sense of solidarity, too; that, essentially, is why we and thirty-odd nations have representatives of one sort or another in Vietnam. The free world aid is mostly military, economic, or social. Political assistance is a new and difficult concept--difficult especially because of the many democratic parties in the nations of the free world and in South Vietnam itself. But if there is a desire to offer political assistance, in what form might it be suggested?

Possible Political Assistance

1. Beginning with the most readily available assistance, the two principal American political parties can be requested to prepare a dozen kits of representative organizational materials to distribute to the chief Vietnamese parties. No doubt only a small proportion of the material will be directly relevant, but it will do two things: it will give Vietnamese parties some idea of how the American parties operate in a mass, competitive situation, and it will give them a feeling of belonging to a community of political parties engaged in similar work. The German parties have already sent supplies of their printed matter, but the dearth of translators is a handicap. The French, British, and Commonwealth countries should be encouraged to make up kits. I mentioned that I had already sent this suggestion to the States when I talked to several of the party people; there was enthusiasm out of all proportion to the idea, but there would have been equal enthusiasm for any evidence of outside interest.

2. This suggested a somewhat related idea which would be more difficult to work out but which promises to produce commensurately greater benefits: the establishment, through the cooperation of many of the parties

of free world countries, of a democratic information center in Saigon. This might take the form of a small conference--library facility manned on a rotating basis by the participating parties, perhaps three at a time for three-month intervals. The facility would endeavor to answer questions posed by Vietnamese politicians and to secure information on political technique problems or obtain political know-how from participating countries.

3. A third, related idea on a less ambitious scale could take this form: periodic conferences in Vietnam of representatives of a number of free world parties. The advantage of this proposal is flexibility; as many or as few free world parties as choose to participate could be fitted into the conference. It could last a few days or it could be extended, it could deal with a few or with many questions of organization and technique. It could be moved around Vietnam to draw into participation more lower echelon and local organizers. Perhaps a good strategy would be to aim at staging this type of conference early in 1970 while trying to develop the idea of an information center for 1971. Thereafter the center could decide whether to sponsor more conferences.

4. A simple proposal, with some small benefits of political contact, is to suggest that many parties in English and French speaking countries exchange publications with Vietnamese parties. Care should be taken to avoid having more than one or two publications go to the same address; in fact, it would be good to have the arrangements made at some one central point and to rotate recipients from time to time.

5. One of the pressing needs of Vietnamese parties is more printed and mimeographed material. The need will increase geometrically as the parties organize. This circumstance gives rise to the proposal that a cooperative be established to handle printing and mimeographing needs of the several parties, thus obviating the duplication of investment in equipment. It is especially important to assist the non-Administration parties in this field.

6. Field representatives are urgently needed to organize and assist district, village, and hamlet units. The need will increase. If any funds can be raised for Vietnamese parties outside of that country, this need should receive first priority. The opposition front parties should not be overlooked.

7. As the parties shed their clandestine methods and "go public," they will need a lot of people with new know-how. They will face a quick training problem. It would probably be helpful if a training program could be prepared and perhaps carried to the point of training a few trainers for each party. In view of the very effective training program for village officials and Revolutionary Development cadre now in being, it should be possible to get a wide diffusion of skill once the program is developed.

8. Looking to the future, it would be desirable to set up systematic arrangements for visits by Vietnamese political people to other countries. Committees might be set up in Japan, Indonesia, India, Maylasia, Singapore, Israel, and western countries to enable visitors to make contact with political people and organizations that would yield the most benefit. It would also be desirable to stimulate the flow of visitors in the reverse direction.

9. Vietnamese parties are, as has been described, deficient in their appeal to women. As they move from the role of clandestine groups to mass parties, they must correct this shortcoming. A number of steps can be suggested and more will no doubt come to light:

- a. Information on women's division activities of the two American parties should be furnished to each of the 12 Vietnamese parties.
- b. Some Vietnamese women political organizers should be invited to the United States.
- c. Women organizers from other countries (India and Israel come to mind; others may be even better) should be sent to Vietnam, perhaps in early 1970.
- d. A national conference and/or regional conferences on women's

participation in party activity with international women representatives should be organized when the time is right, perhaps 1971.

e. Organizers for women should be trained.

10. One of the largest groups in the country will be veterans. As yet, the several veteran organizations are neither very active nor significant. Steps should be taken to establish an appropriate veterans organization, hopefully with a broad political outlook.

11. The problem of fund raising should be met. In their former underground status, parties limited their solicitation of funds to a small circle of the faithful. This now must change. The first target of change is the attitude of the politicians themselves. They have so long been accustomed to raising money in large amounts from small numbers of people, they find it difficult to visualize asking a lot of people for modest sums. It is a state of mind often encountered in the U. S. It can be changed.

I made four specific suggestions to a few top party people. None of them were impressed, but the ideas--and many others--need to be raised again later:

- a. A professional fund-raising organization, such as that employed by the Republican National Committee, might well be employed to "case" the problem thoroughly and, if found desirable, to train a handful of top people who would thereafter disseminate fund-raising know-how.
- b. Thought should be given to a joint party fund-raising operation headed by a prestigious committee staffed by people outside the Government and aimed at large contributors.
- c. A second-level-contributor campaign should be designed to reach white-collar workers of large employers, patterned after the Aerojet model, using the multi-envelope system to preserve the privacy of the contributor.

d. Small-contributor programs should be established, using party dues for members and some local appeal for others. Any appeal outside party ranks must wait for greater security; the Senate election late in 1970 might be a propitious moment.

Whatever the device, I suggested that early attention be given to the problem because a long time is ordinarily required to develop a trained group of solicitors and good contribution habits among party members and citizens. Present sources of funds are likely to disappear or be vulnerable to political attack; the parties must be self-sustaining.

Neil Staebler
408 Wolverine Building
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48108

APPENDIX

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RETURNS

<u>Slate Number</u>	<u>Presidential Candidate</u>	<u>Vice-Pres. Candidate</u>	<u>Total Votes</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
9	Nguyen Van Thieu	Nguyen Cao Ky	1,649,561	34.8%
4	Truong Dinh Dzu	Tran Van Chieu	817,120	17.2
1	Phan Khac Suu	Phan Quang Ban	513,374	10.8
5	Tran Van Huong	Mai Tho Truyen	474,100	10.0
2	Ha Thuc Ky	Nguyen Van Binh	349,473	7.3
11	Nguyen Binh Quat	Tran Cuu Chan	291,718	6.2
8	Nguyen Van Hiep	Nguyen The Truyen	160,790	3.5
10	Vu Hong Khanh	Duong Trung Bong	149,276	3.2
3	Hoang Co Binh	Lieu Quang Khinh	131,071	2.9
6	Pham Huy Co	Ly Quoc Sinh	106,317	2.2
7	Tran Van Ly	Huynh Cong Buong	92,604	1.9

RETURNS BY TACTICAL ZONES, CITIES (C) AND PROVINCES

Cities and provinces	Slate											Total	Registered voters
	1 Suu/ Dan	2 Ky/ Dinh	3 Binh/ Khinh	4 Dzu/ Chieu	5 Huong/ Truyen	6 Co/ Sinh	7 Ly/ Duong	8 Hiep/ Truyen	9 Thieu/ Ky	10 Khanh/ Dong	11 Quat/ Chan		
Tactical zone I:													
Hue (C).....	20,394	5,054	368	1,503	1,937	301	389	499	8,162	501	4,227	43,335	54,827
Danang (C).....	34,061	5,045	1,258	5,160	4,770	1,284	1,039	2,072	22,496	3,215	9,494	89,894	116,053
Quang Nam.....	20,716	15,764	3,776	12,779	5,289	3,018	2,381	4,790	28,378	17,187	16,584	130,662	153,393
Quang Ngai.....	31,468	8,806	4,582	44,323	7,073	2,830	2,491	4,288	41,609	2,911	17,244	167,625	202,664
Quang Tin.....	10,538	6,538	3,098	7,147	7,827	2,257	1,950	4,503	34,045	3,234	5,971	87,102	94,483
Quang Tri.....	14,287	16,008	2,197	8,991	2,580	2,020	1,482	2,630	20,911	8,016	9,335	88,457	107,281
Thua Thien.....	41,203	35,382	2,408	5,168	4,347	1,610	1,311	2,961	33,804	3,710	19,972	151,876	183,160
Total.....	172,667	92,591	17,687	85,071	33,823	13,320	11,043	21,743	189,405	38,774	82,827	758,951	911,861
Tactical zone II:													
Cam Ranh (C).....	4,717	1,287	450	921	978	538	559	1,203	7,324	524	2,642	21,143	24,353
Dalat (C).....	2,314	1,672	508	2,846	5,561	497	539*	773	9,723	768	1,310	26,511	34,765
Binh Dinh.....	27,151	17,601	5,522	46,076	10,293	5,809	4,940	13,021	118,232	5,922	15,790	270,357	302,260
Binh Thuan.....	6,169	4,857	2,006	19,588	7,766	1,992	1,995	3,531	37,924	2,811	5,226	93,835	106,375
Darlac.....	3,209	2,691	1,550	3,552	6,014	1,344	1,410	2,788	38,554	1,770	2,911	65,793	78,099
Kontum.....	1,431	1,443	583	5,700	1,427	368	359	1,169	25,707	607	976	39,770	47,998
Khanh Hoa.....	30,043	7,199	2,732	9,270	7,619	2,929	2,919	4,897	56,192	2,946	14,313	141,059	166,240
Lam Dong.....	2,312	1,505	540	1,039	979	475	410	880	12,043	825	1,332	22,340	26,839
Ninh Thuan.....	5,749	3,348	1,309	4,696	5,020	1,569	1,525	2,410	30,502	1,730	4,123	61,981	67,409
Phu Bon.....	1,197	992	716	1,116	1,248	416	309	2,377	11,717	548	2,376	22,956	27,052
Phu Yen.....	23,261	5,931	2,827	9,176	3,279	2,320	1,855	3,960	30,067	2,327	13,311	98,314	116,107
Pleiku.....	3,885	3,528	1,934	7,164	3,507	1,505	1,577	3,592	29,466	1,569	3,030	60,757	77,572
Quang Duc.....	948	706	333	697	505	424	444	540	8,519	440	733	14,289	15,503
Tuyen Duc.....	2,124	1,502	716	2,728	2,107	684	590	1,192	21,463	1,049	1,428	35,585	41,696
Total.....	114,510	54,272	21,728	114,569	56,303	20,870	19,391	42,283	437,433	23,836	69,495	974,690	1,132,268
Tactical zone III:													
Saigon (C).....	59,371	34,007	13,995	87,670	137,962	13,159	10,010	14,910	135,527	15,300	23,700	545,611	765,340
Vung Tau (C).....	2,227	1,757	646	3,657	4,015	553	469	977	13,456	889	1,083	29,739	35,787
Bien Hoa.....	7,878	7,102	3,140	31,494	13,546	2,965	2,531	4,343	55,488	3,570	5,991	138,048	179,450
Binh Duong.....	7,106	6,196	3,062	23,499	8,576	2,529	2,290	3,698	19,275	2,904	5,719	84,854	113,065
Binh Long.....	1,945	1,396	880	3,936	1,616	1,007	982	1,272	7,732	980	1,454	23,200	28,218
Binh Tuy.....	761	1,496	499	5,143	639	427	488	1,101	11,237	566	845	23,202	27,068
Con Son.....	49	21	16	30	85	4	16	25	658	17	19	940	1,019
Gia Dinh.....	36,472	21,580	9,078	63,934	69,949	7,968	6,774	11,694	171,123	10,422	15,904	424,898	562,190
Hau Nghia.....	3,044	3,082	1,555	19,430	3,837	1,256	1,175	1,608	10,425	1,483	2,761	49,656	63,439
Long An.....	4,544	4,235	2,071	15,535	9,220	1,812	1,831	1,879	15,608	2,407	3,485	62,427	75,303
Long Khanh.....	2,580	3,975	1,159	5,746	3,270	898	823	1,961	25,624	1,403	1,977	49,416	61,155
Phuoc Long.....	832	802	599	1,008	961	617	556	895	11,004	514	654	18,442	20,981
Phuoc Tuy.....	2,176	2,170	1,120	12,002	4,268	933	820	1,291	15,705	1,229	1,826	43,534	50,768
Tay Ninh.....	6,696	5,013	3,607	39,947	6,543	2,284	2,157	3,133	30,830	2,825	4,344	107,379	130,395
Total.....	135,681	92,482	41,427	312,831	264,487	36,412	30,922	48,787	523,692	44,509	69,756	1,601,346	2,114,178
Tactical zone IV:													
An Giang.....	11,502	22,456	6,567	43,483	12,215	3,546	3,291	4,737	62,035	4,968	7,752	182,552	224,274
An Xuyen.....	1,523	1,476	832	6,444	2,491	760	652	3,593	14,326	789	1,131	34,017	42,245
Ba Xuyen.....	4,601	6,378	2,896	20,574	8,823	3,553	2,662	3,665	21,738	3,878	5,428	84,196	103,280
Bac Lieu.....	4,241	5,290	1,923	9,729	6,191	1,902	1,555	2,582	15,717	1,954	3,539	54,623	68,780
Chau Doc.....	9,372	11,023	5,341	40,019	8,043	3,692	3,084	4,336	65,374	4,117	7,136	161,537	184,301
Chuong Thien.....	2,472	2,423	1,405	7,909	2,018	724	724	22,488	997	1,846	43,830	53,298	
Dinh Tuong.....	6,352	6,844	2,977	14,240	15,492	2,479	2,288	3,955	29,732	3,265	4,285	91,909	112,934
Go Cong.....	1,657	1,726	892	2,879	4,581	798	583	1,543	17,594	1,238	1,294	34,785	38,588
Kien Giang.....	6,602	6,729	2,975	28,364	8,258	2,567	2,002	3,072	39,130	2,647	5,771	108,117	132,967
Kien Hoa.....	6,920	6,942	3,509	14,069	9,056	2,815	2,775	4,035	40,845	3,621	6,758	101,345	118,793
Kien Phong.....	4,850	6,351	3,332	34,160	3,812	1,891	1,750	2,524	28,448	2,301	3,933	93,352	111,110
Kien Tuong.....	848	557	396	4,283	732	321	283	434	6,126	414	595	14,788	17,200
Phong Dinh.....	10,772	9,007	5,393	24,103	11,846	2,825	2,697	3,403	28,072	3,336	6,209	107,663	145,332
Sadec.....	5,200	6,703	3,254	13,246	5,068	1,702	1,765	1,861	43,760	1,934	3,224	87,667	97,662
Vinh Binh.....	3,572	7,340	2,839	13,745	5,550	2,488	2,066	3,224	32,246	2,726	3,388	79,184	95,791
Vinh Long.....	10,232	8,523	5,698	27,402	15,311	3,652	3,121	4,189	31,401	3,972	7,351	120,652	148,389
Total.....	90,516	105,768	50,229	304,640	35,487	31,248	47,977	499,031	42,157	69,640	1,400,417	1,694,944	