

Checklist for Study of Delegue.
October, 1955

Interview with: Captain Vo kim Quy, Lt. Nguyen van Do, and Lt. Vu van Bai of the Regional Headquarters of the Gendarmerie.

Place: Dalat

Interviewers: Snyder, Gregory

Date: October 18, 1955

Interpreter: Quan

I. Organization.

Commanding Officer Captain
Assistant Commanding Off. Lieutenant
Section of Dalat

Brigades at Dran, Djiring, Entrerays, Dalat, Blao.
Section of Ban Me Thuot

Brigades at Pleiku, Kontum, Ban Me Thuot and Ankhe.
School (at Dalat)

II. Relationships.

The Gendarmerie is a battalion of the Army. Administrative services are provided by the Army. For day-to-day routine the Regional Headquarters of the PMS works directly under the Chief in Saigon. If there is a serious security problem in the region, the Regional Headquarters then works directly with the military authority of the region.

They respect the requests of the Regional Delegate but if he should ask something not within the competence of the Gendarmerie the Regional Commander would refuse to obey his request.

III. Personnel.

A. Total--Three officers, 56 men.

B. Deployment of PMS company.

Company Headquarters (Dalat)--one officer (Captain), three gendarmes.

School (Dalat)--one Adjutant Chef, two Sergeant Chefs, one gendarme secretary, one gendarme popotier, one gendarme instructor.

Headquarters Dalat Section--one officer (Lieutenant), two gendarmes.

Headquarters Ban Me Thuot Section--one officer (Lieutenant), one Sergeant Chef, one gendarme secretary.

Ankhe Brigade--one Sergeant Chef, two gendarmes.

Dalat Brigade--two Sergeant Chefs, five gendarmes.

Entrerays Brigade--one Sergeant Chef, three gendarmes.

Dran Brigade--one Sergeant Chef, six gendarmes.

Djiring Brigade--one Sergeant Chef, four gendarmes.

Ban Me Thuot Brigade--seven gendarmes.

Pleiku Brigade--one Sergeant Chef, three gendarmes.

Kontum Brigade--one Sergeant Chef, four gendarmes.

C. Recruitment for the Gendarmerie is done in Saigon from the Army and from civil life. Once recruited, the men are sent to one of the three regional schools (Tourane, Dalat, Saigon) for training. Military personnel taken into the Gendarmerie are given six months training, while civilians receive nine months training.

In the school at Dalat there are at present 85 students (72 Vietnamese, 13 montagnards).

During the training period, new recruits are given courses in Physical Education, Military Training, Military Police, Armament, Penal Law and Procedure, Administrative Practice and Procedure, Traffic Law, and Topography.

Enlistment in the Gendarmerie is for three years.

D. Gendarmerie personnel receive the same pay as those of the Army, which is less than that received by the personnel of the Surete and police.

IV. Budget.

The budget of the Gendarmerie is part of the Army budget. All requests for funds must go to Saigon. Salaries are paid through the Gendarmerie Commander in Saigon.

V. Reports, communications and procedures

Monthly reports are made to Saigon and monthly meetings of regional commanders are held in Saigon.

Only serious developments are reported to the Commander of the 4th District of the Army and to the Delegate. When re-enforcements are needed the regional commander can call on the Army.

No reports are made to the Chiefs of Provinces. If the latter need the services of the Gendarmerie they requisition them.

The regional commander makes a tour of inspection of the PMS once each month. Each Chief of Section makes a tour of inspection of the posts in his section once each month.

VI. Law Enforcement

A. No law enforcement problems.

B. Function: working for the army and for civil authorities the Gendarmerie keeps order in the countryside, acting as highway police.

Transfer of military prisoners is handled by the Gendarmerie (civilian prisoners are handled by the Commissariat of Police).

C. There are 59 gendarmes in the PMS, officers included.

D. As noted above the Gendarmerie is directly responsible to the Ministry of Defense, though it works in cooperation with the Ministries of Interior and Justice.

VII. Historical and Legal Background.

The Gendarmerie in colonial Indochina was fashioned after the French counterpart.

Both municipal and provincial police were included in its functions. The "French" Gendarmerie in theory ceased to exist in November 1954 ; practically, it came to its end in January 1955. Since that date the Gendarmerie has assumed an entirely different character. It no longer has jurisdiction over municipal police or provincial police.

VIII. Problems and Suggestions

A. The major problems confronting the Gendarmerie are the lack of transport and the lack of buildings.

There is only one jeep per section and one for the regional commander. This seriously limits the mobility of the Gendarmerie.

The Gendarmerie has no buildings for its many posts and no funds to build or buy buildings.

B. The suggested improvements were to provide for more jeeps and buildings.

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Checklist for Study of Délégué
October 1955

(CHIEF OF POLITICAL BUREAU)

He receives his information from the daily reports of the Sûreté.

Police and Security 450

Law Enforcement

(For details, see the individual reports on each law enforcement agency in the region.)

- A. The main security problem is in the plateau region of the PMS where the Viet Cong occupied much territory just before the Geneva Agreement. It is particularly tense in Kon Tum where it is thought that the civilian Chief of Province may soon be replaced with a military commander because of the heavy Communist infiltration of the local government. Pleiku is said to be a little better secured. As for Dalat itself, no particular problem was presented to us.
- B. The Security and Police, the Civil Guard, the National Gendarmerie, and the Army are all active in the PMS. After interviewing the first three agencies, it is a bit difficult to differentiate between their respective functions and limit of responsibilities. In theory, at least this might be said: The Security is responsible for the maintenance of security in the area; the Police are responsible for the maintenance of order in the cities; the Civil Guard is responsible for guarding public buildings; the National Gendarmerie is responsible for rural and highway patrol.
- C. The personnel level indicated below was furnished by each agency:

1. Security ;	284	Police.....112
2. Civil Guard	1200	
3. National Gendarmerie.	.59	

D. The relationship of the Délégué to each agency is about as follows:

1. The Security and Police--No direct authority but in constant close association.
2. Civil Guard--No direct authority but is regulated through the provincial chiefs who in turn are responsible before the Délégué.
3. National Gendarmerie--split personality. Partially responsible to the Army and partially to the respective province chiefs if called upon to perform an assistance.

Interviews with the Délégué of the
Government for Central-Viêt-Nam

Interviewee : Nguyen Văn Duyêñ, the Délégué
Interviewers : Wickert and Haney (October 18)
Haney (October 21)
Interpreter : Văn

A similar relationship exists between the Surete and the Garde Civile on one hand and the 2nd Bureau (Military Security) of the 2nd Military Region.

Law enforcement.

Security against Viêt-Công raids and infiltration is the key problem for the region. Various types of security and law enforcement agencies are available to meet the threat: the Army, Garde Civile, municipal police, sûreté, and the village militia. Usually the Gendarmerie are occupied with investigation of crimes and traffic accidents on the roads, but it is possible for the Délégué to obtain their assistance in dispersing an illegal political meeting, for example.

The municipal police are charged with law enforcement generally. The Garde Civile is concerned with assuring public order and security. The Sûreté is particularly concerned with uncovering and observing hostile political activity. The role of the village militia, as envisaged by the Délégué, is to strengthen the hold of the central government on the villages by repelling any light raids, by assuring the personal security of the village council, and by observing and reporting the movement and activities of strangers in the village. This militia already exists in skeletal form in almost every village.

At present, security is assured by the Sûreté in the first instance. If a situation develops which those agents cannot control, the Garde Civile will assist. If the situation becomes still worse, the Délégué can request the Army to intervene. In practice, these operations are usually coordinated at the province level by the responsible Chief of Province.

For the future, the Délégué wishes to see a lightly armed force established in every village--a village militia, that would fill up any gaps in the wall of security. Its members would be drawn from the permanent population of the village

on a volunteer basis. (See report on interview by Wickert and Haney with Province Chief at Quang Tri for basis of selection.) They would continue to follow their ordinary occupations by day, but at night they would take turns mounting guard over the village. During the day, they would keep an eye out for unidentified strangers even as they did their regular work.

Armament would not present a great problem: two or three rifles per village and a few hand grenades per man in a force that might vary from 6-12 in number. Some members might provide themselves with bows and arrows or simply with clubs.

At the present the militia donate their services, but the Délégué proposes that for a limited time the national budget should subsidize the arming of the militia and individual payments of 300-500 piastres per month. In principle, the village should foot the bill, and after some months, he believes that the village administration could take over financially due to the improved security situation. Receipts from taxes would increase at the village level.

The Délégué states that this project is near and dear to his heart, and he cites his favorable experience with the village militia when he was province chief in Quang Tri during 1952 while the war was still in progress. He added that, except for the element of cost and the state of the regional budget, he would develop village militias throughout the region on his own motion.