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Name: Charles F. Sloane

Job Title: Assistant Chief, Field Operations

Country of Assignment: Vietnam

Tour of Duty Began: November 22, 1964

Tour of Duty Ends: June 10, 1966

Project Activity on Which Engaged: Field Operations

Prior Country of Assignments and Years: Vietnam, Michigan State University, Vietnam Project 1955-1960

AID/Vietnam 1962-1964

OTHER AGENCY

I have indeed been fortunate to have had the opportunity to work in Vietnam for eight and one-half years in the police field. My experience dates back to September 1955 when I arrived as a member of the Police Advisory Group, Michigan State University/Vietnam project. On completion of five years with MSU, I remained in the United States for two years before returning to Vietnam as Public Safety Advisor, OPS, in August 1962.

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APPROVED BY:

AD/PS:RCI *RCI*

AND OTHER CLEARANCES

Reviewing Officer *Charles E. O'Brien*
Charles E. O'Brien, Chief, Operations

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On return from home leave in November 1964, I was assigned as Assistant Chief, Field Operations, having full responsibility for work performed by police advisors in the field with the Vietnamese National Police. As of this writing, field advisors total thirty-seven.

I beg indulgence for my deviation from the format for an End-of-Tour Report.

The United States Advisory effort in Vietnam missed a golden opportunity to create a national police organization shortly after the arrival of a police advisory team in 1955. As early as 1956, strong recommendations were being made for creation of a country-wide constabulary of approximately fifty-thousand (50,000) men, with patrol distribution down to and including the hamlet level. In the presentation of these recommendations, it was brought out that large areas of Vietnam had never been under control of a national, central government; that security in the countryside was essential before government presence would be felt by the people; that governmental projects and American aid programs required security to permit expansion; that a well-trained, well-disciplined and supervised police organization with experience in living with the people in the villages and hamlets would be well equipped through this association with the people to subdue incipient insurgency and stamp it out before it spread. All of these and additional reasons were used in an effort to sell the national police concept to the American Mission and, eventually, to the Vietnamese Government.

The program was neither sold to nor bought by the Vietnamese Government due to several reasons - the principal one being the lack of solidarity in the American Mission relative to the police concept and the American military frowning on the idea of a para-military police (state police) concept on a national scale. Even after the half-hearted Mission approach, NSU twice discussed this proposal with President Ngo Dinh Diem, to no avail.

If a united front had been presented and sanctions threatened, there would HAVE BEEN NO PROBLEM. The same principle, a national police, was sold to the Vietnamese Government in 1962, six years too late. If the idea was good in 1962, it was far better in 1956.

I like to believe that if the state or national police concept had been accepted by the Vietnamese in 1956 or 1957, the organization well supported by the United States, officered and led by some of the loyal, competent and dedicated men to be found in the National Police, the Viet Cong insurgency would not have been able to get off the ground. In mentioning US support (to everyone's horror, in 1956), the United States could have picked up the tab for full, 100 percent support, including a decent payscale, for this 50,000-man organization, furnishing uniforms even to shoes or boots and all practical police equipment to this date, and the cost would not have been equal to what the United States is presently spending in Vietnam in one month.

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Much has been written, is being written, and will be written regarding the nine years of the Diem (and his family) regime. Ignoring the misuse of police, the suppression of any opposition, political or religious; the arrest and imprisonment of innocent people who were permitted to "buy" their freedom, etc., I would like to discuss, briefly, American aid in principle. As a member of a contract group in the early days, and intensely interested in Vietnam and its people, but a mere bystander in relation to the top-level discussions being made at that time by top-level U.S. administrators, it seems as though steps should have been taken early in the game for the establishment of ground rules relating to American aid. Instead of creating a climate favorable toward American aid and its advisors and technicians by insisting on immediate rectification of deviations from the normal usage of money, materiel and advisory aid, we were constantly cautioned - "Don't rock the boat". It did not take the Vietnamese President, his family and officials very long to realize that no American was about to stand up to them. Thus, when critical issues were at stake, as in 1963, the pattern of refusing to listen to American guidance and advice had been set for eight years. The result? Chaos.

Firmness in dealing with second country national counterparts might not produce friends, but it certainly would produce respect. As matters now stand, we have neither in Vietnam.

1. Existing Differences Between U.S. and Local Practices and Adaptations Attempted

A number of papers have been written regarding the police in Vietnam. For anyone interested in a comprehensive treatise on the evolution of the police of Vietnam from early 1800 to 1957, including history, geophysical, sociological growth and problems of the country, see issues of January, February, and March, 1958 "The Police Chief" - organ of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. The articles were prepared by this writer.

a. Purposes Served by the Activity

American police advisory effort in Vietnam dated to May, 1965 with the arrival of the first members of a police team attached to the Michigan State University Vietnam Project, a contract group staffed principally by members of the University who would advise the Government on various aspects of administration, including police administration. In 1959, the first OPS advisors arrived in-country and, over a period of two and one-half years, in 1962, MSU phased out of Vietnam.

OPS Advisors' effort runs the gamut of not only police administration but also the technical police fields. From a small OPS staff of nine men, the advisory effort has grown to 120 and, by FY 1967, will have grown to 160 advisors and technicians.

Several reasons underlie the tremendous growth of the police advisory staff. Prior to 1962, except for the Cong Hoa (a detective plainclothes police organization formerly called the Sureté) there was little, if any, cohesion among the various other police. The Sureté, led by a Director General, had, on paper, national powers, but this organization fell apart at the regional and provincial levels. After some years of advisory effort in that direction, OPS finally convinced the American Mission and the Vietnamese Government on the practicality of a national police. In June 1962, President Ngo Dinh Diem signed a decree establishing a police, national in scope, to be composed of the various presently existing organizations, including the Sureté.

Unfortunately, however, the Vietnamese did not "buy" some of OPS recommendations relative to authority and management; thus, the name National Police is a misnomer.

b. Methods, Procedures and Standards

1. Technical

Not applicable

2. Administrative

In August, I was assigned to the North Central Lowlands Region (I Corps), consisting of the five northernmost provinces and the cities of Hue and Da Nang, as Regional Police Advisor. It was not until May 1963 that the regional headquarters began to slowly reorganize and conform to the recommended pattern of organization ordered by Saigon. Months later, the provincial police began the same change. To this day, however, nearly four years later, the National Police are national in name only.

Since 1955 the majority of province chiefs and mayors of autonomous cities have been Army Republic of Vietnam officers with rank of major or higher. Notwithstanding the fact that these positions come under the authority of the Minister of Interior, he has no control over appointments to positions and can exert no authority over the incumbent. The ARVN officer appointed as province chief owes his allegiance to the "Corps" commander, usually a general, who has made the appointment. As the Corps Commander is literally "king" in his Corps, so the province chief is "king" in his province. Just so long as the province chief has the support of the Corps Commander, he can do no wrong.

A majority of province police chiefs are now career policemen with a sprinkling of military officers. For a number of years, however, all of them were career army officers of rank of lieutenant or captain. Neither

the career policeman nor the career captain can "buck" the province chief. Any police action taken which deviates from the norm must have the approval of the province chief. Orders may emanate from Saigon, but it does not mean that the orders will be carried out. This in actuality, Vietnam has forty-three provincial and five city police organizations, each operationally, a separate entity with no control by the National Police Directorate, Saigon.

This is not a pretty picture when one considers that we have been here for nearly eleven years.

3. Expansion of National Police

In 1964 a governmental decree authorized the expansion of the National Police from 23,000 to 72,000 men over a three-year period. Later urgency in the national picture caused an up-dating of the time phase. Presently, plans call for the recruitment of the final 20,000 men by end of 1966.

Due to inadequacies within the Vietnamese national budget, it became apparent early in 1966 that no money was forthcoming for the final expansion of 20,000 men this year. In less time than it takes to say "Jack Robinson" (normally requests such as this require many months for decisions to be made) the United States agreed to pick up the tab on the cost of the manpower increase. The expedited action was excellent. The expansion was needed and our response was fast. Couldn't we (the U.S.), however, do something definite relative to office space for the police in the provinces?

The force expanded from 23,000 to 53,000 men in 1965. It will expand to 72,000 by the end of this year, and yet not one room has been added on to any of the forty-three province and five city police headquarters to allow for this expansion. Since 1955, construction of office space for police has been confined solely to Saigon and there was some expenditure for several training centers. The only evidence of American aid the police see in the provinces are weapons and vehicles. An occasional typewriter or file cabinet may filter through, but that is the extent of visible aid.

To the time of this report not one cent or piaster has been spent on any province or city police headquarters. Not one sou has been spent on district police headquarters anywhere in Vietnam.

In the same vein, relative to proper support of the National Police, it becomes rather difficult for a policeman earning 2200 piasters per month (buying power \$12.00) to furnish his own uniform, to be transferred and be required to pay 1000 piasters for living quarters for his family, when living costs have increased 50 percent in less than one year. It should be noted at this point - the police have not had a pay raise since 1955.

We have advocated a National Police. Let us support a National Police. Let us begin to support totally if necessary. It is strongly recommended that we supply all of the equipment needed and necessary to instill the uniformity in a National Police organization.

Would total support of the National Police by the United States be worthwhile? Are the National Police making any contribution to the counterinsurgency effort? Have the National Police a vital role in the struggle against the Viet Cong? Have the National Police lived up to American expectations? The answer to all four questions is an unequivocal "YES". Let me digress for a moment. Ignoring the police actions under the Diem regime, the police were a disorganized lot after the fall of Diem. Unpopular with the masses, they were an unknown entity with the several "heads of government". After the fall of Diem, considerable student opposition to the "coup" governments arose. Each time there was any difficulty - when students ran rampant through the streets of Saigon - the police were ordered to disarm. Unarmed police were supposed to control riotous mobs. The results were foreseen. The police ran from the mobs and were immediately dubbed "white mice" by American journalists. In the face of these mobs, any unarmed policeman would have run, whether American or any other nationality. Unarmed military would have also run. By late 1964, the political situation stabilized and the incumbent government placed a greater reliance on the police. The police rose to the occasion and have performed near miracles since this time.

Under strong leadership, with governmental support and with excellent guidance from Public Safety, the National Police have overcome, in two short years, adverse public opinion. Through conscious monumental effort on the part of every policeman to whom "public relations" has become a byword, the police have made great strides in selling their efforts to the public and to the nation.

In February, I visited all eight provinces in the Lower Mekong Region. I not only talked with the Public Safety advisors but also with provincial operations people, MAC/V sector advisors, province chiefs and police chiefs. I heard little that was derogatory but a great deal of high praise for the police. In five of the eight provinces I talked with sector advisors. The consensus of opinion was "I wish the Vietnamese military had improved as much as the National Police".

Unquestionably, the most effective intelligence in Vietnam is that carried on by the Special Branch of the National Police. As early as 1964, I was told repeatedly by MAC/V intelligence advisors that police intelligence was the most sound and correct of any of the intelligence sources; that many of the military operations are based upon information supplied by the police. If anything, the police intelligence net has improved during the

intervening two years. In other areas also, the police are performing well. In many of the provinces, under excellent leadership, the police conduct what is now known as Family Census checks. With as many men as they can muster, sometimes fifty or sixty, they move out at night and surround a predetermined hamlet or portion thereof and make a physical search of houses and families. Some Viet Cong and many sympathizers are apprehended in this manner, plus draft dodgers and army deserters. It is in the field of Resources Control, however, that the police have made a name. Probably less than one half of the three hundred control check-points are truly effective and yet the police have been able to keep a monumental amount of medicines and supplies out of the hands of the Viet Cong. Here again, the police have learned to handle people gently, but firmly.

There is no question that the National Police have hurt the Viet Cong. About seven months ago it was noticed that there was an appreciable increase in Viet Cong attacks against the police. This practice has increased steadily and there is no doubt that at this time the police are prime targets. In encounters with the Viet Cong the police have performed creditably. There is no throwing away of weapons and running from the scene as is done by the Regional and Popular forces. In the VC attack on Song Be, Phuoc Long Province, the VC had overrun not only MAC/V but also the Regional and Popular forces, and it was only due to the bravery and fighting ability of the police that caused the withdrawal of the VC, thus saving the provincial capital.

Much, if not all, of the progress being made at the regional and provincial police levels must be attributed to the hard work and dedication of Public Safety advisors. If so much can be done with the little support we have given the police (as compared to the support being given the military), much more could be accomplished with more US support to the National Police.

c. Organization and Institutions

1. Implementing

Regional and Provincial Advisors

I, unhesitatingly, believe that the most important advisory contribution by OPS is in the area of field advisors. Due to the breakdown of line authority between the National Police Directorate and the regions and provinces, it is in those regions and provinces that our field advisory staff are making gains in advice to the police.

A composite word picture of what is desired in attitudes and abilities in a rural police advisor would read something like the following: "It is imperative that incumbent not only have a wide knowledge of police work and administration but also the character and temperament favorable

for working with people of developing nations and the ability to adapt and apply his police knowledge and experience to the local situation. This includes the desire to help such people; a flexibility to adjust to frequent changes in personal and work habits; and an ability to cope with language and customs barriers. He must have the desire and ability to cope with a myriad of problems, not all of which are related to the police situation, for example - violent insurgent situations that invade personal life and daily work. The employee must have initiative and resourcefulness, patience, tact and the ability to work with a minimum of supervision."

An OPS provincial advisor's duties are plentiful and varied. In order to be truly effective he must establish close working relationships with American advisors from the other AID divisions and also from MAC/V. At the provincial level the American (MAC/V) Sector Advisors (military advisor to province chief), the S-2 (intelligence), the CID, etc., all assist in giving the advisors a broad knowledge of activities within the province.

On the Vietnamese side, he should make every effort to effect close working relationships with the Province Chief and Deputy Chief for security. Naturally, the Advisor must effect close working and personal relationships with the Provincial Chief of Police and his three deputies, i.e. Uniformed Section, Administration Section and Special Branch Section.

It is seldom that a new rural advisor accompanied by a competent interpreter can become truly effective under six months in the field inasmuch as he is being thrown into an entirely different environmental situation. On any one day the advisor could conceivably be called upon to perform any one of several of the following tasks:

1. Attend a conference called by any of the following persons: USAID Regional Director; Regional Police Advisor; Vietnamese Corps General; Province Chief; deputy Province Chief for Security; or MAC/V Sector Advisor and give briefing on work and capabilities of provincial police or on any particular police problem;
2. Meet with Provincial Police Chief or one of three deputies to discuss police procedures, problems or emergency needs and requirements;
3. Respond to cables from OPS/Saigon to investigate certain matters or resolve a particular point or points in need of clarification.
4. Discuss problems with one of the three Deputy Chiefs of Sections or with Bureau Chiefs of Judicial and Order Police, Administration

Police or Security Police of the Uniformed Police Section; Personnel and Training, Laboratory, communications and accounting and supply in the Administrative Section, and Planning; operational service, management and regulation in the Special Police Section.

5. Work closely with Chief of Resources Control and inspect checkpoints.
6. Work closely with the Family Census program and when counterpart or deputy visits, accompany to scene of Family Census sweep, usually in the middle of the night.
7. Work closely with ID card program.
8. Study needs of department and establish in-service training program, including roll-call training.
9. Institute regularized firearms training for all police. (May be necessary for advisors to "scrumps" materials and build a range before training can begin).
10. Inspect all AID-supplied commodities, including weapons and vehicles for proper repair and use.
11. Check any provincial and local prisons and submit reports on condition.
12. Visit various police outposts with counterpart and inspect AID commodities.
13. Visit the districts within the province and spend at least one night in each. Contacting all American military and civilian personnel in district is a tremendous morale booster for police and even more so if counterpart accompanies.
14. Writing daily, weekly and/or monthly reports plus special memoranda relative to special incidents.
15. Compiling budgetary needs of the police in close cooperation with counterpart.
16. Clamber into a foxhole upon being attacked by the Viet Cong and defend area.

17. Plan for and implement security of police installations including police headquarters, checkpoints, etc.
18. Assist in planning of joint police-military activities and operations - i.e. Family Census operations, Resources Control checkpoints, ambushes, etc.
19. Beg, borrow or "steal" - in other words "scrounging", various building commodities for police.
20. Attend various social functions with counterpart at which food of dubious origin and composition is consumed - many times to the detriment of health, and, last but not least;
21. Be the teacher, minister, father-confessor, alter-ego and wet nurse to the counterpart, and police in general.

To my mind the tragic part of the OFS program in Vietnam has been its inability to recruit sufficient competent man to fill the vacant positions in the field. At present, we have twenty-three provincial advisors trying to cover forty-three provinces and five autonomous cities. The proper type of advisory aid cannot result from part-time coverage of the provinces and cities.

2. Supporting

Not applicable

d. Human Resources

In my position as Senior Advisor, Field Operations, I worked very closely with the regional and provincial police advisors. Due to a number of reasons, principally because of work pressures in Saigon, I did not visit the field as often as I wanted. I did get out a number of times, and, for various periods of time, visited five of the six police regions. On most visits, I not only discussed problems relating to the police advisors but also met as many American and Vietnamese officials as possible. I tried to spend at least one night in the province with the provincial advisor and when time and transportation permitted, I visited as many of the districts within the province as possible.

During discussions with advisors both in Saigon and in the field a number of problem areas were brought out. Two are worthy of discussion and, I hope, action by higher authority (the second problem is brought out under Para f. "Finances and Economic Resources".)

Interpreters

Probably the most troublesome and besetting problem encountered by OPS advisors is the lack of competent and mature interpreters. Not only do the advisors lack competent interpreters but some, in the field, lack interpreters of any kind, competent or not.

It should be realized that it is utterly impossible to perform intelligently in the field without an interpreter. It is also impossible to do an excellent job of advising counterparts through twenty-year old youths, immature and with but a smattering of English. Our work is much too important to rely upon such inadequate tools. It is the consensus that accomplishments in the field are directly related to the calibre and abilities of an interpreter. As several advisors have so aptly phrased it, "The fact that we have such a close bond and association with our counterparts is due solely to our interpreters. We depend on them for our security; for tremendous amounts of time saved because of their knowledge and skills; for avoidance of cultural and social blunders and for performance of much of the routine leg and paper work that becomes so time-consuming. The amount of success in the field is directly related to the maturity, finesse and capability of interpreters."

Two main difficulties present themselves. One, the Vietnamese military draft and, two, higher salaries paid by competing American agencies and American contractors. Relative to the first problem - the draft. Two OPS interpreters received notice of impending draft and were released from USAID on the date they were to report for draft. Information indicates that both of these men are presently working for American civilian government agencies. It is extremely difficult for an advisor to try to rationalize the why's and wherefore's of such action. I believe that our work (OPS) is extremely important. It would thus seem justified that capable interpreters should be and could be declared draft-exempt. If, on the other hand, our work with the National Police is unimportant at this time, then, perhaps, we should retire until the war is won.

e. Material Resources

Not applicable

f. Financial and Economic Resources

Services

There is a need for OPS advisors to be supplied with a "alush" or "contingency" fund. This fund need not be large, but it should be of the revolving type, i.e. monthly. It is suggested that a revolving fund of one or two thousand piasters per month would alleviate difficulties encountered by advisors, in the provinces.

Countless numbers of times certain exigent situations arise in working with the police which require a few piasters to resolve. At the present time, many of the advisors reach into their pockets and supply the wherewithal with no possibility of reimbursement. A fund such as suggested would alleviate a constantly recurring problem.

It must be realized, whether OPS wishes to take cognizance of it or not, that PS advisors are in competition not only with other divisions within AID, but also with other American agencies. Advisors in other USAID divisions, such as Public Works, Health, and Operations, not only have contingency funds, but also, as in the case of Provincial Operations, many "goodies" to hand out, such as bulgar, flour, cooking oil, cement, roofing, etc. One American agency not only has an apparently unlimited supply of piasters, but also planes and helicopters to ride their counterparts and families from place to place. PS advisors are thus placed at a disadvantage, for, in the Vietnamese mind, inasmuch as other advisors have either money or goodies or both, the PS advisors must be pcketing what the Vietnamese should be getting.

I in no way recommend the promiscuous use of money. I do say that certain emergency situations arise with the police such as: need for flashlight batteries, vehicle repair, gasoline, office supplies, repairs to checkpoints, light-bulbs, payment to laborers for small jobs, police accompanying American military on operations and having no money to buy food, photographs for OPS re commodities seized, etc., etc., which would make the recommended contingency fund a boon to our advisors.

Police Problems

A general deterioration of law and order is noticeable throughout Viet-Nam. Beginning in 1965, more and more incidents involving members of the Army Republic of Viet-Nam (ARVN) in various types of crimes ranging from murder to robbery and theft and a generally arrogant attitude towards the civilian population have been noted. In addition to their frequent criminal attacks on the population, there have been increasingly frequent physical attacks on members of the National Police. Medium level police officers have told me that nearly 80% of the crime committed in Vietnam is committed by ARVN personnel.

The only body of men having authority over actions of ARVN off post is the Military Police or Quan Canh. The difficulty lies in having too few Quan Canh and inadequate, weak leadership within that organization. As one field advisor points out, "It is known that the QC are not able to make an arrest, stop or question any soldier without great fear of reprisal; consequently, the QC are ineffective. The soldiers carry their weapons everywhere they go. They go to the market, eat, drink, and refuse to pay. The Military Police say they have no backing from the province chief."

For PS field advisors the above conditions cause dismay, consternation and apprehension.

Relative to these increasingly frequent criminal attacks, this clearly indicates a disintegration of ARVN command responsibility, lack of leadership by officers and an utter lack of discipline. When the Quan Canh do apprehend a culprit, and this is beginning to occur less and less frequently, the culprit is released by the commanding officer with no disciplinary action whatsoever. Field Advisors' reports would indicate that the civilian population is beginning to be apprehensive when ARVN troops arrive in town, on leave. As one advisor has succinctly reported;

"The replacement of an ARVN battalion of Rangers definitely effects the public safety. The Rangers have the reputation, among the populace, of being 'wildmen of the marketplace' but 'poor fighters in combat'. They are living up to their reputation since their arrival. On first day of arrival they were involved in a fist fight with ARVN soldiers. Since then they continue to terrorize the population. Should the police attempt to enforce law and maintain order relative to the Rangers it would undoubtedly result in attacks on the police as has occurred in other areas. The populace expects help. The police do not have the authority to control the military."

The police are caught in a dilemma. The populace looks to them for aid and assistance in combating crime, preventing attacks on civilians and arresting criminals and yet, due to lack of authority and law, the police must turn their backs, so to speak, while the military continues to terrorize and steal. The police do not have authority to act against the military in these matters.

There is also a definite build-up of resentment toward the police by the military. With 700,000 ARVN, as compared to 53,000 police, the police on their Family Census sweeps arrest draft evaders and military deserters. (January 1 to end of April 1966, they arrested an average of 998 draft evaders and 136 deserters, per week.) The draft evaders are turned over to induction centers. Once the former evader is dressed in military uniform he is exempt from civilian law. A personally witnessed incident reveals the problem. In July 1965 I was visiting a Resources Control checkpoint with the Regional Police Director and the Regional PS advisor. As we heard the roar of motor trucks approaching the police ran to the rear of the checkpoint shanty. Army trucks loaded with soldiers sped by. I was then busy ducking viciously thrown loaded 30 caliber ammunition clips, each of which could have crushed a skull. The Regional Director stated it was useless to talk with the area commander regarding the frequently occurring incidents. That it would require specific orders from the "top" before these harassments would cease. It is in this manner that apprehended draft evaders "get given" with the police.

I trust my point is made. It is my firm belief that it is absurd for the United States to be financing many programs designed to "win the hearts and minds of the people", on one hand, and the Government of Vietnam permitting the military forces to alienate the people, on the other hand.

I also feel concern over the actions of American soldiers in Vietnam. The following incident is indicative of the feelings of the Vietnamese people. Three GIs walked into a small beer and soft drink parlor in Cholon. They ordered the proprietor to get them some girls. He told them that he was not a procurer but would be happy to serve them beer or soft drinks. The GIs smashed up his establishment, including more than 60 bottles of beer. After leaving they were apprehended by American MPs and returned to the bar. Under duress they apologized and offered to make restitution. The proprietor refused, saying, "I know what you men were thinking while you were wrecking my place. The offer of money cannot change what you had in your hearts." This was an unusual occurrence. I mean refusal to accept payment for damages but the acceptance of payment would not erase the proprietor's thoughts.

CONCLUSION

I have, in this RTR, indicated the need for support in certain areas of our program. I have also indicated areas of general concern to the United States effort in Vietnam. I leave Vietnam with trepidation in my heart for the safety of hundreds of Vietnamese friends and for the people of Vietnam. Conditions have never been so bad since the early days of Diem's prime ministership. It is difficult to believe that we are winning this war, militarily or for the "hearts and minds of the people." I sincerely hope I am mistaken.

(See next page for Reviewing Officer's Statement)

Reviewing Officer's Statement*Charles E. O'Brien*

My review of Mr. Sloane's report reveals that he has been extremely candid in his recitation of the pros and cons of the program. Mr. Sloane's long tenure of service in Vietnam has given him a host of first-hand facts and figures from which he has composed a comprehensive End-of-Tour report. Many of the problems which he has identified are recognized, and efforts are being made to resolve them.

I do not agree with him that the U.S. pick up the whole tab for 100 percent support of the police. I believe Mr. Sloane's hind-sight took over. I doubt if in 1956 and 1957 anyone visualized the magnitude of the aid and support we are giving today.

The report is a long one and possibly goes farther than what is required. It does contain much of Mr. Sloane's philosophy, it should serve as a good "get acquainted" with O/PS in Vietnam, document.

In this report the employee has more than fulfilled the purposes and requirements of an End-of-Tour report, it is an honest evaluation of how he has seen things.

Part (C) Organization and Institutions, on pages 7, 8, 9 and 10, is well done and should be a "must" piece of reading for O/PS newcomers to Vietnam.

~~XXXXXX~~~~XXXXXX~~Supplemental comments by Approving Officer:

Mr. Sloane has favored the public safety effort with his lucid and very frank statements. His prognostications must be viewed in the light of their source -- a person who has observed practically the full route of the deterioration of the political situation. Certainly the environment has not improved in the period of his service -- witness the substantial growth in military operations and the ever increasing U. S. military troop build-up.

Much has been said about the police not having the authority to act against criminal depredations and conduct of ARVN forces. Current research does not confirm a lack of legal authority, but does rather clearly indicate a lack of capability or desire to act. Inherent in Mr. Sloane's total report is an appeal for a de-militarization of the police and the provision of a logical yet practical legal base upon which they can build the respect needed for a completely effective police force and "rule by law".

LODGE

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MANN *Mann*