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# **REPORT ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONER FOR CIVIC ACTION**

**MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY  
Vietnam Advisory Group**

June, 1957

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Introduction

In this report the Michigan State University Group (MSUG) proposes a plan for reorganizing the central services and field administration of a Vietnamese agency in the interest of greater efficiency and economy.

MSUG has analyzed the structure and functions of the Special Commissariat for Civic Action in two separate phases. Late in 1955 preliminary discussions were held with the responsible Vietnamese officials and representatives of interested American agencies, particularly the United States Operations Mission (USOM) and the Training Relations Instructions Mission (TRIM). Then, at the end of January 1956, this study got under way as one segment of the simultaneous examination of four agencies -- the Departments of Agrarian Reform, Agriculture, and National Education, plus this Commissariat. As in previous studies, MSUG has placed major reliance upon interviews to learn how the entity concerned is actually organized to perform its mission. However, we changed the sequence of interviews for examining these four agencies. The first set was conducted in the field rather than at headquarters in Saigon.

By April 24, 1956 MSUG staff members had talked with provincial officials, village notables, and private citizens, as well as with Civic Action personnel, in six provinces of South Vietnam where teams had been sent from Saigon to live and work in the villages. The files also include an interview with a provincial official in the PMS (now the Highlands of the Central Region), who was conducting a similar program of communal self-help using

locally-recruited teams.

Further research was suspended at the end of April as the teams of Civic Action cadres or agents were called back to Saigon for reorganization and retraining. The study was resumed in November 1956 with a series of interviews at headquarters. Interviewers spoke with the principal officials and every supervisor in the central services of the Commissariat.

At that time the Vietnamese National Army was engaged in two military operations to scour those areas in South Vietnam which were still threatened by armed units of the Viet-Cong and other dissident groups. All of the Civic Action teams in South Vietnam (now the Southern Region) had been assigned to these operations. In this situation the geographical scope of our field survey was limited.

It was decided that the MSUG interviewers would visit two of the provinces concerned where the military pacification had recently been completed. Accordingly, interviews were conducted at the district and village level in My-Tho during December 1956 and in Tra-Vinh during the following month. Also in January 1957 our researchers visited all four provinces of the Highlands to interview provincial officials and Civic Action cadres from Saigon, who had started to work in the villages of the mountaineer tribesmen.

After the successful completion of the two military operations in mid-February 1957, MSUG hoped to extend its geographical sampling for this study into the remaining provinces of the Southern Region where Civic Action cadres have been active. We have noted that the Commissariat has not yet sent its cadres into the coastal provinces of the Central Region; as a result, no MSUG interviews were made in that Region. The Commissariat informed us in

February that all of their teams and mobile groups would shortly be called back to Saigon for reorganization. At that point it was widely assumed that responsibility for administering the community development sector of the impending Five Year Plan would be vested in this agency. The Commissariat intended to regroup its cadres into larger units and to assign each one to a particular province. There it could undertake this additional responsibility for community development from much nearer bases than Saigon.

As of early June, 1957, that assumption has not been realized, and the contemplated reorganization has not taken place. In the meantime the overall responsibility for community development has been assigned to a staff agency, the Directorate General of Planning. However, no entity has been designated or created to administer that program.

MSUG presents these recommendations for reorganizing the Commissariat principally on the basis of information which was gathered from approximately sixty interviews during the two phases of our inquiry. At the outset we are obliged to postulate that the community development program will not become operational in the near future, and that in practice community development and civic action could operate separately without duplication of effort and division of responsibility. If these postulates are invalidated by events, it is urged that a supplementary study be made to determine the optimum relationship between the agencies concerned.

MSUG wishes to record its thanks for the unfailing cooperation which the Vietnamese government and other American agencies have extended in the course of this study.

The report was prepared by Roland Haney, and M.A. Sanderson Jr. with  
the assistance of Vu-Vân-Hoc, Nguyễn-Hoa, Thân-Trong-Huê and Trương-Vân-Khang.

Wesley R. Fishel  
Chief Advisor

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. the Special Commissariat for Civic Action be raised to a Commissariat General, and that the Commissioner General be given the personal rank of a Secretary of State;
2. the Commissioner General revise the structure of the central services in Saigon by creating two directorates and appointing a Secretary General;
3. the Commissioner General delegate to the Director of Cabinet authority to conduct liaison with other agencies;
4. the Commissioner General delegate to the Secretary General authority to maintain facilities for administrative support;
5. the Commissioner General delegate to the Director of Operations authority to draft and execute the overall plan of action;
6. the Commissioner General appoint provincial delegates to supervise the mobile teams;
7. each Chief of Province create a provincial advisory committee for Civic Action.

## Historical Survey

### I

After the Geneva Agreements of July, 1954 and the resulting armistice, the new national government headed by President Ngô-Dinh-Diệm faced enormous administrative problems. Military control of Vietnam north of the Demarcation Line at the 17th parallel passed into the hands of the Communist-led Viet-Minh (or Viet-Cong). Within the residual zone of French military occupation, the Viet-Minh had controlled territorial pockets as large as entire provinces since August, 1945. As the Communist military forces withdrew from these enclaves, pursuant to the armistice, they aggravated the physical damage from years of civil war by destroying crops and livestock, roads, bridges, irrigation canals, schools and public buildings.

Psychological terror supplemented this policy of vandalism. The citizenry, especially the local officials, were warned that this withdrawal meant only a temporary regrouping of forces; for the nation-wide elections to be held in 1956 would result in a Communist victory and reunification under the leadership of Ho-Chi-Minh. When that happened it would go hard with anyone who had cooperated with the government in Saigon in the intervening period.

The Viet-Cong left behind a network of spies and propaganda agents or cadres with access to secret caches of weapons, radio equipment, and other supplies. Thus, in administering these liberated areas, the national government would have to struggle with weighty problems of pacification and reconstruction in an atmosphere poisoned by fear and doubt.

In other areas south of the Demarcation Line the administrative situation

was almost equally difficult. Since 1945 certain districts had passed under the de facto control of politico-religious sects that maintained private armies. There the representatives of the national government could act only at the sufferance of the sect leaders. In many other rural areas, elements of the Viet-Cong concealed themselves by day and descended upon the villages at night to extort money and supplies. In effect these raiding parties conducted a nocturnal administration in the villages, parallel to (but neutralizing) the official administration. And in the national capital, Saigon, the municipal police were controlled by one of the so-called sects.

That, in brief, was the military and political background for public administration in Vietnam late in 1954. To win the loyalties of the Vietnamese people against the competitive challenge of the Viet-Cong, the new government developed a plan of action based upon enlightened nationalism and social reform. Various departments were to be called upon to execute substantive programs of public service in health, education, information, agriculture, etc.

Unfortunately, the field services were not organized in such a way as to bring governmental services directly to the people.

The national departments merely gave technical guidance to their specialists in the field, who were assigned to regional and provincial offices. At a lower administrative echelon the district chiefs represented the province chief, but the national administration rarely penetrated the villages directly. The overwhelming majority of Vietnamese still live in rural villages; yet it has been estimated that at the beginning of 1955, 80% of the public officials and civil servants worked in the capital city.

As a result, governmental programs did not reach the mass of people, and in effect the villages were left open to Communist propaganda and subversion.

The President convened a series of interministerial conferences to study the problem and to suggest ways of bridging this wide gap in the administrative structure. The consequent recommendation called for creation of a flexible and mobile organization, which could penetrate the countryside and win over the villages by explaining the government's policies and programs for social and economic improvement. This suggestion was discussed at a special convocation of political, military, and administrative leaders in January, 1955. Some of the province chiefs objected on the ground that the new entity, which would operate outside established channels, might challenge their position. It was suggested alternatively that each province chief should recruit agents to perform this task as a section of the provincial administration.

## II

Although the group did not arrive at a unanimous position on this question, the President proceeded to create an interim organization for civic action within the Presidency on March 7, 1955 by issuing Instruction No. 11-PTT/VP. After further study, which took account of initial operations in the field, this entity was reorganized by Decree No. 22-PTP, which the President signed on November 18, 1955. The decree establishes a Special Commissariat for Civic Action with responsibility for carrying to the villages the Government's programs for social assistance and for an improved standard of living. In order to discharge this mission the Commissariat is authorized

to assist the national departments in their technical operations at the district and village levels.

The decree lays down a plan of geographical organization for the Commissariat with central services in Saigon, an inspector in each province, and a team of agents or cadres in each district. The agency is to be directed by a Commissioner with the assistance of a Secretary General. With the President's approval the Commissioner is to issue an instruction defining areas of interest, and also governing the physical movement of teams and the operating techniques to be used. Within his overall responsibility the Commissioner is charged with certain specific functions:

- drafting the plan of action in conjunction with the interested departments and the province chiefs
- maintaining liaison in the field with military commanders, administrators, and the technical representatives of national departments
- reviewing the activities of all teams and inspectors
- submitting monthly reports to the President concerning current operations with copies to the interested departments
- organizing training courses for cadres.

A degree of flexibility in recruiting cadres is assured by a provision for employment of private citizens in case the numbers and skills needed cannot be obtained from existing categories of civil servants or military personnel. The President's concern for the quality of instruction in the training courses is reflected in the provision requiring national departments to furnish technical lecturers at the Commissioner's request.

The structure and the assignment of functions within the central services in Saigon are to be the subject of subsequent legislation; but Decree No. 22-TTP describes the status, functions, and responsibilities of the Commissariat's field service in some detail. The provisions dealing with a regional echelon between headquarters and the provincial level have never been implemented.

Under the administrative control of the province chief, each inspector is charged with supervising and examining the operations of all teams in that province. Noting achievements and shortcomings he will report his findings to the Commissioner and to the province chief. At the Commissioner's request he will also conduct special investigations of problems in civic action.

Working in every village of a district, each team of cadres is directed to promote public health, the anti-illiteracy campaign, agrarian reform, the anti-Communist information program, public security, social action, etc. Continuity of effort is to be assured by training volunteer agents from the local population, who will carry forward these activities when the mobile team moves on to other villages.

Here again, as at the national and provincial levels, the reporting function is intended to facilitate coordination; for the head of each team will provide the district chief with a copy of the activities report that is submitted to the inspector. This procedural safeguard of the right to be informed would in turn facilitate the province chief's administrative control of field operations.

It should be noted that the text of this decree goes a long way toward satisfying the objection that was raised at the meeting in January of 1955. As a corollary to the recognition of established authority, another provision calls upon the national departments, province chiefs and district chiefs, technicians, and military commanders to assist the Commissariat and its field organization by providing logistical support and program support as needed.

Article 12 assigns responsibility for executing this decree to the Secretary of State at the Presidenoy. On the same day, November 18, 1955, the Secretary issued Arrêté No. 13-TTP/VP establishing the structure of the central services, assigning functions to the component entities, and placing them under the authority of a Secretary General. The Arrêté names six bureaus: the Private Secretariat, Correspondence Bureau, Personnel Bureau, Accounting and Supply Bureau, Planning and Coordination Bureau, and a Training Bureau.

For various reasons, both economic and political, the reorganization of civic action contemplated in the decree and arrêté of November 18, 1955 has been only partially implemented. A temporary organization headed by a Commissioner existed and operated as early as March, 1955. In that agency the central services consisted of four units reporting to a Chief of Cabinet. By September, 1955 there were six bureaus in the central services, and the arrêté regularized that arrangement. However, no Secretary General has been appointed; and the bureaus have continued to report to the Chief of Cabinet, who is directly responsible to the Commissioner. Also, by September, 1955, two Chargés de Mission (now only one) had been assigned to the organization. Neither the decree nor the arrêté of November 18, 1955 mentions this assignment.

By February, 1957 the number of entities in the central services had grown to eleven units with the addition of a Press Bureau, Security Bureau, Documentation Bureau, and Transport Bureau, plus the fission of the Accounting and Supply Bureau into its two component elements. However, this increase in the number of units reporting directly to one official (the Chief of Cabinet) has not led to the regrouping of the bureaus, according to related functions, into a smaller number of services or directorates.

As for the field organization envisaged in the decree, budgetary limitations prevented the installation of an inspector in each province and a mobile team of agents in each district throughout Free Vietnam. In fact no inspectors have been appointed. The available funds were at first devoted to dispatching teams for limited periods to some of the villages in the Southern Region. Later this partial coverage was extended to the Highlands of the Central Region.

### III

Field operations have passed through three phases. In the first phase, from November, 1955 to April, 1956, the central services with a personnel of seventy-four supported a field staff of approximately eight hundred (800), who were organized into eighty mobile teams. Each of five national departments were represented by two agents on the team: Public Health, Education, Social Action, Information, and Interior. Here the operational base was the village, and sixteen provinces were visited. Each team worked in a village for a period of four to six weeks and then moved on to another village.

In the second phase, from April to June of 1956, the teams were called back to Saigon, retrained, and regrouped into twenty-three larger entities called Province Groups, each one comprised of approximately forty agents. A group would be assigned to one large province or to two of the smaller provinces. Here the district was the operational base. A small supervisory staff and a small reserve of cadres remained at district headquarters while the group divided into cells or units of two agents. Each unit would work in a particular village for a period of eight weeks and then move on until every village in that district had been visited. In this way it was planned to cover all villages in a particular province. However, this plan did not go into operation until May, 1956; and in June the National Army launched two major pacification campaigns sweeping across several provinces and breaking the hold of dissident elements.

In the third phase, from June, 1956 to February, 1957, an enlarged field staff of approximately 1300 was supported by the central services with a personnel of about 200. The field organization consisted of six large entities called Inter-Province Groups, which were placed under the control of the committee directing each military operation. The Inter-Province Group was sub-divided into province groups, teams, and cells or units. This arrangement permitted considerable flexibility in distributing these unarmed volunteer agents throughout an area marked for pacification.

In all three phases the cadres attempted to stimulate and to guide self-help projects in the villages and to implant a feeling of solidarity with the national government. They wore the traditional black calico garb and of the peasants/gained their confidence by living, working, and eating with

them. The Commissariat has not yet compiled and released a complete set of statistics showing the tangible results of these efforts. However, reports from cadres in the field have indicated a wide range of substantial achievements:

- taking a census and making surveys of the physical needs of the villages
- building schools, dispensaries, maternity wards, and information halls
- repairing and enlarging local roads
- digging wells and irrigation canals
- teaching personal and public hygiene
- distributing medicines and giving inoculations
- teaching children in school by day and conducting anti-illiteracy classes for adults at night
- forming a village militia or self-defense group
- conducting political meetings
- explaining the agrarian reform legislation.

While civic action was playing an important role in the two pacification campaigns, the President issued Decree No. 116-TTP on September 5, 1956 making the Commissariat responsible for personnel administration in the field operations conducted by the national departments. According to this decree, the Commissariat would train the cadres and draft programs for joint operations, in collaboration with the interested departments, and then coordinate the execution of approved programs. Field agents specializing in education, agrarian reform, information, labor, etc., would continue to work in these

technical areas; but any combination of specialists might be assigned temporarily to the mobile teams of civic action cadres. The resultant group would work in the field wherever the need for its services was greatest.

Despite the theoretical merits of this technique for mobilizing and applying skills within an integrated field service, the plan could not be put into practice without the assent of the persons affected. Until now the personnel serving in civic action mobile teams have been volunteers chosen by competitive examination from a large number of applicants. Most of them are youthful enthusiasts without previous experience of governmental service. On the other hand, when faced with the prospect of transfers en bloc to the Commissariat's jurisdiction, many of the cadres employed by other agencies have resigned rather than accept the lower salary of 2000 piasters per month and the physical inconveniences of living and working in the villages. There the matter rests. The decree has not been rescinded, but efforts to implement it have lapsed.

At the date of writing, the Commissariat is not engaged in a broad sweep of field operations. This interval should be used to reorganize the agency and to regroup its forces in the light of experience. It is still possible that decisions will be taken at the political level to link the Commissariat with community development or to implement its legal responsibility for an integrated field service. In either case the administrative structure should be revised, after study, to meet the needs of a changed situation. In this report, however, the suggested reorganization is based on an assumption that the Commissariat will enter upon a fourth phase of field operations with essentially the same mission.

SUPPORTING STATEMENTS

- 1). IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE SPECIAL COMMISSARIAT FOR CIVIC ACTION BE RAISED TO A COMMISSARIAT GENERAL, AND THAT THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL FOR CIVIC ACTION BE GRANTED THE PERSONAL RANK OF A SECRETARY OF STATE

The Commissariat's mission may be stated briefly as bringing governmental programs for social and economic welfare to the rural areas of Viet-Nam. In 1957 the Departments of Information and National Education are notable exceptions to the broad observation that permanent governmental agencies do not have full-time or part-time representation in the villages. Previous MSUG studies have indicated that the actual effect of a national program is slight when the chief of the technical service concerned is tied to his desk at provincial head-quarters by shortage of personnel, lack of ever-present transportation, and the / ~~population~~. In this situation the Commissariat can reinforce the impact of that program by instructing its field service to supplement the administrative structure of the national department, thereby filling a gap between that agency and the rural population. A limiting factor is that the Civic Action cadres would need retraining to deal effectively with technical subjects.

In addition to assisting as an auxiliary mechanism in program execution, the Commissariat is authorized to make suggestions for program planning to the responsible departments, to propose inter-ministerial programs for field operations, and to coordinate the execution of those joint programs after approval. The Commissariat must maintain constant liaison with the national departments in order to discharge these functions

promptly and effectively. Unfortunately the question of status or relative standing seems to have blocked a free and productive exchange of views. Interviews throughout the central services revealed an impression that officials in the departments of state find it lowering to their dignity to deal directly with a mere commissariat. It was learned that this attitude has sometimes prevented the Commissariat from calling conferences, and that other agencies have shown a tendency to resist rulings by the Commissariat unless or until the President has endorsed its position.

Protocol should help, not hinder, the conduct of public business. The status of this entity should be adjusted to reflect its responsibilities and to facilitate performance of its mission. Converting the Commissariat into another department of state would imply permanence, and that is not to be desired. In previous reports MSUG has recommended that the existing national departments should extend their field services vertically to reach the people. In the meantime the Commissariat, a ~~temporary~~ agency, bridges the gap. It is suggested that the problem of status would be best resolved by elevating this entity to a commissariat general and endowing the Commissioner General for Civic Action with the personal rank of a Secretary of State.

The adjustment would permit an up-grading of key positions within the agency. As far as protocol is concerned, the Commissioner General and his aides could then consult with their opposite numbers in the permanent departments on a basis of parity. Furthermore, these changes would not affect the administrative relationship between the Secretary of State at the Presidency and this agency. The example of the Commissariat General for Refugees offers a persuasive precedent for this suggestion.

- 2). IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL REVISE THE STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL SERVICES IN SAIGON BY CREATING TWO DIRECTORATES AND APPOINTING A SECRETARY GENERAL.

The purview of civic action is not limited to any geographical subdivision of Vietnam, nor is it restricted in time to any particular period. The decree of November 18, 1955, contemplates the permanent assignment of field service personnel in every province and district. Heretofore the Commissariat has lacked the funds and the opportunity to decentralize operations from the present base in Saigon to offices in the field. In formulating a proposal for reorganization, MSUG has first examined the intended scope of civic action and then noted the difficulties which have temporarily narrowed the range and depth of field operations. The reorganization scheme has been drafted to facilitate full performance of the mission assigned to civic action.

For the central services there is only one raison d'être - to support field operations. It follows that headquarters in Saigon should/so organized as to discharge efficiently the responsibility for recruiting and training qualified cadres, furnishing logistical support to the mobile teams, supervising and guiding the teams' operations, coordinating programs with the responsible agencies, etc. As the Commissariat General expands its field organization to meet nation-wide responsibilities, the number, variety, and complexity of demands upon the ~~central services~~ can be expected to increase. MSUG believes that the existing structure is inadequate to sustain that additional workload.

The proposal for revision does not, however, imply any adverse criticism of past performance. On the contrary, the recognized achievements of mobile teams attest to a contribution from headquarters. More particularly, MSUG interviewers were highly impressed by the efficiency of operations at the central services (in the Mail Room for example). It was observed that the ratio of headquarters personnel to field staff has been kept very low. On the procedural side it is worth noting that the Chief of Cabinet holds daily staff meetings with his bureau chiefs and that a bureau is expected to complete action on any routine matter within 24 hours.

MSUG considers that the responsible officials have done good work at headquarters despite the organizational framework. A permanent expansion of field operations would reveal the weaknesses in that structure. For instance, the Chief of Cabinet is responsible for supervising the eleven bureaus that make up the central services, and each of the bureau chiefs reports directly to him.

The span of control limiting effective supervision is a somewhat flexible concept in public administration. Many observers have agreed, however, on the validity of this criterion - that the supervisor should be able to find time in the course of an ordinary business day to discuss matters privately with each of his immediate subordinates. Given the existing structure of the central services, a marked expansion in the volume of business would further decrease opportunities for the Chief of Cabinet to employ this technique for giving guidance. To be sure, the staff meeting should contribute greatly to a general understanding of the situation and to a coordination of efforts, but a group discussion cannot replace the

private conference with its freer atmosphere. The difference in methods would appear especially significant in a society that attaches great value to maintaining "face".

Anticipating an increase in the Commissariat General's workload, MSUG recommends that the units constituting the central services should be regrouped along functional lines into three larger entities to be headed by a Secretary General, a Director of Cabinet, and a Director of Operations. This adjustment would resolve the administrative problem of the span of control confronting the Chief of Cabinet. His post should then be abolished as redundant, for the two Directors and the Secretary General would each be directly responsible to the Commissioner General.

By delegating to these three aides a limited authority to decide and to act, the Commissioner General could rid himself of the enormous workload generated by day-to-day operations and routine administration. He would then be free to take a general view of the agency's mission and its performance. He could concentrate upon broad questions of policy and program. Yet that delegation of authority would not impair his ultimate responsibility nor his control over the agency; for these principal assistants would work under his immediate supervision.

At his own discretion the Commissioner General might include within an effective span of control one or two Chargés de Mission to undertake studies, investigations, and other special missions as his personal agent. The organization plan recommended by MSUG does not involve the assignment of specific responsibilities to a Charge de Mission.

These related concepts of a supervisory span of control and the delegation of authority to subordinates can be profitably applied at every

echelon of administration within the agency. As in previous studies MSUG will be happy to work with the responsible officials at the Commissariat General to implement the spirit as well as the text of the accepted recommendations.

3). IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL  
DELEGATE TO THE DIRECTOR OF CABINET AUTHORITY TO  
CONDUCT LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCIES.

The decree of November 18, 1955 does not disturb the responsibility of national departments for determining the content of their programs for social and economic advancement. Civic Action is an instrument for carrying those programs to the rural population. As the Commissariat General will depend upon other agencies to supply the substantive elements for its program of action, the function of liaison assumes a critical importance.

Interviews at the central services revealed that three entities are now engaged to some extent in performing this function. It is proposed that responsibility for maintaining a continuous liaison with the interested departments should be consolidated and vested in the Directorate of Cabinet. This entity's concern for good public relations suggests assignment of the Press unit to its jurisdiction. The Office of the Private Secretary serves the Commissioner General in a quasi-confidential capacity. Placing this unit under the administrative supervision of the Director of Cabinet would help to insulate it from the broad stream of routine business within the agency.

- 4). IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL  
DELEGATE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL AUTHORITY TO  
MAINTAIN FACILITIES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT.

The post of a Secretary General is created by the decree of November 18, 1955, and we have already noted that an arrêté of the same date places the central services under his direction. MSUG proposes that the Secretary General's responsibility for supervision be limited to the units which furnish administrative support or housekeeping services. This category contains the entities charged with personnel, accounting, and mail room services, procurement of supplies, and physical security at headquarters.

At present the accounting function is split between the Bureau of Accounting and the Office of the Private Secretary. This division of responsibility should be ended by withdrawal of the latter from that area. Heretofore the accounting unit has prepared the budget for this agency. With the anticipated expansion of the Commissariat General's activities it may become advisable to create a separate entity for the budgeting function.

- 5). IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL  
DELEGATE TO THE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS AUTHORITY  
TO DRAFT AND EXECUTE THE OVERALL PLAN OF ACTION.

National departments requesting collaboration from the Commissariat General should specify which elements of their program they wish to see carried into the villages. MSUG proposes that a Directorate of Operations be created to hold and coordinate these detailed requests into a coherent plan of action for guiding the activities of mobile teams in the field.

This task will require the establishment and review of priorities for measuring competing claims for service, and in practice the whole question of timing and emphasis may be settled only at the Cabinet Council level. Within this setting the Director of Operations would draft an overall plan for the Commissioner General's consideration, and after approval he would supervise its execution. As contemplated in the decree of November 18, 1955 information copies of progress reports from the field should be forwarded to the interested departments. Of course this exchange of information would flow through the Directorate of Cabinet in both directions.

A subordinate entity controlling field operations should be created to serve as the authorized channel for communication with the mobile teams. The training unit should be assigned to the Directorate of Operations, to offer courses of in-service training as well as the standard orientation for new cadres. The units for planning and documentation should be combined into one entity and placed under the authority of this Director so as to advise him in developing and implementing the plan of action. As control of the available transportation is critically important in widely dispersed operations, it is also suggested that the transport unit should be assigned to this Directorate.

6). **IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL APPOINT PROVINCIAL DELEGATES TO SUPERVISE THE MOBILE TEAMS.**

In its main lines the reorganization of the field service proposed by MSUG echoes the scheme envisaged by the decree of November 18, 1955. Both

plans involve decentralizing operations and depend upon the permanent assignment of field service personnel in the provinces. MSUG suggests a change in terminology: Provincial Delegate instead of Inspector, because of the special significance of the term "inspector" within the administrative lexicon. A Provincial Delegate would represent the Commissioner General in each province. He would be accredited to the Chief of Province at the same rank as the chief of a technical service representing one of the national departments. Working under the administrative control of the Province Chief, the Provincial Delegate would direct the activities of a mobile team of cadres within the guide-lines established in the overall plan of action.

A more important difference between the plans lies in the choice of the operational base. The decree contemplates assignment of a mobile team in each district. MSUG suggests that a larger group of cadres be assigned to the province as a whole. This team could be divided into smaller groups and dispatched to villages scattered throughout the province, or the entire unit might temporarily concentrate its efforts upon one particular district if the situation required it. This provision for flexibility follows the example given by the Commissariat when it regrouped the cadres for the second phase of field operations in April of 1956. Then the team consisted of approximately forty agents. In March, 1957, the Commissariat prepared to administer the community development program and planned to station a team of fifty agents in each province.

For future operations MSUG believes that the strength of the team could vary from one province to another. Taking the long-range view, it would seem that the success of those operations in raising the standard of living is more likely to depend upon the selection and training of volunteers from

the local population. These volunteer agents would be responsible for carrying the program forward when the civic action cadres transfer their attention to another village.

The field teams will need full support from the central services to meet this problem. Within the Directorate of Operations, the planning and documentation unit could draft a short curriculum and prepare training manuals emphasizing the concept of organized self-help in the villages. Perhaps the training unit could conduct workshops for the volunteer local agents at provincial headquarters. Whatever techniques or training aids may be available, the civic action cadres should realize that they have not completed their work in a particular village until someone has been trained to succeed them. The In-Service Training Division of the National Institute of Administration would be the logical service to assert in this training.

**1). IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL  
REQUEST EACH CHIEF OF PROVINCE TO CREATE A PROVINCIAL  
ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR CIVIC ACTION.**

In many instances the people of a village, with guidance from civic action cadres, have taken steps to improve their economic situation. This is a form of guided self-help. It is possible that local resources in manpower, tools, and materials will be sufficient to do the desired job - building a village school, digging a well, repairing the road, etc. One must assume that the cadres would discourage grandiose schemes for community improvements that bear no relation to immediate realities. The communal project <sup>a</sup> may, however, require a small but essential investment of

skills and materials that cannot be obtained from local sources.

The budget for one or more of the permanent departments (Public Works, Health, National Education, etc.) might already provide for procuring a limited quantity of the needed materials, and the necessary technicians might be already in their employ even though in small numbers. Civic Action does not and should not try to duplicate these resources of supplies and skilled manpower. However the cadre can help greatly to solve this problem because he has been living in that village and he knows what is needed to make the project feasible.

Acting on a report from the field agent or from the head of the appropriate unit in the team, the Provincial Delegate would bring the facts in the case to the attention of the chiefs of the technical services concerned. If he decided that further action was necessary, the Provincial Delegate could request the Chief of Province to intervene in his administrative capacity.


MSUG proposes the creation of a Provincial Committee for Civic Action to serve as a forum for coordinating governmental assistance to these communal self-help projects. It is suggested that the Chief of Province act as Chairman and that the Provincial Delegate should be the member responsible for preparing an agenda. He could be called the Executive Officer. All the chiefs of the technical services should be included in the membership. The committee would meet regularly, and minutes should be kept.

The Executive Officer would submit to the committee those requests for governmental assistance as reported by the Civic Action cadres. If

the members wanted further information, the Chairman might direct the District Chief to make an independent examination of the problem. Through experience the committee would develop its own procedures and standards for evaluating requests.

It is assumed that the overall plan of action to be issued by the Commissioner General would emphasize objectives and leave considerable room for the individual Provincial Delegates to develop subordinate themes and schedules. The proceedings and decisions of this committee would then assist the Provincial Delegate to a marked degree in devising a feasible plan for civic action in that province.

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION CHART  
FOR THE CENTRAL SERVICES



The question of raising subordinate entities from bureaus to services can be resolved on an individual basis by the Director concerned or by the Secretary General.

PROPOSED FIELD ORGANIZATION AND CENTRAL OFFICE

FIELD RELATIONSHIPS

