January,1986
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"THE INSIDERS"
P.O. Box 182
Vienna, VA 22180

Dear Insiders,

IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT, IN LIGHT OF EVIDENCE, WE LEFT LIVE AMERICANS IN CAPTIVITY AGAINST THEIR WILL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AS PRISONERS OF WAR. WE SEEK TO SECURE THEIR RELEASE.

PLEASE DUPLICATE THIS NEWSLETTER AND PASS IT OUT TO YOUR FRIENDS.

HISTORY. "The Insider" is a publication whose sole purpose is to publish information about the live POWs in Southeast Asia. The publication started in January 1982. The objective is to inform the American public of the proof that live POWs are still being held in Southeast Asia and to secure their release. The initiatives taken by the Insiders have shaken loose some alarming findings that have gained the publication the reputation as a critic of the Administration's position on the live POWs. "The Insider" is opposed to any faction that does not support the rescue of live POWs or the negotiated settlement that will return all the live POWs and permit as full an accounting of MIAs as is possible.

A SPECIAL THANKS to all the people who have helped with the continued efforts of "The Insiders".

Critics of "The Insiders" claim and probably, rightfully so, that it publishes information with an operational bias. It assumes that live U.S. POWs were knowingly left behind in S.E. Asian prisons and attempts to prove this thesis. The proof not withstanding, it steps on officials who follow non-productive stratigies. It bring to light many problems, raises concers, and analyzes facts or suspicions, that prevent fast solutions to the live POW problem. It dares to raise the question about the failure of the U.S. Government officials to expediditiously secure the release of the live POWs.

Over the years there have been many military rescues of POWs/hostages, attempted by special elite forces. One such raid during WWII liberated 2200 American POWs but since that time the United States has been politically restrained from using military force to liberate Americans who are being held hostage in foreign countries. In fact, politicians have been more willing to ignore any knowledge that foreign governments would hold back American prisoners after a confilct. Thus, politicians have refrained from appointing a permanent commision to study the problem and accept the responsibility of following recommendations that a pannel of professionals might suggest. These recommendations might lead to a solution. Why has there historically been so much political resistance towards the use of U.S. military force to free Americans held prisoners in foreign countries?

The Administration in power in the Executive Branch sets the policies and strategies for dealing with foreign governments. After three years in office the Executive Branch has implemented its campaing promises with programs shaped by bureaucrats and begins to campaign for a second four year term in office. It simply seeks to keep from scarring its record by not exposing itself to to old failurees, and politically unpopular programs. It concentrates on domestic issues which increase popularity and beats its chest on areas that shows its efforts are successful and helpful to the American people. On problem areas such as live POWs, the dirty little unpopular problem is set aside to be handled by low level Lt. Cols. who can control the situation and keep a lid on the problem. The operating instructions at the NSC is - "do not let this ugly problem raise its head during my administration". Do not let weak political decisions of the past be a problem where politically this administration must criticize another. Do not create an incident or problem area that can be a major plitical embarrassment for the United States in the eyes of the world. Thus, raiding to rescue live POWS or paying a ransom to secure their release is a "No No" in the eyes of the administration where it pit the possibility of two super powers against on another in an adverse way.

On Capital Hill, "POWs" is a dirty word both in the Senate and the House of Representatives. It's political suicide to admit that POWs are a real problem for which there is no Easy Solution, other than to raid or to pay. Thus, the problem becomes politically labled "CONTROVERSIAL" and no one wants to touch emotional issues that are so hot they will burn your chances for re-election. Most legislators are advised by their staff to stay away from the live POW problem because it could be politically damaging. Large campaign contirbutors do not see it as healthy to get involved in an issue of international significance, when domestic local problems of crime, welfare, bankruptcy, and the economy choke the voters of a district or state. Most voters want jobs, prosperity, and tranquility and do not want to see their tax dollars gobbled up by military rescues that have failed in the past and cost billions of dollars. Thus the live POW problem goes untouched by most Congressmen and Senators who avoid adversity and considerate on constitutant mail.

What about the Congressman who decides to campaing the live POW problem and try to "bring home live POWs." Lets look for a monment at Congressman William Hendon (R-N.C.). He dared to raise the POW problem as an unsolved issue by the past administrations and points out problems in the current Reagan Administration. What resistance did he encounter? First, it took Hendon one full year to get a meeting with President Reagan, that took place in January 1986 to discuss the live POW problem. Memo after memo went to the White House requesting a meeting on this subject but the men who surround President Reagan turned down these requests. Finally, a political friend of President Reagan bypassed the bureaucracy around Reagan and set up a meeting. During this one year battle againt the bureaucracy surrounding the President, hunger strikers demonstrated in bamboo cages, starving nearly to death to get Reagan's attention. Good upstanding, patriotic Americans with no previous arrest record HAND CUFFED themselves to the White House fence protesting Reagan's failure to rescue the live POWs. Thousands of Vetrans and concerned Americans grouped up at the Vietnam Memorial and marched up to the White House fence screaming. "BRING THEM BACK ALIVE" and "BRING THEM HOME OR SEND US BACK." Thousands of telephone calls and letters were sent to the White House asking that Reagan rescue the live POWs. The asking changed to demanding action on the live POWs, as this problem was ignored at 1600 Pennsylvaia Avenue. Some radical Special Forces factions poured oil on bridges leading into Washington and blocked traffic with signs and barracades demanding that Reagan rescue the live POWs.

Hundreds of man hours were spent lobbing Congress to co-sponsor HCR-129, calling for the Priot Commission to study

the live POW porblem and hundreds of pounds of paper work, news letters, and articles on the POWs were distributed in the halls of Congress, in an effort to get attention placed on the live POW problem. Petitions came in from all over the country with millions of signatures demanding that the President rescue the live POWs. Still Reagan kept his eyes closed and his mouth sealed on this problem.

Congressman Hendon introducted a bill calling for a Commission to be set up to study the live POW problem, in April 1985. This legislation was ambushed by the Reagan Admisistration and its well meaning supporters to "protect the President". Now, nearly a year later some 133 co-sponsors have indorsed this Commission on live POWs. Many are asking, what are we protecting the President from - if there is evidence that live POWs are still being held - we want to bring them home, today.

Congressman Hendon who has been labled a trouble maker because of his views on "LIVE POWs" has been hit hard politically. Some Reagan Administration officials have contacted contributors and put the word out to withhold contributions from Hendon. The political dirty trick stepped up their pace when ***SPLAT*** right in the middle of Hendon's heavily populated district the EPA comes up with a computer study that shows the best place in the entire country for a nuclear waste disposal site is in Hendon's back yard. The computer study did not name remote areas of the Nevada or New Mexico desert but stastically it picked the 11th District, near Ashville, N.C. as the best place for this dump site. "I think that the person putting the information in the computer was told to select the 11th District," said and unnamed source.

During the 1986, re-election race Hendon faces a tough battle. He only won by 51% in 1984. James McClure Clarke and Sen. Bo Thomas, two political heavy weights are squaring off to run against Hendon, who is looked at as a thorn in the side of the Administration because of his stance on the live POWs. Political gossip says that the candidate who runs against Hendon will receive some major funding to support their election effort.

There are really only two approaches to solving the live POW problem, either raid or pay. PAY APPROACH-If the U.S. paid Vietnam 4 billion dollars in war reconstruction aide, established diplomatic relations, or provided economic assistance, we could have some of our live POWs back. However, paying a ransome, would set a president that would encourage tarrorists to take Americans hostage, and hold them for money. RAID APPROACH-if the U.S. raided the Soviet Satelite Vietnam, we could probably rescue some live POWs. However, raiding would pit two super powers against one another in a third world conflict that may lead to nuclear war.

What would it take and what would it cost to raid and rescue? First of all the Soviets have silos with missles in them on Vietnamese soil. In a raid the U.S. could probably trigger an international incident that could lead to nuclear war. The human life cost of a raid is high if it costs one raider or one POW his life. Undoubtedly, the Vietnamens, who are the 4th largest army in the world, would not put down their AK 47s' and fail to fire their SAM Missles, to allow a raiding party to stroll into the prison camps of North Vietnam and simply take back POWs it has been holding for 13 to 20 years.

Is the U.S. military ready to conduct a raid into North Vietnam? Has the President given the order to prepare for a raid to rescue live POWs? What is the current thinking about special operation raiders? Review the following:

Commentary provided by "Time" January 13, 1986, "A warrior elite for the dirty job".

-Special operations budgets peeked in 1960 prior to Vietnam at $1 billion, dropped to $100 million in 1975 after the Vietnam War, was standing at $441 m illion in 1982, under Reagan, and the budget is set at 1.2 billion in 1986.

-In 1980 investigations into the "DESERT ONE" fiasco faulted the Pentagon for having available only eight specially equipped helicopters to transport the rescue force.

-Accouding to Sam Nunn of Georgia, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, "We are only slightly more prepared to carry out the Iranian hostage rescue mission today (1986) than we were when it failed".

-Special Forces units have earned readiness ratings of no better than C-3, meaning "Marginally Ready".

-The Air Force cancelled an annual inspection of the First Special Operation Wing (1st SOW) at Hulburt Field, Florida in December 1985, because all (11) helicopters and fixed-wing aricraft were down for repairs according to the Armed Forces Journal.

-Special OPs were labeled "Oddball Outfits", by the Pentagon and its missions are doomed by inter-service rivalry and poor (MANAGEMENT) preparation. The "Joint Special Operations Command" crested in the Pentagon has not been able to overcome snafoos created by Top Brass at the Pentagon who spend more time and money arguing over who in right for the job, than training equipping, and deploying elite forces.

The "DELTA FORCE" is training to rescue hostages by land, the "SEALS" by sea, but other military units have their own "BABY" special forces projects like the Army, "TASK FORCE 160", "THE RANGERS", "THE GREEN BARRETES", and the Marine Corps units, and the Navy's "SEAL TEAM SIX".

-The Pentagon's view is that the Green Barrettes are social misfits unable to live by the Army book. Special operations are distrusted for having a "Back-Door" command structure that bypasses the normal chain of command. Thus, the conventionally minded command structure of the Pentagon (MANAGERS) misuse such elite forces.

-During Grenada Special Ops fell victim to misuse by field commanders who insisted that special troops working in broad daylight and using conventional tactics. A Delta Force unit sent to free political prisoners in Richmond Hill Prison had to turn back under fire before it could reach the prison, which turned out to be abandoned. A Navy Seal Team sent to take over a radio station moved in at first light and was repulsed by enemy fire, as a result the Seals had to blow up the radio station, rendering it useless as a pasification tool during the invasion.

-These elite units are even used from domestic surveillance inside the United States.

Summary: Special Forces/Special Operations units are highly trained in unorthodox methods of warfare but are mismannaged and misued by the management (TOP BRASS) at the Pentagon. "They are nothing more than expendable ammunition, a tool of modern warfare", said a high level Pentagon Official.

What does it take to put together a raid to rescue live prisoners? To answer the question, let's review that plan that failed in the raid into Teheran, Iran in 1979 by the Delta Force.

Obviously the planners felt that the Son Tay raid was an operational success but here were no POWs rescued. Two good publications about Son Tay are detailed in a Pentagon summary called "Prisoners of War", a selective bibliography publised in December 1985 by the Pentagon Library, Rm 1A518, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310-6000. It lists 38 pages of publications on POW/MIAs, available at the Pentagon Library. These two publications about Son Tay are-"The raid by Benjamin F. Schemmer and the Armed Forces International Journal" January 1980, "U.S. Raiders Killed 100-200 Chinese Troops in 1970 North Vietnam Foray."

The Son Tay and Teheran Raids are listes as historic failures but mainly are so because U.S. politicians fail to recognize the value of life. No funded, ongoing program is underway to liberate U.S. Prisoners held by foreign governments. Out of fear, U.S. politicians keep their political eyes closed to the problems related to recovering live U.S. Prisoners. It is inconceivable for politicians to plead ignorance when there is an historical record showing that Communist countries hold U.S. prisoners as a matter of their political philosophy and doctirne. U.S. prisoners were kept back in the Soviet Union after World War II. The Chinese Communists kept U.S. prisonsers long after the Korean War and may have transferred them to the Soviet Union. The Vietnamese Communists kept French prisonsers after the 1954 end of their war in Asia, and may have transferred some of them to the Soviet Union. The evidence indicated that the Vietnamese Communists kept back U.S. prisoners after 1973 when the U.S. stopped fighting, and may have transferrd some of them to the Soviet Union.

In Korea some 389 known, confirmed U.S. POWs were never relased - they were kept back by the Communists. Some of these POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union. Many U.S. prisoners who came out of the Soviet prison system have stated that they saw or heard about or spoke to U.S. POWs who were transferred to Soviet control after having been captured in Korea.

The Vietnamese claim that they have no U.S. prisoners under their control so the next logical question should be - how many U.S. POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union? What happened to the majority of the (EWO), Electronic Warfare Officers who were shot down over North Vietnam? Why were there very few EWOs ever released? Could the Soviets have placed an order with Vietnam asking for EWOs to be transferred to their control? Stastical computer studies conducted by DIA analysts say, yes.

Prisoners who have come out of the Soviet prison system include John Noble, Cox, Turner, Pvt. Verdine, Dolgun, Victor Herman, and Marchuk. How many other U.S. prisoners did these Americans see in the Soviet prison system?

A source in Isreal and a center for prisoners comming out of the Soviet Union informed "The Insider" that U.S. prisoners are held by the Soviet Union at a camp near the city of Chita and in three camps on an island called Wrangel.

U.S. politicians should "WAKE UP" and start to negotiate a spy swap or prisoner exchange program that will free these Americans held hostage as prisoners but we don"t have any spies or prisoners to exhange. Buying them out has not been seen as a viable option when it appears that some of these U.S. prisoners in Vietnam are under Soviet control. U.S. politicians are simply going to have to "WAKE UP" to the realities of the live POW problem and set up a program to recover U.S. prisoners. The idea of making the Vietnamese Communists an offer to financially compensate them for releasing live U.S. POWs is the most distasteful, dispicable, and deplorable option being discussed. A source close to the situation overheard Lt. Col. Dick Childress tell a Congressional staffer outside of a closed hearing, that, "We have sent the Vietnamese and offer."

WHAT HAVE YOU DONE TODAY TO RESCUE A LIVE POW??

From DELTA FORCE by Beckwith & Knox, pages 226-229

The code name of the mission to free the hostages was Eagle Claw. As described to General Jones, the basic plan was this (see map): Three troop-carrying MC-130s and three fuel-bearing EC-130s would depart from the island of Masirah, which is off the coast of Oman, and fly to Iran, where they would land 200 miles southeast of Teheran at a location called Desert One-at 33 05' N by 55 48'E. On the ground they would wait for the arrival of eight RH-53D helicopters.

Launching from the carrier Nimitz somewhere in the Gulf of Oman, the eight helicopters, flying a different route and in four section of two each, would arrive approximately thirty minutes after the last 130 had landed.

On arrival, the RH-53Ds would refuel and on-load the assault force of 118 men.

Unless six helicopters - a minimum figure deemed necessary by the air planners to lift the combined weight of the assault team and the equipment - were able to depart and fly to the next location, the mission would be aborted at Desert One.

Once the helicopters had refueled and on-loaded Delta, they would proceed toward Teheran and the 130s would return to Masirah.

Flying two and a half to three hours, the helicopters would land at Delta's hide-site - at 35 14' N by 52 15' E - ideally one hour before sunrise.

After Delta had been off-loaded, the RH-53Ds would fly to their hide-site fifteen miles north of Delta, where they would spend the daylight hours hidden in the hills around Garmsar.

At Delta's landing zone, the assault team would be met by two of the DOD (Department of Defense) agents who had been placed in Teheran several days before. They would lead Colonel Beckwith and his men five miles overland to a remote wadi sixty-five miles southeast of Teheran, and there Delta would remain concealed throughout the daylight hours.

After last light, two ofthe DOD agents would return to the wadi, driving a Datsun pickup truck and a Volkswagen bus. One of these vehicles would transport the six drivers and six translators, who had come with Delta, back toward the outskirts of Teheran to a warehouse where six enclosed Mercedes trucks were stored.

The other vehicle would carry Colonel Beckwith on a reconnaissance of the route to the embassy. Once the route and the vicinity around the compound had been checked, Beckwith would return to the hide-site. The six trucks would already have arrived and be waiting.

Delta, which had for this mission been reorganized into a Red, a White, and a Blue Element, would climb aboard the trucks around 8:30 PM. They would be driven north along the Damavand Road, where they would encounter a permanent 2-man checkpoint at Eyvanekey and at Sherifabad. If for some reason the trucks were stopped and searched, the guards would be seized and carried with Delta.

The next step had some flexibility built into it. The precise route through Teheran to the embassy and the method the trucks would use to traverse this course, convoy or leapfrog, would be determined at this time and would rest largely on the recommendations put forth by the DOD agents and on what Colonel Beckwith had been able to observe.

A 13-man assault team, tasked to rescue the three hostages being held in the Foreign Ministry Building, would travel in the Volkswagen bus and take a different route to their target.

Between 11:00 PM and midnight a select group of operators would drive up to the embassy in the Datsun pick-up and with .22-caliber suppressed (with silencers) handguns take down the two guard posts and the walking guards along Roosevelt Avenue.

Driving two abreast, the trucks carrying Red, White, and Blue Elements would follow a little distance behind. When the assault team reached a position on Roosevelt Avenue across from the soccer stadium, they would leave the trucks and, using ladders, swiftly and silently climb over the embassy wall and drop into the compound.

Red Element, comprising forty men, was responsible for securing the western sector of the compound, freeing any hostages found in the staff cottages and commissary, and neutralizing the guards who were in the motor pool and power plant areas.

Blue Element, also forty men, was responsible for the embassy's eastern sector and freeing hostages found in the Deputy Chief of Mission's residence, the Ambassador's residence, the Mushroom, and the chancellery.

The smaller 13-man White Element was responsible for securing Roosevelt Avenue and eventually covering the withdrawal of Red and Blue Elements to the Amjadieh Soccer Stadium. One machine gun, an M60, was positioned to enfilade Roosevelt Avenue to the north and another, the HK21, to cover it to the south.

Two AC-130s flying on station over Teheran would prevent Iranian reinforcements from reaching the embassy compound. Using a predetermined grid system that pinpointed targets and zones in the area of the embassy, Major Buckshot and Sergeant Major Foreman were responsible on the ground for calling in, if necessary, covering fire from the gunships.

Inside the embassy compound, once Red Element - which had the farthest to travel and most area to cover - was in position, the wall was to be blown.

This large explosion signaled the beginning of the assault on the buildings. Any armed Iranian guards encountered would be killed and the hostages located and freed.

The operation would take approximately forty-five minutes.

Major Snuffy (pseudonym), who was acting as Delta's air officer, would already have alerted the RH-53Ds outside of Garmsar and by now they would be orbiting north of the city.

At his signal, the choppers would begin to arrive in the vicinity of the compound.

If, as was expected, the poles placed in the embassy's open acres could be removed, the first helicopter would be called directly into the embassy grounds. There it would load all the freed hostages, who would be accounted for by Delta's medics.

A second chopper could also be brought in.

If the poles could not be removed, the alternate plan was to move the hostages across to the soccer stadium.

Once all the hostages they'd liberated had been lifted out, Red, followed by Blue, would withdraw through the gaping hole in the wall and cross Roosevelt Avenue to the stadium, where, accompanied by White, they would load on the remaining helicopters.

Sometime during the assault on the embassy, the 13-man Special Forces team tasked to assault the Foreign Ministry Building would begin its operation. Their plan was to scale the outside of the building and enter through its third story windows. They would then eliminate any resistance they met and free the three hostages.

Outside the building, in a adjacent parklike area, one of the helicopters would make the pick-up.

While these operations were going on and the targets in Teheran were going down, thirty-five miles to the south, in Manzariyeh, a Ranger contingent wouldfly in, take, and secure the airfield there. They would hold the field until the helicopters arrived from Teheran.

Once everyone had arrived in Manzariyeh, all of the hostages, drivers, translators, helicopter pilots, crews, DOD agents, Special Forces assault team, and Delta Force would be airlifted out of Iran on C-141 StarLifters.

The Rangers would then dry up Manzariyeh and be flown out themselves.

A contingency plan covered the eventuality that not enough helicopters would be available to lift the hostages and the assault forces out of Teheran at one time.

In that case, in the soccer stadium across from the compound - if, after removing the hostages, there were not enough RH53Ds to remove the assault force - Delta would take up a defensive position around the stadium's perimeter.

The remaining helicopters, however many there would be, would shuttle back and forth between Manzariyeh - wehre they would unload the hostages and refuel - and the stadium, until every member of the assault team had been removed.

If no helicopter had been able to return, Delta would be prepared to evade and escape.



SONTAY

On Saturday, May 9, 1970 Sgt. Norval Clinebell, while reviewing aerial photos of an area west of Hanoi, located two POW camps, Ap Lo and Son Tay. Sgt. Clinebell reported his findings to his boss, Colonel George J. Iles, USAF. By comparing new and old reconnaissance photos of the area someone inside of Son Tay had left a code in almost hieroglyphic like fashion that there were 55 POWs in Son Tay. Someone laid clothes out to dry, spelling "S.A.R.", standing for "search and rescue", and the letter "K" for "come".

Colonel Iles took the Son Tay finding to his boss Colonel Rudolph Koller (a former POW in WWII and P-51 pilot), C.O. of the 1127th, and a civilian named Claude Watkins, an intelligence specialist in the Escape and Evasion Branch (also a former POW, WWII). Col. Koller called Maj. Gen. Rockly (Rocky) TRIANTAFELLU at the Pentagon. General "Rocky" was the USAF Assistant Chief of Staff for intelligence. Maj. Gen. Triantafellu was real excited when told of the POW camp finding. Maj. Gen. Rockly Triantafellu called DIA and spoke with Navy Captain John S. "Spot" Harris about the discovery. Capt. Harris then brought his DIA POW team to Maj. Gen. Triantafellu's office in the Pentagon.

On May 11, 1970 one of the DIA POW team stated their information and the interpretation was "a bunch of shit". This same man from DIA's POW team also said the message on the ground called for a rescue was "a pile of crap". This man was taken outside in the hall and told that he was never to be seen again - he wasn't!

Maj. Gen. Triantafellu took his group, Intelligence and Evaluation, Col. Iles, Col. Koller, and Claud Watkins to room 4D1062 in the Pentagon to see Brigadier General James R. Allen, Deputy Director for Plans and Operations, USAF. Gen. Allen is tall, lean, and deadly serious and after reviewing the material, took the team to Pentagon room 1E962 in the basement.

S.A.C.S.A. (Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities) was headed by Brigadier General Donald D. Blackburn, USA. He represented SACSA to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He called in Col. Ed E. Mayer who headed S.O.D. (Special Operations Division) of SACSA. You needed to have far more than a "Q" clearance to find out what SOD did. "The Insiders" source was called in to listen to the USAF info.

Air Force Tech. Sergeant Norval Clinebell who first located Son Tay worked for the 1127th USAF FAG (Field Activities Group) in the north part of Fort Belvoir which was heavily guarded by wire fences. Behind these fences was a collection of small intelligence groups, one of which was the Escape and Evasion Branch which worked exclusively on POW/MIAs. All C.A.S. (Controlled American Sources) team members were military, not CIA, and SACSA controlled them. The first plan was to insert a CAS team agent in around Mt. Ba Vi with a small radio on a low frequency. From a radar site in Laos (Site 32) a CAS agent was to be inserted but this plan was later scrapped.

It was learned that six US POWs were taken out of Son Tay daily as a work party and would be available to rescue. General Blackburn and Colonel Mayer decided to break into Son Tay and instead of rescuing six POWs, would try to rescue them all. On May 25, 1970 General Blackburn went to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, then Army General Earl G. Wheeler. In room 2E873, General Wheeler okayed the feasibility study. Soon after, General Wheeler was replaced by Admiral Moorer.

On May 27, 1970 Gen. Blackburn saw his immediate boss, Lt. Gen. John Vogt, USAF Joint Chiefs Director of Operations. General Vogt okayed the plan to study the rescue feasibility but was upset at Gen. Blackburn for going to the Chairman first.

On June 1, 1970 the feasibility study group met its deadline and made an initial briefing to the Chairman of the Joing Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Moorer, on the initial plan. At 3:00 PM operation "Polar Circle" (the first of three names picked by the computer for the Son Tay raid) was presented to Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, Director of DIA, by Gen. Blackburn and Col. Mayer. General Bennett liked the presentation and brought more analysis into play.

From Building 213 in the Washington Navy Yard, only a few blocks from the Capitol building, the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), part of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), began to make its contribution to the operation. SR71 spy plane photos confirmed POW camps at Ap Lo and Son Tay. Confirmation of camps also came from relatives of Vice Premier Nguyen Cao Ky who was from the Son Tay area originally.

The original plan of agent insertion was too risky. A second plan to launch from a CIA base in Laos was considered and a third plan to launch from Thailand at night with an aerial refueling was on the drawing board. This third plan required the moon to be just at the right angle for navigation and was very tricky with the monsoon weather window giving the first target date of October. An immediate effort was put forth to try to meet the weather window.

Gen. Blackburn cautioned the planning team, "when you operate against a sophisticated intelligence system, don't hedge, be sure". The feasibility study group was tasked to report its findings on July 25, 1970. Gen. Blackburn wanted Hanoi's attention drawn away from Son Tay with Naval diversionary attacks over Hai Phong on the Gulf of Tonkin. Gen. Vogt wanted the feasibility study group to have completed the report by June 30th. He also claimed the 25 member feasibility group was too large,too many people cut in on the "know" at this stage, and cut the members in half.

On June 2, 1970 Gen. Blackburn and Col. Mayer briefed Gen. Wheeler who is ecstatic about the plan. General Wheeler stated, "I don't see how anyone can say no to this".

On June 5, 1970 Gen. Blackburn briefed the Joint Chiefs in the "Tank", the JCS staff room. Col. Mayer made the presentation, as he is meaner in appearance! The Chiefs okayed the first plan and gave the okay to go ahead and proceed with the feasibility study in depth.

On June 9, 1970 Gen. Blackburn and Col. Mayer went over to CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia and briefed George Carver, Special Assistant for Southeast Asia matters and his Deputy for POW Affairs Richard Elliot. SACSA and Carver's office worked almost daily together. One option given strong consideration was to launch the raid from a CIA base in Laos called Site 32, west of the two targets.

The Deputy Director of DIA was Maj. Gen. Richard R. "Dick" Stewart, USAF, who was a tough, hard mover, very demanding and determined to knock professionalism into DIA whose reputation stunk during the Vietnam War. Navy Captain "Spot" Harris with DIA once told a CIA Deputy Director at that time, "If I find out that you have held back on one dot of information that will help free those POWs, I'll personally commandier a cruiser, sail it up the Potomac River, and blast this fucking building (CIA HQ) off the map!". (There was no love lost between DIA and CIA.)

DIA's photo analyst John T. Hughes, who was famous for the 1962 Cuban missile spotting, was brought in to help. Lockheed's "Big Bird" satellite, a multiple sensor recon bird, SR71 recon planes, and Teledyne Ryan, "Buffalo Hunter", a low altitude recon drone, and RF-4 recon aircraft were used. Gen. Wheeler cautioned the feasibility study group, "Without intelligence, accurate intelligence, the raid has no chance for success". By July 1, 1970 the feasibility study group finished its job and a planning group started its work.

CIA's top POW specialists, Ken Brock, Dick Elliot, and William Miller were brought into the planning group. A CIA specialist Dolf Droge, who spoke Vietnamese fluently, understood the culture, and served three tours in Vietnam and Laos with the agency for International Development, was brought in on the plan. He stated that what would happen if the POW camp was raided, the effect on POWs in other camps would be prophetic. "Their treatment would improve dramatically!" (And it did.)

On July 11, 1970 Col. Arthur D. "Bull" Simons was brought into the planning group. Both Gen. Blackburn and Col. Mayer went down to Fort Bragg, NC to notify "Bull" that he would be the ground commander of the Son Tay raid. Blackburn asked Simons if he would go on a "tentative rough" mission. Simons responded, "Hell yes, let's go. I don't need to know any more about it".

On July 12, 1970 the Joint Contingency Task Group (JCTG) was formed at Eglin Air Force Base, FL. Brigadier General Leroy J. Manor, USAF, was picked as overall commander of the operation. General Manor was the direct opposite of Colonel Simons, but was a meticulous planner.

On July 14, 1970 the POWs were moved from Son Tay, as the Song Con River was in flood stage. They were moved to Dong Hoi, 15 miles to the east. The POWs named this camp "Cape Faith".

Lt. Col. John Allison, the USAF top "Jolly Green Giant" pilot, and Lt. Col. Herbert Zehnder, USAF, were picked to fly the mission. The CH53 helicopter crew and pilots still did not know the plan.

Col. Simons, USA, picked Lt. Col. Elliot Sydnor as his Deputy C.O. and Capt. Richard "Dick" Meadows to lead the compound assault force, and they were told of the plan.

Lt. Col. Joseph R. Cataldo, a surgeon, volunteered for the raid not knowing what it was all about. He was told and he still volunteered.

All of the rest of the raiding forces were not told of the target of the raid. The raiding party selection began looking for 15 officers and 82 enlisted men for the Army assault party; 50 assault team, 10 back up team, 32 support detachment. Of the 39 man planning staff, 11 were from the original feasibility study group. Four of the 39 would end up flying into Son Tay.

Several new faces began to appear: Navy Captain William M. Campbell from the C.N.O. (Chief of Naval Operations) office; "Blue Max" Army Major Max Newman, counterintelligence specialist; USAF Lt. Col. John Kennedy, Pacific Air Defense Analyst, NSA's expert on North Vietnam Air Defense network; Navy Captain "Spot" Harris who headed DIA's four man contingent.

Eglin Air Force Base, Auxiliary Field #3, was the training sight. (Doolittle Raiders trained at Eglin for their World War II Tokyo raid.)

The Son Tay camp was built as an exact mock up of the real thing for practice. It was pre-fabricated so it could be pulled down during the day when the Russian spy satellite came over. Daily training was limited to the four hour period when the Russian spy satellite was on the other side of the world. Two Cosmos 355s came over the US, twice each in a 24 hour period at an altitude of 70 miles. The mock up camp of San Tay consisted of poles and canvas that could be rolled up and stored out of sight. The pole holes were covered by lids with dirt on top of them so they could not be spotted when the Russian spy satellites flew over.

The planning staff's goal was to have the training plan ready by August 20, 1970 and the actual operations plan ready by August 28, 1970.

The actual training began on September 9, 1970 and was finished by October 6, 1970. The raiding force was deployed by October 10, 1970, in time to launch between the 20th and 25th of October. The computer then changed the plan's name to "Ivory Coast" (the second name for the Son Tay raid).

The Army couldn't get 30-round magazines for the assault force as 20-round clips were standard. Simmon's men got them from the Colt Firearms Corp. via "non-normal" channels.

The assault team forces wanted a special knife to pry open doors or barricades. The Army equipment center R&D lab had it but it would take four months to get the knives. Supply crews for the force found some similar knives stored in a warehouse at Eglin AFB and had them modified in the base machine shop in two days.

The forces wanted night vision devices but a night sight that the Army had spent 18 billion dollars on since the Korean War in research and development, was not ready. In 1970 the Army still did not have one and neither did the CIA. The only thing the Army had in night sight equipment was a closely guarded secret. It took five weeks for the Army to release all "six" of the prototypes to the force. They were all hand built items still being tested and there was no way more could be provided for the raid.

A sargeant found an advertisement in the rear of a hunting magazine listing a $49.00 night sight distributed by Armalite Corp. of Costa Mesa, California called "Single Point Nite Site". He ordered it by phone and it took three days to receive. It was made in Great Britain and imported by a Minnesota firm, Normark Corp. Serious gun buffs knew about the night sight but the Army did not. It worked, so Simons ordered 49 more.

The Sears Roebuck catalogue was most helpful in locating sporting type items the Army had said would take too long to manufacture.

The force needed special explosives to destroy the "Banana-1" helicopter but the Army ordnance stated that it would take nine months to research, develop and test. The supply unit of six men took three days to design it! A four foot section fire hose, 4" in diameter, packed with 4 pounds of C-4 with Thermite, with a timer detonator at each end.

Brigadier General Blackburn contacted Milt Zaslov of NSA for special "elint intel" (electronic intelligence). Some large scale maps (1 inch to 50,000 inches) were made on the ground for DIA. Some small scale photo mosaics of the Son Tay area were put together of an area 65 miles to the west of the Black River. Special photographs showing each turning point from Laos to the target were assembled.

"Barbara" was the code name of a $60,000.00 table-size exact model replica of the Son Tay compound built by the CIA in June 1970 at Col. Mayer's request. "Barbara" was precise in every detail of Son Tay and had been rigged with viewing devices so the assault force could see the compound exactly as the real thing would look the night of the assault.

"Operation Popeye", a joint Department of Defense (DoD) and CIA rain making effort took place throughout the year, resulting in the heaviest rainfall in twenty years. Flooding rivers and slowing the enemy's ability to supply its troops was the objective of "Popeye". "Popeye" started in March 1967 and lasted until July of 1972.

It was not learned by SACSA inside of DoD until after the Son Tay raid that the CIA had its own program to disrupt the enemy supply lines. CIA teams operating in northern Laos dumped tons of emulsifier onto trails and stream banks to collapse them, turning these trails and river banks into quicksand bogs.

In September 1970 night training started that broke the assault teams into three groups. "Blue Boy", team-1, the compound assault team, consisted of 14 men lead by Capt. Meadows who would land inside the compound in an HH3 helicopter. "Red Wine", team-2, the command and security team, consisted of 20 men lead by Lt. Col. Sydnor. "Green Leaf", team-3, was the support group of 22 men led by Col. "Bull" Simons, who's personal radio call sign was "Wildroot".

Teams 2 and 3 would land outside the walls of the Son Tay compound in CH53 helos. Plans green, blue and red were put together in case any of the different helicopters carrying teams went down. The attack had to be swift, violent, and lethal. "Bull" Simons was so serious about the training that he would count the bullet holes in the sillouette targets to make sure of every hit.

On October 6, 1970 the last rehearsal was conducted at Eglin. The staging base was at Takli in Central Thailand and Udorn was the launch base. Brigadier General Manor, the overall commander of the Son Tay raid, was positioned at Monkey Mountain in "Da Nang" (a cave underground used as como base).

Once the forward party was in SE Asia, the raid was postponed until November. In late October NSA reported no activity in the camp, but on November 2, 1970 there was an incredible increase in activity in the camp.

On November 18th the final briefing was given to President Nixon who approved the plan and gave the go. At a briefing given at Takli Airbase, Thailand to the team on November 20th, the target was first disclosed and the team gave a standing ovation. The message to execute was "Mumbletypeg", amputate Kingpin". "Operation Kingpin" (the third name for the Son Tay raid) hit at 2:18 AM (Hanoi time) on Saturday, November 21, 1970.

02:18 "Bull" Simons' helicopter set down 400 meters south of the Son Tay compound near the "secondary school".

The North Vietnam air defenses were totally confused by all the aircraft over North Vietnam. 105 planes were launched from three Navy carriers and Two Thai Air Bases, all arrived at the same time over North Vietnam.

Timing was most important as the guards changed on the hour and half hour at Son Tay. Two miles east of Son Tay city, fire fight simulators exploded, simulating a fire fight on the ground. A C-130 flagship dropped its flares perfectly right over the compound, lighting it up brilliantly.

Major Fredrick Donohue, USAF pilot of CH53 "Apple 3" gunship eased the helo between the two west wall guard towers and gave the command to "fire". Two mini-guns (4,000 shots per minute!) shredded the guard towers and one guard barracks beyond. The helo pulled up dropping Sydnor's team outside the wall and went into ground hold position, one and one half miles west of the compound. (All radios were now on line.)

HH3 Helo (Banana 1) with Capt. Dick Meadows on board crash landed inside the compound just as Apple 3 (CH53) cleared on its gun run. Flight Engineer Tech. Sgt. Leory Wright, USAF, had his ankle broken by a fire extinguisher torn loose by the heavy crash landing in the compound. 1st Lt. George Petprie was thrown out of the helo into the compound.

Capt. Meadows spoke through his bullhorn, "We are Americans. Keep your heads down. We are Americans. This is a rescue. We're here to get you out. Keep your heads down. Get on the floor. We'll be in your cells in a minute."

The thirteen other men in his team ran for the cells and front gate. The prison came alive with gunfire from guards and return fire from the American assault team . . . the guards lost! "Wildroot, this is Blue Boy, we're in!", Meadows radioed Col. "Bull" Simons.

Colonel Simons was busy shooting up Russians, Poles, and East Germans 400 meters south of the Son Tay compound at the "secondary school". He acknowledged the transmission. Much cussing was also heard over the radio net in Udorn, Thailand and in Da Nang, South Vietnam.

2:21 The south wall of Son Tay prison was blown open by satchel charge and Capt. Meadows was knocked down by the blast. Simons' men were to blow the wall but they were still killing Russians, so Lt. Col. Sydnor and his 22 man unit switched missions and blew the wall so they could support Meadows' team and provide a way of getting the POWs out fast.

(At H (hour) plus + 2 mintues and 45 seconds, Lt. Col. Sydnor saw Col. Simons' chopper go down in the wrong direction and put plan "green" into effect. He took his crew and team into the compound through the hole in the wall, exchanging missions with Simons' team.

Moderate winds drifted the helos farther from the compound, more than expected, and the "secondary school" looked like the Son Tay compound in the moonlight. Simons realized he was in the wrong place when he saw no barbed wire on the walls and men heavily armed running out of the building shooting at them. Simons' men returned the fire.

Apple 1 pilot Lt. Col. Warner Britton, USAF, (Simons' helo) ordered his aircraft mini-guns to open fire on these tall soldiers as they returned to pick up Simons' men who were killing these attacking troops as fast they left their buildings.

Three violent battles were now going on:

1. The fake one, northeast compound;
2. Meadows and Syndor's assault on the prison; and
3. "Bull" Simons' "pre-emptive strike" on the "secondary school".

Lt. Col. Britton, coming back to pick up the "Bull", stated that he thought he was flying into a "burning and exploding ammo dump"! "Bull" Simons' team had attacked the "secondary school" by blowing its south wall with satchel charges, then rushing in and shooting anybody in sight. When Britton arrived there were armed enemy rushing out of the "schools", two non-burning buildings. Some stored gasoline or diesel fuel had blown up inside the school and Simons' team of 22 men had killed 200-300 very tall (5'10" to 6') soldiers. Some were Orientals but most were Caucasians dressed in dark shorts and white T-shirts.

(Brigadier General Manor wrote later in his after action report that these were ground forces, well armed and well trained. He was unable to identify their nationality but intelligence sources later identified them as some Russians with Poles and East Germans who were training the North Vietnamese on early warning ground interceptor equipment that had been moved into the "light industrial complex" about 300 meters east of the "school".)

2:26 The raid was now eight minutes old and "Bull" Simons' team had eliminated a major military complex in five minutes! (02:21 - 02:26 hours) "Bull" Simons' team was evacuated from the "secondary school" in Lt. Col. Britton's helo.

2:27 Simons radioed Meadows and Sydnor to revert back to the basic plan as they land outside the Son Tay prison compound in Apple 1 helo. Simons' demolition team rushed to knock out a bridge north of the prison. Sydnor's team destroyed the power station and power poles outside the compound. Sydnor's team then cleared the pump house on the canal southwest of the camp, killing 22 NVA.

02:28 Dick Meadows' team searched the prison and cleared out what few guards remained. They killed 35 NVA guards and realized a devastating surprise.

02:29 Simons' team cleared the command headquarters killing 10 NVA. Eleven minutes into the Son Tay raid, all cell blocks were checked twice - no prisoners! The radio message was, "Wildroot, this is Blue boy, negative items, search complete, negative items."

02:30 Simons radioed, "Wildroot to all teams, prepare to with draw to L.Z. (landing zone) for extraction." "Blue boy and Red Wine exit on first extration helicopter and set up L.Z. security, Red Wine to the west and Green Leaf to the east."

02:31 Simons ordered photographers into the compound to take pictures of the empty prison cells.

02:32 (14 minutes into the raid) CH53 landed back in the compound and took Meadows' team plus the three Air Force crewmen from the HH-3 chopper, Kalen, Zehnder, and Wright of "Banana 1".

02:36 (18 minutes into the raid) Sydnor's team was ordered out with exception of security group, pathfinders, and M.A.C.O. (Marshalling Area Control Officer). MACO's job was to count every man boarding the departing helos and come up with as many men out as came in. Twenty six men left on this helo.

02:40 (22 minutes into the raid) Another helo came in to board the remaining teams (33 men). No one was left behind.

02:41 Dick Meadows raced into the compound, alone, got into the wrecked helo, Banana 1. He set the demo charge then raced out to the waiting chopper.

02:44 Simons' men opened fire with M-79 grenade launchers at four small vehicles racing up from the industrial area. These enemy troops were about to cross a foot-bridge as the first vehicle was hit and burst into flames and the other three vehicles stopped.

02:45 All men were aboard the Apple 1 helo and Simons stated, "Count 33, count correct". The helo lifted off.

The mission plan called for 26 minutes on the ground but actual ground time was 27 minutes - one minute late. 200-300 NVA and Warsaw Pact personnel killed. Two major compounds, along with equipment, were destroyed. US casualties - one broken ankle by fire extinguisher; one fractured left leg by running into a helo loading ramp on departure from compound; one flesh wound (a Sergeant) in the inner thigh!

02:47 (6 minutes out) A tremendous explosion rocks the compound as "Banana 1" blows up on schedule.

Two EC-121 USAF "College Eye" aircraft loaded with communications euipment orbited the area in the Gulf of Tonkin. One experienced an oil line failure and returned to Korat, Thailand and another had many on-board failures of radio gear. An RC-135 "Combat Apple" radio relay aircraft also experienced radio failure orbiting the Gulf of Tonkin.

The "computer buffer" system operated by the Marine Corps also failed. This system was to enable Brigadier General Manor at Monkey Mountain, Da Nang, South Vietnam, to contact Navy planes. All radio systems failed except the ones carried into the raid.

The Navy jamming system worked all too well at jamming the NVA air defense systems, and apparently ours too! Apple 3 Major "Marty" Donohue was on the ground east of the Finger Lakes waiting for word to get out. With the Song Con River behind him, he couldn't hear too clearly on the radio, the final calls, "In the clear". Donohue said, "What's happening?" to an AlE pilot still in the area. The AlE pilot said, "Everybody is gone, get out!" So, Apple 3 fired up and lifted off. It took Apple 3 some thirty minutes to catch up with the rest of the group.

Five F105 "Wild Weasel" (equiped with electronic equipment to project phony electronic images to fool incoming missiles and electronic gear to re-direct onboard missiles electronics away from the target) aircraft escorted the raiding force to protect it from the "Fan Song" radars and direct SA-2 missiles away from the force. Brigadier General Manor ordered the F105 escort but forgot to notify Washington. Later his staff was blamed for this oversight.

As the raiding and assault force were returning, an F105 took a near hit and flamed out over Les Plaine de Jarres (Place of the Urns) in Laos at 32,000 feet. The F105 was code named "Firebird Five", it was piloted by Major Donald W. Kilgus and the backseater was Captain Clarence T. Lowry. They both ejected at 8,000 feet when the engine would not re-start.

Apple 4 Lt. Col. Royal Brown picked up Kilgus and Apple-5 Major Murphey picked up Lowry. Both helos were shot at so a C-130 flare ship dropped flares in the area and AlE (equiped with 8000lbs. of ordnance and four 20 mm cannons that fire 800 rounds per minute each) shot up the ground fire sights.

Both Maj. Murphey and Lt. Col. Brown had been flying nine hours, all over hostile territory, but with this rescue all the Son Tay radiers, ground and air, were brought home alive.

At 04:28 hours (Hanoi time) on November 21, 1970 the raiding force landed at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base. Brigadier General Manor was there when Simons walked out and stated, "No prisoners". The assault team, bushed by the mission, still had to undergo extensive debriefing. Senior officers wrote out detailed "Summary of Operation" reports that were put on the teletype to Washington at 09:15 hours that morning to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Moorer. The report got lost!

Manor and Simons flew back enroute to Washington that morning while the assault team was allowed to rest 24 hours, under guard, beforebeing flown back home. The support team and the headquarters team remained another 24 hours and then returned home on a C-141 Starlifter.

ANALIST'S STATEMENT:

A source that was three miles away from the Son Tay raid when it happened said that in 1975 a POW guard known as "Scarface" bragged about the NVA's superior counter-intelligence that had a spy in the South Vietnamese palace who tipped them off. Another source said the POWs were moved just prior to the raid. Another source in intelligence says that the information about the Son Tay raid will be classified for a long time because of the Russians who were killed. Historians speculate as to whether the US intelligence system knew that the Son Tay prison was empty and pulled it off to boost moral among the POWs. "The POWs would at least know we tried."

Attached is the list of POWs known to have been in Son Tay and a list of the Son Tay raiders. Also attached is a list of awards for valor and the planning group. Also attached are maps of the Son Tay raid and a map of the Son Tay prison camp.









The Son Tay Prisoners

(All of the POWs held at Son Tay were known to have been captured, as opposed to being carried on "missing-in-hostile-action" lists.)

United States Air Force

(Of the 333 USAF pilots who were captured and later returned to U.S. control by the North Vietnamese, 45, or just over 13½ percent, were imprisoned at Son Tay.)

Rank	Name	Date Shot Down or Reported Missing	Date Returned to U.S. Control
Lt. Col.	Elmo C. Baker	23 Aug 67	14 Mar 73
Maj.	Charles G. Boyd	22 Apr 66	12 Feb 73
Capt.	Richard C. Brenneman	8 Nov 67	14 Mar 73
Capt.	Edward A. Brudno	18 Oct 65	12 Feb 73
Lt. Col.	Alan L. Brunstrom	22 Apr 66	12 Feb 73
Capt.	Hubert E. Buchanan	16 Sep 66	4 Mar 73
Col.	William D. Burroughs	31 Jul 66	4 Mar 73
Capt.	William W. Butler	20 Nov 67	14 Mar 73
Capt.	Larry E. Carrigan	23 Aug 67	14 Mar 73
Capt.	Larry J. Chesley	16 Apr 66	12 Feb 73
Capt.	John W. Clark	12 Mar 67	18 Feb 73
Maj.	Thomas E. Collins, III	18 Oct 65	12 Feb 73
Lt. Col.	Thomas J. Curtis	20 Sep 65	12 Feb 73
Capt.	Myron L. Donald	23 Feb 68	14 Mar 73
Capt.	Jerry D. Driscoll	24 Apr 66	12 Feb 73
Col.	Richard A. Dutton	5 Nov 67	14 Mar 73
Capt.	Leroy F. Ellis, Jr.	17 Dec 67	14 Mar 73
Maj.	Kenneth Fisher	7 Nov 67	14 Mar 73
Capt.	Frederic R. Flom	8 Aug 66	4 Mar 73
Lt. Col.	Willis E. Forby	20 Sep 65	12 Feb 73
Capt.	David E. Ford	19 Nov 67	14 Mar 73
Capt.	Henry P. Fowler, Jr.	26 Mar 67	18 Mar 73
Capt.	David F. Gray, Jr.	23 Jan 67	4 Mar 73
Maj.	Charles E. Greene, Jr.	11 Mar 67	4 Mar 73
Lt. Col.	David B. Hatcher	30 May 66	12 Feb 73
Lt. Col.	Julius S. Jayroe	19 Jan 67	4 Mar 73
Maj.	Robert D. Jeffrey	20 Dec 65	12 Feb 73
Lt. Col.	Thomas M. Madison	19 Apr 67	4 Mar 73
Lt. Col.	Louis F. Makowski	6 Oct 66	4 Mar 73
Capt.	Ronald L. Mastin	16 Jan 67	4 Mar 73
Capt.	Thomas N. Moe	16 Jan 68	14 Mar 73
Maj.	Robert D. Peel	31 May 65	12 Feb 73
Lt. Col.	Ben M. Pollard	15 May 67	4 Mar 73
Capt.	James E. Ray	8 May 66	12 Feb 73
Maj.	Jon A. Reynolds	28 Nov 65	12 Feb 73
Lt. Col.	Wesley D. Schierman	28 Aug 65	12 Feb 73
Lt. Col.	Bruce G. Seeber	5 Oct 65	12 Feb 73
Maj.	Richard E. Smith, Jr.	25 Oct 67	14 Mar 73
Lt. Col.	Robert L. Stirm	27 Oct 67	14 Mar 73
Maj.	Thomas G. Storey	16 Jan 67	4 Mar 73
Capt.	Leroy W. Stutz	2 Dec 66	4 Mar 73
Maj.	Russell E. Temperley	27 Oct 67	14 Mar 73
Lt. Col.	Irby D. Terrell, Jr.	14 Jan 68	14 Mar 73
Capt.	Gerald S. Venanzi	17 Sep 67	14 Mar 73
Capt.	Lawrence D. Writer	15 Feb 68	14 Mar 73

United States Navy

(Of the 145 Navy pilots who were captured and later returned to U.S. control by the Vietnamese, 16, or just over 11 percent, were imprisoned at Son Tay.)

Rank	Name	Date Shot Down or Reported Missing	Date Returned to U.S. Control
Lt. Cdr.	Wendell R. Alcorn	22 Dec 65	12 Feb 73
Cdr.	Claude D. Clower	19 Nov 67	14 Mar 73
Cdr.	Render Crayton	7 Feb 66	12 Feb 73
Lt. Cdr.	Michael P. Cronin	13 Jan 67	4 Mar 73
Lt. Cdr.	Robert H. Doremus	24 Aug 65	12 Feb 73
Lt. Cdr.	Ralph E. Gaither, Jr.	17 Oct 65	12 Feb 73
Lt. Cdr.	Paul E. Galanti	17 Jun 66	12 Feb 73
Lt. Cdr.	Danny E. Glenn	21 Dec 66	4 Mar 73
Lt.	Wayne K. Goodermote	13 Aug 67	14 Mar 73
Lt. Cdr.	John Heilig	5 May 66	12 Feb 73
Lt. Cdr.	Wilson D. Key	17 Nov 67	14 Mar 73
Lt. Cdr.	Dennis A. Moore	27 Oct 65	12 Feb 73
Lt. Cdr.	Robert J. Naughton	18 May 67	4 Mar 73
Lt.	Theodore G. Stier	19 Nov 67	14 Mar 73
Lt.	Gary L. Thornton	20 Feb 67	4 Mar 73
Lt. Cdr.	William M. Tschudy	18 July 65	12 Feb 73

United States Marine Corps

(Of 37 Marine Corps officers who were captured by the North Vietnamese, 4, or just under 11 percent, were imprisoned at Son Tay.)

Rank	Name	Date Shot Down or Reported Missing	Date Returned to U.S. Control
Lt. Col.	John H. Dunn	7 Dec 65	12 Feb 73
CWO-4	J. W. Frederick	5 Dec 65	Died in captivity
Maj.	Orson G. Swindle, III	11 Nov 66	4 Mar 73
Capt.	James H. Warner	13 Oct 67	14 Mar 73

The Son Tay Raiders

United States Army

Support Group

Rank	Name	Parent Organization
Col.	Arthur D. Simons	Hq, XVIII Abn Corps
Capt.	Eric J. Nelson	Co B, 7th SFG
Capt.	Glenn R. Rouse	HHC, 2d Bn USAIMA
Capt.	Udo H. Walther	Co D, 6th SFG
SFC	Earl Bleacher	2d Bn, USAIMA
SFC	Leroy N. Carlson	Co C, 7th SFG
SFC	John Jakovenko	Co C, 6th SFG
SFC	Jack G. Joplin	HHC, 6th SFG
SFC	Daniel Jurich	Co B, 7th SFG
SFC	David A. Lawhon, Jr.	Co C, 7th SFG
SFC	Salvador M. Suarez	Co B, 6th SFG
SFC	Donald E. Taapken	Co C, 6th SFG
SFC	Richard W. Valentine	Co B, 7th SFG
SSgt.	Walter L. Miller	Sig Co, 6th SFG
SSgt.	Robert L. Nelson	Co B, 6th SFG
SSgt.	David S. Nickerson	Sig Co, 6th SFG
SSgt.	Thomas E. Powell	Co D, 7th SFG
SSgt.	John E. Rodriquez	Co C, 6th SFG
Sgt.	Gary D. Keel	Co C, 6th SFG
Sgt.	Keith R. Medenski	Co B, 6th SFG
Sgt.	Franklin D. Roe	Co B, 6th SFG
Sgt.	Marshall A. Thomas	Co D, 6th SFG

Assault Group

Rank	Name	Parent Organization
Capt.	Richard J. Meadows	Det 1, USAIS
Capt.	Thomas W. Jaeger	Co A, 7th SFG
Capt.	Dan H. McKinney	Co D, 7th SFG
1st Lt.	George W. Petrie	Co D, 6th SFG
MSgt.	Thomas J. Kemmer	Co B, 6th SFG
MSgt.	Billy K. Moore	Co C, 6th SFG
MSgt.	Galen C. Kittleson	Co B, 6th SFG
SFC	Anthony Dodge	2d Bn, USAIMA
SFC	Lorenzo O. Robbins	Co B, 6th SFG
SFC	William L. Tapley	Co C, 6th SFG
SFC	Donald R. Wingrove	Co D, 6th SFG
SSgt.	Charles G. Erickson	Co B, 7th SFG
SSgt.	Kenneth E. McMullin	HHC, 6th SFG
Sgt.	Patrick St. Clair	Co C, 6th SFG

Command Group—Security

Rank	Name	Parent Organization
Lt. Col.	Elliott P. Sydnor	Det 1, USAIS
Lt. Col.	Joseph R. Cataldo	Surgeon General, Hq DA
Capt.	James W. McClam	Co A, 6th SFG
Capt.	Daniel D. Turner	Co A, 6th SFG
MSgt.	Joseph W. Lupyak	Co D, 7th SFG
MSgt.	Herman Spencer	Co C, 7th SFG
SFC	Tyrone J. Adderly	Co A, 6th SFG
SFC	Donald D. Blackard	Co B, 7th SFG
SFC	Freddie D. Doss	HHC, 6th SFG
SFC	Jerry W. Hill	2d Bn, USAIMA
SFC	Marion S. Howell	Co A, 6th SFG
SFC	Billy R. Martin	Co A, 6th SFG
SFC	Gregory T. McGuire	Co A, 6th SFG
SFC	Charles A. Masten, Jr.	Co D, 6th SFG
SFC	Joseph M. Murray	Co A, 6th SFG
SFC	Noe Quezada	Co D, 7th SFG
SFC	Ronnie Strahan	Co B, 6th SFG
SSgt.	Paul F. Poole	Co B, 6th SFG
SSgt.	Lawrence Young	2d Bn, USAIMA
Sgt.	Terry L. Buckler	Co D, 7th SFG

Support Personnel

Rank	Name	Parent Organization
Lt. Col.	Bill L. Robinson	Co D, 6th SFG
Lt. Col.	Gerald Kilburn	HHC, JFKCMA
Capt.	Randle L. Smith	HHC, JFKCMA
Sgt. Maj.	Minor B. Pylant	Co A, 6th SFG
MSgt.	Jesse A. Black	Co A, 7th SFG
MSgt.	Edgar C. Britt	Co A, 6th SFG
MSgt.	Bernard L. Rauscher	Co D, 6th SFG
SFC	Franklin B. Abramski	Co B, 7th SFG
SFC	James A. Bass	HHC, 6th SFG
SFC	Archie Batrez, Jr.	Co D, 6th SFG
SFC	Robert L. Dodd	Co A, 7th SFG
SFC	Charles M. Erwin	Co D, 6th SFG
SFC	James A. Green	Co A, 6th SFG
SFC	Bobby R. Hansley	Co B, 7th SFG
SFC	Roswell D. Henderson	Co D, 7th SFG
SFC	Frederick L. Hubel	Co B, 7th SFG
SFC	Bruce M. Hughes	Co D, 7th SFG
SFC	John R. Jourdan	Co B, 7th SFG
SFC	Ernest R. Pounder	Co A, 7th SFG
SFC	Aaron L. Tolson, Jr.	Co D, 6th SFG
SFC	Burley W. Turner	Co D, 7th SFG
SFC	Grady C. Vines	Co C, 7th SFG
SSgt.	Elmer D. Adams	Co D, 6th SFG
SSgt.	Rodger D. Gross	HHC, 7th SFG
SSgt.	Larry G. Stroklund	Co A, 6th SFG
SSgt.	David L. Wilson	Co C, 6th SFG
Sgt.	Brian J. Budy	Co B, 6th SFG
Sgt.	Michael G. Green	Co C, 6th SFG
Sgt.	Robert R. Hobdy	Sig Co, 6th SFG
Sgt.	John J. Lippert	Co D, 7th SFG
Sgt.	Arlin L. Olson	Co D, 6th SFG
Spec. 5	Willard F. Dezurik	Co D, 6th SFG
Spec. 5	Lawrence C. Elliott	HHC, 6th SFG
Spec. 5	Gary R. Griffin	Co D, 6th SFG
Spec. 4	Christopher Casey	Co B, 6th SFG
Spec. 4	Frank J. Closen	Co B, 6th SFG

UH-1 Aircraft Crew Members

Rank	Name	Parent Organization
1st Lt.	George W. Williams	6th SFG
CWO-2	Ronald J. Exley	6th SFG
CWO-2	Jackie H. Keele	6th SFG
CWO-2	John J. Ward	6th SFG
Spec. 6	Larry C. Boots	6th SFG
Spec. 4	Alan H. Wood	82nd Abn Div

United States Air Force

Assault Force

Aircraft	Code Name	Rank	Name	Parent Organization
HH-3	Banana 1	Lt. Col.	Herbert E. Zehnder	ARRTC
		Maj.	Herbert D. Kalen	ARRTC
		TSgt.	Leroy M. Wright	ARRTC
HH-53	Apple 1	Lt. Col.	Warner A. Britton	ARRTC
		Maj.	Alfred C. Montrem	ARRTC
		MSgt.	Harold W. Harvey	ARRTC
		MSgt.	Maurice F. Tasker	ARRTC
		SSgt.	Jon K. Hoberg	40th ARRS
HH-53	Apple 2	Lt. Col.	John V. Allison	ARRTC
		Maj.	Jay M. Strayer	40th ARRS
		TSgt.	William E. Lester	ARRTC
		TSgt.	Charlie J. Montgomery	ARRTC
		SSgt.	Randy S. McComb	40th ARRS
HH-53	Apple 3	Maj.	Frederic M. Donohue	ARRTC
		Capt.	Thomas R. Waldron	ARRTC
		SSgt.	Aron P. Hodges	ARRTC
		SSgt.	James J. Rogers	ARRTC
		SSgt.	Angus W. Sowell, III	ARRTC
HH-53	Apple 4	Lt. Col.	Royal C. Brown	37th ARRS
		Maj.	Roy R. Dreibelis	37th ARRS
		TSgt.	Lawrence Wellington	ARRTC
		SSgt.	Wayne L. Fiak	40th ARRS
		SSgt.	Donald Labarre	ARRTC
HH-53	Apple 5	Maj.	Kenneth D. Murphy	703d SO Sqdn
		Capt.	William M. McGeorge	40th ARRS
		TSgt.	David F. McLeod	ARRTC
		SSgt.	John J. Eldridge	40th ARRS
		SSgt.	Daniel E. Galde	ARRTC
HC-130P	Lime 01	Maj.	William J. Kornitzer, Jr.	ARRTC
C-130	Cherry 1	Maj.	Irl L. Franklin	7th SO Sqdn
		Maj.	Thomas L. Mosley	7th SO Sqdn
		Capt.	Randal D. Custard	7th SO Sqdn
		Capt.	Thomas K. Eckhart	7th SO Sqdn
		Capt.	William A. Guenon, Jr.	7th SO Sqdn
		Capt.	James F. McKenzie, Jr.	7th SO Sqdn
		Capt.	Thomas L. Stiles	7th SO Sqdn
		MSgt.	Leslie G. Tolman	7th SO Sqdn
		TSgt.	William A. Kennedy	7th SO Sqdn
		TSgt.	Kenneth C. Lightle	7th SO Sqdn
		TSgt.	James M. Shepard	7th SO Sqdn
		SSgt.	Earl D. Parks	7th SO Sqdn
C-130	Cherry 2	Lt. Col.	Albert P. Blosch	Det 2, 1st SOW
		Maj.	John Gargus	Det 2, 1st SOW
		Maj.	Harry L. Pannill	Det 2, 1st SOW
		Capt.	John M. Connaughton	Det 2, 1st SOW
		Capt.	David M. Kender	Det 2, 1st SOW
		Capt.	Norman C. Mazurek	Det 2, 1st SOW
		Capt.	William D. Stripling	Det 2, 1st SOW
		TSgt.	Dallas T. Criner	Det 2, 1st SOW
		TSgt.	Billy J. Elliston	Det 2, 1st SOW
		TSgt.	Jimmie O. Riggs	Det 2, 1st SOW
		TSgt.	Paul E. Stierwalt	Det 2, 1st SOW
		SSgt.	Melvin B. D. Gibson	Det 2, 1st SOW

Assault Force Alternates Who Did Not Fly

Aircraft	Code Name	Rank	Name	Parent Organization
HH-3	Banana 1	Maj.	David E. Vaughn	37th ARRS
C-130	Cherry 1	SSgt.	Robert L. Renner	7th SO Sqdn
C-130	Cherry 2	Lt. Col.	Cecil M. Clark	Det 2, 1st SOW
		Capt.	Ronald L. Jones	Det 2, 1st SOW
C-130	Cherry 2	TSgt.	Failus Potts	Det 2, 1st SOW
		SSgt.	William J. Brown	Det 2, 1st SOW

Attack Group

Aircraft	Code Name	Rank	Name	Parent Organization
A-1	Peach 1	Maj.	Edwin J. Rhein, Jr.	1st SOW
		Maj.	John C. Waresh	56th SOW
A-1	Peach 2	Maj.	James R. Grochnauer	1st SOW
		Capt.	Robert M. Senko	56th SOW
A-1	Peach 3	Maj.	Richard S. Skeels	1st SOW
		Lt.	James C. Paine	56th SOW
A-1	Peach 4	Maj.	Eustace M. Bunn	1st SOW
		Capt.	Robert H. Skelton	56th SOW
A-1	Peach 5	Maj.	John C. Squires	1st SOW
		Capt.	William R. Sutton	56th SOW

MIG Combat Air Patrol Group

Aircraft	Code Name	Rank	Nume	Parent Organization
F-4	Falcon 1	Maj.	Kenneth L. Gardner	13th TFS
		Capt.	Larry L. Henry	13th TFS
F-4	Falcon 2	Capt.	John D. Landin, Jr.	13th TFS
		Capt.	George E. McKibben	13th TFS
F-4	Falcon 3	Maj.	George E. Coats	555th TFS
		Capt.	Stuart B. McCurdy	555th TFS
F-4	Falcon 4	Maj.	Hubbard W. Lee	555th TFS
		Capt.	Michael T. Golas	555th TFS
F-4	Falcon 5	Maj.	James C. Maloney	13th TFS
		Capt.	Russell G. Wright	13th TFS
F-4	Falcon 11	Maj.	Orville B. Baird	555th TFS
		Capt.	Carl Paladino	555th TFS
F-4	Falcon 12	Capt.	Douglas P. Brown	555th TFS
		Capt.	Charles E. Smith	555th TFS
F-4	Falcon 13	Capt.	John L. Cantwell	13th TFS
		Capt.	Larry L. Henry	13th TFS
F-4	Falcon 14	Capt.	Ronald M. Hintze	13th TFS
		Capt.	Joseph R. Preston	13th TFS
F-4	Falcon 15	Maj.	Jimmy C. Pettyjohn	555th TFS
		1st Lt.	Thomas A. Wagner	555th TFS

Wild Weasel Decoy Group

Aircraft	Code Name	Rank	Name	Parent Organization
F-105	Firebird 1	Lt. Col.	Robert J. Kronebusch	388th TFW
		Maj.	John Forrester	388th TFW
F-105	Firebird 2	Maj.	Raymond C. McAdoo	388th TFW
		Maj.	Robert J. Reisenwitz	388th TFW
F-105	Firebird 3	Maj.	Everett D. Fansler	388th TFW
		Maj.	William J. Starkey	388th TFW
F-105	Firebird 4	Maj.	Murray B. Denton	388th TFW
		Capt.	Russell T. Ober	388th TFW
F-105	Firebird 5	Maj.	Donald W. Kilgus	388th TFW
		Capt.	Clarence T. Lowry	388th TFW

Maintenance Support Group

Rank	Name	Parent Organization
Capt.	Gerard M. Carroll	Det 2, 1st SOW
Capt.	Lionel E. Faggard	AFLC
MSgt.	Thomas E. Hogan	1198 OE&T Sq
TSgt.	David L. Brookover	1198 OE&T Sq
TSgt.	Ronald H. Casey	1198 OE&T Sq
TSgt.	Gerald Crisp	Det 2, 1st SOW
TSgt.	Charles W. Duff	1198 OE&T Sq
TSgt.	Billy R. Frederick	Det 2, 1st SOW
TSgt.	Tommy C. Moseley	1198 OE&T Sq
TSgt.	Bradley A. Whittier	1198 OE&T Sq
TSgt.	Richard W. Yates	1198 OE&T Sq
SSgt.	George T. Butler	1198 OE&T Sq
SSgt.	Raymond L. Chalkley	1198 OE&T Sq
SSgt.	George R. Kendall	1198 OE&T Sq
SSgt.	Donald R. Skidmore	1198 OE&T Sq
Sgt.	Robert W. Cleeland	Det 2, 1st SOW
Sgt.	Dale E. Dalton	Det 2, 1st SOW
Sgt.	David N. Dierking	Det 2, 1st SOW
Sgt.	Elliot L. Rothman	Det 2, 1st SOW
Sgt.	Kenneth A. Ruud	Det 2, 1st SOW
Sgt.	Robert D. Werner	Det 2, 1st SOW
A1C	Richard A. Bacon	Det 2, 1st SOW
A1C	Stephen P. Goodson	Det 2, 1st SOW
A1C	James R. Holder	Det 2, 1st SOW
A1C	Jerry D. Melcher	1198 OE&T Sq
CIV	Walter R. Fuller	Texas Instruments
CIV	Garry L. Hesse	Hallicrafters
GS-13	Hubert J. Hildreth	Air Force Logistics Command
CIV	Gene L. Pyle	Texas Instruments

Security Police Support Group

Rank	Name	Parent Organization
SSgt.	Wilbert Bell	464 SP Sq
AIC	Steven L. Berg	464 SP Sq
AMN	Stanley W. Crouch	464 SP Sq
AMN	Joseph T. Jernigan, Jr.	464 SP Sq
Sgt.	Clarence A. Ratcliff	464 SP Sq

Munitions Group

Rank	Name	Parent Organization
TSgt.	Teddie R. Goss	1st SOW
TSgt.	Giles C. Rose	1st SOW
Sgt.	William H. Mowder	1st SOW

Son Tay Awards for Valor

(*Decorated by President Richard M. Nixon at the White House on November 25, 1970. All others were decorated by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on December 9, 1970.)

United States Army

Distinguished Service Cross

Col. Arthur D. Simons*
Lt. Col. Elliott P. Sydnor
Capt. Richard J. Meadows
MSgt. Thomas J. Kemmer
SFC Tyrone J. Adderly*
SSgt. Thomas E. Powell

Silver Star

Lt. Col. Joseph R. Cataldo
Capt. Thomas W. Jaeger
Capt. James W. McClam
Capt. Dan H. McKinney
Capt. Eric J. Nelson
Capt. Glenn R. Rouse
Capt. Daniel Turner
Capt. Udo H. Walther
1st Lt. George W. Petrie, Jr.
MSgt. Calen C. Kittleson
MSgt. Joseph W. Lupyak
MSgt. Billy K. Moore
MSgt. Herman Spencer.
SFC Donald D. Blackard
SFC Earl Bleacher, Jr.
SFC Leroy N. Carlson
SFC Salvador M. Suarez
SFC Donald E. Taapken
SFC William L. Tapley
SFC Richard W. Valentine
SSgt. Charles G. Erickson
SSgt. Kenneth E. McMullin
SSgt. Walter L. Miller
SSgt. Robert F. Nelson
SSgt. David Nickerson
SFC Anthony Dodge
SFC Freddie D. Doss
SFC Jerry W. Hill
SFC Marion S. Howell
SFC John Jakovenko
SFC Jack G. Joplin
SFC Daniel Jurich
SFC David A. Lawhon, Jr.
SFC Gregory T. McGuire
SFC Billy R. Martin
SFC Charles Masten
SFC Donald R. Mingrove
SFC Joseph M. Murray
SFC Noe Quezada
SFC Lorenzo Robbins
SFC Ronnie Strahan
SSgt. Paul F. Poole
SSgt. John E. Rodriquez
SSgt. Lawrence Young
Sgt. Terry L. Buckler
Sgt. Gary D. Keel
Sgt. Keith R. Medenski
Sgt. Franklin D. Roe
Sgt. Patrick St. Clair
Sgt. Marshal A. Thomas

Distinguished Flying Cross

1st Lt. George W. Williams
CWO Ronald J. Exley
CWO Jackie H. Keele
CWO John J. Ward

United States Air Force

Distinguished Service Medal

Brig. Gen. Leroy J. Manor*

Air Force Cross

Lt. Col. John V. Allison
Lt. Col. Warner A. Britton
Maj. Frederic M. Donohue
Maj. Herbert D. Kalen
TSgt. Leroy M. Wright*

Silver Star

Lt. Col. Albert P. Blosch
Lt. Col. Royal A. Brown, Jr.
Lt. Col. Herbert R. Zehnder
Maj. Eustace M. Bunn
Maj. Irl L. Franklin
Maj. John Gargus
Maj. James R. Grochnauer
Maj. Alfred C. Montrem
Maj. Kenneth D. Murphy
Maj. Harry L. Pannill
Maj. Edwin J. Rhein
Maj. Richard S. Skeels
Maj. John C. Squires
Capt. John M. Connaughton
Capt. David M. Kender
Capt. Norman C. Mazurek
Capt. Thomas L. Stiles
Capt. William D. Stripling
Capt. Thomas R. Waldron
MSgt. Harold W. Harvey
MSgt. David V. McLeod, Jr.
MSgt. Maurice F. Tasker
Sgt. Dallas R. Criner
TSgt. Billy J. Elliston
TSgt. William E. Lester
Tsgt. Charles J. Montgomery, Jr.
TSgt. Jimmy O. Riggs
TSgt. Paul W. Stierwalt
TSgt. Lawrence Wellington
SSgt. Daniel E. Galde
SSgt. Melvin B. D. Gibson
SSgt. Aron P. Hodges
SSgt. Donald LaBarre
SSgt. James J. Rogers
SSgt. Angus W. Sowell, III

The Son Tay Planners

Feasibility Study Group (convened by SACSA, June 10, 1970)

Rank	Name	Service	Parent Organization
Col.	Norman H. Frisbie	USAF	Hq USAF
Col.	William C. Norman	USA	SACSA
Lt. Col.	Warner A. Britton	USAF	ARRTC
Lt. Col.	Keith R. Grimes	USAF	Air Univ
Lt. Col.	Thomas F. Minor	USA	DCSOPS
Lt. Col.	Lawrence Ropka, Jr.	USAF	Hq USAF
Maj.	Arthur A. Andraitis	USAF	Hq USAF
Maj.	Boyd F. Morris	USA	USAJFKCEN, Ft.
Capt.	James A. Jacobs	USAF	DIA
Capt.	John H. Knops	USAF	Hq USAF
Lt.	Theodore A. Grabowsky	USN	CNO
1st Lt.	James A. Brinson	USMC	DIA
SGM	Donald M. Davis	USA	6th SFGA, Ft. Bragg
GS-8	Frances L. Earley	DA	SACSA
GS-6	Barbara L. Strosnider	DAF	Hq USAF

Planning Group (convened by SACSA, August 10–14, 1970)

Rank	Name	Service	Parent Organization
Brig. Gen.	Leroy J. Manor	USAF	USAFSOF
Col.	Arthur D. Simons	USA	Hq XVIII Abn Corps
Col.	Norman H. Frisbie	USAF	Hq USAF
Capt.	William M. Campbell	USN	CNO
Lt. Cdr.	Clair R. Hershey	USN	CNO
Lt. Col.	James V. Bailey	USA	Hq DA AC/S COMELEC
Lt. Col.	Joseph R. Cataldo	USA	Hq DA SG
Lt. Col.	Keith R. Grimes	USAF	Air Univ
Lt. Col.	Benjamin N. Kraljev, Jr.	USAF	Hq USAF
Lt. Col.	Richard A. Peshkin	USAF	Hq USAF
Lt. Col.	Lawrence Ropka, Jr.	USAF	Hq USAF
Lt. Col.	Homer Willett	USAF	Hq USAF
Maj.	Arthur A. Andraitis	USAF	Hq USAF
Maj.	Richard S. Beyea, Jr.	USAF	Hq USAF
Maj.	Thomas E. Macomber	USAF	Hq USAF
Maj.	Boyd F. Morris	USA	USAJFKCEN, Ft.
Maj.	James H. Morris	USA	7th SFGA, Ft. Bragg
Maj.	Max E. Newman	USA	USAFNTC-USAFAC
Capt.	James A. Jacobs	USAF	DIA
Capt.	John H. Knops	USAF	Hq USAF
Capt.	Richard J. Meadows	USA	Det 1, USAIS
1st Lt.	James A. Brinson	USMC	DIA
SGM	Donald M. Davis	USA	6th SFGA, Ft. Bragg
MSgt.	William S. Gann	USA	6th SFGA, Ft. Bragg
SFC	Jesse E. Sherrod	USA	6th SFGA, Ft. Bragg
GS-8	Frances L. Earley	DA	SACSA
GS-6	Barbara L. Strosnider	DAF	Hq USAF

SACSA's Administrative Support/Augmentation Group

Rank	Name	Service	Parent Organization
Capt.	John S. Harris	USN	DIA
Col.	Franklin C. Rice	USAF	NMCC
Lt. Col.	John E. Kennedy	USAF	PDAF
Maj.	Harvey D. Hallman	USAF	USAFSOF
Maj.	Frank C. Vogel	USAF	Hq USAF
1st Lt.	Michael L. Batsell	USAF	USAFSOF
MSgt.	Billy B. Baber	USAF	USAFSOF
DM 1	Larry Downing	USN	OJCS
SSgt.	Stanley G. Graves	USA	DIA
SSgt.	John J. Martin	USAF	USAFSOF
GS-8	Elneita S. Russell	USAF	USAFSOF



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