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1279

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SITUATION. 2479 C/70

1. The situation was ever changing. It required us to frequently change our activity plans.
2. We encountered difficulties and hardships in the bordering, front, and rear areas.
3. We had difficulties in rear service tasks. The enemy attacked the three areas ((VC controlled areas, suburban areas, and sensitive areas of the rear line)) and our rear bases in the ((Vietnam-Cambodian)) border. In the face of such a situation, our troops became demoralized. Consequently, we must have them politically reindoctrinated.
4. There was also the event of Uncle Ho's death.

We did not properly estimate the friendly and enemy capabilities.

We did not achieve any decisive victory.

II. IDEOLOGICAL EVOLUTION.

1. Spring and Fall Campaign: The indoctrination on the resolution ((unspecified)) helped the cadre and soldiers to fully understand the situation and improve their ideology.

The results of our combat activities were satisfactory.

We were successful in the diplomatic field.

Before and during the Spring and Summer Campaign, we were enthusiastic and our combat potential was high. We made intense efforts to overcome difficulties.

((Weak points)). The main points of the General Offensive and Uprising phase have not been completed in accordance with the plan of the Party.

Cadre and soldiers were impatient. They wanted to overrun the enemy during the Spring and Summer Campaign. They were tired of waging a protracted war and were not confident in "Possibility 1". ((They were not confident that US Government would withdraw its troops as scheduled.))

The enemy had intensified counteroffensives, pacification, and psywar activities. Such a situation had demoralized our personnel. Several individuals found excuses to avoid fighting.

2. Autumn and Winter Campaign.

Political indoctrination sessions on Resolution No. 9 were conducted for the personnel to strengthen their ideology and determination to fight.

Uncle ((Ho's)) death also affected the troops' mind.

The difficulties encountered in the rear service activities have limited our military operations. In the face of this situation, we have to make some changes in the deployment of troops in the battlefield. Part of our forces were moved to the lowlands.

Beginning of the Autumn and Winter Campaign.

At the beginning of the campaign, our activities were effective and our methods of combat were valuable.

Many units attained the prescribed criteria but some units did not.

Many individuals were tired and sick.

In short, 100 percent of our personnel were afraid of a protracted war and did not believe that Possibility 1 would materialize. However, they still maintained the determination to fight and realized our successes and the enemy's collapse.

Influenced by the Revolution, the working class had developed its movement.

The activities concerning motivation for "Four-Good-Quality" agencies and units increased from 50 to 70 percent.

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Ideological weaknesses.

The majority of cadre and combatants were afraid that Possibility 1 would not materialize.

Corruption developed.

III. ASSESSMENT OF FRIENDLY FORCES.

1. Strong points: The personnel carried out the Party policies unanimously and placed full confidence in them.

They understood that friendly forces were leading the war and the enemy was weakened.

They were determined to carry out Uncle's ((HỒ Chí Minh)) testament.

They made positive efforts to fulfill their missions.

Weak points: They did not believe that Possibility 1 would materialize. This lack of confidence greatly affected their morale and minimized their confidence in the Party policy.

They did not believe that local agencies could make improvements.

They understood that the enemy was stubborn but they did not see his weaknesses.

They nurtured an illusive peace and displayed a wait-and-see attitude.

They claimed that the enemy would be able to overcome his difficulties and had the feeling that we were not strong enough to defeat the enemy.

They waited for something new from the Central ((Party)) Headquarters.

2. Our attacks were not continuous.

Our will to fight and conduct a General Offensive was weakened.

Many individuals displayed a weary and hesitant attitude. This feeling was more prevalent in the front than in the rear.

More people violated the regulations.

Acts of mass desertion have increased.

3. Sense of organization and observance of discipline.

Orders were properly carried out.

Solidarity was well maintained among the arms branches.

The system of reporting was well observed. Reports were of good quality.

According to reports, the quality of F5 and F7 ((possibly 5th and 7th VG/NVA Divisions)) was poor.

4. Execution of policy.

The higher echelons provided effective ideological, guidance to personnel at facilities.

Weak points:

We conducted many small attacks (174).

Excessive freedom. Lack of a sense of responsibility.

Laxity in discipline maintenance.

Insubordination.

Lack of vigilance.

Poor maintenance of noise and light discipline.

Tactical and technical skills of cadre and troops were improved. However they still failed to completely destroy the enemy.

They balked at holding to the bordering areas.

5. Security maintenance and counter psywar and "Open Arms" activities:

We still neglected the indoctrination on the proletariat viewpoint and on the resentment against the enemy. We neglected to control the ideology of cadre and troops.

We allowed the enemy to detect our presence and inflict casualties on us due to our negligence concerning troop movement, billeting, and messing. (Ten cases ((of defection)) were caused by the enemy psywar activities). We failed to observe security regulations in disseminating missions.

b. Strong points:

We paid attention to political indoctrination and ideological guidance. We established "Four-Good-Quality" Party Chapters.

Cadre and soldiers were absolutely faithful to the Party.

Shortcomings:

Cadre and troops did not thoroughly understand the significance of the General Offensive and Uprising and methods of ideological guidance. They did not have a firm ideological concept and high determination to fight and win over the enemy.

We should find the reason why our shortcomings continued to exist.

Political indoctrination:

Strong points:

Indoctrination was continuously conducted to improve the political knowledge of cadre and troops and strengthen their determination.

Cadre and troops unanimously observed the Party's policy lines.

1. They were determined to accomplish missions.

2. Cadre paid attention to the main indoctrination regarding revolutionary characteristics and ethics.

Cadre and troops made every effort to overcome difficulties in all aspects.

3. They thoroughly understood the policy and guidelines for the leadership of combat activities and for the improvement of tactical and technical skills.

They attached importance to drafting preliminary and recapitulative reports on the results and utilized them to train and improve the cadre's skills. As a result, combat efficiency was increased.

4. Indoctrination was frequently provided for cadre, recruits, and Local Force troops.

However, since the unit had many new cadre and was constantly being replenished with recruits, the combat skills of its personnel were poorer than before.

5. Political and ideological indoctrination placed emphasis on main problems in accordance with the prescribed requirements.

Basic indoctrination was given to the cadre and troops to make them thoroughly understand the Party's policy line and develop their enthusiasm.

Weak points:

The cadre and personnel feared a protracted war. They expressed reluctance and weariness in the face of difficulties. This affected the Party's policy line and weakened the high determination of both cadre and troops.

Indoctrination was superficially conducted ((without definitive guidelines)).

The methods of indoctrination were not in accord with the policy line. The people were not frequently indoctrinated. They are very receptive to the enemy's psychological activities.

No efforts were made during basic indoctrination in order to promptly correct erroneous thoughts of the cadre. Cadre's skills were not satisfactorily improved to meet the prescribed requirements.

The unit still neglected ideological control.

Professional skills of the cadre were poor. We were not successful in promoting the people's sympathy toward the Revolution and indoctrinate them with revolutionary missions.

Military activities left much to be desired.

We did not motivate the people to in turn motivate others.

Cadre and troops did not have confidence in the people's capabilities.

Indoctrination was not performed under its many different forms.

We failed to promote the people's will to fight, and did not use persuasive indoctrinations.

Three requirements to be attained:

Conduct critiques to eliminate erroneous thoughts.

Evaluate strong and weak points in leadership.

Draft a plan for future activity: Its contents will consist of five parts ((sic)).

2 Dec 69

TRUC ((possibly an official of COSVN)) ENEMY COMBAT PLAN IN 1970

1. The enemy will continue to carry out his 1969 plan.

We failed to fiercely attack Saigon. The US declared a withdrawal of their troops.

The contents of Resolution 9 were known by the enemy.

Contents of the enemy general plan:

1. Realizing that we were able to fight a protracted war, ((the enemy)) made every effort to use both political and military influence. The enemy was also aware of the following:

Our combat capabilities were increasingly weakened so we could launch only small sapper attacks and shellings. He would have to confront two types of warfare regular and guerrilla warfare. Therefore, the enemy will attach importance to winning the people's sympathy.

They ((SVN)) fear that the US will withdraw all of its troops while the Puppet administration is still weak.

Furthermore, they alone will have to fight a protracted war (beyond 1970)

((For this reason)), in accordance with the "Vietnamization plan," the US will not withdraw a great number of its troops from VN but will leave behind their major forces to strengthen the Puppet Army.

Enemy scheme:

1. At the same time, the enemy will carry out two plans: He is ready to extend the war but also is making preparations to end it. He wants to secure a strong position in both cases.

2. In order to accomplish these two plans, the enemy will focus every effort in increasing his pacification activities.

3. If the Vietnamization plan is successful, the Puppet troops will replace the US troops and the US will withdraw their troops gradually from VN.

4. The enemy will continue to adopt the "clear-and-hold" strategy, and conduct sweep operations.

a. Employment of US forces.

The enemy continued to deploy the US troops as he had done before.

The Puppet forces were deployed in outer perimeter areas.

The US and Puppet forces were positioned alternately ((possibly in the inner perimeter areas)).

The ratio of US forces employed in the military operations was smaller than the Puppet forces and the latter were deployed in the forward areas.

The Puppet troops played an important role in combat. They fought in the outer areas.

Employment of two forces.

((In outer and inner perimeter areas)). In outer perimeter areas, there were Puppet Main Forces and satellite troops.

In inner perimeter areas, there were security forces such as public security, police, and pacification teams.

Division of ((four)) areas.

Safety areas: Consist of over 30% of Category B and C hamlets.

Disputed areas: Will be taken charge of by Special Forces.

Enemy activities:

The Main force units operate from the disputed area to the border area. The Regional Force try to eliminate our local force troops and agents operating in the safety areas. The Popular Forces try to annihilate our guerrilla troops in the safety areas.

Special Forces operate in the border area and along our supply routes.

Pacification and Phu¹⁹ong Hoang ((Phoenix)) forces are being activated and developed.

Phu¹⁹ong Hoang ((Phoenix)) forces in the villages.

They consist of police, security, reconnaissance, and rural development personnel and agents of intelligence organizations.

Organization of the command system in the secure area.

Role of the province chief: The province chief will have the responsibility for strengthening the Regional and Phu¹⁹ong Hoang ((Phoenix)) forces.

Role of the village chief: The village chief will have the right to mobilize all forces, even the Phu¹⁹ong Hoang ((Phoenix)) forces if necessary.

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((Role of)) CTZ Commanders: They command the main forces. If necessary, they will come to aid secure areas.

B. The above plan of the enemy proved that he is cunning and stubborn. He has a long-range plan to counter our class struggle movement.

Why?

Why did the enemy succeed in pacifying some areas?

Why were the results of our Spring-Summer Campaign so meager?

The enemy wants to implement his Vietnamization plan because he believes that it will succeed.

While implementing this plan, he only considered our weaknesses and neglected our strong points.

He also believed that he was strong while disregarding his weak points.

The enemy only attached importance to military activities, and failed to realize our strong position in the political field.

Enemy disadvantages.

The US met the following difficulties:

It was driven into a dilemma. It did not know whether it should withdraw its troops from VN.

They confronted the strong protest of their own people.

The antiwar movement exerted great influence in their country and triggered other movements.

Due to these disadvantages, the US has been increasingly defeated.

2. Are the Puppet Forces in outer perimeter areas strong or weak?

The Puppets developed their forces by increasing their strength to 700,000 troops but their combat capabilities were poor.

How are our military and political activities in the three areas (mountainous, lowland, and rural areas)?

What forms did our political struggle take?

We gained the initiative and shifted to an offensive position.

Our combat was included in the international war between the Communist and Capitalist blocs.

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On 2 Dec 69:

We continued to study the situation and strengthened our determination ((to fight and defeat the enemy)).

In accordance with the ((COSVN resolution)) we must have a clear-cut viewpoint.

We assessed the enemy situation in 1969 and all the phases of our activities in the past.

From the day the Party came into existence until 1945 when the French Government was overthrown, the Party had only 5,000 Party members.

The Party led the Resistance against the French Colonialist to victory.

The Party successfully liberated half of the country in a short period of time. The Party was founded a long time ago and continued to fight for the country.

Since 1954 when the enemy ((US)) initiated aggression against SVN, the Party has guided the Revolution to the present victories and continues to build socialism.

Since 1960 we have initiated simultaneous offensives.

In 1965, the enemy's unconventional war was defeated.

In 1965 and 1966 the US entered our country.

We then said, "We are able to defeat the US."

In 1966-67 we said, "The US has obviously been defeated."

Then we launched our General Offensive and Uprising with successive phases of attack and gained many victories.

((These victories marked)) a turning point in our history.

The enemy had to shift to the defensive, halt the bombing of NVN, and recognize the NLFSVN at the Paris Conference.

Confirmation of our successes in 1969

We destroyed 540,000 enemy troops and a great part of his war facilities.

The enemy was forced to de-escalate the war and withdraw his troops.

His aggression plan was undermined.

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Why did the enemy have to de-escalate the war?

War caused heavy losses in personnel and property.

182 billion dollars were spent for this war.

The war has been very lengthy. For these reasons, the US will not be able to prolong the war on a large scale.

The US troops are inclined to defeatism and are weary of war.

The US Government aroused indignation among the US people. It failed to stabilize the situation in the rear areas and was frequently faced with the strong protest raised by the people in the USA and around the world.

Upon the death of Uncle Hồ, 121 countries and 2,000 delegations praised him as a great leader and cheered our people.

Vietnamization Plan of the US

This was an attempt of the US to escape from certain defeat. They did not know whether they should draw back their forces ((to take the defensive)) or give up fighting.

All of the enemy's strategic schemes were defeated by us.

POLITICAL FIELD.

1. In ((RVN)) temporarily controlled areas, the people are guided by Province Chief Su^u ((possibly a name)) whom the enemy considers as Trần Văn H^uu^u ((sic)) ((possibly the former Prime Minister Trần Văn H^uu^u)).

2. The ((Revolutionary)) Government was established.

3. On our side, Communist parties and workers' forces in the world helped to oppose the neo-colonialism of the US imperialists.

4. The countries of the world have made a united front with us.

DIPLOMATIC FIELD.

The US aggression scheme was revealed.

We had the support of countries all over the world.

Everyone knew of our victories.

Hu^unh ((possibly Bishop L^uam Ngoc Qu^uynh)) thought of evacuating Catholic refugees abroad ((T.N = possibly because he fears conquest by Communist troops)).

Military Capabilities.

We are able to attack battalion, regiment, and division-size forces and eliminate 70% of the strength of the 18th Puppet Division. Our forces are able to stay close to the bordering areas such as B^uen Tre, M^u Tho, B^unh Thu^uan, G^o Dau, etc ... ((sic)).

Military Region 3.

We are able to attack Puppet troops in lowland areas and seize manpower and material resources.

We are able to develop technical and tactical implementation guidelines by studying COSVN's Resolution 9, helping ((cadre and troops)) to make major progress in evolving their ideology, and properly implementing the above resolution which summarizes the contents of previous resolutions.

In brief, we should gradually push back the enemy to gain partial victories before achieving the complete victory.

If not, our struggle with the enemy would be in a protracted and complex state.

In addition we should have a firm standpoint and strong belief in the final victory.

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- The enemy's basic plan did not change.
- Presently the US have carried out the Vietnamization plan. However, it was another one of their unsuccessful plans.
- The following proved the stubbornness of the enemy:
 - Initiate the Vietnamization plan.
 - Intensify political and economic activities and wage psychological warfare.
 - Take violent action against those who sympathize with the Revolution or talked about the restoration of peace.
- Our two capabilities:
 - We are able to achieve the final victory in a short time and confirm the serious policy line of the Party.
 - We may have both disadvantages and advantages ((sic)).