

----- FULL TRANSLATION -----

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██████████ Nam

DOCUMENT RELATING TO THE
FIFTH GUERRILLA WARFARE CONGRESS
HELD BY MILITARY REGION 5

Draft

MATTERS RELATED TO LEADERSHIP OVER THE PEOPLE'S
GUERRILLA WARFARE MOVEMENT IN THE NEW STRATEGIC PHASE

(Speech ~~to be delivered~~ by the ^{Comrade Commander} ~~Commanding General~~
of Military Region 5)

Dear Comrades:

We are in the seventh day of the Congress. We have listened to 10 reports. A number of other reports have already been prepared but they cannot be presented to the congress due to the lack of time. Before starting the second part of the Congress, on behalf of the ~~Military Region Current Affairs~~ ^{Standing Committee} ~~Party Committee~~, the Military Region Party Committee, and the Military Region ~~Headquarters~~ ^{Command}, I am going to make the following preliminary summary (██████████) so that you will study and discuss it, and give your suggestions.

Through the reports of hamlets, villages, local areas, and district companies, and through your discussions and exchange of views, we have dealt with many interesting matters and have learned from many valuable experiences related to the many-sided development of the great (██████████) movement. Such an abundance of interesting material cannot be discussed within the scope of this conference, nor can it be contained in this summary.

The purpose of this congress, as you realize, is to review the activities of the people and of the guerrilla force in our Military Region since the 1968 Spring General Offensive and Uprising, in order to learn from the experiences in leadership and to work out future plans with more initiative and more specific actions, thus contributing to the development and the intensification of the people's guerrilla warfare movement in our Military Region and enabling it to coordinate with other armed forces in making greater achievements throughout the region and the ~~country~~ prior to the decisive victory.

Kien [SVN]

*Standing Committee
of the
Regional Party
Committee*

The basic problems have been specifically pointed out by Brother Nam in the Opening Speech and you have already discussed them. In this summary, I will bring out the following five main points:

1. New developments in the strategic position of the people's guerrilla warfare movement in Military Region 5;
2. Two conditions that are considered as the keys to victory;
3. ~~Experiences in leadership~~ *problems concerning leadership ideology or the great experiences in leadership*
4. ~~Some specific requirements~~ *tactical issues*
5. Outline of the general situation and missions for the ~~coming~~ *future period.*

x x
x

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I. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STRATEGIC POSITION OF THE PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA WARFARE MOVEMENT.

Dear Comrades,

Under the ^{extremely} clear-sighted leadership of the Party, our Military Region has, together with the people throughout the ^{"Mien"} country, [South VN] ^{very} made extremely great achievements.

As you ^{know} realize, after the Geneva Agreements, Military Region 5 met temporary difficulties. However, our movement resumed its development in 1959, and after years of struggle and strengthening of forces, it expanded vigorously in 1964-1965, making great leaps forward. Along with the development of the political movement, our people's guerrillas, in conjunction with other armed forces throughout the country, defeated the Americans in their ^{Special} ~~unconventional~~ war. To salvage the situation, the US hurriedly sent ~~its~~ troops to SVN. The limited war then began. Along with the people and the armed forces throughout the country, our people in Military Region 5 smashed the first and second counteroffensives waged by the US imperialists in the dry season of 1965-1966 and the dry season of 1966-1967 ~~respectively~~. In 1967, using the indecision of the enemy, and following the directive of the Party, we frustrated the enemy's 1967-1968 dry season counteroffensive plan from its inception.

1 ~~At that~~ ^{And of the} moment when the limited war waged by the Americans reached its climax, going even beyond the imagination of the Americans, ^{when} our people's war, directed by the Party, ~~also~~ attained its highest degree of development, ^{phase of} our Party, ~~then~~ ^{on the basis of} made a decision to shift to a General Offensive and Uprising. In the early spring of 1968, as a result of our great achievements, our patriotic war progressed to a new stage. This was an important turning point which was followed by repeated victories in the spring, summer, fall, and winter of 1968 and spring, summer, and fall of 1969. The US imperialists, for their part, were toppled from the summit of their limited war ^{by} during our General Offensive and Uprising in the early spring of 1968. They were forced into failure and had to de-escalate the war. They had to stop bombing part of the North, engage in talks with the South, then stop the bombing of the ~~entire~~ ^{the} North and sit at the conference table in Paris to talk ^{with} to the ~~People's National~~ ^{with the} Liberation Front which is now the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. This is a serious defeat. They are defeated militarily, politically, diplomatically, and economically. They have de-escalated the war, but they still have a ~~war potential~~ ^{obscure} and are still ~~intransigent~~. Therefore, the war remains ~~intransigent~~ ^{highly decisive} and we still must pass through a period of hard and strenuous fighting. However, we are determined to surmount all obstacles, overcome the fierceness of war, endure sacrifice, ~~win~~ ^{with} make ~~gradual~~ ^{decisive} achievements, and win the great and ~~final~~ ^{decisive} victory.

of achievements and effective developments,
 victory set by NLF and progress toward winners

Our past achievements and practical experiences have proven that from the simultaneous uprising to the frustration of the Americans' ~~unconventional~~ ^{special} war and the forced de-escalation of their limited war, our people's guerrilla warfare movement has developed increasingly. ~~We have attacked the enemy more and more vigorously and have contributed our widespread efforts to the overall task.~~ It is obvious that in the course of the revolution in SVN, the strategic ~~position~~ ^{role} of the

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guerrilla warfare movement has been continuously strengthened. It provides favorable conditions for the evolution of a new strategic phase. The more favorably the new strategic phase evolves, the more interest must be taken in strengthening the strategic position and fulfilling the requirements of the people's guerrilla warfare movement.

A superficial understanding of this point is a ~~serious~~ ^{grave} mistake in strategy. On the opening day [of the congress], Brother Nam specifically mentioned that the people's guerrilla warfare movement plays an essential and decisive role, not only now,

This movement has attacked the enemy continuously, with more and more vigor, thus contributing an extremely important and increasingly common victory.

but also in the period that will follow the ^{end of the war} ~~cessation of hostilities~~

^{In practice} ~~being realistic~~, how has the strategic position of the people's guerrilla warfare movement in our Military Region 5 developed?

a. In the past phases of activities, our guerrilla and district local forces concentrated their efforts on attacking the enemy, ^{suppressing} ~~annihilating~~ tyrants, breaking their oppressive control, destroying strategic hamlets, and defending our villages

b. In this phase of activity:

Mission: Our guerrilla and district local forces have destroyed not only the enemy's forces (including troops, high-ranking officers, technicians, tyrants, oppressors, and ring-leaders) but also his war-making facilities. They have provided direct support for the people and played the key role in the destruction of strategic hamlets. Along with the people, they have risen up, fought the enemy, suppressed tyrants and oppressors, won over and gained control of the population, and held their positions in encircling the enemy and launching continuous attacks against him. In other words, the people's guerrilla warfare movement has been the ~~people's basic~~ ^{form of the mass} uprising. ~~There~~ ^{armed} There have been changes and improvements in the methods of winning over the people and controlling the situation. We have won the people over and controlled them in local areas, in their old and new villages, we have stayed close to them, ~~privated~~ ^{returned} them to destroy ~~concentration centers~~, and returned them to their former residences. We have controlled them even in ~~concentration centers~~ or in other areas to which they have been driven, including towns and cities.

armed

Expansion of ^{areas} ~~bases~~ of operations: In the past, our guerrillas and district local forces operated only in mountainous and rural areas. Now, our guerrillas and local forces operate ^{in cities} ~~in towns and cities~~. This is a very new development that has never existed in other countries or even during our first resistance war.

distinct sectors

and city-fringe areas

Organization: Since our missions have developed, the organization of our forces has also developed. This organization has evolved in many aspects. Our guerrillas are organized into spearheads, covert self-defense, and ^{special} ~~specific~~ action units. They are organized into armed force units in accordance with the people's army system or the security system. They are also organized into armed force units providing direct support for

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for the various associations, including Youth Groups, Women's Associations, labor unions, etc...

In the course of its development, due to our people's, initiative, and practical attitude, our guerrillas and people have their own armed services and specialized units that produce, modify, simplify, improve, or even modernize rudimentary weapons to make the best use of them.

Rule: ^{on} ~~from~~ the basic concepts of attacking the enemy continually, an extremely strict and revolutionary rule has come into existence. This rule is ~~extremely very~~

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simple, ~~however, extremely~~ ^{but very} strange and difficult to understand. Even some of our comrades do not understand it thoroughly. It is as follows: In the course of our fierce General Offensive and Uprising, all missions expanded. Of these missions, the most essential and decisive one is that of winning over the people and controlling them. It is, in other words, the mission of motivating the people to wage a continuous armed uprising against the enemy. The fiercer the uprising is, the more ^{intense} effort must be made to intensify the movement for winning over the people. ^{will become the more} ~~This movement must expand~~ vigorously, ^{and move} deep into the enemy's last refuge. It is obvious that, in our revolutionary struggle against the American aggressors, our people's war, thanks to ^{the} correct policy ~~has~~ of the Party, has expanded in accordance with the rule that the fiercer the war is, the stronger the movement will become. This is to say that our people's guerrilla warfare movement ^{is increasing} ~~has developed~~ ^{over} further in the fierceness of war. When we see a ravaged village, if we jump to the conclusion, without being fully informed of the situation, that our movement is not developing, we are wrong; because, in reality, it continues to develop, very strongly and vigorously in one aspect or another.

among us,

H

Capability: Since the spring of 1968, we have used many creative methods of attack, especially in ^{the} ~~core~~ areas of cities and in areas bordering cities. These methods have been used by newly developed armed forces. They have applied not only the method of attacking the enemy independently but they have also applied coordinated combat tactics, and have attacked the enemy simultaneously, vigorously, and continuously, destroying enemy units completely. They have also applied highly coordinated combat tactics to attack the enemy in large operations and initiated their own campaigns or coordinated with other main force units to launch specific campaigns aimed at taking the initiative in constantly attacking or containing the enemy. This is a new and salient feature which denotes the great capability and the important role of our people's guerrilla warfare. The old concept of the guerrilla warfare is ~~incomplete~~ ^{outdated}

and may entail hazards in leadership.

Combat efficiency: The demands for the development of the guerrilla warfare movement will be very great in the days to come. We must be ~~fully grasp~~ ^{fully grasp} the lessons learned in carrying out missions, the ~~evolution of~~ ^{evolution of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~sound~~ ^{sound} way to organize ~~the~~ ^{the} forces, in order to increase combat efficiency. All these are new requirements of the guerrilla warfare movement that must be fulfilled with initiative and great effort.

properly

According to the reports on the results of the activities on the battlefield throughout the Military Region, the strategic effect of the people's guerrilla warfare movement is ~~growing~~ ^{growing} ever greater, despite the fierceness of the war. ~~The~~ ^{The} combat efficiency also becomes ~~ever higher~~ ^{ever higher}. All these have ~~greatly~~ ^{greatly} contributed to the overall ~~success~~ ^{effectiveness} of the campaign and ~~to combat~~ ^{as well} effectiveness. *→ constantly reached the highest point*

The many improvements in the guerrilla warfare movement have made ~~worthy~~ ^{worthy} contributions to the ~~general~~ ^{general} task. However, since the fall of 1968, this ~~task~~ ^{success} has not yet brought about any great change in the military situation ~~throughout the~~ ^{throughout the} country or in Military Region 5, ~~and as a result, it has not~~ ^{which would produce a change} yet provided the conditions for the attainment of the final ~~stage~~ ^{stage}. Since it plays such basic and decisive role, the people's guerrilla warfare movement has a large share in the ~~responsibility~~ ^{situation} for this ~~situation~~.

It is necessary to reaffirm that the guerrilla warfare movement occupies a very important strategic position. However, if we do not concentrate our efforts on strengthening and developing it and turning it into practice, it will be nothing but empty theory.

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AT THE SAME TIME

PROBLEMS
11 TWO SITUATIONS THAT ARE CONSIDERED AS THE KEYS TO VICTORY,
AND THE MAIN REASONS FOR DEFICIENCIES AND WEAK POINTS IN
GUERRILLA WARFARE.

Dear Comrades:

meeting here
learn from and bring into
light We are assembled in this room to ~~discuss our achievements~~ ^{discuss our achievements} and ~~improve~~ ^{improve} our strong points, but we must also honestly criticize our weaknesses. If we only consider the strong points and neglect the weak points, the ~~movement~~ ^{movement} will not be improved.

The topic to be discussed is the following: Why did the

to
as well
change
no over all we mean

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movement make progress in some local areas while it remained stagnant and ineffective in some other areas? What were the keys to success and the reasons for the ~~weaknesses~~ *shortcomings?*

a. From a thorough ^{understanding} ~~assessment~~ of our political policy, missions, and strategic guidelines during the General Offensive and Uprising, we are aware of the important role and strategic position of guerrilla warfare. It is also known through experience that the most essential point (in the guerrilla movement) consists of strengthening the absolute and ~~rock~~ leadership of the Party whose direct representatives are the village Party Committees and Party Chapters. At the same time, we should emphasize the role of the local military agencies ~~which act as a military staff~~ for the Party ~~in the movement~~. *organs*

total an

Though ~~the task of strengthening the guerrilla movement~~ ^{this point has been mentioned} has been mentioned repeatedly in the directives and resolutions of the ~~Region Party Committee, Military Region Party Committee and Military Region Headquarters,~~ ^{Command} the guerrilla movement has not been given due attention by our infrastructure. The hamlet Party Chapters still lack enthusiasm and determination. They ~~do not have specific plans and they provide effective control and supervision.~~ The local military ^{organs} ~~agencies~~ do not concentrate their efforts upon developing the people's guerrilla warfare. They still do not realize that this is a highly important task. They have to actively break the enemy's oppressive control and win over the people; otherwise, the revolutionary movement will be greatly endangered in the present phase and in future phases.

the building of

b. Political awareness, by itself, is not ^{enough} ~~adequate~~. It is merely the ^{theoretical} ~~mental~~ aspect. In fact, a considerable number of comrades were aware of the ^{mission} ~~importance~~ ^{importance} of the people's guerrilla war, just as they knew about the mission of the local military ~~agencies~~ ^{organs}. However, the most important thing consists of transforming their awareness into actions.

The reports of Comrades in D, C, K, H, T, B, C, C2, and C3, all mentioned the following points as necessary to our success:

"In all circumstances, even if we have to make sacrifices and endure hardships and the fierceness of war, the Party Chapters, Party members, cadre and armed forces must ~~hold on~~ ^{hold on} ~~stay close~~ to the ~~movement~~ ^{movement}, and continuously not fail the people to struggle against the enemy in every way possible."

firmly

ing and adequate control.

The above point is not new to us; but let us ask this question: "How many villages or hamlets in each province and district of our Military Region have performed this task seriously?" We should be frank and confess that very few of them have succeeded. Some provinces or districts have only been moderately achieved ~~successful~~. As for the other provinces and districts, we wonder whether the province and district ~~and~~ have provided effective assistance and motivation, and publicized the experiences as they should.

staying close

→ military commands

As far as ~~motivation~~ is concerned, it would not be fair to say that our ~~cadre~~ did not stay close to the movement. In fact, ~~they did pay attention to the task. However, some~~ some comrades and Party Chapters were ~~right~~ *behind* the masses. Some ~~other~~ *did better by* mingling with the people, but they seldom ~~appeared before the masses~~ *surfaced or if they did, they merely appeared for a few hours for such functions as holding a public meeting.*

stayed close to

~~masses, concealing their identity in a type of indoctrination meeting so that they could take the support of a number of people and dare not~~ *bring* ~~bring them into the struggle, because they feared being discovered by the enemy who would then destroy the movement. They concentrated on getting help from the people, and remain~~ *concentrate* ~~in some other areas, our cadre remained indifferent at the suggestions of the people who proposed that we kill enemy forces, because they feared being discovered by the enemy.~~ *After that, they mentioned in their reports, or when they were asked, that they stayed close to the area, but could not operate, because of enemy activities. It using violent* *difficulties* ~~and certain measures, were complicated for movement, and the revolutionary spirit of the local people was low, and so~~

bring

question related to

There were many such cases of staying close to the areas, ~~therefore the word "stay close" was used only vaguely it is not correct to say that our men did not stay close.~~

However, with the above ways of "staying close" to the areas, how could we hope to motivate the people? ~~We must understand something.~~ The Vietnamese people possess a revolutionary spirit by tradition, but if we fail to motivate them adequately, how can we make them stand up to wage the revolution sought by the Party?

To stay close is to actually mingle
"staying close" means "mingling" with the populace. In base-level areas, this point is even more important cannot be missed.

The phrase would lose its significance if we stayed close to an area but failed to motivate the people. If we acted that way, the area would become a mere shelter for us. It is as though in war we were on the defensive or in combat we were avoiding the fight.

→ refuge

Staying close to the movement and the motivating of the people are related tasks. They influence each other and together become a powerful force. What should we do to motivate the people successfully? What did comrades in C, D, and K do? First, they stayed close to the guerrilla movement with great enthusiasm, and performed their tasks systematically. They began to motivate ~~each~~ ^{each} ~~separate~~ individuals, then ~~separate~~ cells and continued to spread their activities far and wide among the people. They motivated the people continuously, made them

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(Page 8 of O.T.)

→ aware of the poverty, misery, humiliation and sadness caused to them by the enemy, and promoted their hatred of the enemy. Furthermore, our cadre knew how to organize the people ~~into~~ ranks, and enlist them in the people's organizations, such as Farmers', Youth, Women's Associations, etc. They trained hardcore agents, established legal and secret ~~schools~~, and performed specifically assigned missions. In short, they went systematically from motivating and strengthening the people to organizing and guiding them to struggle and break the enemy's oppressive control. Through the struggles, they improved the organizations, developed the people's force, stepped up the movement of killing tyrants, and screened out bad individuals. As a result, they controlled the people more closely and led the people's struggles more effectively. We can say that they are now standing firm in their areas of operations, despite the fierceness and perils of war

~~We are not switching to~~ ^{agitation for action} ~~by leap and bounds,~~ ^{By citing the above examples, we do not want to see}

~~all cadre improve their motivation tactics in big strides, that is, to attack the enemy~~ ^{thoroughly} ~~and mobilize all the people into~~ ^{meetings} ~~meetings, what we want is that they should begin~~ ^{to spread propaganda and promote a renewed enthusiasm among the people. They should} ~~to spread propaganda and promote a renewed enthusiasm among the people. They should~~ ^{to resume staying close to the people and to motivate them more carefully.} ~~to motivate them more carefully. If the people are not sufficiently motivated and indoctrinated, their meetings will have no effect, because after our troops withdraw from the area the enemy will come back and regain control of the people.~~ ^{Instances of this type have already taken place in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Quang Ngai, Quang Nam and Khanh Hoa Provinces. Let us be thoroughly aware of the slogan: Staying close without motivation, motivation without appropriate actions, performing actions without an effective organization, all this will lead the people's guerrilla war (that is, an armed uprising by the people to establish} ~~seize power) to failure and will prevent it from developing.~~

master ship

→ otherwise, after the meetings are over and our men have withdrawn, the enemy will return and things will be back where they were

on the basis of thoroughly grasping the role played by the village Party Committee, Party chapters in coordination with the local military organs, we must be aware that the key to success is to firmly cling to the movement to constantly motivate the people and organize their struggle against the enemy.

~~We should once and for all stress the role played by the village Party Committee, Party Chapters, and local military agencies. They must stay close to the movement, motivate the people continuously, and guide the people in their struggle. This is the key to success.~~

~~The great experiences in leadership or problems concerning the~~
III. ~~EXPERIENCES IN LEADERSHIP ON MATTERS CONCERNING LEADERSHIP~~
ideology of leadership

~~As we know, some local areas have been successful in guiding the guerrilla movement, due to two factors:~~

Various localities have scored successes thanks to two key facts

- ~~1. They stayed close to the movement.~~
- ~~2. They knew how to motivate the people, and organizing them into ranks to fight the enemy.~~

From this, we can draw a number of major experiences in leadership
~~we have gained profitable experiences from their activities and should improve our own leadership in the following way:~~

- experience: Arming the entire*
1. *for* ~~First principle: the people must be motivated to participate in the resistance and in the armed struggle.~~

As we have mentioned above, ^{our} the people possess a strong revolutionary spirit. With the direct ^{leadership} guidance of the local Party ^{body} headquarters and the assistance of the local military ^{organs}, ~~we have the determination to~~ stay close to the people, motivate them and organize them ^{for the struggle} into ranks, ~~we will succeed in getting all the people to participate in the resistance and armed struggle.~~ *we have the capability to arm the entire people for the resistance and struggle.*

a. We ^{are} defeating the US, not because we possessed ~~more~~ more personnel or property than they, but because the entire army, people, and Party ~~are~~ united and have a high determination to win. This ~~is~~ ^{is} a point which the US did not anticipate.

This is the basis for our people's guerrilla warfare. Without the people, nothing can be done. The Party members, cadre, and troops will be more enthusiastic in their ideology if they gain the support of the people.

Conversely, the more active the people are, the more courage and strength they lend to the Party, cadre, armed forces, and people's organizations. This is an important, basic, and decisive factor which enables the Party and troops to achieve their missions.

causing the people to lose their enthusiasm too
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effectiveness of their
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Some guerrilla and action units, and some Party Chapters were repeatedly driven out of the enemy areas. So, they became less enthusiastic. Their combat ~~spirit~~ and performance were reduced, ~~which had a bad influence on the people~~. The main reasons were that our cadre lived in one area and operated in another. They ~~failed to encourage each other and to gain the sympathy of the people~~. By saying this, we do not mean to deny the utility of weapons and ammunition, and the effect of combat plans and tactics. We only mean that if we gain the support of the people and unite them behind the troops and Party, we will multiply the effect of weapons and ammunition, and conduct our combat tactics more creatively and more flexibly.

b. With the help of the people, we can expand our ^{entire} activities broadly and ^{continuously} evenly. The enemy will be ^{trapped} encircled by a large net ^{which leaves him no escape}. The above point is demonstrated by the combat report of Village D ~~██████████~~. Since the summer of 1968, Village D conducted about 1,500 battles, capturing 25 enemy troops, seizing 36 weapons, shooting down two aircraft, and destroying 29 military vehicles (including 11 APC's). The guerrillas killed 450 enemy troops, while the people eliminated 1,165 troops, that is, three fourths of the enemy casualties. ^{armored v.}

Whether the enemy entered the village or ^{marched} moved along the communication route, he was continuously attacked by the people and the guerrillas. We can cite another example to prove the ability of the people: When our personnel tried to kill S ~~██████████~~ he escaped their grenade attacks twice, but on the third try, due to a trick by a peasant and a youth, he paid for his crimes and lay dead on the roadside where ^{enemy} passenger-cars and ^{enemies} military trucks, frequently passed. Furthermore, the people participated in attacking the ^{communication lines} communication lines day after day. ^{there are days we see} In a short period, they helped kill four tyrants and reconnaissance agents along a very short portion of the road through the hamlet. This action frightened the enemy and we thereby gained more favorable conditions for controlling the area. The people became enthusiastic in screening out bad elements. The village Party Committee, the Party Chapter, and the guerrilla forces became more eager to destroy the enemy.

The above was a ^{valuable} model ^{and a practical way} example and a valuable lesson for ~~us~~ carrying out our struggle.

c. ^{concerning the villages} Besides the strong point mentioned above, ^{another point} ~~the village had another~~ ^{out:} Despite the fierceness of war, we successfully improved and strengthened the Party, the Group, the armed forces, and various associations both in quality and quantity. In particular, the teenagers and women participated in ~~the~~ ^{great numbers} in the struggle and fighting against the enemy.

The motivation of ~~the~~ ^{entire} the people to participate in the people's guerrilla warfare movement is an urgent requirement. The people are ready, [redacted]

[redacted] We have experience, [redacted] The question is whether we are determined to maintain the movement, constantly motivate the people, and organize them for the struggle or not?

To do this, first of all, village Party Committees, Party Chapters, Party members, and the armed force must undertake the job and endure hardships. They must repeatedly motivate the people. At the same time, they must develop the guerrillas force. ~~people should be motivated again and again for each struggle~~ ^{for the people} to do this, be patient in this task and understand that the motivation

[redacted] cannot be achieved after only a few hours in a meeting, but takes a long time. However, this does not mean that we have to draw out the motivation over a period of years, but ~~seriously try our best to achieve it~~ ^{we must strive to achieve it positively and with a sense of urgency.}

~~Our basic task consists of motivating all the people to resist and struggle against the enemy and arming all of them. This task is basic because it determines the nature of the people's guerrilla war.~~ ^{Arming the entire people for the struggle is a fundamental problem which determines the nature of the people's}

2. Second principle
^{experience:}

We must fully understand the theory of attacking the enemy energetically, violently, and continually at an ever-increasing rate. We must use local units to launch three-pronged attacks: military ^{activities}, political struggles, and ^{coop-} military ^{activities} closely-linked efforts.

a. By studying the reports, it is found that the movement develops [redacted] in areas where our attacks are violent and constant ^{and where the enemy resistance is stiff.}

^{good cases.} Village C, concentration area VT, and Village H are typical. In Village C, the enemy constructed strongholds and concentrated the people in Hamlet 2. ^{by wicked schemes} ^{was very wicked.} The comrade from a Party Chapter [redacted] said: "Never mind. Let them concentrate [redacted] provided that we can still control the ^{area}. If we react too energetically, difficulties might occur and we might not be able to maintain the movement." But this argument was ^{smashed by positive factors} rejected by an enthusiastic people. The enemy planned to ~~stop~~ ^{and will} our movement. If we do not prevent him from doing so, he will continue to concentrate the people from other hamlets. ^{there} This situation would cause difficulties to the people, the armed forces, and the Party Chapters.

Therefore, we ~~resisted~~ ^{and will} the enemy violently. ^{and will} After a period of ^{rationally} confrontation with the enemy was violent, ^{but we need violence to deal with} violence. As a result, after a period of see-saw

the people
head off

to do this
Guerrilla war

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battles for the control of the population,
 time, it was clear that the enemy ~~would~~ ^{did} not succeed in concentrating people from ~~other~~ ^{any} hamlets. On the contrary, a number of our comrades in Village C succeeded in ~~regulating an~~ ^{winning control} additional hamlet. This is a ~~good example of~~ ^{valuable lesson on} the concept of ~~offensive~~ ^{offensive} ~~conceal~~ ^{conceal}

There is certainly decisiveness from village X. ~~((Page 11 of O.T.))~~

in the life-and-death ~~struggle~~ ^{against the U.S. imperialists} ~~with~~ ^{certain} ~~violence~~. The Party side which is more courageous, enduring, and ~~victorious~~ ^{victorious} will be victorious.

On the war theater of our Military Region, certain localities
 Because of ~~incorrect attitudes such as overconfidence,~~ ~~shirking, fear of violence and sacrifice, lack of confidence in the masses, and failure to attack the enemy, on the part of many agencies in the Military Region~~ there was a ~~serious lag to the movement~~ X Village X in Quang Nam ~~is typical of this failure.~~ Previously, it was a very secure village composed of four to five thousand trustworthy people. All the ~~tyrants~~ ^{tyrants} in the village had been ~~destroyed~~. The enemy had to replace them with personnel from another areas. Initially, ~~we~~ ^{the inhabitants in the village} underestimated the enemy. But, after several ~~attacks were launched against the village,~~ and after the establishment of ~~new~~ ^{new} ~~difficulties~~ ^{new} ~~arose.~~ The struggle movement died down. The ~~local people and guerrillas suggested the annihilation of the wicked ringleaders because the latter were supporting the Americans. But, our cadre did not dare fight for fear that our force would be discovered. As a result, we were oppressed by the enemy, and had many difficulties in our movement, even though we used secret routes. Also, the criteria for destruction of the enemy fixed for this village during 1969 was only 20 personnel. This is a good~~ ^{valuable lesson} ~~experience in leadership.~~ ^{for us, a major experience in leadership.}

b. By studying the reports we also learn that enemy soldiers ~~and strongholds~~ are densely concentrated in strategic positions in the province capital, strategic lines of communication in Village D, areas K3, C, and BT, etc... ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~areas where~~ ^{areas where} C75, and C2 ^{are operating}. But, in these areas the enemy does not threaten to encircle us. On the contrary, we are constantly encircling him, creating favorable conditions for ~~improving our encirclement~~ ^{developing} ~~and attacking~~ his last refuge. These are not like the encirclements of the posts of Khe Sanh, Dakto, Tiéh Phuóc, and Hà Tân, which were conducted by our main force units. Here, the encirclement is conducted by the people's forces, guerrilla forces and other armed organizations in conjunction with the people's political struggles and military proselyting activities. Our armed agent networks consist of overt and secret agents, women, youths, and teenagers. ~~Some~~ ^{units of} ~~people's force units~~ consisting of overt and secret personnel succeeded in vigorously

Attack the enemy.

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attacking the enemy, thus frustrating his defense and counter-encirclement plans (in K3 and D areas) [redacted]. In the near future guerrilla activities should be intensified in all areas. Thăng Bình and Bình Sơn Districts were encircled and violently attacked by similar forces, which adapted all kinds of tactics such as: Partial destruction of the enemy, harassing attacks, and annihilation attacks. But, presently district and province [redacted] are less active in leadership. They should restore zeal in leadership to be successful in their forthcoming missions. During the Summer Campaign of 1969 a small force from a province unit [redacted] and guerrilla units from two villages conducted model encirclements of enemy ^{isolated} posts. [redacted] and isolated them. But, it is regretful that the guidance provided by our ~~cadre~~ was lax. It would be better ~~to~~ if they had transfer^{red} the mission of encircling [redacted] to the guerrillas, local forces, and the local inhabitants after five or seven days. ~~It~~ provided additional support to the guerrillas [redacted] and ~~only~~ ^{kept} a number of local force personnel ~~on the left~~ [redacted]. This is an idea for developing the people's guerrilla force and making it more effective. We must learn from this encirclement to improve our activities for the forthcoming encirclement of other ^{enemy isolated posts} [redacted] in the province.

c. Adoption of the three-pronged attack.

(Page 12 of 0.1.1.1)

The reports made by village, and district ^{and areas} [redacted] reveal that ~~areas which adopted the three pronged attack~~ ^{where} ~~achieved~~ ^{was} success in all fields, and their guerrilla ~~forces improved~~ ^{development was developed}. In these areas, even though our strength was not very great, we succeeded in stopping an enemy that had greater strength and modern equipment, because we have a very powerful political struggle force. Combined with military activities, our political struggles made our forces significant and put the enemy into a defensive position, unable to implement his wicked scheme. Our success in the struggle against the enemy's levelling of the terrain in K3, H, D [redacted] and setting up of the McNamara defensive line in D [redacted] proved that the coordination between our military activities and political struggles was very effective. [redacted] we killed 60-70 enemy personnel. The enemy was ready to react, but hesitated for fear that the people would stand against him and demand compensation for the damage caused to their houses. We owed this success to the direct guidance ~~and~~ ^{led} by the Party Chapter. Our Party, cadre, and armed forces ~~must~~ ^{stay} close to the people, continually motivating them and urging them to carry out three-pronged attacks locally.

what was regarded as a

low rank of Diem's army province

[Party author

if they had

was in 6 months

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Military proselyting activities By studying the reports, it is found that we only succeeded in harassing the enemy, and restricting some of his brutal activities. We must devote more efforts in this field to ~~turn~~ ^{turn} ~~our~~ ^{our} military proselyting force ~~to attack the enemy by surprise~~ ^{to attack the enemy by surprise} ~~destroying the enemy's~~ ^{destroying the enemy's} defensive positions, and halting his sweep operations. ~~We~~ ^{We} should ~~gain the favor of enemy troops~~ ^{induce} ~~that they will join us to take to~~ ^{to} ~~in a demonstration, abandon their duties, and revolt~~ ^{conduct} ~~confusing and paralyzing his~~ ^{conduct on the} anti-war protests in order to ~~confuse and paralyze the enemy.~~

sheet,

In leadership, we must maintain firm control of the three-pronged-attack. By maintaining close coordination in the three-pronged attacks

~~we will create a real force~~ ^{we will create a real force} for the people's guerrilla war.

(There must be a clear distribution of responsibilities among the three prongs)

Our leadership must be effective enough to ensure that these three-pronged attacks can provide mutual support in attacking the enemy vigorously. ~~The armed~~ ^{armed} ~~forces~~ ^{forces} must strike the enemy hard. They must move ~~fast~~ ^{fast} without relying on political struggle activities or military proselyting efforts. The political struggle ~~effort~~ ^{effort} must create and seize opportunities to rise up ~~immediately~~ ^{at the correct time} without waiting for the armed forces.

The members of the military proselyting ~~force~~ ^{force} must be resourceful and ~~brave~~ ^{brave}. They must try to ~~induce~~ ^{induce} enemy troops, ~~to fight one another~~ ^{to fight one another} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~cause them to oppose the war,~~ ^{defect from their} ~~and revolt,~~ ^{defect from their} ~~Each~~ ^{Each} ~~prong~~ ^{prong} must create favorable conditions for the others, maintain close coordination and mutual support with others and urge ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~others~~ ^{others} to ~~attack~~ ^{attack} ~~jointly~~ ^{jointly} ~~in an~~ ^{in an} ~~overall~~ ^{overall} ~~attack on~~ ^{attack on} the enemy. To ~~be successful,~~ ^{be successful,} it is essential ~~that agencies~~ ^{that agencies} to maintain close coordination ~~at the base level.~~ ^{at the base level.}

attack on

d. ~~The people's guerrilla warfare movement must adopt the three-pronged attack, using the local force to attack the enemy. By so doing, we will effectively coordinate with the three types of troops~~ ~~and the other two types of forces~~

~~Including the enemy means~~ ^{Including the enemy means} preparing the battlefield, ~~oppressing~~ ^{oppressing} the enemy, gaining the initiative in controlling the people, and frustrating the enemy's plan of troop deployment. It supports and creates favorable conditions for the development of the main force in preparation for large attacks. The close coordination and mutual support maintained between K3 and D ~~was an~~ ^{was an} example showing how to succeed in constantly launching attacks against province capitals and district seats defended by a numerically superior enemy.

(putting up)

d. The people's guerrilla warfare movement, by implementing the three-pronged attack with on-the-spot forces, is really achieving the coordination between the three types of troops and the base

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The concept ^{of} using the local force to carry out the three-pronged attacks in encircling ~~posts~~ ^{the enemy}, if well understood by our cadre, will show the power of our guerrilla warfare. It requires us to be more decisive in breaking the enemy's grip, and gaining control of the population.

We must make the best use of the above experience, ^{because the} ~~and adopt the three-pronged attack in guerrilla warfare in~~ ~~mountainous and lowland areas.~~ If we do not fully understand this point ^{and} if we do not make ^{possible} ~~best~~ efforts to implement it,

(Page 13 of O.T.)

we will not be able to expand the movement or keep it uniform and stable.

3. United the people, the people, we attack the enemy, the stronger we are, the greater are the victories we achieve, and the more people we control!

Through the experiences gained by our personnel in Villages D, C, B, C2, and C75 and by comparing them against ^{with} ~~the~~ activities conducted throughout the battlefield, it is obvious that when we seize the initiative, constantly attack the enemy, and encircle him, using the three-pronged attack, we grow stronger, achieve greater victories, and succeed in leading the revolutionary force.

The enemy ^{encountered} ~~launched~~ fierce attacks against the above areas. Despite this, our comrades, Party members, cadre, and the armed force, after ~~reducing~~ ^{hesitation} ~~shirking~~, hesitation, fear of hardships and sacrifice, stayed close to the people, and motivated them to endure hardships and struggle against the enemy. As a result, we succeeded in continually attacking the enemy. Our attacks became more violent when the enemy reacted violently. Finally, he gave up. On our side, Party members, cadre, the armed force, and civilian organizations became stronger in size and in quality. More united, more experienced and more resourceful, they put more confidence in Party leadership and policy, and were more confident in

without a worthy purpose, its fighting spirit is poor and at all -

Because the US is conducting an unjust war, its fighting spirit was gradually decreased. It developed a complicated organization without uniformity, which led to disorder. set forth its ~~accurate~~ ^{correct} policy and guidelines based on its assessments and comparison of our forces and the enemy's. Our local forces, relying on ~~their~~ ^{our Central Authority's} clear understanding of the enemy and aided by its policy and guidelines, were confident of their own strength and the people's, they succeeded in ~~the~~ creating a new ~~force~~ forced the enemy into his passive and besieged position and launched successive attacks, achieving success

Our Central Authority

→ strength which

As our decisive victory ~~is~~ draw near, the enemy's reaction ~~resistance~~ becomes fiercer. If we do not evaluate the enemy's capabilities correctly, and only count his strength, weapons and war facilities, we will hesitate and be fearful of starting our ~~own~~ ^{own} attacks, or ~~treating~~ ^{treating} the people to conduct their struggles against the enemy. Therefore, ~~an accurate~~ ^{correct} comparison of the enemy and ~~the~~ ^{our} situation constitutes the basic ~~prerequisite~~ ^{consolidated strength} in the development of our ~~own~~ ^{own} forces in order to achieve our great victories.

Correct

((Page 15 of O.P.))

g. The acquisition of a consolidated force strength

Through our practical ~~experiences~~ ^{experiences}, develop

the ability to ~~form~~ ^{develop} consolidated ~~force~~ ^{strength} using our ~~own~~ ^{own} is a problem of ~~experience~~ ^{experience} for our military, political, and diplomatic ~~activities~~ ^{activities}. From the point of view of our Central Authority it involves all aspects of our military, political and diplomatic efforts. From the point of view of the military region and part of the province, a consolidated force can be acquired through close coordination between the military and political forces on the three fronts

From the point of view of

and in the three areas the close ~~work~~ ^{work} of the ~~three forces~~ ^{three forces} and cooperation among the three types of troops ~~and~~ ^{and} all combat methods and all struggles among all methods of combat and struggle

of troops

in the local area, particularly in the village, ~~political~~ ^{political} and ~~military~~ ^{military} activities can be acquired through successive military ~~activities~~ ^{activities} continued the ~~three fronts~~ ^{three fronts} against the enemy. → activities

by military

The local force is made up of guerrillas of both sexes and all ages. The people's armed organizations have different names but their basic purpose is to fight the enemy any time and under any circumstances. The villages H, K3, D, and C have ~~created~~ ^{created} a consolidated ~~force~~ ^{strength}. It constantly motivated the people to fight the enemy, and thus acquired such a superior ~~force~~ ^{strength} that they defeated the enemy who was ~~entirely~~ ^{entirely} superior to them in numbers.

→ step by step. → constantly

is declining

We must learn from these experiences. We must use them in the execution of political and military policies, in conjunction with ~~three pronged attacks (in mountainous and lowland areas) as prescribed by the Party.~~ All Party cadre and members must know their responsibility in the execution of the Party policies and guidelines in bringing the people's guerrilla war to a successful conclusion. *development.*

We must absolutely
~~Our primary missions are to~~ cling to the movement, to motivate and organize the people so that they can provide mutual help and to motivate one another in order to strengthen the three front attack in our areas. *carrying out the three-pronged attack in order to create the consolidated strength.*

We must utilize the entire people's force in the development of our strength. *We must consider some modifications to the guerrilla force in particular, we must not stick to a rigorous form of organization.* ~~We must consider some modifications to the guerrilla force based on the enemy situation, members to develop it and provide it with various forms.~~ It must be made up of people of both sexes and all ages who devote themselves to their assigned construction jobs as well as combat activities. Thus, we can build up a consolidated force capable of encircling and attacking a well-equipped enemy with strength much larger than ours in numbers but whose morale is weak. In this way we can succeed in removing the enemy's oppressive yoke and gaining control of the people. Acquiring this consolidated strength will contribute to stepping up a general campaign with successive attacks. We are forcing the enemy to face a protracted campaign with continuous and complicated problems caused by our people and events.

The enemy's permanent tension will cause several loopholes in his defensive system and we will have opportunities to use our small force to deal deadly blows at him. Hence, with a high combat efficiency, we can ready the people's guerrilla warfare movement for simultaneous, coordinated activities, and enable it to ~~stabilize and~~ *hold the ground* to improve and take the initiative in combat. With a great sense of responsibility, cadre of all villages and hamlets, along with those serving at the province and district levels, must foster the consolidated force. When people refer to the district or province unit (or the people's guerrilla warfare movement), the names of these units must represent to them a consolidated force. *strength*

((Page 16 of J.T.))

With this end in mind, we must master the organization and perfectly carry out the ~~tactical guidelines concerning the three-pronged attacks in the mountainous and lowland areas.~~

Two-step, three-prong policy

application of the strategy... we must not stick to a rigorous form of organization... and development of the guerrilla

Guerrilla warfare's combat efficiency and the enemy's casualties.

It is difficult to ~~make~~ ^{compute} ~~an~~ ^{the} ~~accurate~~ ^{ratio of} computation ~~of~~ the ratio of enemy casualties inflicted by our people's guerrilla war. However, our village, district, and province ~~commanders~~ ^{military commands} must perform their tasks well to deserve being the staff elements of the Party ~~Headquarters~~ ^{Bodies}. Their correct computations provide an accurate assessment of their specific missions and responsibilities, thus keeping the higher echelon abreast of all information pertaining to the movement.

Since the beginning of the spring of 1969, our military ~~units~~ ^{to date} have destroyed 130,000 enemy soldiers, 40,000 of which were ~~guerrillas~~ ^{guerrillas}. The latter figure represents 30% of the total enemy toll. This means percent of the enemy KIA were in the lowlands and 7% were in the mountainous areas. However, the enemy casualties are still too low. Here we ~~do not~~ ^{speak of the} ~~destruction of~~ ^{destruction of} enemy ~~forces~~ ^{in BOL and our facilities}.

During the campaign, every province, district, and village must ~~compute~~ ^{compute} enemy losses inflicted by our ~~main forces and guerrilla forces~~ ^{main forces and guerrilla forces} with details of casualties ~~suffered by his various forces~~ ^{suffered by his various forces}. The ~~computations~~ ^{computations} are to be reported periodically, every month, every quarter, and every semester. ~~Based on these reports, we can~~ ^{Based on these reports, we can} ~~measure~~ ^{measure} the progress of the movement ~~of the total enemy~~ ^{of the total enemy}.

We ~~must~~ ^{must} make the utmost effort to inflict 50 to 60 casualties ~~on the enemy~~ ^{on the enemy} and this will be of great significance.

The enemy's casualties must be in proportion to the progress of the movement. This constitutes the basic requirement of our national struggle which includes arming all of the people. We must highly strengthen the combat efficiency of all local district forces and guerrilla units. Once we succeed in forming a consolidated ~~force~~ ^{force}, our combat efficiency will increase automatically. ~~Moreover,~~ ^{Moreover,} a continuous increase in the efficiency of the aforementioned units will contribute in the formation and development of a consolidated ~~force~~ ^{force} with improved attack capabilities. The aforementioned problems are closely ~~connected~~ ^{interrelated}.

Full confidence in the consolidated ~~force~~ ^{force} and in our growing combat ~~efficiency~~ ^{efficiency} will help us in an accurate comparison of ~~forces~~ ^{forces} and an accurate comparison of forces will strengthen our confidence in forming a consolidated ~~force~~ ^{force} with a high combat efficiency to defeat the US. With such a consolidated ~~force~~ ^{force}, we will break the enemy's oppressive control of the people under all circumstances. In any type of battle, we will dare to make the appropriate ~~decisions~~ ^{decisions} in order to hold the battle ground and to

destruction of

speak of the

of the total enemy

of our forces, etc.

develop our position, thus creating for ourselves more favorable opportunities. These points reveal our responsibilities and capabilities in greatly stepping up the people's guerrilla war in all areas, ^{particularly} in border areas, ^{key} cities, towns and in city-fringe ^{and} populous strategic communication routes, ~~considered as key areas.~~

wells along

I have already dealt with several points pertaining to leadership, which had been recorded in all situation reports reaching here. The conclusion is that through the party's leadership, and the direct leadership of the village Party Committees and hamlet Party Chapters, we succeeded in holding the areas, in consolidating and in leading the people's struggles against the enemy, and thus achieved four victories. In the different reports, I noted the following major subjects: The ~~people's~~ ^{uninterrupted} attacks, ~~the enemy's~~ ^{the fact} ~~encirclement of our forces,~~ the encirclement of the enemy and the conduct of the three-pronged attack; the comparison of forces and acquisition of ^{strength} consolidated ~~strength~~; and the enemy's casualties in relation ^{to} our combat efficiency. These points provide a new basis for leadership. We must study and develop them with our own creative capabilities.

~~Dependent on the~~

GENERAL SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

Through the performance of our struggles, along with our construction tasks which have been carried out so far within the Military Region, and ~~in~~ ^{from the typical} reports from Villages D, E, and F, we select the following subjects.

1. How can we acquire ^{draw} ~~the~~ ^{an operation method, especially those} ~~high combat efficiency~~ ^{combat efficiency} ~~and a high~~ ^{and a high} ~~combat efficiency.~~

a. Methods of operations:

^{War theater comprises} Our battlefield stretches over ~~in~~ ^{three areas} ~~the~~ ^{city, rural, and mountainous areas.} The cities became our new operational areas after our General Offensive and Uprising. ^{and city-fringe} Cities are ~~surrounded~~ ^{linked together} ~~by the enemy's~~ ^{which are linked to the} ~~intermediate~~ ^{border areas.} A large number of people have been forced to relocate in the district towns and their outskirts, as well as along the communication route and in border areas. A large number of enemy troops are stationed in the ~~all~~ ^{mentioned} areas, where they exercise strict control of the people and their defensive system is well consolidated. These areas hold the sensitive or key positions which ~~we~~ ^{we must} ~~yield~~ ^{is reluctant} ~~to us.~~ ^{on the other hand,} ~~However,~~ we are determined to gain control of these areas. Both the rural and intermediate areas will affect the enemy's defensive system. Therefore, we ~~must~~ ^{must} ~~carefully~~ ^{carefully} ~~select~~ ^{select} these areas and clear them of all occupants.

areas

→

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they were spreading out

The population of these areas, which had been relocated, started their struggle to return to their former residential areas. We have supported the population and are determined to frustrate the enemy's schemes to tighten their control of the people; and a type of war of war with fierce fighting between us and the enemy has occurred in these areas.

As a result, some comrades asked the Military Region to determine an operating procedure for these areas. The Military ~~Region's~~ answer is that no ^{general} operating procedure could be established ^{because} ~~due to~~ ~~the~~ specific situations and that our activities must be very flexible in order to cope with such variation.

We must purify the ranks of the people

each area is different for

With regard to this matter, we studied the methods of operation adopted so far by K3, D, C, H, F. Bgan, and AN. Each of these methods of operation bears a different character; however, the single purpose of these villages is to attack the enemy, complying with our guidelines concerning the three-pronged attack in the mountainous and lowland areas. Whenever the determination is to the attacks are continuous, the two-step, three-prong concept is applied with

Therefore, we must acquire a strong revolutionary attitude and devise a large number of methods to force the enemy surrender. Our immediate objective must be to annihilate the wicked administrative personnel, as well as reconnaissance and patrol elements. We can use either our secret or legal methods to destroy them. We must conduct the three-pronged attacks against the enemy in order to improve our position on the battlefield. Then, we must purge the people in order to gain them. From these immediate objectives, we proceed to our decisive victories and establish a solid base for the performance of our subsequent missions. Only our determination to fight the enemy can help us in finding effective ^{operation methods} rather than conducting more futile discussions which lead to nothing. In some areas some of our elements suggested the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the enemy. These suggestions are absolutely dangerous; therefore, we must completely erase such ideas.

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b. Methods of attack:

During the Fourth Guerrilla Warfare Congress, a total of 12 methods of attack had been discussed. We must continue to study them so as to employ them effectively.

Through the General Offensive and Uprising, we have developed and improved additional street fighting methods for use in cities and provincial towns. (This has been the subject of a separate report in a previous meeting).

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of creativeness and flexibility of the people. They will know how to attack the enemy with anything they have and at any time. They will rely mainly on their own efforts, resources, and capabilities to attack the enemy, modifying and using the most of captured weapons such as "bomb launcher" [redacted], 105mm howitzers, chemical ^{WAS 102} ~~agent~~ throwers, and explosive charge launchers.

combined Diversionary attack. This method of attack is to be ~~coordinated~~ with the use of trickery to cause enemy troops to fight ~~against~~ one another, distrust one another, ~~so as to make~~ *to* ~~them~~ damage their own weapons, ammo, and equipment with their own hands and live in constant fear and ~~disaffection~~ ^{UN-BUSINESS}. This is an attack method designed to destroy the enemy's physical and mental strength, as well as his material resources.

In every village and district, it is necessary to have our comrades study ways and means to cause enemy troops to fight ~~against~~ one another. For example the two [village] ^{Village 7} ~~villages~~ in the D [redacted] and the guerrillas in the TK [redacted] with only two grenades and a few rifle shots, succeeded in causing enemy soldiers to shoot at one another, resulting in hundreds of them killed. *This is a good fighting method.*

[villages] The method of destroying the enemy's oppressive control and staying close to the people to win them over to our side. In order to control the people, it is mandatory to kill enemy tyrants and stay close to the people. This is the rule. How do we annihilate the tyrants who are close to the people? Recently in the K and R [redacted] we were able to destroy the enemy and stay close to the people, but the enemy conducted an all-day counterattack with artillery, armored vehicles, and aircraft. The result was that we could not protect the people, because they had to run ~~for cover~~ ^{for cover} to the hills or seek refuge, their houses having been burned down.

On the other hand, fearful of being killed, the tyrants themselves were always on the move, finding hiding places for themselves. Often we attacked empty places, and when we withdrew the enemy returned.

~~((Page 19 of 20))~~

This is a study of the use of offensive and defensive actions in a complex situation involving both friendly and enemy troops, and also a presentation of a method of destroying a special target, which is one of our main missions at the present moment.

Under

So as to be able to smash the enemy control, it is of primary importance to follow enemy activities very closely and watch for opportune moments to hit him at the right time and place. By so doing, we can surely destroy the enemy, even with a small force. If we only consider relying on a strong force in our attack, we will sustain ~~heavy~~ losses without ~~having~~ *making* the guarantee of success. The method of attack most commonly used now is to sneak into enemy areas, pursuing, encircling, selecting targets and following them through to their hideouts in their local areas or in areas where they are in self-imposed exile, ~~where they seek refuge and~~ *where they seek refuge and* such as (strong points, district seats, province capitals) and then mow them down.

Consequently, we must ~~understand~~ *motivate* the people ~~fully and fully grasp~~ the three-pronged attack ~~concept~~ *concept* must also closely coordinate the forces inside ~~with those outside.~~

Concerning large ~~resettlement areas,~~ *resettlement areas,* we must either infiltrate our forces into these areas or encircle them, and conduct raids and ambushes to destroy the members of the ~~enemy stronghold.~~ *enemy stronghold.* After the attack, we only need to leave behind a few liaison cells to coordinate ~~with the action unit~~ *with the action unit* for motivating the people, developing ~~and providing~~ *and providing* backing for the people to rise up, to mow down and repress the surviving tyrants, while the main element of our attacking force moves away to attack another place or intercept the enemy's counterattacking ~~force.~~ *force.* This is also an attack concept according to which the attack must be "neatly" ~~conducted;~~ *conducted;* the attacking force must strike to stay close to the enemy and hold the ground but not lay waste to everything in its path. Usually we succeed in solving only part of the whole problem. Consequently, the results obtained in the field of gaining and holding the people were very limited. Some significant achievements in this sphere were nevertheless noted in Binh Ky, Cao Lanh, Binh Trung, and An Ninh "Cells" ~~which need developing but deserve to~~ *develop, study* ~~serve as examples for the other areas to study and follow.~~ *and fully exploit.*

c. Although ours is a small force, it is a quality force with high combat efficiency.

This is a new factor in our army which has ~~turned up~~ *turned up* a number of ~~previous established concepts.~~ For a year now, our cadre, soldiers, and the people have experimented with this concept on the battlefields with very good results,

yet in this conference hall our comrades of district ~~units~~ ^{military commands} do not understand it. And if they don't, how can they lead and develop the people's guerrilla war?

Understanding the above factor is necessary for a correct implementation of the Party's combat leadership concept. I beg to repeat:

By high "combat efficiency" I mean killing many enemy troops while sustaining few losses in life and ammunition, ~~having the battlefield situation well in hand~~; capturing weapons and prisoners quickly; creating conditions to attack the enemy continuously; becoming ever stronger in attacks; and gaining and holding the people. The battle of Lo Dat, in which a mere 15 comrades of ours succeeded in killing 515 US troops while suffering no casualties was a great ~~example~~ ^{battle with a} for us with a kill ratio of zero to 515 in our favor.) The kill ratio reported in an attack by guerrillas and local force units against a US "P" ~~unit~~ was one to 180 in our favor. The ~~diversionary~~ ^{tricky} attack by two mothers of ~~the~~ "D" and "T" reportedly had a kill ratio of zero to 185 in our favor. The attack by an old man in Village C against NIT ~~unit~~ had a kill ratio of zero to eight, and the attack by a teenager in Village D ~~had~~ a kill ratio of zero to seven. ^{were battles with high combat efficiency} ~~The above-mentioned combat actions are examples of high combat efficiency.~~ Because of the light losses, our armed forces and the people's organizations have a greater capability of conducting sustained attacks with ~~while~~ our cadre, soldiers, and the people become more experienced and mature. So the more they fight, the stronger they will become, and the greater will be their ability in using a small, elite force to beat a larger enemy force with high losses inflicted on the latter while our troops suffer light casualties. By a "great ^{great} victory," I do not mean one ~~won~~ ^{won} by a large force of ours in a big fight against a large enemy force with heavy losses ~~caused to the latter.~~ ^{the aim to destroy} I rather mean one in which ~~we can successfully send a small force against a larger one, because such victories reflect credit on our commanding cadre in their leadership role and on our soldiers in combat.~~ ^{we have good leadership and a high combat efficiency.}

The figures mentioned above are not significant in themselves but rather in the fact that they symbolize the high ideological awareness, the firm political stand, and the high sense of responsibility of our cadre and soldiers toward the people, the Party, the classes, and the nation. When speaking about the military art, we merely talk about the "outward appearance" ~~of the military art.~~ But it is the sense of duty behind that outward appearance that really counts. With the armed force given us by the Party and people we must

They are significant

devote all our efforts to studying the enemy, thinking of the most effective way to attack him, and drafting a good combat organization and leadership plan so as to be able to achieve the highest results for the Party, ^{the class} and people. We must make careful calculations and guard against ~~disposing of the lives of our comrades-in-arms and the people of our village~~ ^{acting according to our} whim in matters involving the lives of our comrades, companions and

In raising combat efficiency, the most urgent task is to perfect the local armed forces' and the people's combat techniques. To this end, we must satisfactorily ~~satisfy~~ ^{meet} the ~~five~~ following requirements.

- We must have the spirit of attacking the enemy continuously and thoroughly understand the three-pronged attack ~~concept~~

- We must thoroughly ^{master} ~~understand~~ and implement the combat leadership concept in a creative manner.

- We must strive to improve our combat tactics and techniques wherever and whenever possible.

^{follow} ~~develop~~ the ~~movement~~ ^{and control} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~attacks~~ ^{timely and}

- We must have the enemy situation well in hand, ^{closely} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~organize~~ ^{organize} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~attacks~~ ^{the}

- We must constantly strive to consolidate the various people's organizations and armed organizations, have full control over our forces; manufacture our own equipment; and assign personnel to take charge of targets and specific areas, while watching for opportunities to attack the enemy.

Efforts must be made to reach this criteria: Five to nine guerrillas must be able to destroy a whole enemy ~~[Platoon]~~ ^[Platoon] ~~outside its defensive position~~ ^{outside its defensive position}. This kill ~~criteria~~ ^{ratio} may be lower if the enemy is entrenched in his fortifications

The kill ratio in each combat action ~~must~~ averages one to 20 in our favor for district local forces and one to 30 for guerrillas. In previous years, the kill ratio was one guerrilla for three to five enemy killed. (At present, the kill ratio is one to three in Gia Lai; one to 12 in Kontum; and one to 1, 2 ~~in the hills~~ ^{in the hills}).

Daklak → one to 27 in Kontum

Particular attention must be paid to constantly raising the number of enemy killed by guerrillas in each combat action. Between 50 to 60 percent of the total number of enemy killed (must be accounted for by guerrillas) in each campaign and in each year, in the province and district.

While making positive efforts to raise the kill ratio, we must also strive to thoroughly understand the strategic position, role, and mission of the people's guerrilla war.

I ~~beg~~ ~~our comrades~~ here to conduct further discussions and studies and ~~sign the "contract"~~ before leaving, *let's sign the pledge together.*

In summary, in order to have good operating procedures, it is necessary for us to be aggressive in attacking the enemy, have a ~~strong~~ ^{absolute} revolutionary spirit, a high determination to destroy the enemy, and a complete knowledge of the ~~three-pronged attack concept~~ ^{two-step}. Based on these factors we will motivate the people to apply existing attack methods with resourcefulness and boldly create ~~new ones~~ ^{new ones} so as to be able to bring the kill ratio of the people's guerrilla war to a higher level to be commensurate with its strategic position and role. To attain this goal, we must understand that raising "combat efficiency" is a revolutionary requirement, and in order to satisfy that requirement, we must always strive to improve our armed forces to bring them to perfection.

2. Make positive and bold efforts to develop our forces in line with the class concept, political standard, and ~~the~~ objective, with special emphasis placed on recruiting teenagers and women at the hamlet level, and stress on the observance of the principle of secrecy.

you last [from 10-14 years old - Editor] [From 14-20 - Edu] ((Page 21 of 22))

3. So as to be able to conduct continuous attacks to kill the enemy, disrupt his control system, gain and hold the people, it is necessary for us to make real efforts to develop our forces in a way that follows the class concept and political standard. Village K, C, and D are model examples of successes. In this field. In these villages, you have centered your ~~efforts~~ ^{on} the poor people who are alienated from the enemy, who suffer at the hands of the enemy, and who do not have political relations with the enemy. Thanks to ~~that~~ ^{their} ~~correct~~ ^{correct} choices of yours, ~~the~~ ^{they} stood firm "upright" and developed despite the fierce situation.

stood firm "upright" and developed despite the fierce situation. ~~the~~ ^{they} stood ~~firm~~ ^{on} ~~their~~ ^{their} ~~own~~ ^{own} ~~feet~~ ^{feet}

On the other hand, the ^{case} [redacted] of a man named Loc in Village B is a heart-breaking example. A great many of our comrades and people have been killed, and the [redacted] movement has met with difficulties and fallen off to an unusually low level, just because we ~~selected~~ ^{failed to stick to the} wrong ~~person~~. This is an important problem for which we have issued many directives and resolutions. You are asked to implement them correctly. They are connected with the question of gaining and holding revolutionary government power, protecting the Party, and developing the [redacted] movement at the fundamental level. We are not to act as we please. [redacted]

b. Concerning the development of forces, there are many types of people to recruit but we must center our efforts ^{on youths,} around the teenagers of both sexes and the women. We must pattern our recruitment on the [redacted] force of D and K [redacted] which is composed of hundreds of teenagers with the women accounting for half of ^{the} total strength. In these areas our guerrilla force conducted successful attacks ^{and struggles} against the enemy, thus making ^{to} this contribution significantly to the ~~quick~~ development of the movement. A number of ^{comrades} ~~us~~ failed to realize the importance of the role of teenagers [redacted], and as a result did not pay due attention to developing the teenager force to attack the enemy. They did not see that teenagers have more favorable conditions to attack the enemy [redacted]. Uncle [redacted] [48'] has taught us the lesson [redacted]

[redacted] and before his death he wrote in his testament that: "We must take care of, bring up, and educate our ^{youths and} ~~young people~~ ^{with which} ~~to pass on~~ a new generation to pursue our revolutionary task."

Taking care of the young shoots

~~Leading to the oppression~~ of the nation and the revolution is an extremely important mission. This is an ideological concept, a responsibility which we must acknowledge. Living under a tyrannical rule with their chances of education shattered, and having nurtured a deep hatred of the enemy, and with their hearts filled with an ever present enthusiasm, our young boys and girls are ready to stand up to ~~rush forward~~ ^{accomplish} ~~big~~ ^{big}. ~~Though small in physical stature,~~ they can do a great deal of work. So we have the responsibility to organize them ~~into groups~~, educate them, and indoctrinate them on revolutionary ideology and the class concept ^{right now}. Considering the present fierce situation which is packed with heartbreaking events, we must regiment our children, gradually guide them in the conduct of their first [redacted] activities, and based on the results obtained continue to educate them, train them, and orient ~~to~~ them toward the future of the Revolution, with a view ^{to} transforming them into talented men and outstanding Communists, determined to carry on the work of their leaders and fathers.

As experience shows, ^{youths and} teenagers, of both sexes, have better conditions for attacking the enemy. But when training them, we must ~~think of giving~~ them a good ideological indoctrination ~~to generate in them the necessary motivation to attack the enemy with increasing energy and determination now and to become~~ ~~of the Revolution in their local areas and the nation in the future.~~ → In this way

The question of women:

^{care} ~~Great~~ must be taken ^{properly recruit} to develop and train women. ~~In a proper manner.~~ A number of areas have trained some women, but only for use ~~in~~ petty work. Other areas do not have any trained women at all, despite repeated insistence on our part. We must frankly admit that this shortcoming stems from the fact that a number of our ^{comrades} still entertain capitalistic and feudalistic ideas or still look down upon the feminine sex, not considering females as capable of assuming important responsibilities.

In his lifetime, Uncle ^[Hô] always fought for the equality of rights between man and women, because this is a part of the people's concept, the ^(class) proletarian concept.

Vietnamese women maintain a bitter hatred of the enemy. They have a strong revolutionary spirit. Thus how can we say that we do not have any basis for motivating them? Can we believe Comrade "P" who said that the women in area "Y" are not responsive to motivation? Nothing can be further from the truth than that allegation. ^{Strong} on all battlefields, and particularly since the spring of 1968, women have shown great skill in attacking the enemy. Some of them have displayed outstanding leadership and command ability. Here in this conference, who among us has not heard our female comrades present their ~~achievement~~ achievement reports?

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^{You} ~~ask you~~, comrades, ^{must} ~~to~~ look at this problem from the proper angle and conduct critiques and self-critiques within the Party ranks on the good and bad points, so as to get rid of all non-proletarian ideas in the future, concerning the development of the women's force. You should make positive efforts in developing this force and take

improvised ~~_____~~, and on ~~_____~~ and strategy ~~_____~~

In order to defeat the enemy, our force must include ~~_____~~ of all the people. But this ~~_____~~ force must be well-organized, highly trained, and thoroughly indoctrinated, ideologically and politically, and assigned proper missions. Ideological and political training must ~~_____~~ *serve as a base for other types of* ~~_____~~ *take precedence for success* ~~_____~~ *or our* ~~_____~~ *winning power,* ~~_____~~ *the government and* ~~_____~~ *the* ~~_____~~ *basic* ~~_____~~ *level*

3. Exercise leadership in an overall and constant manner with stress on the main objective and immediate action ~~_____~~ *sudden developments* Take the initiative to set model examples, discover ~~_____~~ *timely draw experience* model examples ~~_____~~ *from these model exam* ~~_____~~ *step up and spread* ~~_____~~ *to stimulate our entire organization* ~~_____~~ *examples into widespread achievements.* ~~_____~~ *in order to turn mode*

The following are closely interrelated ~~_____~~ inseparable points to be observed by leadership in the implementation of the ~~_____~~ *policy:*

a. It is necessary to see the relationship between the main ~~_____~~ objectives and the overall ~~_____~~ missions. In the present moment, province ~~_____~~ *units, districts* ~~_____~~ *units, and village units have to* ~~_____~~ *military commands* ~~_____~~ *must* exercise overall leadership over the ~~_____~~ ~~_____~~ movement in their local areas. The main objective is to destroy the enemy's control in order to gain the people and power. If this can be done, we can develop the movement. Leadership must concentrate its efforts on this main objective. ~~_____~~ *around which the other* ~~_____~~ *objectives will center.* ~~_____~~ *the whole was the star,* ~~_____~~ *emphasis must* ~~_____~~ *be placed on the most difficult, most important, and most* ~~_____~~ *critical phase, and efforts must be concentrated on* ~~_____~~ *driving units in charge of the overall success* ~~_____~~ *of their area.*

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use model examples [of success] to stimulate our entire campaign

b. We must ~~make substantial efforts in intensifying guerrilla warfare throughout the country. To gain experience in leadership, we must follow the model examples already set by other units and other areas in each of the steps toward. We must exercise control over our activities, and practice them until we can perform them automatically.~~ This is a very dialectical method of operation which is, however, so simple that even Village C has successfully applied it in the course of countering an attack launched by the enemy against Hamlet 2. [redacted]. However, the same method has not been applied in other areas. In some cases, our cadre have fallen into "naturalism" [redacted]

[redacted]: they are not determined; they do not make decisions or plans in advance; instead they believe that, under the leadership of the Party ^{at the base level} successes will occur naturally and because of the people's vitality and creative power. When a model example is discovered by a leader, he fails to build it up and continuously exploit it. Sometimes, lessons learned have not been publicized in time or studied carefully, and as a result, there have been very few ^{model} successes, and the models themselves, in some instances, seem to be depreciated. We must also admit that we have fallen into "naturalism" in another way, in that we have not taken full responsibility for the people's efforts. In this connection, we must motivate all village Party Committees, Chapter Party Committees, and all hamlet and village ^{military commands} ~~units~~ to assume their own responsibility for their tasks and act upon their own initiative in fighting the enemy. In addition, all ^{comrades at} district and province ~~levels~~ must understand their roles, missions, and political responsibilities.

At present, [redacted] each province and district has attained a different degree of development. We must expand it promptly so that 75 percent of the ^{villages} in the entire Military Region will be like D, H, G, and A, and there will be no more weak villages. If we succeed in doing this, great changes will occur.

c. Various provinces and districts made the common mistake of placing too much emphasis upon cities, towns, and city-bordering areas and neglected the rural areas. When concentrating upon lowland areas, they disregarded the mountain areas. ^{when} ~~they~~ focusing ~~them~~ on a concerted ~~effort~~ ^{of stepped up} activities, they neglected to maintain the continuity of their activities. This neglect will certainly result in the slow development of the [redacted] movement in every province, district, and village. We should understand that ~~the specific guidelines for~~ the people's guerrilla war is to launch ^{the} three-pronged ~~attacks~~ against the enemy in all three areas. This leadership must be ^{all encompassing}. Depending on the circumstances, we must concentrate our efforts upon intensifying the movement in key and weak areas. At the same time, we must maintain our leadership over other areas to prevent the local movement from being weakened.

Chapter

phase

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levels

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firm hold on sudden developments.

d. Another problem concerns exercising leadership in a *constant* permanent manner with ~~stress on immediate action~~. For example, in Ba Lang An, Binh Dong, Eastern Thanh Binh, and Eastern Duy Xuyen, we must ~~analyze~~ *know* the enemy's schemes and ~~assess~~ our situation accurately in order to take proper countermeasures. As soon as the enemy attempts to implement his schemes, we must take immediate actions to counter him. If he attempts to overwhelm us, we must overwhelm him whenever possible. If the enemy fiercely attacks us, we must fiercely attack him. We should then strengthen leadership ~~in the face of sudden developments~~ *concern to fail to* under no circumstances should we assess the situation ~~only once~~ *five or seven* weeks, as we did in the past. In one instance, we learned about the enemy throwing thousands of our people into the sea ~~several days~~ *and constant* after the incident occurred. This was *our comparative bitter experience.*

The best method of guiding the ~~movement~~ *and constant* is to exercise leadership in a permanent and overall manner, with *stress on the* emphasis on immediate and central missions. We have acquired much useful experience through ~~our~~ *military commands* successes and shortcomings. Various provinces, ~~district units,~~ *and* even village ~~units~~ *should* learn from these experiences.

1. Increase vigilance, absolutely guard secrets, preserve and strengthen our forces, and make sure that no bad element exists in the Party, in the armed forces, or among cadre.

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e. The nearer we come to achieving ~~victory,~~ *victory* the more the enemy resorts to ~~elaborate~~ *elaborate* schemes and tricks, attempting to harm us both at the present time and in the future. Experience shows this is inevitable. The present phase is the most important one in the class struggle. Thus, we must not be negligent.

taking place The case illustrated by Loc ~~did not take place only in~~ *was not the only one* Binh Trung. All provinces have made the mistake of revealing ~~leaking~~ *leaking* secrets, which in some cases, has resulted in heavy losses and limited our success. For example, in Quang Ngai Province, the enemy had full knowledge of our ~~plan~~ *plan* five days prior to the start of the 1969 Spring Campaign. In the ~~Fall Campaign,~~ *Fall Campaign,* a ~~cadre~~ *cadre* in Binh Son District ~~gave complete~~ *gave complete* information regarding the attack by Unit X against Binh Lien, including the date and hour ~~of movement of various~~ *of movement of various* ~~forces etc.~~ *forces etc.* This error was partly due to the local organization of activities and prescribed regulations. However, ~~the~~ *the* ~~incident was mainly~~ *incident was mainly* due to the lack of vigilance, poor ~~knowledge~~ *knowledge* of the class struggle, and a poor sense of responsibility to the Party and the people. In regard to this problem, we should learn from Village D, ~~the~~ *the* organization, ~~and~~ *and* coordination ~~of~~ *of* ~~struggles and combat activities, that are~~ *struggles and combat activities, that are* ~~required~~ *required*.

tasks,

b. We must be determined to ^{urgently} ~~quickly~~ eliminate the ^{leaking} ~~revealing~~ of secrets, negligence, and the lack of vigilance. The ^{standing} ~~Current Affairs~~ Committee of the Military Region Party Committee has issued many directives ^{relating} ~~relating~~ to this problem. All comrades should study these directives and ensure that all armed forces personnel study them. These problems should be discussed among the armed forces personnel and specific measures should be proposed to eliminate them. Every month, each Party Committee ^{member} ~~member~~, ^{each} ~~each~~ local unit member, each Party member, ^{every} ~~every~~ soldier, and ^{each} ~~each~~ the people must attend at least one caucus discussing the matter

5. Political and ^{within} ~~political~~ tasks ^{among} ~~must~~ be continuously and completely implemented ^{by} the Party and ^{among} ~~the~~ people. We must fully understand the concept of attack, strengthen the people's will to fight, and be determined to eliminate rightist attitudes and ^{fallacious} ~~fallacious~~ arguments, in order to strongly develop the people's guerrilla warfare movement and successfully carry out our strategic missions.

Concerning this matter, the Political Department will make a special report. I will only discuss a few main problems.

Through different reports and the assessment of the battlefield situation, generally speaking, the people, Party ^{Body} ~~headquarters~~, and armed forces have shown high determination, ^{and} ~~and~~ ^{strong} ~~strong~~ positions, active, and experienced many sacrifices and hardships. A number of villages have displayed their high spirit in fighting the enemy independently and attacking his ^{weak} ~~weak~~ fiercely. However, in ^{some} ~~some~~ villages it has been noted that rightist and negative ^{phenomena} ~~outlooks~~ still exist.

^{These} ~~This~~ error ^{phenomena} ~~error~~ has been noted through the following points and arguments: ^{A. Doctrine of the characteristics: combat activities should} ~~A. Doctrine of the characteristics: combat activities should~~ ^{from the reality of life and be easy to carry out in a creative} ~~from the reality of life and be easy to carry out in a creative~~. However, we are wrong if we cling to the above doctrine and if we do not do the work that other areas have been able to do and instead point to the difficulties, the fierceness of war, and the hardships and sacrifices. We are also wrong if we argue that we cannot do the work because of the characteristics of our local areas, the characteristics of the enemy and terrain, the poor combat ability of the people, and the poor conditions of their weapons. By clinging to such a doctrine we become content to avoid fighting the enemy and to seeing the movement driven backward.

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Our dominant ^{characteristics} ~~characteristics~~ are that we are extremely heroic, self-reliant, self-governing, and creative. We dare to fight against the US and defeat it. We can accomplish any mission and defeat any enemy (to include the US imperialists). This is the ^{reality} ~~disposition~~ ^{which} ~~which~~ must be displayed by each ^{locality} ~~locality~~ and unit ^{reflected} ~~reflected~~ by every citizen, every locality, every unit.

average.

"Doctrine of the ~~Mean~~." This ~~argue~~ is rather widespread. It is unfortunate that some comrades, as well as some ~~areas~~, advocate this attitude. It is essential to severely criticize those who adhere to this doctrine and to make them overcome it. This type of error cannot be detected immediately. It is not true that the comrades or the localities making this error do not operate, implement missions, or engage in fighting ~~enthusiastically~~. They do fight and struggle, but only ~~for~~ *in a measure* ~~of~~ *of* fighting. ~~However~~. It is important to realize that, in ~~the course of~~ the revolutionary struggle if we are not determined to progress, or if we come to a stop, then we are really ~~going~~ *about to go* backwards or we have already slipped backwards. We have no other course, except to resolutely abandon this attitude and move ahead, launching repeated attacks and gaining increasingly greater victories.

c. Subjectivism and self-satisfaction in achievements made before the mission is completed. A number of villages and units have overcome many difficulties to attain very great achievements. But after the situation stabilized, they accomplished nothing. After internal critique sessions, it was revealed that the reason for failure was due to subjectivism and self-satisfaction. How disastrous this error is!

They stopped short of conquering the

Some other villages, BK, CH, and AN ~~areas~~, for example, had resolutely obtained and actively maintained control over ~~some~~ *a number* of their hamlets. However, ~~in~~ *the few* remaining hamlets ~~they~~ *instead* started to build defensive perimeters, ~~but they then unfinished~~. In this case, self-satisfaction and the tendency to ~~defend and~~ *defend and* shrink back to ~~from duty were noted.~~

defense

localities and

In addition, some ~~local~~ units in the ~~areas~~ fierce situation have not fought well, have failed to gain control over the people, and have been ineffective in combat. Yet, they were unwilling to admit their shortcomings. They felt self-satisfied in reasoning that they have done rather well in making many ~~achievements~~ during the fierce phase of the struggle between the enemy and themselves. They even challenged other units and localities to attain the achievements that they had. This error can be eliminated by regularly criticizing the people in villages, districts, provinces and members of the district ~~civil affairs~~ *operations* committee, district Party Committees, and province Party Committees who adhere to this attitude. The appearance of subjectivism and self-complacency in any area marks the first backward step of the movement there. It is necessary to be alert to quickly detect this error, especially after many achievements have been made. We should severely criticize persons who are at fault here and point out correct and incorrect attitudes. Only in this way can we gradually develop the movement of our units.

d. In the field of tactics and ~~during~~ combat, the tendency to ~~merely defend~~, the overreliance on ~~weapons~~ weapons, and the tendency to demand modern weapons were noted.

principal and manifestations
Above are the ~~main~~ *principal* widespread ~~signs~~ *manifestations* of the rightist and negative ~~attitude~~ *attitude*. It is now necessary to concentrate efforts upon eliminating this mistake. Political and biological tasks must be successfully carried out, and constant attention be paid to correcting erroneous thoughts. ~~Comrades~~ *Comrades* in C and D have acquired good experience in this field and we should learn from them. By fostering a high revolutionary spirit, correcting their concept of attack, and strengthening their determination and will to fight, these comrades succeeded in eliminating their error. In addition, they did not just talk, but they sought measures to overcome their shortcomings.

V. OUTLINE OF THE GENERAL SITUATION AND MISSIONS FOR THE FUTURE

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a. Enemy situation

The enemy's increasingly heavier military, political, economic, and diplomatic setbacks compelled him to de-escalate the war and withdraw 25,000 troops. In the future, the enemy will send home 35,000 more troops. This number is of no significance. Of importance is the fact that politically the enemy himself has acknowledged his losing position and has had to de-escalate the war. However, since he ~~still~~ *still* possesses large military forces and war potential, he remains ~~intelligent~~ *intelligent* and resorts to many ~~wicked~~ *wicked* schemes. ~~In~~ *Through* the de-Americanization of the war, he de-escalates step-by-step, attempting to bring it to an advantageous end. He has strengthened his defense of cities and surrounding areas, proceeded with his accelerated pacification program, swept, searched, ~~and~~ *and* destroyed our stepping-stone areas, ~~and collected~~ *and collected* and relocated the people from those areas. He has increased his attacks against the areas adjacent to his controlled areas, trying to foil our offensives, sabotage our corridors, cause disorder to our rear, and cut off our economy. He will also intensify his psychological warfare and espionage activities, and increase and make full use of his weapons and technical devices. Nevertheless, the enemy is carrying out his schemes from a strategically defensive position. He has sustained repeated defeats and his troops have been seriously demoralized. In one instance, a US company of the Americal Division on 22 Aug 69 staged an antiwar protest ~~in a battle in Que Son~~. Black US soldiers in Sep 69 invited white US soldiers in Đà Nẵng ~~to protest~~ *to protest*. More ~~brutal~~ *brutal* schemes and tricks will be utilized by the enemy. But he is losing and is suffering more defeats with each day.

delicate

→ right on the battle field of

b. Future mission

phase of

At present, we are engaged in the General Offensive and Uprising. We thus need to make even greater efforts.

urgently

Brother Nam made a careful analysis of this matter. I just want to stress that we must strive to intensify the three-pronged attack, strengthen the three ~~fronts~~ ^{lines of attack}, apply various tactics in a skillful and resourceful manner, train well various armed forces, and raise our combat effectiveness to the highest degree. We must immediately win great victories to provide conditions for the achievement of the decisive victory. To this end, the people's guerrilla war, playing a very important role, must greatly exceed what it has achieved since the spring 1968. In this Congress, after discussion, if we are satisfied with the achievements we have made for ^{more than} one and a half years now, we will be unable to meet the aspirations of the people and the requirements of the Party. As soon as we return to our local areas, we should be highly determined to take specific and proper measures to satisfactorily fulfill our duties as cadre of local agencies and military units, and to assist our province Party Committee, district party Committees, and village guerrillas to bring the people's guerrilla war to a stronger position in the shortest possible time. We must be determined to fight, we must give up all illusions about peace, and we must be determined to fight to the last against the imperialists and their henchmen. Prior to his death, Uncle ~~_____~~ advised us: "The anti-US resistance may take the lives of many more men and cause the destruction of much more property, but our victory is certain." This is the natural result and we must do our best to achieve it.

It is obvious that the US is losing the war and that we are winning the war.

~~losing the war? Yes, the US has already lost the war. Winning the war? Yes, we have already won the war. But how badly should we defeat the US? Like two teams on a football field, we must defeat it with the highest score possible: 9/1, for example. Defeating the US with such a score will bring a stable peace, expedite the achievement of democracy, and speed up the improvement of our people's welfare. We can then quickly reunify our country and complete the national and democratic Revolution in the South, and lead it to socialism. For the said reasons, we must fight to the last.~~

----- END OF TRANSLATION -----

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Report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured on 31 March 1970, and concerns a draft of a speech to be delivered by the Commanding General of Military Region 5 at the Fifth Guerrilla Warfare Conference held by Military Region 5. The speech contains five main parts as follows: (1) New factors that have developed in the people's guerrilla war in Military Region 5; (2) the two conditions that are the key to victory; (3) concerns concerning leadership; (4) guerrilla tactics and methods; and (5) objectives of future missions of guerrilla forces.

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Following is a summary of information contained in this document. This document was captured on 31 March 1970 in South Vietnam (AT970620; I CTZ) by 1st USMC Div, FMF. The document was received at CDEC on 7 April 1970, and was