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15. SUMMARY:
 (C) This report contains information obtained from enemy documents and concerns two notebooks, with entries dated 1969 and 1970. The notebooks were maintained by an unidentified member of the Security Section, An Xuan Village ((Party Committee, Tuy An District Party Committee, VC Phu Yen Province, Southern Sub-Region, VC Region 5)). The notebook entries pertain to activities of the An Xuan Village Security Section during 1969 and 1970 including production, security maintenance, recruitment, and proselyting activities.

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----- FULL TRANSLATION -----

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1970

NOTEBOOK RECORDING REPORTS ON ACHIEVEMENTS
GAINED BY THE SECURITY SECTION OF
AN XUAN VILLAGE IN 1969-70

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REPORT ON ACHIEVEMENTS GAINED
FROM 1 JAN TO 30 MAR 69.

I. ENEMY SITUATION AND ACTIVITIES:

1. Enemy situation and activities in the first three months of 1969:

The enemy conducted one sweep operation. No personnel or materiel losses were reported.

Enemy activities in Feb 69: The enemy disseminated two types of propaganda leaflets. In the first he urged our troops to desert to his side. In the second he promised monetary rewards for those who would capture friendly cadre.

The enemy was unsuccessful in his psychological warfare activities and was unable to plant his personnel in friendly ranks.

Political situation: All people ((in villages and hamlets)) courageously participated in building combat villages, digging spike pits, planting booby traps, and enforcing regulations concerning security maintenance against enemy espionage activities.

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REPORT ON ACHIEVEMENTS GAINED BY THE SECURITY SECTION OF X6 ((POSSIBLY AN XUAN VILLAGE)) FROM 1 ((JAN)) TO 30 ((MAR)) 69.

I. ENEMY SITUATION AND ACTIVITIES:

1. Enemy situation and activities from 1 Jan to 30 Mar 69:

The enemy conducted one sweep operation. No personnel or material losses were reported.

During the first ((three)) months of the year, the enemy used "Morane" ((observation)) aircraft to detect friendly bases. He bombarded and shelled our village in order to destroy our farm production. His aircraft conducted one bombing mission but caused us no casualties. Enemy troops on ships used loud speakers and spread leaflets calling for our surrender and promising monetary rewards for those who would capture friendly cadre. Nevertheless, nobody responded to their appeals.

The enemy failed to plant his personnel in our hamlets.

II. POLITICAL SITUATION:

The whole population ((in the village)) continuously participated in struggles and uprisings ((against the enemy)), meetings, critique and self-critique sessions, farm production activities, labor activities, defense and security maintenance, construction of combat villages, and guerrilla warfare.

The people also took part in activities against the enemy's psychological warfare and his planting of personnel in our hamlets.

During these three months, four meetings were held, which were attended by 425 people.

III. REGARDING THE SECURITY MAINTENANCE, 90% OF THE VILLAGE POPULATION STUDIED SECURITY REGULATIONS.

Economic situation in the village: Seventy percent of the population had sufficient food to eat, whereas 30% had been in want of food.

Farm production and husbandry activities: The people planted 46,550 manioc plants, 95,893 potato plants, 83,250 taro plants; produced 150 gia ((one gia equals 30 kilograms)) of rice; and bred 10 pigs.

The village planted 92,005 spikes and 65 grenades and mines improvised from M-79 rounds; blocked 10 roads; and dug 125 spike pits.

((The village security section)) judged one case of robbery: Bui Hai was accused of stealing 10 kilograms of rice from Ngô Thi Co. He pleaded guilty when brought to trial and was sentenced to return the same quantity of rice to the owner.

The section arrested Nguyen Thi Day as an enemy agent in Xuân Phước. She was investigated, then sent to the District ((Security Section)). Here she was put to death.

The section also tried a case involving the following unlawful love affair: Ngô Xu was accused of having an illegal love affair with Phan Thi Tam until the latter became pregnant. At the trial, Ngô Xu was sentenced to

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provide support for Phan Thi Tam for three months. In addition he was to provide her with three ampules of penicillin.

The baby should be supported ((by Ngô Xu)) for one month.

Security ((section)) personnel were regularly assigned "front line" tasks and they succeeded in carrying out their tasks in each phase.

15 Mar 69.

((Security personnel also accomplished the following:))

They sent 27 letters to proselyte enemy personnel ((in villages)); grew 144 gia of rice, 11,790 manioc plants, and 10,165 banana plants; conducted seven meetings with 315 participants; and raised five pigs, seven sows, and five suckling pigs.

They wrote and displayed 25 banners along the road and grew 755 meters of potato vines, 3,000 tobacco plants, and 2.30 kilograms of black beans.

This was a recapitulative report on achievements gained by the Security Section of X6 during the past three months from ((incomplete sentence)).

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REPORT ON ((THE SITUATION)) DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS OF 1969.

I. ENEMY SITUATION:

Following their defeat in the General Offensive and Uprising phase in the political, military, and diplomatic fields, the US imperialists and their henchmen wanted to save the situation by using the following new and cunning schemes:

They devised the accelerated pacification program, relocated the people and encroached upon their land to gain control of the population.

The election of the Puppet village council was a demagogic trick to prepare for the future political solution to end the war in our country.

Espionage activities: Spies were planted in our area to collect information on the situation of the Revolution. The case of Nguyễn Thị Dãy in Area 2 was typical. At the same time, the enemy used the wives of cadre who were residing in our controlled areas to persuade them to work as agents to collect information on our situation.

Since the beginning of the year, three sweep operations were conducted against the village by South Korean troops, and another by GVN Special Forces stationed in ((the village)) church area. Each operation lasted from three to seven days. The purpose of these operations was to encroach upon areas bordering cities and search for the agencies of revolutionary forces operating in local areas, as in Areas 1, 4, and 5. In addition, the enemy launched air and artillery strikes against the village every day, causing many difficulties for our movements and production activities.

At present as well as in the future, the enemy plans to relocate the people and plant underground espionage agents among the people. At the same time, he will intensify military activities to prepare for a political solution.

II. POLITICAL SITUATION:

Presently the village has 111 inhabitants. All of them have participated in organizations or groups and have a revolutionary spirit. They were determined to overcome hardships and difficulties to defeat the enemy's schemes and to remain on their native land and participate in the struggle against the US aggressors.

Indoctrination and the ideological campaign were successfully carried out among the people.

Therefore, they were able to distinguish friendly forces from the enemy. They were also successful in the performance of other tasks, such as the civilian labor task and farm production.

R E P O R T

The enemy launched three sweep operations; One in Area 1, one in Area 2, and one in Area 4. Enemy losses: Eighteen KIA and 31 WIA.

Friendly casualties: Six KIA.

A bag containing 70 kilograms of rice was burnt. Enemy aircraft launched nine raids on trails and our production workshops.

The following cases of theft were judged:

Three cases of rice theft in Area 1.

Two cases of rice theft in Area 2.

One case of rice theft in Area 5.

Review of the study conducted on ((security maintenance)) regulations:

In Area 1, four sessions were conducted with 20 participants in each session.

$$((20 \times 4 =)) 80$$

In Area 2, five sessions were conducted with 35 participants in each session.

$$((35 \times 5 =)) 155 ((sic))$$

In Area 4, four sessions were conducted with 10 participants in each session.

$$((10 \times 4 =)) 40$$

In Area 5, five sessions were conducted with eight participants in each session.

$$((5 \times 8 =)) \underline{40}$$

Total participants 315 ((sic))

The number of people who returned ((to the village)) areas:

Area 1: 4 persons

Area 2: 29 persons

Area 4: 1 person

Area 5: 1 person

Total : 35 persons.

((Marginal note))

In the "forward area", the DKB ((possibly 122mm rocket launcher)) element killed four enemy soldiers. ((End of marginal note))

There were two security personnel in XP ((possibly Xuan Phuoc)).

Security affairs: One major case remains to be settled in Area 2, and another in Area 4.

ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION BETWEEN OUR CONTROLLED AND ENEMY CONTROLLED AREAS AS OF 4 DEC 69.

165 ((sic)).

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RECAPITULATIVE REPORT ON THE SITUATION AT THE END OF 1969.

PART 1.

A. Enemy situation:

1. Last year, the enemy launched four sweep operations in ((An Xuan)) Village, including a raid against Area 1 conducted by ((GVN)) Special Forces stationed in the church area at 1300 hours on 21 Jan 69. Approximate troop strength was two platoons. Three other sweep operations were conducted by South Korean troops.

On 23 Mar 69, enemy troops landed in Son Long to launch a sweep operation in Area 1. About two companies engaged our defensive forces. The enemy suffered nine KIA and WIA and had to withdraw to Son Long.

On 23 Mar 69, South Korean troops moved from An Linh to Area 4 and 5 and stayed there for one night. Our defense forces attacked, killing three and wounding three others.

On 12 Jul ((69)), the enemy landed approximately one battalion in Area 1. The unit withdrew on 21 Jul 69. During these 10 days they launched sweep operations in Areas 1 and 2. Twelve of them were killed and 22 others were wounded by our explosive charges. This made a total of 49 KIA and WIA.

The enemy launched nine bombing raids and conducted artillery fire against the village almost every day and night during the year.

Generally the enemy launched attacks on our rear base areas, such as Areas 1 and 2. He conducted airstrikes and artillery fire against

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the village to prevent the revolutionary forces from stationing there and to hamper our production activities.

A few persons did not observe concealment ((regulations)) well to avoid air observation. For example, the cooking in Area 1, the drying of paddy in Area 2, production activities in Area 3, and the movement of forces at entry and exit points in Area 5.

Note: There were no ((enemy)) informants, spies or agents planted in our organization to supply information to the enemy.

2. No activities were conducted by religious factions and reactionary parties in the village.

3. All enemy officials fled, so they had no contact with the people residing in the village.

In relocation centers such as Tam Gian and Xuan in forward ((GVN)) controlled areas, Puppet administrative machinery ranging from inter-family chief level to village council level still existed. However, the lower level personnel from hamlet chiefs down were completely inactive. If anyone was still performing his job, he had submitted to our cadre or agents.

B. General situation:

I. SECURITY.

In the past year, no pillage or murder occurred in the village.

Corruption and appropriation of public funds:

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Theft decreased by 80 percent this year, as compared with previous years. Such cases were only minor, such as stealing a can of rice or things of little value.

Three out of seven thefts in the village were settled. Another case was settled by the people themselves. The people and cadre did not steal anything from public funds, but the bookkeeping of these funds was in disorder. For example:

1. Funds collected for troop support in enemy areas were not accurate.
2. Since the day the Front Committee was activated, village funds have not been made public for review.
3. Many goods sent from areas were lost.

War losses: No person died of disease or famine during this year. Eight persons were killed during enemy sweep operations and another one in the defense of P93 ((sic)) in Area 4. Therefore, a total of nine persons were killed.

II. PEOPLE'S SITUATION.

The living conditions of the people were much better this year than previous years. Therefore, the people enthusiastically carried out production activities.

The people contributed ((material)) resources and manpower to the Revolution this year, but they did not contribute as many goods as during previous years. The total number of inhabitants was 110 persons who provided over 1,400 kilograms of unhusked rice, 4,500\$ ((SVN)) ((118\$ SVN = \$1.00 US)) and over 1,043 cong ((man days))

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In general, everyone was anxious and eagerly desired peace. But a few people were tired of war; therefore, they had shirking attitudes.

PART II.

RESUME OF ALL TASKS

I. THE TASK OF CONDUCTING OPPRESSIVE ATTACKS AGAINST THE ENEMY.

1. The tasks of eliminating tyrants and breaking the enemy's oppressive control over the population were not properly carried out this year because there were no friendly agents in enemy areas. Our main forces, operating in a liberated area during a penetration raid, killed a hamlet chief and an inter-family chief, and captured a spy. The spy was later evacuated to our base area. Because of the difficult situation, the task of annihilating tyrants was not as successful as required. However, local ((RVN)) administrative personnel at lower levels were already confused. Some of them (in Tam Giao Hamlet) wrote to let us know that they wanted to go over to our side.

2. The task of conducting political attacks against the enemy has been carried out. Twenty warning letters together with 12 propaganda letters were given to enemy personnel from lower level personnel to village council chiefs.

Results: Hamlet chiefs and village council members were still intransigent. Only four interfamily chiefs abandoned their positions.

3. The task of oppressing counterrevolutionists in liberated areas was also carried out in accordance with regulations for rural areas.

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A number of weakpoints of 12 HV ((possibly association members)) were noted.

Two of them had been invited to the village for ((political)) indoctrination within five days. They were interrogated and their wrong actions, such as the following, were criticized by the people.

They had avoided civilian labor tasks, spoken pessimistically, and stocked my toc ((possibly My Tox insecticide)) and explosive charges for fishing.

4. Specialized tasks against the enemy.

In the village, we investigated a suspicious person, and afterwards cleared this suspect. (We had indoctrinated him without punishing him.)

We gathered information on a total number of 148 enemy personnel fleeing their areas of responsibility.

II. SECURITY MAINTENANCE TASK.

1. We motivated our people to perform the security maintenance task.

We conducted five indoctrination sessions for 315 persons of the village on this subject and on the regulations for rural areas.

Furthermore, we conducted three other indoctrination sessions for 30 persons returning from the ((enemy's)) strategic hamlets.

According to the plan of maintaining the local ((revolutionary)) movement, each area had to hold a monthly meeting to insure compliance with the regulations ((for rural areas)). Through these meetings, we detected a number of thefts. We also discovered a number of lazy people who did not

intensively carry out their assigned revolutionary tasks.

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III. THE TASK OF RECRUITING AGENTS, DEVELOPING OUR ((SECURITY)) FORCES, AND STRENGTHENING OUR SECURITY MACHINERY.

1. The strength of underground agents.

There was one underground agent in our controlled area, and three others in forward ((GVN controlled)) areas, two legal security agents, two village security agents, and two underground agents.

In Area 6, most of our sub-section chief cadre were concurrently ((security agents)).

Comments: After reviewing ((the results)) of our three main tasks (attacking the enemy, developing our ((own)) forces, and protecting friendly forces), we found out that they were not as successful as required. This was because of the difficulties of the situation and the shortage of cadre.

PART III.

1. Based on the requirements of the situation, our future tasks ((will be)):

A. In the rear area:

To complete the roster of targeted individuals who have been investigated and classified.

To establish and systematize a security ((network)) in each area, and recruit four underground agents in Areas 2, 4, and 5.

To review the regulations ((for rural areas)) in order to judge a number of cases of theft. To start training for the people and population control.

((Marginal note))

To establish the village political files.

To judge the thefts in Area 4 and the criminal case in Area 2. ((End of Marginal Note)).

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B. In the forward area.

1. To proselyte 80% of the ((local)) population.

2. To organize secret security forces; each area should have at least one agent.

To organize one action team.

3. To screen at least 80% of the local people, including those in Areas 6 and 7.

4. To provide professional training for our cadre and agents.
5. To complete the roster and the classification of the people.
6. Assassinate tyrants: Four openly, and two secretly.
7. To conduct political struggles. Warn five persons and proselyte 10 others.
8. To assess the enemy situation. Learn his intelligence and espionage plan, and plan of utilizing his Special Forces.

Keep abreast of activities of disguised reactionary parties and factions.

Thoroughly understand the leaders of all religious groups and thoroughly understand Puppet military tyrants.

Learn about the enemy's psywar and Chiêu Hồi ((Open-Arms)) activities, and his oppressive administrative control in hamlets and villages.

The population at the beginning of 1969:	111 persons
KIA or died:	7 ((persons))
Defected ((to RVN)):	1 ((person))
Moved to ((enemy's)) strategic hamlet:	1 ((person))
((Sub-total:))	<hr/> 102 persons
People returned to their former land:	33 ((persons))
((Total:))	<hr/> 136 ((persons)) ((sic))
Th M Cao	HD ((sic))
Vo Hung	HD ((sic))
Nguyen D Chi	AF ((sic))
D n Thang ((sic))	
M d Tuy ((sic))	
Le Thanh	
Nguyen Tinh	
Hoa Tran	
Nguyen Can	
Nguyen Mung	

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In rear areas: ((We should)) motivate ((the people)) according to the six ((prescribed)) motivation principles.

Specific tasks:

1. Motivate all people to heighten their vigilance.
2. Check and assess the activity and ideological attitude of each individual ((to see if he is doing)) right or wrong.

((People who are charged with)) theft or corruption should be indoctrinated or judged promptly.
3. Inspect the construction and improvement of the people's trenches, the camouflage of their living quarters, roads, ((air and artillery)) shelters, cultivated lands, and hiding places.
4. Properly organize and check activities concerning the security, communications and the warning ((system)).
5. Register those individuals who temporarily live in the area.
6. Provide specialized refresher training for hamlet security cadre.
7. Made a roster of all individuals who have been registered. These persons should continuously report to the district security section for further control.

Those keeping weapons which have not been authorized by military authorities must notify responsible personnel.

They should be trained to use these weapons properly following prescribed regulations.

8. Enemy leaflets should be collected and destroyed.

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We should not listen to his psywar activities, which he broadcasts over loudspeakers.

9. Hamlet and village units should be strengthened to meet the requirements.

Hamlet security agents should be frequently improved.

10. Internal activities should be conducted in conformity with prescribed regulations.

Activities of all subordinate areas should be opportunely reported to the higher echelons for stimulation and control.

11. Keep abreast of all changes of the situation to adjust our ((intelligence)) records.

12. Complete the classification ((of the people)). (Recruit new agents and keep important targeted individuals under surveillance.)

Make a roster of suspects and quickly investigate and settle their cases.

Investigate information furnished by our agents.

((Problems)) to be solved:

Settle the theft in Area 3. Ngo Thi Quy stole the private belongings of her niece named Lien:

One lady's wrist-watch with a gold strap ((costing)) 3,500\$ SVN; three bottles of different kinds of western medicine ((costing)) 700\$ ((SVN)); two books and one big notebook; one toothbrush, and one tube of dental cream; one lady's jacket of Thai silk, colored brown; three hairpins; two bags of coke cans; three bags of oranges; and two cans of pork.

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ACTIVITY PLAN FOR THE SECURITY BRANCH

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION.

An Xuan is one of the first villages liberated in ((Tuy An)) District. At present, it is completely under our control. It is composed of six populated areas and two unpopulated areas.

The population in this village is 164.

Its terrain is complicated.

Areas 1 and 2 of this village are adjacent to the Xuan Phuoc stronghold. The enemy has frequently conducted surprise raids against these areas. Therefore, we sometime suffered some losses.

Areas 4 and 5 are also two areas adjacent to the enemy's front line. Consequently, the Hon Ba High Point in this area is the position from which the enemy intends to launch operations.

From An Nghiiep Area to areas under our control, there is one village which is located along Communication Line 6. In sparsely populated areas where our control is loose, the enemy often launches operations against our forces.

II. AREA OF OPERATION

An Xuan is a village in which the mobile units of the district and province can conduct attacks against the enemy on his front. This village is also a

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corridor and entry and exit point. For this reason, the enemy has put particular emphasis on this village by conducting continuous attacks to detect our forces. His purpose is to occupy it in order to support his forces operating in other areas. The present primary mission is to win over the people and keep them from being relocated by the enemy. According to the policy of the district security branch and the characteristics of the situation in this village, the security branch should draft plans for the following specific missions:

III. MOTIVATION OF THE PEOPLE.

1. Motivate the people to attend meetings to make them fully aware of the enemy's demagogic plans. Exert every effort to indoctrinate them and heighten their vigilance. Motivate them to take part in our activities with 100% participation, including teenagers.

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2. Conduct reorientation training courses for those who harbor erroneous thoughts.

Review individual relationships of our cadre and soldiers. Appropriate measures should be taken.

a. As for political activities in Areas 1 and 2, we should strive to detect ((enemy agents)) operating in our liberated areas and watch those who come from the enemy liberated areas.

b. In Area 4, we should make all efforts to settle all problems

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concerning theft. Then, those who are guilty of theft should be sent to a reorientation training course.

3. Security task: To insure security for our bases, maintain revolutionary achievements, limit losses among the people, and insure the task of winning over the people, we should carry out the following missions:

a. Dig tunnels for each family and intensify control around farm production areas when the enemy conducts sweep operations.

b. Organize security guards and sound the alarm in case of attack.

c. Proceed with the registration system and intensify our activities in entry and exit points. Organize the people into groups. Each group is led by a group leader. Strive to monitor the people's daily activities and prevent the enemy from detecting us.

4. Counter enemy propaganda.

To prevent our people and cadre living in liberated areas from being demoralized and taken in by enemy propaganda, Open-Arms, and psywar activities, we should implement the following missions:

a. Indoctrinate the people and our cadre not to listen to enemy propaganda broadcasts or read his leaflets. Never use his leaflets for wrapping or for other purposes.

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5. Administration section:

a. Make a list of radio owners and urge them to have their radios registered at the district committee. Forbid the people to listen to the enemy radio broadcasts.

b. Register extra weapons.

IV. STRENGTHENING OF FORCES.

To meet the present situation and future missions, the security branch should play a primary role in the fight against the enemy for the protection of the people. For this reason, the branch has organized the cadre as follows:

1. Organization:

- a. Village level: There are two illegal members.

The section chief is in charge of the forward area and his assistant is in charge of the rear area.

There are three legal cadre. Two cadre are in charge of Area 1, the other is in charge of Area 2.

b. Area level: There is one sub-section chief acting as security cell leader in each area. One specialized cadre is assigned the mission of operating in Area 4. Two cell members are assigned missions in Area 2. Each hamlet is guided by a group leader. Each area must recruit from one to three secret informants.

2. Improvement: We should conduct training courses to further improve the professional skills of specialized personnel.

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3. Working procedure:

a. Each village should conduct a meeting on the 10th day of every month.

b. Each area should motivate cadre to attend monthly meetings in order to review regulations and past missions.

4. Method of submitting reports.

Promptly submit reports ((to higher echelons)) concerning events occurring in the area.

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Organization of Arrow I:

There were five cadre in Area 2 and three others in Areas 3, 4, and 5. All these cadre were female except one farmer. Coordination and operations committees were established in Areas 6 and 7.

Total population ((in An Xuan Village)) was 327. ((Secret)) guerrillas consisted of three teenagers.

We have motivated 200 people to attend a reorientation training course, collected 17,850\$ SVN and 4,700\$ SVN ((118\$ SVN = \$1.00 US)), 300 kilograms of rice, and 65 kilograms of rice reserved for supporting the troops. In addition, we have disorganized 30 People's Self-Defense Force members, urged five inter-family chiefs to resign their positions, killed one tyrant (named Pham Thu living in An Nghiep) and submitted 29 proselyting letters to ((SVN Government)). We also received a letter from village council members.

Following are the names of inter-family chiefs: Pham Minh, Vo B^uoc, Xin, Vo Do, Nguyen Cong, Le Nam, Nguyen Nhot, and Ong Keo.

Hamlet chiefs: Hoa and Tr^am.

Organization of Arrow II.

Twenty People's Self-Defense Force members were disorganized.

We motivated a number of civilian laborers to begin to work until Apr ((1970)):

In province and district: 124 persons

In village: 83 persons

Three months, 72 ((sic))

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Three month activity report:

As for the rear area: We succeeded in motivating 300 people to participate in security maintenance courses for four nights. Also, we brought to trial four robbery cases in Areas 3, 4, and 5, and made a list of voters and the population ((in An Xuan Village)).

We classified the people into the following categories:

A: 51 persons

B: 47 persons

C: 16 persons

Eight personnel attended a political indoctrination training course in two phases during four days. Sporadic indoctrination was also given to five other people.

As for the forward areas: We motivated 400 people to participate in struggles against the enemy. We exerted every effort to annihilate three tyrants whose names were Huỳnh Cường, Phạm Thu ((possibly living in An Nghiệp Village)) and Sơn ((possibly living in An Xuân Phước Hamlet)). We completely smashed the People's Self-Defense Force and arrested 30 enemy troops. We submitted 29 proselyting letters ((to the SVN government)).

((Marginal notes)) Five enemy troops defected to our forces in June. We motivated 25 people to return from enemy resettlement centers. ((End of Marginal note)). We urged five interfamily chiefs to resign from their positions. We received one letter from ((village)) council members who desired to surrender. In addition, we succeeded in motivating 15 people to return to their native villages and in conducting operations to purify the people living in Areas 2, 3, 4 and 5. The enemy launched two sweep operations against Areas 1, 2, 3, and 4 with the participation of the ((GVN)) Special Forces and Korean Forces.

20 Apr 70 ((sic))

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Following were the names of the People's Self-Defense Force members:

In the center area ((sic)):

Nguyễn Thuận: Inter-family chief

Phan Huệ.

Phạm Ngọc Anh

Trā Co²

Huynh Than[^]

Huynh Mai

Đào Sanh

Đỗ Chin: Inter-group chief

Total: Eight members

In Phu Hoi area:

Le Tanh[^]

Mai Cai[^]

Nguyen Sai[^]

Nguyen Nhi[^]

Tran Binh[^]

Le Len[^]

Nguyen Hoi[^]

Tran Du[^]

Vo Thinh[^]

Pham Thao

Truong Van Toan[^]

Nguyen Quoi[^]

Nguyen Loi[^]

Total: 13 members

Following are the enemy personnel who have frequently oppressed the people:

In the center area: ((sic))

Trā Thi Chinh: CTU ((sic))

Phan Thi Dươc[^]

Tran Thi Mo[^]

Tran Thi Kheo[^]

Vo Thi Bay[^]

Tran Thi Đung[^]

Nguyễn Đông, Tam, and Hóc are members of the province People's Armed Security Force.

They were assigned missions to operate in Areas 1 and 2 for 11 days as of 21 Apr 70.

District security conferences were held from 5 Jun to 3 Sep 70:

1. Strengthening of our forces.

We recruited the following agents:

Overt agents: Ten (five agents in TG ((sic)) Area and five in Xuân Phước Area).

Covert agents: Five (three agents in TG Area and two in Xuân Phước Area).

Espionage agents: Two (one in TG Area and in Xuân Phước Area).

Xuân Phước security cadre: 2.

In addition, we activated two armed reconnaissance cells (one in TG area and another in Xuân Phước Area).

2. Annihilation of enemy tyrants:

We annihilated four enemy tyrants (two in TG Area and two in Xuân Phước Area).

We conducted thought reform for 11 personnel (six in the district and five in Xuân Phước Area).

We conducted political indoctrination training courses for 40 personnel (20 in the village and 20 in Xuân Phước Area).

We submitted 50 proselyting letters ((to SVN Government)) (30 letters had been written in TG Area and 20 in Xuân Phước Area).

We wrote 30 warning letters (20 letters had been written in TG Area and 10 in Xuân Phước Area).

3. Task of winning over the people:

We won over 50 people (30 people living in TG Area and 20 in Xuân Phước Area) and succeeded in classifying them into different categories.

4. Internal security:

Cadre must be 100% loyal to the Party.

5. We conducted a meeting with the participation of the cadre serving on the front line.

6 Jun 70

We conducted a meeting with the participation of the following representatives: Mr Bông and Tai of An Linh Area and Mr Mach of An Nghiêp Area.

The sub-section in Area 5 consisted of eight personnel.

1. We set forth farm production criteria for the people living in the An Linh Area and disseminated regulations for people in each control station.

Merchants residing in the area located at Mr Đang's former house and beyond should move to another area from the sixth day of the fifth month of the lunar year.

2. Area from Mr Hanh's to the ricefield should be in the kill zone beginning from the eighth day of the fifth month of the lunar year.

3. On the night of 7 ((possibly Jun 70)), our unit held a meeting to review billeting conditions. In addition, the task of clearing the ground for growing rice was unsuccessfully performed, and some members showed discontent toward their higher echelons.

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On the night of 7 ((Jun)) 70, a conference was held in Area 4. ((The following problems were discussed:))

1. Internal regulations concerning the messing, billeting and movement.

From 7 May of the lunar calendar ((possibly 1970)) that section of the road from the hill near Mr Hoanh's house to Mr Than's cow shed will be a kill zone.

2. People who had previously returned ((to their former farm land)), will not be allowed to move anymore.

3. The production ((task)) has already started and will be continued until the harvest.

Help was been provided for Mr Dung to cultivate his ricefield. Pick axes were furnished by Mr Hanh.

((We)) used women and female guerrillas ((in these laboring tasks)).

Notify all agencies about the defectors ((to RVN)), and report them ((to the higher echelons)).

On 8 Jun 70, we moved to Xuan Phuoc to receive rice, and prepare activities against enemy sweep operations.

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17 Jun 70.

Mr Quang's unit was designated as a production element.

In the rear area, Mrs Hiep has been under observation because of her suspicious movements. Presently, she is living in Area 1. She planned to move to An Dinh. Previously, she came to the railway station, intending to move to Tuy Hoa ((Province)).

((Comrade)) Le was tired and reported to the 109th Medical Unit.

We should settle the personal problems of Comrade Can of the quarter-master ((unit)).

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Today, 3 Apr 70, we (Dung, village committee member; Bui Hai, local coordination and operations committee member; Tran Chau, local security agent; and Le Nhon, Farmers' Association sub-chapter member) held a meeting in Area 4 to solve some problems concerning Comrade Nhon. At the meeting, Comrade Nhon confessed:

"I, of my own accord, gathered Mr Long's bananas and Hai's gourds, took Thang Lang's manioc, carried Tuong's unhusked rice to my home to grind it into eight cans of husked rice, and took Long's two tablets of medicine during the indoctrination period."

Due to the above confession, we solved all problems concerning Comrade Nhon except the case of stealing Comrade Long's medicine. It is necessary

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that the village armed security section study and settle this matter as requested by the person concerned.

In the meeting, a report was made under the signature of our cadre and the person concerned:

Person concerned:

Le Nhon

Area 4 4 Apr 70

For village security section

((Two illegible signatures))

Area cadre: /S/ Chau

Mr Nguyen Long agreed not to demand compensation ((for the medicine stolen)).

18 Apr 70

Owner of the medicine

Nguyen Xuan Long

18 Apr 70: The case of stealing medicine by Nguyen Son was settled. Son has ~~settled~~ with the owner.

Person concerned

/S/ Son

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1. Mr Thao and Canh ((were suspected of taking Le Nhon's four kilograms of flour because)) while Nhon was on duty, Thao and Canh often came to his house. However, ((after careful investigation, the culprits were)) Hai and Canh.

2. The case of Le Huyen's losing bananas: Mr Nhon often came to gather ~~botel~~, he might have taken these bananas. More evidence was that his wife was found carrying bananas. Further more, Mr Canh ((might also be the culprit)) because he lived near the banana ((garden)).

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JUN 70

POLITICAL ((DETAINÉES)) JUDICIARY PROCESS.

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1. Phạm Thị Chin, age 19, lived in Area 1, Trung Thanh. Her husband was KIA, a member of 47 ((possibly 47th RVNAF Infantry Regiment)). She has received payment of 86,000\$ ((SVN)) ((118\$ SVN = \$1.00 US)) as compensation for ((her husband's)) death. She applied for a job with ((an unidentified)) US agency in Dec 69.

2. Huynh Thị Hương, age 17, of Area 1, worked with a US agency in Xuan Phuoc. She had once accompanied her American ((agency)) to Tuy Hoa ((town)) where she had stayed for a time.

3. Võ Thị Yết, age 30, of Area 2. On 2 Jun 68, Yết was entrusted with a reconnaissance mission by Trung and Hương, Chief and Assistant Chief of ((RVN)) Phước Hiệp Hamlet.

4. Cao Chut, a suspect, was accused by Brother "Nh" of having helped Cao Bung move to the hamlet ((unspecified)).

It was clear that after his escape from the enemy, Bung showed Chut the place where his belongings were hidden. He ((Bung)) slept separately on the next night and then moved away.

According to the opinion of the ((local)) people, Chut was very reluctant to carry out his assigned revolutionary tasks.

Another rumor among the ((local)) inhabitants indicated that Chut was a thief.

----- END OF TRANSLATION -----