

ATE January 10, 1969

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THE COSTLY TRAGEDY THAT IS VIETNAM

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, it would now appear clear that the Government of South Vietnam, regardless of what purports to go on in Paris, is determined to do everything possible to delay substantive negotiations designed to bring the war in Vietnam to a conclusion. More on that later.

It is now also clear that when historians write of this war they may well call it "The Costly Tragedy That Was Vietnam"; because any fair-minded person will agree that the effort has seriously impaired the political, military, and economic position and prestige of the United States, all over the world.

Over \$100 billion of the taxpayers' money has gone down the drain in this major land war on the mainland of Asia; and not only is there little to show for it, but also because of the nature of the conventional military establishment it has forced us to build, this Nation could be moving closer to what civilization dreads most—a full nuclear exchange.

More important than any cost in money, however, is the fact that more than 30,000 of our finest youth have been killed, and over 190,000 wounded.

As Dr. Kissinger pointed out in a recent article, during November 1967, the head of the U.S. military in Vietnam stated that "the war was being won militarily," adding that "a limited withdrawal of American forces might be undertaken beginning late in 1968."

And less than a year ago the administration emphasized that the pacification program—the extension of the control of Saigon in the countryside—was progressing satisfactorily.

In a few days came the Tet offensive. This development negated these two assertions. Today our position in Vietnam, despite the above gigantic expenditures in lives and treasure, would appear unimproved.

From a purely military standpoint, the reason for this tragedy is clear. Fighting against brave and well-led guerrillas, the ground forces of the United States have been at grave disadvantage, one major reason being that the three countries which border South Vietnam have been declared sanctuaries; therefore, our troops have never been able to counter-attack.

At the same time, ever since the United States, in effect, took over this war, our air power and sea power have been shackled, in a manner, and to a degree, never before known in major warfare.

No doubt because of the true political position which was brought out by the

results of the Tet offensive, and in further effort to start peace negotiations with Hanoi, on March 31 last, this shackling was increased. U.S. military forces were forbidden to conduct any attacks whatever, either by air or by sea, north of the 20th parallel. Actually none above the 19th parallel, which gave the North Vietnamese full use of Vinh, their major supply base in the southern part of that country.

By the latter action it was hoped the North Vietnamese would come to the conference table. This they did, last May 13; and the American people looked forward with relief to a reduction, if not a cessation, in the cost and the killing. Since that date, however, 7,603 Americans have been killed, 51,532 wounded; and not a penny less than an additional \$18 billion has gone down the drain of this war.

Little, if anything, has been accomplished. In retrospect, again as Dr. Kissinger has pointed out:

Hanoi has always placed great reliance on the pressure of world opinion; the "illegality" of (any) U.S. bombing was therefore a potential political weapon.

Thereupon, on November 1 last, the United States made an even further military-political concession by announcing that there would be no further air or sea attacks against any part of North Vietnam.

This would appear to be acknowledgement that a true victory was not in the cards because—Kissinger again:

The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win. The North Vietnamese used their main forces the way the bullfighter uses his cape—to keep us lunging in areas of marginal political importance.

There is little use crying over the spilled milk, and more important than events of the past are those of the present and future.

With that premise, however, it is also important for every American to realize how self-centered and stubborn the Government of South Vietnam has been; a Government which does not appear to represent a majority of the people of that country; a Government which nevertheless the United States, despite the heavy cost, continues to prop up.

It would appear the representatives of North Vietnam are willing to negotiate. Their country has been hurt badly; because of the physical damage, even worse than ours.

Where, therefore, is the stumbling block?

Based on the record, the answer to that question would appear clear. The representatives of South Vietnam in Paris are exercising a virtual veto of all realistic efforts to get to the conference table and commence substantive talks.

As we hear day after day about their endless objections as to the shape of the Paris table, one can sympathize with the GI in the foxhole of the Mauldin cartoon, with the caption: "Dear General Ky: I don't think much of the seating arrangements either."

If fearful of any reduction of our military, or of the dollars owing into their country, why should Saigon desire any termination of this war?

The above facts, plus world conditions, amply illustrate why we should work for an end to the fighting, however; and to that end the recent offer by the North Vietnamese, as reported in the press, for negotiations to commence at a round table—no sides—was a reasonable suggestion and should be accepted. But the South Vietnamese refused.

The North Vietnamese said further that if such a circular table was adopted, they—the North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front—would be willing to eliminate designation by nameplates and flags. But the South Vietnamese refused.

Accordingly, it would appear that, to get substantive talks started, Saigon and its Paris representatives must be convinced that the American people want action, now.

Perhaps General Ky hopes President-elect Nixon and his people will be easier to negotiate with; and therefore nothing will be lost by waiting. Let us hope that is not correct, because any delay can only result in additional losses.

In his San Antonio speech of September 1967, President Johnson said that we would be willing to stop all bombing of North Vietnam if substantive talks could begin.

All bombing was terminated last November 1, 70 days ago. Since then 1,485 Americans have been killed and billions more dollars have been spent.

With the premise that many more American lives will be lost if Saigon is allowed to continue the delay by arguing about the technicalities of procedure, I suggest the following:

First. The North Vietnamese suggestion of a round table, without nameplates or national flags, be accepted.

Second. The United States begin negotiations with Hanoi immediately, looking toward a military disengagement.

Third. The United States should make it clear that we prefer Siagon be a full participant in the negotiations, even with respect to the withdrawal of foreign forces.

Fourth. If, for reasons of their own, the South Vietnamese Government does not believe it timely for them to come to the negotiating table, that is their decision. But in our own interest we should make it clear to the South Vietnamese that we must now move promptly to negotiations; then set a date for starting those negotiations, and be there on that date, with or without the South Vietnamese.

In that way, to the immense satisfaction of the American people, we can follow the wise recommendations of both Secretary Clifford and Dr. Kissinger by moving toward a military settlement with Hanoi, letting the Vietnamese work out the political settlement.

Thereupon we could turn a large part of our gigantic budget for swords into ploughshares; and as a result have substantial resources available to cope with the great and growing problems which also face us in other parts of the world as well as here at home.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield to my able friend the Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I would like to say to the Senator from Missouri that he has made a splendid speech, and I wish to identify myself with his views. I have the same feelings in my heart that he has.

I would like to ask the Senator this question. It may very well be—we are very sophisticated here—that all of this stalling around has been based on the desire to await January 20 to get the new team on the job. However, does the Senator from Missouri agree with me, since this is January 10, and only 10 days from January 20, that unless the process which he outlined is started now there is not going to be any change when there is a changing of the guard in Paris; that we will see revealed an effort to block negotiations; and that the time is right that the present team has to get on the job to do what the Senator is saying?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, as usual the able Senator goes to the heart of a situation. The thrust of this address is let us get on with it so these strung-out procedural negotiations develop into actual substantive negotiations.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator for his constructive contribution.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the rule of germaneness may be waived so that I may proceed for 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN in the chair). Is there objection? The Chair hears no objection, and it is so ordered. The rule of germaneness is waived by unanimous consent.

The Senator from New York is recognized.

THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the other area of tension and conflagration that the Senator from Missouri should have spoken of in addition to Vietnam is the Middle East.

In the newspapers this morning, the headlines refer to Soviet efforts to bring about some kind of peace in that area under its leadership, generally headlined as "An Imposed Accord," as one newspaper referred to the matter.

This is a dangerous situation for the United States. I have been in the Mediterranean just recently and spent a day aboard a U.S. 6th Fleet carrier which was constantly shadowed by a Soviet destroyer. The situation in the Mediterranean is now one where a large Soviet fleet—nuclear armed—faces a great American fleet, nuclear armed. We must remember that in the 6-day war in 1967 the radical Arabs attempted to involve the Soviet Union and the United States by false statements that U.S. planes were being used against the Arab States. With that kind of highly irresponsible situation in the Middle East anything can happen. Therefore, it is a situation which

deserves the highest priority on the part of the United States.

The thing that worries many people in this country is whether American policy has been changed, following the Beirut airport incident. It is still an "incident" and only a minor element of the entire situation that faces us in the Middle East. This is the main thing that must be made clear in the minds of the American people.

Whatever may be the view of individuals concerning that incident—most unfortunate, in my judgment, particularly as regards some of its political consequences in Lebanon and elsewhere—let us not miss the forest for the trees.

The fact is that Israel and the preservation of Israel still remains a "basic tenet" of U.S. policy as John Foster Dulles put it, because Israel is a bastion of freedom in the Middle East. Therefore, U.S. policy is organized so as to assure Israel's preservation. This requires us to keep our eyes on the whole situation, rather than one event.

Several days ago 16 Senators issued a declaration to put this entire situation in true perspective. They expressed their judgment that the Middle East is the area in the world where the danger of war is most acute. That statement is supported by what we have seen happening in the last few days. Putting the situation in focus does not mean that any views as to the Beirut incident need to be abandoned by anyone who would entertain them, including our Government.

The United Nations Security Council resolution of December 31 failed to take account of the very real threat to the survival of Israel caused by activities of various Arab nations surrounding Israel and including, unhappily, activities originating in Lebanon.

The important thing is that we should keep in focus what is at stake here. Above everything else, we must profit from our experience of 1956 and 1957. At that time, the United States exerted great pressure on Israel to withdraw its forces from the Sinai. To the later regret of President Eisenhower, promises made at the time were not fulfilled and they were breached—to Israel's severe disadvantage. Subsequently the United States was placed in a most embarrassing and difficult situation especially 10 years later when war erupted again because of a breakdown in the agreements and arrangements which the United States had unwritten in 1957.

NOTICE OF HEARINGS ON ELECTORIAL REFORM

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to read into the Record a statement by the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, Mr. BAYH's statement is as follows:

Mr. President, I wish to advise the Senate that the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments will hold hearings on January 23 and 24 on proposals relating to

Electoral reform. The hearings will begin at 10:00 a.m. in G308 (auditorium) of the New Senate Office Building. Persons interested in being heard should contact the Subcommittee staff in room 419 of the Senate Office Building.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

NOTICE OF FIRST MEETING OF THE AMERICAN GROUP OF THE INTERPARLIAMENTARY UNION

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 10 minutes on extraneous matters, without regard to the rule of germaneness.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Colorado? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, the first meeting in the 91st Congress of the American group of the Interparliamentary Union will be held at 10 o'clock Wednesday morning, January 29, in the Senate conference room, S-207, in the Senate wing of the Capitol. As each Senator knows, all Members of the Senate are members of the American group, and all are eligible to attend. The meeting will be given over to the election of officers for 1969-70, and to other matters of an organizational nature. I hope as many as can will plan to be present.

THE U.S.S. "PUEBLO" INCIDENT

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, as an American, I rejoiced with all other Americans on Christmas Eve when the 81 living crew members of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* were released by their captors, the North Koreans.

While I remain deeply grateful that the *Pueblo* crew has been returned to safety in these United States, the manner in which their release was arranged has some disturbing aspects to it. Without wishing to at all dampen the good will owed these men for their service to their country, I do believe a few comments are in order.

At the outset let me make it clear that my concern for these men and their families is no less genuine and humanitarian than those who arranged for their release.

However, I cannot help but believe that the final chapter of this phase of the *Pueblo* affair has not yet been written. Many questions must be answered, and the American people have the right to know the answers.

The timing of this affair appears to me to be the most curious. If we intended to admit before the whole world that we were wrong, and then to deny that our apology was valid, did we have to wait 11 months to do it?

In the spring of 1968, during hearings before the Defense Appropriations Committee, I raised the question of whether or not we would apologize for this incident. I was told by Defense Department officials in substance that—and I cannot quote them directly because this occurred during a classified part of the hearing—such a move would be unthinkable on our part because it would cause a great loss of honor and prestige to the United States. I asked DOD officials a simple question in reply: "What prestige?" I told them in substance that "when a fourth-rate power can hijack one of our ships on the high seas and get away with it, what honor and prestige are you talking about?"

So a move which was unthinkable in the spring became policy by winter. However, it was the added dimension of this policy which really disturbs me.

Not only did we admit to Communist charges that we intruded into the North Korean territorial waters, but we then turned around and advertised that we had lied about it.

The document we signed will make an excellent propaganda piece throughout the Communist nations where our repudiation of it will not be heard. The document will also be effective in underdeveloped areas where the Communists can show "proof" of U.S. "aggression" to the uneducated. But worst of all, the fact that we signed a document we knew was false and that we admitted it can—and I certainly expect that it will—be used against us in, as an example, our Vietnam negotiations in Paris and at any other time in the future when we sit across the conference table from the Reds.

Let us also face this fact: The North Koreans still have the ship, what is left of it, and there is virtually no hope of ever retrieving it.

We still do not know how many secret documents were aboard when the *Pueblo* was captured. On June 10, 1968, when the Navy Department appeared before the Defense Appropriations Committee, I said I considered the *Pueblo* affair "a case of rather extreme, in my opinion, neglect." I said then, and I will repeat now, that the *Pueblo* affair raised in my mind grave doubts on "the use of those self-destruct devices, the question of why the instructions under which the commander of the *Pueblo* handled the ship as he did, and the question of allowing information to fall into the hands of the North Koreans."

In briefings, the Department of Defense has insisted that it would not have been feasible to have used adequate self-destruct devices on the *Pueblo*, thus preventing the enemy from capturing our equipment and documents. Frankly, I doubt the authenticity of DOD's posture in this regard. In light of the very successful self-destruct devices we use in aircraft, it seems highly unlikely to me that we could not have protected our papers and equipment aboard ship.

Inquiries are now being conducted into the entire *Pueblo* incident. Hopefully, these probes will answer many of our questions about this affair. Many questions, however, may remain unanswered. For these the American people deserve and must have answers. They must be

told the truth on the timing of the release of the crew. They must be told the truth as to why we apologized and then lied. But more than anything else that will be revealed through investigation, the American people need to know that we will never suffer another *Pueblo*.

We need to know that the enemy, be they North Koreans, Chinese, East Germans, Soviets, or whoever, will not get away with a *Pueblo* ever again. The American people need such assurance, but the enemy needs it even more.

AMENDMENT OF RULE XXII

The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolution (S. Res. 11) to amend rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate.

THE CASE FOR OPEN DEBATE

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, over the years there have been many eloquent attacks and rebuttals on the question of limitation of debate in the U.S. Senate. Those of us who come upon such well-plowed ground cannot hope to shed much in the way of original thought upon this subject; yet I am sure there are good reasons and necessary arguments that it would be well to cover again so they will be fresh as we once again consider the question.

It is curious to me that there seems to be a singular case of split vision operating upon our national scene today. Almost any paper or magazine on the newsstand has an article or reference made to the rights of minorities. There is a strong assertion made that the "rights" of certain minorities are violated if they are not allowed to disrupt the educational processes of large institutions of learning when they do not agree 100 percent with every aspect of the operation of that school.

The rights of racial minorities are constantly held before us in the public print and on the air, as they should be.

I would not wish to be mistaken, Mr. President, by having my remarks interpreted to mean that I would do away with these reports of the rights of these minorities. However, if there is a creed operative in the public outpouring upon the rights of minorities today, I think it might well read something like this:

"We hereby pledge ourselves to uphold and promulgate the cause of proclaiming the 'rights' of certain minorities."

I think that might be the correct wording of such a creed, Mr. President, and I think its wording to be very important. There apparently is no concerted effort to uphold the rights of all minorities—only certain minorities. I speak firsthand, Mr. President, because I have personally been the victim of discrimination, and witnessed such selective discrimination.

In my State of Arizona, we have a great number of American Indians. These people—wards of the Federal Government—have been largely mistreated and ill-used by the very Government sworn by treaty to protect them; yet there is no great national outcry to right these wrongs. Those of us speaking out on behalf of the American Indian are distinctly in the minority. We are often ignored, seldom heeded, and our efforts are frequently rewarded with a great deal of lipservice and little tangible result.