

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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1. COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM, LAOS, CAMBODIA
 2. SUBJECT: (U) Infiltration of the 3004th Group
 3. ISC NUMBER: 780.000, 782.000
 4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Feb 68 - May 68
 5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: CIC, II CTZ, Pleiku Province, RVN; 30 Apr 69
 6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 3
 7. SOURCE: Captive TRAN Trung Phong (TRAANL, TRUNG FONG) aka TRAN Mao (TRAANL, MAOR) CMIC No A-2539
 8. REPORT NUMBER: 1516-0538-69 (580)-05
 9. DATE OF REPORT: 16 May 69
 10. NO. OF PAGES: 11
 11. REFERENCES: BLACK BEARD 6a, 6b
 BTA 200, 210
 DIRM: 1N2, 1N3
 SICR: U-UPE-A1532
 12. ORIGINATOR: Hq 6499th Special Activities Group
 13. PREPARED BY: L. M. HANSEN, Capt, USAF Det 6, 6499th Sp Acty Gp
 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: Colonel William G. Laine for WILLIAM HAMLEN Colonel, USAF

15. SUMMARY: (C) This report contains general information concerning the 3004th Infiltration Group (formerly the 1st Bn, 2d Regt, 250th Div), consisting of 600 men, and its infiltration during the period Feb 68 to May 68. Included is information on the training received by the group, march discipline, liaison stations, visitor areas, and the incidence of malaria. Also included is limited information concerning the infiltration route through North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Possible locations are given for the T-1, T-2 and T-11 stations and for the 84th NVA hospital in Cambodia. The existence of telephone lines which paralleled the infiltration route throughout Laos and the results of a herbicide mission in Laos are discussed.

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1. (C) BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

- a. Name: TRAN Trung Phong (TRAAN, TRUNG FONG) aka TRAN Mao (TRAANL, MAOR)
- b. Rank: Private First Class
- c. Duties and Unit of Assignment: Soldier; 1st Sqd, 1st Plat, 10th Co, K-6 Bn, 24th NVA Regt.
- d. DPOB: 20 Jun 49; NAM TIEN Hamlet, SUONG LAM Village, Lang Giang District, Ha Bac (BAC GIANG) Province, NVN.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

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e. Parents' Names: Father: TRAN Trung Long (TRAAVL, TRUNG LONG), living; Mother: DANG Thi Long (DEANGV, THIV LONG), living.

f. Circumstances of Capture: On 16 Apr 69, Source's unit, the K-6 Bn, 12th NVA Regt, was given the mission of attacking a truck convoy along Route 14 in Kontum Province. As they were attempting to crawl within 100 meters of the road in order to carry out the ambush, they were sighted by six tanks from an ARVN armor unit. The tanks opened fire on the ambush party who attempted to fight back but were forced to flee. Source's first contact with the enemy convinced him that he would be killed sooner or later so he decided to surrender. He was captured at 1400 hours at (ZA222740, Sheet 6537II).

g. Significant Activities: Source lived with his parents at his POB until mid 1967 and worked on a cooperative rice farm. During this period, he received six years education. After being drafted in Jul 67, he was assigned to the 2d Sqd, 1st Plat, 7th Co, D-5 Bn, 2d Regt, 250th NVA Division, in Phu Binh District, Thai Nguyen Province, NVN, for training. In Feb 68, the unit was redesignated the 3004th Infiltration Group and began its infiltration journey. After 45 days, they entered Laos. It took an additional 46 days to travel through Laos to Cambodia. The unit reached its destination, the T-3 station in May 68. Source and members of his company were then assigned to the K-6 Bn, 12th NVA Regiment and the cadre (assistant platoon leaders and above) began their return trip to North Vietnam. Before Source could actually join his new unit, he was stricken with malaria and was carried to the 84th NVA hospital in Cambodia. He remained at the hospital for two and one-half months during which time he received medication consisting primarily of quinine, nivaquine, and vitamins. In early Aug 68, he was sent to the THU DUNG area near the T-10 station to convalesce. During his two month stay at this location, Source was assigned to the 1st Co of the K-23 Battalion. In Oct 68, he returned to the K-6 as a member of the 1st Sqd, 1st Plat, 10th Co. The K-6 battalion had been fighting in Kontum Province, RVN, and had sustained heavy casualties. The entire battalion was sent to a location near the T-1 station in Cambodia near the tri-border area. Their mission was to provide security for a truck park and road against possible attacks by Special Forces (See IR 1516-0543-69). In Dec 68, the battalion returned to the T-9 station to await orders sending them back into South Vietnam. Source again became ill with malaria and spent one month in the 84th hospital, and an additional month in the THU DUNG recuperation area. In Feb 69, four members of the 24th NVA regiment came to THU DUNG and picked up 90 men including Source, and took them to the battalion's location near the PO KO River. He remained with the battalion until his capture on 14 Apr 69.

h. Additional References: 7AF ICP 1A4d(3); MACV ICP P1/EEI/21-2/SOR-1; Air Intelligence Questionnaire and Requirements, Laos; Map: Laos, AMS, Series L7015, Sheets 6144 II and 6143 I, Edition 1, dtd 1965, Scale 1:50,000; Map: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, AMS Series L607, Sheets 6538 and 6437, Edition 1, dtd 1965, Scale 1:100,000; Map: Vietnam, AMS Series L7014, Sheet 6537 II, Edition 1, dtd 1965, Scale 1:50,000.

2. (C) THE 3004TH INFILTRATION GROUP:

a. Designation: This unit was formerly designated as the 5th Battalion, 2d Regiment, 250th NVA Division. It was redesignated the 3004th Infiltration Group prior to infiltration on 10 Feb 68. Source knew of no other designations or cover names for this unit.

b. Mission: The mission of this unit was to infiltrate South Vietnam to assist in its liberation. The 250th NVA Division had the mission of

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training new groups for subsequent infiltration (Interrogator's Note: Source knew that a previous 5th Bn had already been trained by the 2d Regt, 250th Div, and sent southward).

c. Letter Box Number: The LBN for the 7th Co, 5th Bn, 2d Regt, 250th Div was 91513 CS while in North Vietnam. The unit never received mail after beginning its infiltration march.

d. Uniforms: Everyone in the unit was issued two sets of dark green uniforms which they wore during infiltration. There was no difference between officer's and enlisted men's uniforms.

e. Strength and Organization: Before beginning its infiltration, the unit was at full strength with approx 600 men, including cadre. It was composed of four companies consisting of approx 130 men each, plus an eighty-man headquarters section. While still in North Vietnam, these companies were designated as the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Companies. This numbering system did not change during infiltration. Each company had four platoons numbered consecutively one through four. Each platoon consisted of three squads numbered consecutively one through 16, with each squad in the company being part of the numbering system. Source did not know how the headquarters section was organized; however, it included the command element, messengers, and one medic.

f. Locations: Source did not know the location of the 250th Division headquarters. He heard the headquarters for the 2d Regiment was in BAC GIANG City, Yen Dung District, Ha Bac Province. The 5th Battalion (3004th Infiltration Group) had its headquarters in LANG CHAU Hamlet, TAN KIM Village, Phu Binh District, Bac Thai (Thai Nguyen) Province, NVN. Source did not know the locations of other battalions in the 2d Regiment. (Interrogator's Note: Neither LANG CHAU Hamlet nor TAN KIM Village could be located in Phu Binh District. Reference materials failed to list either in the appropriate place.)

g. Weapons: The unit possessed the following weapons and basic loads during their infiltration:

32 RPDs	300 rounds
32 B-40 ATGL	5 rounds
20 K-54	unknown
7 per squad CKC	100 rounds
3 per squad AK-47	150 rounds

h. Morale: While training in North Vietnam, the unit's morale was very high. They were told that they would have to hurry southward in order to achieve glory for themselves because South Vietnam was almost liberated and they would only be a governing force. They were pleased because they did not think they would have to fight.

i. Pay Rates: While in North Vietnam, a private, private first class, corporal, and sergeant received 5, 6, 8, and 10 North Vietnamese piasters respectively per month. Prior to departure, they were paid three months advance pay. They were not paid again after beginning their infiltration.

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j. Personalities: The following were battalion cadre:

Commander: Captain Quan (QUAAN)

XO: Captain Nhan (NHANV)

PO: Captain Mai (MAI)

Assist PO: Captain Phan (PHAN)

Chief of Staff: 1st Lt Ba (BA)

3. (C) INFILTRATION OF THE 3004TH GROUP:

a. Pre-Infiltration Training:

(1) Location: The training area for the unit was located in the area surrounding TAN KIM Village, Phu Binh District, Thai Nguyen Province, NVN. The 6th Company was quartered in BAN THACH Hamlet; the 7th Company in HAI MINH Hamlet; and the 8th Company in LANG TRAI Hamlet. Source could not remember the location of the 5th Company. The entire group stayed in quarters provided by the civilian occupants of the area.

(2) Infantry: The basic military training, to include general military tactics was conducted at company level from July to Nov 67. Each member of the unit was taught how to take apart and reassemble both the CKC and the AK-47 assault rifles. In addition, each man fired only three rounds with the CKC and six rounds with the AK-47. They witnessed the firing of one round by the B-40 ATGL and the men (two per squad) who were equipped with the RPD each fired six rounds with that weapon. Six hours per week were spent in learning assault and hand to hand combat techniques. Other major topic areas during the infantry phase of the training were: one day devoted on how to ambush allied convoys; two days on how to attack large military installations; and two nights of how to attack small outposts.

(3) Physical: Each Saturday, members of the unit would carry rocks on their backs for eight hours. They started by carrying 15kg; this was increased by one kilo increments each week until each man was carrying a minimum of 25kg. The stronger personnel carried as much as 30kg. Near the end of the training period, the entire group/battalion took a six day hike with full field gear including the 25kg back pack.

(4) Political: Forty-five days of political training was given the unit. They studied the history of Vietnam to include the French period during which time they compared the French colonialists with the American invaders. They were taught relatively little about Communism other than it represents the "highest ideal". Other subjects were the puppet government in SAIGON, the brotherhood of Red China, and the current revisionist policies of the first socialist country, the Soviet Union.

(5) Medical: The members of the unit were taught simple medical procedures as how to bandage a wound, how to evacuate wounded, and how to stop bleeding. They were also taught not to drink unboiled water, to always sleep covered with a mosquito net, and to take two nivaquine tablets every week to help prevent malaria.

(6) Instructors: All instructors were the cadre (assistant platoon leaders and above) of the group. No foreign personnel were observed at the training area.

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(7) Schedule: Training was conducted six days a week with Sunday off. Each day began at 0600 hours with calisthenics. After breakfast, the day began at 0800 with the subject for the day. At 1130 hours they would eat and rest until 1330 hours when the training would be resumed. At 1700 hours, they ate the evening meal. After the evening meal, the whole company would meet for three hours to discuss and critique the day's activities. The day officially ended at 2100 hours. In January 68, the unit was given 15 days rest and then a 15 day leave. When they arrived back at the training site after leave, they were subjected to additional political training. They also prepared their equipment for infiltration.

b. Departure and March discipline: The group was notified three days in advance by the battalion political officer of their imminent departure. The group departed at 1400 hours on 10 Feb 68. The headquarters section led the group, followed by the 5th company at a distance of approx 100 meters. The other three companies then followed, each separated from the other by a distance of 100 meters. This same general order prevailed throughout the infiltration march except that the four companies and the headquarters section would change their relative positions within the column each day. They always marched in single file with the commanding officer at the head of the column, the executive officer at the rear and the political officer always with the headquarters section. The unit had neither radios nor crew-served weapons. After entering Laos and for the remainder of the journey, the lead company in the column would provide point security with one squad which proceeded the main body by approx 100 meters. The last company provided a squad to serve as rear guard approx 100 meters after the main group.

c. Supplies: Platoon leaders and above carried maps but only company commanders and above had compasses. Each member of the unit carried the following supplies:

2 Sets dark green uniforms

2 pair underwear

1 hammock

1 plastic raincoat

1 mosquito net

1 hat

1 pair sandals

1 canteen

1 first aid kit including 100 water purification tablets, 50 nivaquine pills, 100 vitamin tablets, and 50 multi-vitamin tablets, two bandages plus antiseptic.

1kg sugar

1 canned milk

1kg salt

Rifle and basic load

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d. Special Instructions:

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(1) Enemy Forces: The unit was briefed several times on the existence of Special Forces in Laos. They were told to be ready to fight at all times. However, if they were to encounter Special Forces, one company was to engage them while the remainder of the group continued onward. At no time during the infiltration did the group actually encounter any hostile forces.

(2) Aircraft: If aircraft were sighted, the unit was to remain immobile. If they were being attacked, they were to take cover in the trees or foxholes if available. They were cautioned never to panic and run. They were also told not to fire at the aircraft unless specific instructions were given to do so.

(3) Mines: The unit was frequently cautioned about the existence of "leaf" mines in Laos. They were told never to leave the trails as they stood the risk of stepping on such a mine and being killed or wounded. The group actually encountered three separate mines. While in southern Laos (location unknown), the assistant political officer stepped on such a mine which blew part of his foot away and resulted in his being unable to continue the infiltration (See Paragraph 7).

e. Liaison Stations and Visitor Areas in Laos: The infiltration group never actually stayed at a liaison station. They always bivouacked in a visitor area which was generally located at least 500 meters from the station. These visitor areas were either located directly on the infiltration trail or up to 500 meters away. Generally, the bivouac area was a large area where the group set up camp for the night and few facilities were available. All waste products were buried in the jungle. Some elaborate areas had several framework buildings each capable of providing shelter from the rain for ten men (Interrogator's Note: The information below is of a general nature and not necessarily applicable to every station and visitor area).

(1) NVA Station Personnel: There were usually seven men at each liaison station/visitor area. Two were guides, two were keepers of the visitor areas and told the group where to set up camp, etc, and three were rear services personnel who issued rice at those stations where the unit received supplementary rations of rice. (Interrogator's Note: According to Source, they only received rice at every second or third station and had to transport enough to last until the next supply station.)

(2) Supply Transportation: At several supply stations (location unknown) Source observed approx ten NVA personnel who did not belong to the liaison station. He inquired about their identity and was told they were transportation people who brought rice from North Vietnam via truck to a location near the liaison station. Source never actually observed any trucks or the roads utilized by them.

(3) Dispensaries and Aid Stations: At every third or fourth liaison station there was an aid man who could care for minor ailments and give some medication. Every five or six stations had a medic with a small dispensary capable of treating five or six men over an extended period. Source believed each dispensary had an ample supply of medicine. The dispensary building which Source actually observed was described as being approx 10m X 10m X 6m.

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(4) Liaison Station Buildings: There were generally two buildings at the liaison stations which also served as rice supply points (these were the only stations which Source actually visited). One building was a rice storage facility approx 10m X 4m X 6m and the other was living quarters for the station personnel measuring approx 4m X 4m X 3.5m.

(5) Visitor Area Security: While bivouacked in a visitor area, each company occupied its own specific area as a unit. Each night one squad per platoon was designated as the security squad. One man per squad (or 12 men per company) would stand guard for one hour before being relieved. Guards were changed each hour. The headquarters section camped in the middle of the visitor area and did not provide personnel for perimeter security as did the four companies. No patrols were sent out to reconnoiter the surrounding area.

(6) Foxholes: At each visitor area, there were previously prepared foxholes available. The foxholes were generally L-shaped and large enough to accommodate three people. Most were unused and appeared to be in poor condition. None were reinforced.

(7) Freedom of Movement: Personnel were never allowed to leave the visitor areas without prior permission. While marching, they were not allowed to leave the trails because of "leaf" mines (see Para 7).

f. Cooking: Food was prepared once a day at approx 1600 hours on HOANG CAM underground stoves. At this time, small rice balls were prepared to be eaten the following day. Fires were never utilized for warmth and were never allowed to burn after dark. Breakfast was taken at approx 0700 hours each day, noon meal at 1100 hours, and the evening meal at 1630 hours.

g. Trails: The trails used by this unit were allegedly built in 1961 and were approx one meter wide. They appeared in excellent condition even during the rainy season. Source did not observe any special markings on the trails and did not know of any special trail names or designations other than the HO CHI MINH Trail.

h. Trucks and Truck Parks: Source did not observe any trucks or truck parks in Laos.

i. AAA Sites: Source observed 12.7 AAA weapons on at least two occasions in Laos. These sites were located near the tops of the mountains. Source could not provide any locations or dates. He never observed any larger weapon in an AAA role.

j. Aircraft: Source did not observe any type of aircraft being used by North Vietnamese, Laotian, or Cambodian personnel. Approximately three times a week, they observed L-19 aircraft flying over their position. They were never subjected to an airstrike.

k. PsyOps Leaflets: Source was exposed to PsyOps leaflets approx twice a week while infiltrating through Laos. Whenever possible, he picked them up and read them but did not believe what they said. There were also many others who did the same thing. In Cambodia, Source saw PsyWar leaflets on approx 30 different occasions. He picked them up and read them whenever circumstances allowed. There were no PsyOps broadcasts in Laos and only one that Source could understand while in Cambodia. Source stated that he did not even remotely believe the leaflets until after he entered South Vietnam and observed that conditions were not as they had been led to believe. The cadre attempted to forbid the reading of the leaflets and threatened

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punishment for those who did, but this had little effect. (For further details see IR 1516-0540-69).

l. Mines: The infiltration group only encountered mines once during their journey southward. On that occasion, the assistant political officer left the trail and stepped on a mine which blew away the heel of his foot and made him incapable of continuing the infiltration. (For further details see IR 1516-0541-69).

m. Malaria: Of the 600 personnel who departed North Vietnam, nearly 50 percent suffered at least mild attacks of malaria during infiltration. However, only 15 people were so ill that they had to be left at liaison stations along the way. The remainder were able to proceed as far as the T-3 station in Cambodia which was the destination of the group and the station at which they received their assignments to other units.

(1) Medical Personnel: The infiltration group had no doctors and only one trained medic who was attached to the group headquarters. In addition, each company had two aidmen who could give first aid and minor treatment for illnesses.

(2) Treatment: After malaria had been contracted, the patients were treated with additional nivaquine tablets, quinine tablets, an unknown shot, and vitamin pills. Source considered this treatment quite effective.

n. Infiltration Pass: Source received his first pass at station T-3 in Cambodia from the company executive officer. He was never asked to show it to anyone, so he rolled it up and smoked it.

o. Morale: After the unit entered Laos, morale began to sag considerably. The hard march, homesickness, and fear of what lay ahead caused many to want to desert. In reality, Source knew of only three desertions in his company; all were quickly found and returned. There was simply no place to go when one deserted because no one knew the way back to North Vietnam and they would usually be apprehended by the personnel who worked at the liaison stations. Morale remained very low until the unit arrived at the T-3 Station in Cambodia where they received food, a few days rest and numerous political and propaganda lectures which served to strengthen their morale considerably.

p. Gas Attacks: The unit was told that in the event of a gas attack, they were to moisten their handkerchiefs with whatever fluid was available and hold them to their noses. They had no gas masks or other defensive equipment.

4. (C) INFILTRATION ROUTE:

a. North Vietnam: The journey from Thai Nguyen Province to the Laotian border took 45 days. (Interrogator's Note: Source kept a diary until it was discovered mid-way through Laos by the cadre and destroyed.) While in Nam Ha Province, the group crossed Route 1 but did not utilize it for marching. At an unknown location in Quang Binh Province, they approached Route 15 and marched parallel to it (about one kilometer to the south) for two days. For the final four days in North Vietnam, Source was unable to see the road and had no idea how far away from it they were. The route from Thai Nguyen Province took them through the following provinces and districts:

Thai Nguyen Province: Phu Binh District

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Ha Bac Province: Hiep Hoa District

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Bac Ninh Province: Tien Son and Thuan Thanh Districts

Hung Yen Province: Van Giang, Khoai Chau, and Kim Dong Districts

Nam Ha Province: Duc Tien, Binh Luc, and Than Lien Districts

Nam Dinh Province: Y Yen District

Ninh Binh Province: Gia Vien and Nho Quan Districts

Thanh Hoa Province: Ha Trung, Trieu Son, Trieu Hoa, Nong Cong, and Nhu Xuan Districts

Nghe An Province: Quynh Luu, Dien Chau, Yen Thanh, Do Luong, and Nam Dan Districts

Ha Tinh Province: Duc Tho and Huong Khe Districts

Quang Binh Province: Tuyen Hoa, Quang Trach, and Bo Trach Districts

b. Laos: The journey through Laos lasted 46 days; they stopped at liaison stations numbered one through 43. Source was not positive at what point or when the group crossed the TRUONG SON Mountains in Laos. He thought it must have been near the MU GIA Pass because they had been marching along route 15 just before entering the mountains. The initial part of the journey in Laos took place in Kham Muoi Province (Interrogator's Note: Kham Muoi Province is undoubtedly Khammouan Province into which Route 15 enters through the MU GIA Pass at WE814534; 174010N/1054610E, Sheet 6144 II). It took the group four days to cross the TRUONG SON Mountains inside Laos. They then walked south along the smaller hills on the western side of the mountains. After approx 15 days, they entered a very small valley with a 60 meter wide river flowing through it. The unit followed the river eastward for approx two kilometers before crossing it on trees which had been placed from rock to rock to make a serviceable bridge. Source called this river the LAM BAC River. (Interrogator's Note: No river by this name could be located on the reference maps. However, a small river called the NAMLOT river fits the description given by Source. He also acknowledged that this could have been the river they crossed, although he would not positively identify it. This river has its origin at WE943210; 172225N/1055320E, Sheet 6143 I. It then flows east northeast for approx 1500 meters then south southeast through the mountains.) After crossing the river, the group rested, filled their canteens, and headed almost straight south. After several more days march, they entered another small valley and crossed a second river, which Source could not identify, on similar bridges (Interrogator's Note: This is possibly the DAK XOU River which runs almost east and west through the southern part of Laos). Source was unable to provide any additional information concerning the route through Laos.

b. Cambodia: Approx two hours after entering Cambodia, the unit arrived at the visitor area for the T-1 station. Source placed the location of this station in the vicinity of (YB735221; 1440N/10732E, Sheet 6538). It was along the side of a small hill with a small stream running south at base of hill. From T-1, the unit walked approx five and one-half hours to reach station T-2 which Source believed was approx ten kilometers (flying distance) from T-1. Source placed the location of this station in the vicinity of (YB699092; 1433N/10730E, Sheet 6538). Again, the station was located on a small hill with a stream at its base. The surrounding area was covered with

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bamboo jungle.

(1) T-3 Station: Source arrived at this station on 3 May 68 after an approx four hour walk from the T-2 station. Source could not provide any information which would help locate this station. It was in a small valley covered with extremely heavy foliage. In addition to the station itself, there were five or six large visitor areas each located in a separate, but adjacent valley. Source saw approx 300 men from an unknown unit who were resting in one of the visitor areas. He did not know their unit but understood they had been fighting in Kontum Province. They told him it was an approx 10 day walk to Kontum city. Source observed that the unit had five 60mm mortars and several B-40 and B-41 ATGLs. There were ten houses located at the station itself. Each was similar to the others and measured approx 10m X 6m X 8m; constructed of wood with bamboo roofs. Approx 30 NVA soldiers assigned to the station occupied these buildings. There were no Cambodians at this station. In the visitor area there were 40 frame buildings measuring approx 4m X 5m X 3m. They had no roofs and the soldiers put their raincoats over the frames to keep out the rain. Each frame building housed ten men. According to hearsay information, there was also a dispensary located at T-3, but Source could provide no information. Source was generally restricted to his own visitor area, but did go to local manioc fields on one occasion to gather manioc. While there, he observed three Cambodian civilians also gathering manioc. There was no verbal contact between the NVA and the Cambodians although each appeared friendly to the other. Source had received no instructions whatsoever regarding relations with Cambodians. He did not know where these Cambodians came from or how far it was to their village. While at the T-3 station, Source was reassigned to the K-6 Battalion, 24th Regiment. However, after one week at the station he became ill with malaria and was transported to the 84th hospital near station T-9.

(2) Route to the 84th Hospital: Source was carried on a stretcher for six days before reaching the hospital. The route took them through the T-4, T-5, T-6, T-7, and T-8 stations. At each of these stations, (except T-5) Source observed from two to six buildings all similar in size measuring 4m X 3m X 4m and housing from four to ten NVA soldiers at each station.

(3) The 84th Hospital: Source did not know the location of the T-9 station but stated it was near the 84th Hospital. Source placed the location of the hospital in the vicinity of (YA508548; 1404N/10719E, Sheet 6437). Source remained at the hospital for approx 2 1/2 months receiving treatment for recurring malaria. (For further details concerning the 84th Hospital see IR 1516-0539-69).

(4) THU DUNG Area: After being released from the hospital, Source was sent to an area reserved for the recuperation of sick and wounded soldiers. This area was located near the T-10 station but not part of it. Source could not provide more specific details regarding location. The area usually had from 50 to 200 men in it at a time. During the time the men were in the area called the THU DUNG area, they were assigned to the 1st Company of the K-23 Battalion. Source could provide no other information regarding this unit other than the fact that it served as a replacement battalion for units returning from combat in South Vietnam. For this reason the number of people actually in the THU DUNG area varied a great deal. Source spent approx two months there before he was returned to his unit, the K-6 Bn, 24th NVA Regt. During this time most of his time was spent in farming activities trying to raise vegetables to supplement the diet of the K-23 Battalion personnel.

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DD FORM 1396c

REPLACES DA FORM 1048-1, 1 AUG 60 AND DA FORM 896, 1 AUG 60 WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 68

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ORIGINATOR

Hq 6499th Sp Acty Gp

5. (C) OBSERVATIONS IN LAOS:

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a. Telephone Communications: Throughout the infiltration while in Laos Source observed what he understood to be telephone wires. The poles were approx 50 meters apart, six meters tall and a two meter crossmember near the top on which was strung two strands of wire which Source estimated to be 2mm in diameter. The uncovered wire appeared at times to be copper and at other times steel. The direction of the wires and poles generally paralleled the infiltration trail. Source did not observe the wires after reaching the last station in Laos, T-43. One of the cadre told him that they were telephone wires which provided a communications link between North and South Vietnam. Source did not know if the wires stopped at station T-43 or their further destination.

b. Herbicide Missions: Between the 36th and 37th stations in Laos, foliage along the infiltration route was either dying or dead. Many of the leaves had already dropped off the trees and Source felt it would have been easy to spot the infiltration group from the air. However, the only aircraft spotted at that time (early Apr 68) were high-flying jets. The infiltration trail that led through the defoliated area necessitated a change in tactics. The entire group walked a great deal faster than usual in order to get through the area and often they even ran in order to hurry through the more barren areas. Source was unable to give any information which would help locate this specific area.

c. PATHET LAO: In early April 69 at an undetermined location, Source's group met a group of 25 Pathet Lao troops heading north on the same trail. The troops were armed with seven or eight "strange-looking" rifles. One of the group cadre had served in Laos earlier and spoke for approx two minutes with the leader of the Laotian soldiers. Relations between the two were cordial. Source could provide no other information relative to the Laotian units; the cadre simply told them that the troops were Laotian Communists.

d. Pipeline: At no time while in Laos did Source observe any pipelines of any description.

COMMENTS OF THE PREPARING OFFICIAL:

6. (C) Source was of above average intelligence with an excellent memory. He answered all control questions accurately and without hesitation. Furthermore, his answers to specific questions were consistent with each other even though the same detailed questions were asked at different points during the interrogation. The interrogator sees no reason to doubt the veracity of the information contained in this report.

7. (C) This report partially satisfies SICR U-UPE-A1532. Collection action against this SICR on this Source is terminated. Reports on the 84th NVA Hospital (1516-0539-69), US PWs in HANOI and Cambodia (1516-0542-69), Truck Park in the Tri-Border Area (1516-0543-69), PsyOps Effectiveness (1516-0540-69), and Effectiveness of Mines (1516-0541-69) were obtained from this Source.

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DD FORM 1396c

REPLACES DA FORM 1048-1, 1 AUG 60, AND DA FORM 608, 1 AUG 60, WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 64

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INTERROGATIONS ON IR FORMS

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