Texas Tech University

Rolling Thunder

Operation
Title
Rolling Thunder
Start Date
3/2/1965
End Date
10/31/1968
CTZ
DRV
TAO
North Vietnam
Objective
air strikes at targets in North Vietnam to interdict flow of supplies south. to bomb the DRV so that it will be more inclined to surrender
Description
After FLAMING DART the military moved on to a new air campaign that would last until October 31, 1968. It was supsended from December 25, 1965 to January 31, 1966 to induce the DRV to negotiate. The Airforce and Navy expected ROLLING THUNDER to bring the DRV to the negotiation talbe relatively quickly with an acceptable cost to the U.S. They planned to strike at the DRV's vital industrial centers and force it to face economic ruin if it did not negotiate. The Navy and Marines flew from aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Meanwhile, the Air Force flew from bases in Don Muang, Korat, Nakhon Phanom, Takhli, Udorn, and Ubon in Thailand as well as others on Guan, Okinawa. The targets were divided into geographical packages between the Navy and Airforce. The first Package, which was north of the DMZ, was considered part of the ground war and so controlled by MACV. The other packages were controlled by Pacific Command (PACOM). Route Packages II, III, IV, and VIB were the responsibility of the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet's Task Force 77. Packages V and VIA were the responsibility of the U.S. 7th Air Force/ 13th Air Force headquarters. B-52 bombers remained under the command of the Strategic Air Command. Air operations over Vietnam were meant to be a diplomatic signaling device slowly escalating in intensity and not destroying the DRV's ability to fight. The operation went through five phases, beginning with the bombing of barracks and other military sites and moving on to industrial targets. Johnson called seven bombing halts throughout ROLLING THUNDER to give the DRV a chance to negotiate. However the DRV used these breaks to rebuild defenses and continue to ship supplies to the South. The breaks in the bombing only told the North that the U.S. was not serious about the war. The bombing did not weaken the Communists resolve, but they did hurt the U.S. troops' determination. On April 1, 1968, Johnson called off all bombing north of the 20th parallel. Finally he ordered a halt to ROLLING THUNDER on October 31. The operation failed for many reasons. First, the conventional warfare waged in the air campaign had little impact on the unconventional warfare in the south. Also, since the DRV was an agricultural country, it could not be defeated in airstikes resembling those used on industrial countries in WWII. The economy did not depend upon an industrial base. Johnson was seeking a limited objective; he only wanted the DRV to allow the RVN to be independent and he wanted to avoid contact with China and the USSR. Air power was not well suited to limited warfarer. To continue, Johnson exercised much more control over the bombing than was necessary or prudent. He feared starting a war with China or the USSR, and also distrusted the generals. The size, location, and frequency of air strikes were determine in Washington by people who did not understand Vietnam. Pilots were not allowed to act according to the situation as they saw fit. Finally, the DRV was a very determined foe. All it had to do was outlast the U.S. and make the war too costly for the U.S. people. The failure of ROLLON THUNDER helped accomplish this. The operation cost the U.S. nealry 1,000 aircraft and hundreds of POWs, KIAs, and MIAs.
Allied Units Involved
Unit
USN
Unit
USMC
Unit
USAF
Killed in Action
hundreds
Missing in Action
hundreds
Wounded in Action
hundreds
Enemy Units Involved
Unit
People's Army of Viet Nam
Branch Abbrv.
PAVN
Killed in Action
52,000 citizens
Sources
Author
Spencer C. Tucker
Title
The Encyclopedia Of The Vietnam War: A Political, Social & Military History
Author
Harry G. Summers, Jr.
Title
Historical Atlas Of The Vietnam War
Author
National Archives and Records Administration
Title
Preliminary Checklist Of United States Military Operations In Southeast Asia

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